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  Human	   culture	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   uniquely	   exhibit	   a	   ‘ratchet	   effect’,	   with	  beneficial	   modifications	   being	   made	   to	   cultural	   traits	   over	   many	   generations.	  This	   is	   widely	   thought	   to	   have	   allowed	   an	   accumulation	   of	   technology	   and	  knowledge	   over	   time,	   and	   to	   be	   of	   central	   importance	   to	   the	   remarkable	  ecological	  and	  demographic	  success	  of	  humans.	  Whilst	  many	  researchers	  argue	  that	   the	   roots	   of	   human	   culture	   lie	   in	   social	   learning,	   a	   process	  widespread	   in	  nature,	  the	  exact	  cognitive	  capacities	  that	  set	  humans	  apart	  are	  not	  known.	  	  To	   provide	   a	   comparative	   assessment	   of	   nine	   separate	   hypotheses	   regarding	  different	  social	  and	  cognitive	  factors	  that	  may	  underlie	  a	  capacity	  for	  cumulative	  culture,	   in	   this	   thesis	   a	   cumulative	   puzzlebox	   was	   presented	   to	   three	   species.	  Groups	   of	   capuchins,	   chimpanzees	   and	   children	   were	   provided	   with	   the	  opportunity	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  three	  sequential	  levels	  to	  retrieve	  rewards	  of	   increasing	   desirability.	   Higher	   level	   solutions	   spread	   only	   in	   the	   children.	  Evidence	   was	   found	   for	   the	   occurrence	   of	   teaching,	   imitation,	   complex	  communication	   and	   prosociality	   in	   groups	   of	   children,	   but	   not	   in	   groups	   of	  capuchins	   and	   chimpanzees.	   Furthermore,	   these	   processes	   were	   positively	  correlated	   with	   the	   performance	   of	   individuals	   within	   the	   groups	   of	   children	  which	   was	   the	   only	   species	   to	   show	   evidence	   of	   cumulative	   cultural	   learning.	  Five	  further	  hypotheses	  focussed	  on	  alternative	  social	  and	  cognitive	  factors	  were	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence	  from	  this	  experiment.	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   1	  
CHAPTER	  1	  
INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  STUDY	  OF	  CULTURE	  
	  
What	  is	  culture?	  
	  Given	  that	  the	  field	  of	  anthropology	  is	  often	  broadly	  regarded	  by	  outsiders	  as	  the	  study	  of	  human	  culture,	  it	  is	  remarkable	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  branches	  of	  social	  anthropology	   in	   which	   the	   term	   ‘culture’	   is	   no	   longer	   used	   (Scheper-­‐Hughes,	  1995;	   Alvard,	   2003).	   These	   researchers	   abandoned	   the	   study	   of	   culture,	  believing	   that	   there	   was	   little	   that	   could	   be	   gained	   by	   treating	   behavioural	  practices	   as	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   understanding	   of	   cultures	   and	   that	   cultural	  relativism	  was	  ethically	  and	  morally	  wrong.	  There	  are	  fears	  that	  an	  evolutionary	  approach	   to	   culture	  would	   foster	   genetic	   determinism	  and	   the	   view	   that	   some	  populations,	   particularly	   hunter-­‐gatherers,	   are	   regarded	   as	   inferior	   and	  culturally	   ancestral	   to	   the	   Western	   populations,	   into	   which	   they	   will	   evolve	  (Bloch,	  2000;	  Alvard,	  2003).	  Anthropologists	  are	  also	  sceptical	  of	  the	  treatment	  of	  cultural	  traits	  as	   individual	  units	  that	  are	   independent	  of	  the	  population	  and	  typically	  maintain	  instead	  that	  individual	  cultural	  traits	  can	  not,	  and	  should	  not,	  be	  identified	  but	  rather	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  social	  make-­‐up	  of	  a	   population	   (Bloch,	   2000;	   Alvard,	   2003).	   However,	   as	   the	   term	   ‘culture’	   was	  disappearing	  from	  the	  work	  of	  some	  anthropologists	   it	  started	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  lexicon	  of	  researchers	  in	  other	  fields	  such	  as	  biology,	  psychology	  and	  biological	  anthropology	   (Cavalli-­‐Sforza	  &	   Feldman,	   1981;	   Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	   1985;	   Galef,	  1992;	  McGrew,	  1992;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Laland	  &	  Galef,	  2009a).	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The	  term	  ‘culture’	  has	  a	  variety	  of	  meanings	  to	  different	  researchers	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  variety	  of	  components	  contained	  within	  the	  definitions	  outlined	  in	  Table	  1.1.	  As	  Sterelny	  (2009)	  points	  out,	  these	  definitions	  are	  not	  stipulative,	  they	  are	  hypothesis	  choosing.	  Thus,	   through	   formulating	  a	  definition,	   investigators	  have	  determined	  the	  focus	  of	  investigation,	  by	  limiting	  what	  is	  investigated	  and	  how	  it	  is	   investigated.	  Using	  different	  definitions,	   the	   focus	  of	   the	  study	  of	  culture	  can	  cover	  over	  11,000	  species	  (Lumsden	  &	  Wilson,	  1981)	  or	  be	  restricted	  to	  a	  single	  species,	  namely	  humans	  (Kroeber	  &	  Kluckhorn,	  1952).	  The	  definitions	  can	  also	  affect	  which	  social	   learning	  processes	  are	  deemed	   to	  underlie	  culture,	  whether	  these	   are	   limited	   to	   specific	   processes	   such	   as	   teaching	   and	   imitation	   (Galef,	  1992)	   or	   encompass	   all	   social	   learning	   processes	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   The	  definition	   will	   also	   affect	   at	   what	   level	   culture	   is	   studied,	   whether	   culture	   is	  treated	  as	  the	  physical	  expression	  of	  specific	  behaviour	  patterns	  (van	  Schaik	  et	  al.,	   2003)	   or	   is	   treated	   as	   the	   ideas	   and	   beliefs	   which	   lie	   behind	   behaviour	  patterns	  (D'Andrade,	  2008).	  	  These	   often	   contradictory	   or	   opposing	   definitions	   of	   culture	   illustrate	   how	  fractious	  the	  study	  of	  culture	  remains.	  Culture	  is	  now	  studied	  within	  a	  range	  of	  disciplines,	   including	   biology,	   psychology,	   social	   and	   biological	   anthropology,	  and	   the	   definitions	   of	   culture	   from	   each	   discipline	   are	   based	   upon	   different	  literature,	  with	  a	  different	  focus	  of	  study	  and	  different	  objectives	  (Ingold,	  2001;	  Alvard,	  2003;	  Laland	  &	  Galef,	  2009b).	  Due	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  research	  fields	  using	  this	  term,	  there	  remains	  vigorous	  debate	  on	  the	  definition	  and	  scope	  of	  culture,	  and	  in	  which	  species	  it	  may	  be	  observed.	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Table	   1.1:	   A	   variety	   of	   definitions	   relating	   to	   culture	   from	   a	   range	   of	   researchers	   in	   differing	  fields.	  Adapted	  from	  Rendell	  and	  Whitehead	  (2001).	  
Source	   Definition	  Boesch	  et	  al.	  (1994)	   A	   behaviour	   is	   considered	   cultural	   only	   if	   differences	   in	   its	   distribution	   between	  populations	  are	  independent	  of	  any	  environmental	  or	  genetic	  factors.	  Boyd	   and	   Richerson	  (1985)	   Culture	  is	  information	  capable	  of	  affecting	  individuals’	  phenotypes,	  which	  they	  acquire	  from	  other	  conspecifics	  by	  teaching	  or	  imitation.	  Boyd	   and	   Richerson	  (1996)	   …we	  define	  cultural	  variation	  as	  differences	  among	  individuals	  that	  exist	  because	  they	  have	  acquired	  different	  behaviour	  as	  a	  result	  of	  some	  form	  of	  social	  learning.	  Byrne	  et	  al.	  (2004)	   Cultural	   ‘pattern’	   can	   emerge	   as	   a	   near-­‐automatic	   product	   of	   social	   learning,	  whereas	  transmission	  of	  richer	  information	  reveals	  a	  distinctive	  ‘sign	  of	  mind’	  in	  certain	  species.	  D’Andrade	  (2008)	   Culture	   is	  defined	   to	   include	   ideas,	   institutions,	  affectively	  and	  motivationally	  charged	  ideas,	  and	  collectivized	  ideas.	  	  Feldman	   and	   Laland	  (1996)	   Culture	   is	   treated	   as	   shared	   ideational	   phenomena	   (ideas,	   beliefs,	   values,	   knowledge)	  that	  are	  learned	  and	  socially	  transmitted	  between	  individuals.	  Galef	  (1992)	   …an	   animal	   tradition	   that	   rests	   either	   on	   tuition	   of	   one	   animal	   by	   another	   or	   on	  imitation	  by	  one	  animal	  of	  acts	  performed	  by	  another.	  Goodall	  (1986)	   …the	  performance	  of	  a	  gifted	   individual	  can	  spread	  through	  a	  group	  and	  quite	  rapidly	  become	  part	  of	  its	  tradition.	  Heyes	  (1993)	   …a	   subset	   of	   traditions	   in	   which	   the	   focal	   behaviour…has	   been	   formed	   through	   ‘the	  accumulation	  of	  modifications	  over	  time’.	  	  Kroeber	   (1948)	   in	  
Kroeber	   and	  
Kluckhorn	  (1952)	   …the	  mass	   of	   learned	   and	   transmitted	  motor	   reactions,	   habits,	   techniques,	   ideas	   and	  values-­‐	  and	  the	  behavior	  they	  induce-­‐	  is	  what	  constitutes	  culture.	  Culture	  is	  the	  special	  and	  exclusive	  product	  of	  men,	  and	  is	  their	  distinctive	  quality	  in	  the	  cosmos.	  Kummer	  (1971)	   Cultures	   are	   behavioural	   variants	   induced	   by	   social	  modification,	   creating	   individuals	  who	  will	  in	  turn	  modify	  the	  behaviour	  of	  others	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Laland	   and	   Hoppitt	  (2003)	   Cultures	   are	   those	   group	   typical	   behaviour	   patterns	   shared	   by	   members	   of	   a	  community	  that	  rely	  on	  socially	  learned	  and	  transmitted	  information.	  	  Lumsden	   and	  Wilson	  (1981)	   Culture	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   all	   artifacts,	   behavior,	   institutions,	   and	   mental	   concepts	  transmitted	  by	  learning	  among	  members	  of	  society,	  and	  the	  holistic	  patterns	  they	  form.	  McGrew	   and	   Tutin	  (1978)	   …six	   conditions-­‐	   innovation,	   dissemination,	   standardisation,	   durability,	   diffusion	   and	  tradition-­‐	  together	  form	  the	  beginnings	  of	  an	  operational	  definition.	  Tomasello	  (1999)	   …artifacts	  and	  social	  practices	  with	  a	  history,	  so	  that	  each	  generation	  of	  children	  grew	  up	   in	   something	   like	   the	   accumulated	   wisdom	   of	   their	   entire	   social	   group,	   past	   and	  present.	  van	   Schaik	   et	   al.	  (2003)	   …	  a	  system	  of	  socially	  transmitted	  behavior.	  Whiten	  et	  al.	  (1999)	   …	   a	   cultural	   behaviour	   is	   one	   that	   is	   transmitted	   repeatedly	   through	   social	   or	  observational	  learning	  to	  become	  a	  population-­‐level	  characteristic.	  Whiten	   and	   van	  Schaik	  (2007)	   …the	  possession	  of	  multiple	   traditions,	   spanning	  different	  domains	  of	  behaviour,	   such	  as	  foraging	  techniques	  and	  social	  customs.	  	  Since	  a	  comparative	  approach	  is	  being	  taken	  within	  this	  thesis,	  the	  definition	  of	  culture	   is	   taken	   back	   to	   its	   most	   basic	   element:	   social	   learning	   and	   the	  transmission	   of	   information.	   To	   allow	   for	   comparison	   of	   species,	   the	   broad	  definition	  of	  Laland	  and	  Hoppitt	  (2003)	  is	  used	  to	  define	  culture.	  Thus,	  from	  this	  point	  in	  the	  text	  when	  culture	  is	  referred	  to	  it	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘group	  typical	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behaviour	   patterns	   shared	   by	   members	   of	   a	   community	   that	   rely	   on	   socially	  learned	  and	  transmitted	  information’.	  	  
Prerequisites	  for	  culture	  ‘Innovations’	  are	  required	  to	  introduce	  new	  behaviour	  patterns	  and	  ideas	  into	  a	  population.	  In	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  ‘culture’,	  the	  behaviour	  pattern	  is	  then	  required	  to	   be	   propagated	   by	   ‘social	   learning’,	   with	   some	   behaviour	   patterns	   becoming	  ‘traditional’	  or	  cultural.	  	  	  
Innovation	  No	  culture	  is	  possible	  without	  innovation;	  a	  cultural	  behavioural	  pattern	  cannot	  exist	   without	   being	   invented	   by	   an	   individual	   or	   group	   of	   individuals	   (Tarde,	  1962;	   Rogers,	   1995).	   Human	   history	   is	   littered	   with	   the	   names	   of	   famous	  innovators,	   such	   as	   James	  Watt	   (steam	   engine),	   Thomas	   Edison	   (phonograph,	  lightbulb),	   Johannes	   Gutenberg	   (printing	   press).	   In	   contrast,	   few	   animal	  innovators	   are	   individually	   known,	   the	   most	   famous	   being	   Imo,	   the	   Japanese	  macaque	   at	   Koshima	   Islet,	   who	   started	   washing	   the	   sweet	   potatoes	   the	  population	  were	   provisioned	  with	   in	   the	   sea	   to	   remove	   sand	   and	   later	   sifting	  wheat	  in	  water	  to	  separate	  it	  from	  the	  sand	  (Kawai,	  1965).	  However,	  innovation	  has	  been	  observed	  throughout	  the	  animal	  kingdom	  (Lefebvre	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Reader	  &	  Laland,	  2001;	  2003).	  	  The	  term	  ‘innovation’	  may	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  both	  a	  process	  of	  inventing	  a	  new	  behaviour	  pattern	  and	  the	  product	  of	  this	  process.	  Reader	  and	  Laland	  (2003,	  pg.	  14	   )	   define	   innovation	   (sensu	   process)	   as	   a	   ‘process	   that	   results	   in	   new	   or	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modified	  learned	  behaviour	  and	  that	  introduces	  novel	  behavioural	  variants	  into	  a	  population’s	  repertoire’.	  This	  definition	  of	  the	  process	  includes	  the	  stipulation	  that	   individuals	   learn	   the	  behavioural	  pattern	   to	  differentiate	   the	  process	   from	  those	  novel	   behaviour	  patterns	   that	   individuals	  perform	  by	   chance	   and	  do	  not	  replicate.	  	  	  Archaeologist,	   Michael	   Schiffer	   (2010)	   divides	   innovation	   in	   humans	   into	   four	  processes:	   invention,	   development,	   replication	   and	   adoption.	   Invention	   is	   the	  deliberate	   designing	   of	   a	   new	   process,	   whether	   this	   is	   a	  major	   break	   from	   an	  existing	  technology	  or	  a	  small	  modification	  to	  one	  that	  pre-­‐exists.	  Development	  is	  the	   trial-­‐and-­‐error	   modification	   of	   the	   process	   that	   refines	   it;	   this	   may	   range	  from	   adequately	   mastering	   the	   physical	   manipulations	   required	   for	   a	   simple	  process	   to	   seeking	   cost	   effective	   raw	   materials	   and	   a	   workforce	   for	   a	   human	  product	   in	   the	   Western	   world.	   Replication	   is	   the	   process	   by	   which	   other	  individuals	  start	  to	  adopt	  the	  innovation,	  while	  adoption	  is	  the	  rolling	  out	  of	  the	  innovation	  across	  the	  population.	  Whilst	  Schiffer’s	  definitions	  may	  be	  specifically	  human	   centred	   and	   the	   exact	   definitions	   of	   each	   of	   the	   processes	   may	   be	  debated,	   his	   division	   of	   innovation	   into	   separate	   processes	   suggests	   that	   there	  are	   component	   parts	   of	   innovation	   (sensu	   process)	   that	   may	   apply	   to	   some	  extent	   in	   all	   instances	   of	   animal	   innovation.	   Animals	  may	   be	   likely	   to	   develop	  their	  motor	  actions	  after	  they	  initially	  invent	  a	  particular	  process,	  perfecting	  the	  movements	   necessary	   for	   a	   behavioural	   pattern;	   the	   spread	   of	   an	   invention	  through	  a	  population	  may	  then	  occur,	   leading	  to	  adoption	  by	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  population	  and	  possibly	  the	  start	  of	  a	  new	  tradition.	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Innovations	  are	  also	  defined	  as	   the	  product	  of	   this	  process.	  Reader	  and	  Laland	  (2003,	  pg.14)	  define	   innovation	   (sensu	  product)	  as	  a	   ‘new	  or	  modified	   learned	  behaviour	   not	   previously	   found	   in	   the	   population’.	   This	   is	   an	   operational	  definition,	   individuals	   within	   a	   population	   may	   innovate	   and	   find	   the	   same	  solution	   that	   is	   already	   present	   within	   the	   population	   without	   using	   social	  learning,	  however	  this	  is	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  observationally	  with	  any	  degree	  of	  certainty.	  However,	   there	   has	   been	   some	   attempt	   to	   divide	   innovations	   (sensu	  product)	   into	   separate	   categories;	   Ramsey	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   make	   a	   distinction	  between	   ‘cultural	   innovations’	  and	   ‘personal	   innovations’.	  Personal	   innovations	  they	  define	  as	   “those	   idiosyncratic	  behaviours	  of	   individuals”,	  whereas	  cultural	  innovations	  are	  those	  that	  spread	  within	  a	  population.	  Ramsey	  et	  al.’s	  definition	  of	   innovation	   is	   broader	   than	   that	   of	   Reader	   and	   Laland	   (2003)	   as	   it	   includes	  personal	  behaviour	  patterns,	  not	  just	  a	  population	  level	  definition.	  The	  merit	  of	  this	   distinction	   is	   contestable	   as	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   personal	   innovations	   are	  qualitatively	  different	  to	  cultural	  innovations	  and	  whether	  personal	  innovations	  might	   simply	   be	   innovations	   that	   have	   not	   had	   a	   chance	   to	   spread	  within	   the	  population.	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  shall	  follow	  Reader	  and	  Laland’s	  definitions	  of	   innovation	   (sensu	   process)	   as	   a	   ‘process	   that	   results	   in	   new	   or	   modified	  learned	   behaviour	   and	   that	   introduces	   novel	   behavioural	   variants	   into	   a	  population’s	   repertoire’	   and	   innovation	   (sensu	   product)	   as	   a	   ‘new	   or	  modified	  learned	  behaviour	  not	  previously	  found	  in	  the	  population’.	  	  Although	   not	   studied	   as	   widely	   as	   social	   learning	   and	   other	   behavioural	  processes,	   a	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   innovation	   carried	   out	   by	   Reader	   and	   Laland	  (2002)	  revealed	  533	  reported	  instances	  of	  innovation	  in	  field	  and	  captive	  studies	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across	   47	   primate	   species.	   Overington	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   found	   2182	   technical	  innovations	   in	   803	   bird	   species	   reported	   from	   studies	   published	   in	  ornithological	  journals	  from	  1944	  to	  2002.	  	  Various	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  put	   forward	  as	   to	   the	  causes	  of	   innovation.	  One	  important	   factor	   may	   be	   state-­‐dependence	   (i.e.	   ‘necessity	   as	   the	   mother	   of	  invention’).	  For	  example,	  a	  subordinate	  individual	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  behavioural	  strategy	  than	  a	  dominant	  because	  the	  latter	  is	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  former	  to	  have	  ready	  access	  to	  food	  sources	  or	  mates	  (Lee,	  2003;	  Reader	  &	  Laland,	   2003).	   Some	   researchers	   have	   suggested	   that	   those	   individuals	   with	  more	   ‘spare-­‐time’,	   such	   as	   juveniles	   who	   are	   protected	   and	   provisioned	   by	  parents	   and	   other	   adults,	   and	   are	   therefore	   not	   in	   need	   of	   food,	  may	   be	  more	  likely	  to	  invent	  new	  behaviour	  patterns	  (Kummer	  &	  Goodall,	  1985).	  Although	  in	  an	  experimental	  investigation	  on	  innovation	  in	  callitrichid	  monkeys,	  Kendal	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Kummer	  and	  Goodall	  (1985)	  adults	  were	  more	  innovative	   than	   juveniles.	   Therefore,	   the	   evidence	   is	   mixed	   on	   whether	  innovation	  is	  more	  dependant	  upon	  environmental	  stress	  or	  privileged	  access	  to	  resources.	  	  There	  are	  several	  theories	  that	  have	  been	  posited	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  innovation	  rates	   between	   species.	   The	   ‘social	   brain’,	   or	   ‘Machiavellian	   Intelligence’	  hypothesis	   states	   that	   those	   species	   with	   complex	   social	   systems	   are	   more	  intelligent	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  the	  social	  relationships	  within	  the	  population	  (Byrne	  &	  Whiten,	  1988).	  If	  general	  intelligence	  correlates	  with	  innovativeness	  of	  a	   species	   then	   those	   species	   that	   live	   in	   large,	   complex	   societies	  would	  also	  be	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more	   likely	   to	   innovate,	   however	   there	   is	   little	   empirical	   evidence	   supporting	  this	  hypothesis	  (Day	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  Foraging	   strategy	   has	   also	   been	   hypothesised	   to	   affect	   the	   likelihood	   that	  individuals	   of	   a	   particular	   species	   innovate,	   although	   the	   foraging	   strategy	  proposed	  to	  correlate	  differs	  between	  hypotheses	  (Day,	  2003;	  Day	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  For	   example,	   species	   that	   use	   extractive	   foraging	   but	   are	   not	   anatomically	  specialised	   to	   do	   so	   have	   been	   hypothesised	   to	   be	  more	   innovative	   than	   non-­‐extractive	  foragers	  or	  species	  with	  structural	  adaptations	  for	  extractive	  foraging	  (Parker	  &	  Gibson,	  1977).	  As	  these	  species	  do	  not	  have	  the	  structural	  adaptations	  for	  extractive	   foraging	   they	  are	  hypothesised	   to	  need	   to	  be	  more	   innovative	   in	  their	   solutions	   to	   gain	   food,	   including	   through	   the	   use	   of	   tools.	   In	   contrast	  Greenberg	   (1983;	   2003)	   finds	   a	   correlation	   between	   neophobia	   and	   foraging	  specialisation	  in	  birds.	  This	  suggests	  that	  those	  species	  that	  are	  more	  generalist	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  more	   innovative	   than	  specialised	  species	  as	   they	  are	   less	  neophobic	  than	  species	  that	  specialise	  on	  one	  food	  type.	  The	  role	  of	  personality	  type,	  for	  example	  the	  level	  of	  neophobia,	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  innovation	  in	   a	   species	   (Gosling,	   2001).	   Those	   species	   with	   low	   levels	   of	   neophobia	   will	  interact	  with	  novel	  objects	  more	  frequently,	  increasing	  the	  chance	  that	  they	  will	  invent	  a	  novel	  behaviour	  pattern	  (Day	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  Some	  researchers	  have	  speculated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  animal	   ‘geniuses’	   for	  innovation	  to	  occur.	  For	  example	  Imo,	  the	  Japanese	  macaque,	  has	  been	  described	  as	  such	  by	  several	  authors	  (Lumsden	  &	  Wilson,	  1981;	  Kummer	  &	  Goodall,	  1985).	  However	   others	   have	   disputed	   this,	   saying	   that	   the	   role	   of	   specific	   ’clever’	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individuals,	  including	  human	  innovators,	  has	  been	  overestimated	  and	  population	  dynamics,	   such	   as	   size	   and	   connectivity	   within	   the	   population,	   are	   more	  important	   factors	   (Basalla,	   1988;	   Mesoudi,	   2010).	   As	   detailed	   later	   in	   this	  chapter,	  Basalla	  (1988)	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  although	  certain	  human	  ‘inventers’	  have	  been	  heralded	  as	  geniuses	  they	  usually	  build	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  other	  people	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  novel	  situations,	  making	  the	  whole	  innovation	  more	  cooperative	  than	  the	  common	  telling	  of	  the	  story	  would	  have	  it.	  	  	  	  
Social	  Learning	  	  Many	  of	  the	  definitions	  in	  table	  1.1	  use	  social	  learning	  as	  one	  of	  the	  criteria	  for	  a	  behavioural	   pattern	   to	   be	   considered	   cultural.	   For	   some	   researchers	   imitation	  (or	   teaching)	   is	   required	   for	   the	   behavioural	   pattern	   to	   be	   considered	   cultural	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  e.g.	  Galef,	  1992;	  	  but	  see:	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2005),	  for	  others	   any	   social	   learning	   mechanism	   is	   sufficient	   (e.g.	   Boesch	   et	   al.,	   1994;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Laland	  &	  Hoppitt,	  2003).	  	  	  Social	   learning	   is	   typically	   defined	   as	   ‘individual	   learning	   that	   is	   influenced	   in	  some	   way	   by	   the	   social	   environment’	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   1993,	   pg.	   496);	   this	  includes	   ‘observation	   of,	   or	   interaction	   with,	   another	   animal	   (typically	   a	  conspecific)	   or	   its	   products’	   (Heyes,	   1993,	   pg	   207).	   Social	   learning	   has	   been	  studied	  in	  a	  number	  of	  animal	  taxa	  since	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  (Zentall	  &	  Galef,	  1988;	   Whiten	   &	   Ham,	   1992;	   Heyes	   &	   Galef,	   1996)	   and	   a	   number	   of	   different	  social	  learning	  mechanisms	  have	  been	  identified	  (figure	  1.1).	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  Figure	  1.1:	  Categorisation	  and	  definitions	  of	  social	  learning	  mechanisms	  as	  produced	  by	  Whiten	  and	  Ham	  (1992).	  	  	  Some	  classifications	  of	  social	   learning	  mechanisms	  differentiate	  between	  ‘social	  enhancement’	  (Galef,	  1988)	  or	  ‘social	  influence’	  (Whiten	  &	  Ham,	  1992)	  and	  social	  learning.	  These	  social	  enhancement	  processes	  allow	  individuals	  to	  gain	  exposure	  to	   a	   stimulus,	   but	   not	   to	   learn	   anything	   about	   the	   behavioural	   pattern	   from	  others;	  rather,	  they	  learn	  about	  the	  behavioural	  pattern	  by	  individual	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	   learning.	   However,	   more	   recent	   categorisations	   have	   not	   made	   this	  distinction,	  instead	  categorising	  all	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  lead	  to	  learning	  from	  other	  individuals,	  be	  it	  direct	  or	  indirect,	  as	  social	  learning	  (Heyes,	  1994;	  Zentall,	  1996;	  Hoppitt	  &	  Laland,	  2008).	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  Social	  influence	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  categories	  by	  Whiten	  and	  Ham	  (1992)(figure	  1.1).	  Exposure	  ensures	  an	  individual	  experiences	  the	  same	  learning	  environment	  as	   other	   individuals	   due	   to	   being	  with	   other	   individuals.	   Social	   support	   occurs	  when	  being	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   others	   reduces	   fears	   of	   an	   individual,	   therefore	  allowing	  a	  greater	  motivation	  to	  learn;	  this	  has	  also	  been	  called	  social	  facilitation	  (Visalberghi	  &	  Addessi,	  2000;	  Hoppitt	  &	  Laland,	  2008).	  With	  matched	  dependant	  
learning	  an	  individual	  learns	  to	  use	  the	  behaviour	  pattern	  of	  another	  individual	  as	  a	  discriminative	  guide	  for	   its	  own	  learning,	   in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  a	   light	  or	  buzzer	  might	   act	   as	   a	   stimulus	   in	   an	   operant	   box.	   The	   final	   category	   of	   social	  influence	  defined	  by	  Whiten	  and	  Ham	  (1992)	  was	  contagion.	  This	  is	  the	  release	  of	  an	  unlearned	  behaviour	  pattern	   in	  one	   individual	  by	   the	  performance	  of	   the	  same	   behaviour	   pattern	   in	   another	   individual	   (Whiten	   &	   Ham,	   1992;	   Zentall,	  1996).	  	  	  Contagion	  is	  subsumed	  within	  response	  facilitation	  by	  Byrne	  and	  Russon	  (1998).	  The	  term	  was	  introduced	  by	  Byrne	  (1994)	  and	  is	  defined	  as	  when	  ‘the	  presence	  of	   a	   demonstrator	   performing	   an	   act	   (often	   resulting	   in	   reward)	   increases	   the	  probability	   of	   an	   animal	   which	   sees	   it	   doing	   the	   same’	   (p.237).	   Response	  facilitation	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  either	  learned	  or	  unlearned	  behaviour	  patterns.	  An	  example	  of	  response	  facilitation	  is	  Hoppitt	  et	  al.’s	  (2007)	  investigation	  of	  social	  behaviour	   in	   domestic	   fowl.	   This	   study	   examined	   preening,	   sitting	   and	  dustbathing	  behaviour	   in	  hens;	   controlling	   for	   location	  effects	  and	   the	  effect	  of	  external	  stimuli,	  they	  found	  that	  preening	  behaviour	  was	  facilitated	  by	  preening	  conspecifics.	   Response	   facilitation,	   therefore,	  may	   be	   viewed	   as	   spanning	   both	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social	   influence	   and	   social	   learning,	   depending	   upon	  whether	   the	   behaviour	   is	  learned	  or	  not.	  	  	  Other	  social	  learning	  mechanisms	  include	  stimulus	  enhancement	  (Spence,	  1937)	  and	   local	   enhancement	   (Thorpe,	   1956).	   Some	   authors	   have	   proposed	   that	   the	  terms	   should	   be	   combined	   and	   regarded	   as	   the	   same	   process	   (Galef,	   1988;	  Whiten	  &	  Ham,	  1992;	  Heyes,	  1994),	  whilst	  others	  maintain	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  are	   sufficiently	   different	   to	   warrant	   separate	   labels	   (Zentall,	   1996;	   Hoppitt	   &	  Laland,	   2008).	   Stimulus	   enhancement	   occurs	   when	   the	   observation	   of	   a	  demonstrator	   (or	   its	   products)	   exposes	   an	   individual	   to	   a	   stimulus;	   the	  individual	  must	  then	  learn	  asocially	  the	  exact	  behaviour	  pattern,	  having	  learned	  that	  the	  behaviour	  must	  be	  directed	  at	  the	  stimulus.	  The	  location	  of	  the	  stimulus	  does	  not	  matter,	  as	   long	  as	  the	  stimulus	   is	  the	  same	  then	  the	  behaviour	  will	  be	  directed	  towards	  it.	  Local	  enhancement,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  drawing	  of	  an	   observer’s	   attention	   to	   a	   particular	   location	   by	   a	   demonstrator	   (or	   its	  products),	   the	  observer	  must	   learn	   the	  exact	  behaviour	  pattern	  asocially.	  Local	  enhancement	  may	  apply	  to	  a	  complete	  location	  or	  may	  apply	  to	  a	  small	  section	  of	  a	   larger	   stimulus	   to	  which	   the	   attention	  of	   the	  observer	   is	  drawn.	  Hoppitt	   and	  Laland	   (2008)	   report	   considerably	   more	   evidence	   for	   local	   than	   stimulus	  enhancement.	  	  A	   familiar	   possible	   example	   of	   stimulus	   enhancement	   is	   the	   bottle	   opening	  behaviour	  by	  titmice	  (Sherry	  &	  Galef,	  1984),	  in	  which	  the	  authors	  found	  that	  the	  birds	  could	  learn	  to	  open	  the	  foil	   tops	  of	  milk	  bottles	  after	  being	  exposed	  to	  an	  already	  opened	  bottle	  and	  without	  needing	  to	  observe	  the	  technique	  of	  another	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bird.	   The	   stone	   handling	   behaviour	   of	   Japanese	   macaques	   is	   likely	   to	   also	   be	  partly	   transmitted	   by	   local	   and	   stimulus	   enhancement	   (Leca	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   In	  semi-­‐free-­‐ranging	   experiments	   it	   was	   found	   that	   individuals	   directed	   their	  attention	   to	   used	   stones	   that	   were	   piled,	   as	   if	   they	   had	   been	   dropped	   by	   a	  previous	  stone	  handler,	  rather	  than	  those	  scattered	  as	  they	  are	  commonly	  found	  naturally.	   Drawing	   of	   attention	   to	   particular	   locations	   or	   stimuli	   allows	   stone	  handling	  to	  be	  perpetuated.	  	  
Observational	   conditioning	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   process	   by	   which	   an	   individual	  learns	  to	  which	  circumstances	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  should	  be	  a	  response	  (Whiten	  &	   Ham,	   1992;	   Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   Galef	   (1988)	   documents	   that	   the	   term	  
vicarious	   instigation	   had	   previously	   been	   used	   to	   describe	   this	   process.	  Observational	   conditioning	   was	   coined	   to	   describe	   the	   behaviour	   of	   young	  rhesus	   macaques	   that	   learned	   a	   fear	   of	   snakes	   from	   the	   response	   of	   their	  parents,	   in	  which	  they	  learned	  that	  a	   fear	  response	  was	  appropriate	  (Mineka	  &	  Cook,	  1988).	  	  	  
Emulation,	   as	   a	   social	   learning	   mechanism,	   has	   been	   defined	   in	   a	   number	   of	  different	  ways	  (Byrne,	  1998;	  Custance	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Byrne,	  2002).	  These	  included	  
goal	   emulation,	   which	   is	   the	   learning	   of	   the	   goal	   to	   pursue	   by	   a	   subject	   from	  watching	   a	   demonstrator	   (Whiten	   &	   Ham,	   1992;	   Custance	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   The	  actions	  required	  to	  reach	  the	  goal	  are	  not	  learned	  socially,	  thus	  the	  actions	  must	  be	  learned	  asocially	  by	  the	  subject.	  Emulation	  is	  also	  often	  defined	  as	  affordance	  
learning,	  by	  which	  the	  subject	  learns	  the	  affordances	  of	  an	  object-­‐	  e.g.	  that	  a	  rake	  may	  be	  used	  to	  move	  a	  peanut	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  1987)-­‐	  but	  not	  the	  actions	  that	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are	   required	   for	   the	  behaviour	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   1993).	  Alternatively	   the	   term	  emulation	  also	  may	  describe	  object	  movement	   re-­enactment,	   in	  which	  a	   subject	  learns	   that	   an	   object,	   or	   part	   of	   an	   object,	  moves	   in	   a	   particular	  way	   and	   then	  seeks	   to	   recreate	   that	   movement	   without	   observing	   the	   actions	   used	   by	   the	  demonstrator	   (Heyes,	   1998;	   Custance	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   Custance	   et	   al.	   (1999)	   also	  document	  another	  definition	  of	  final	  state	  re-­creation,	  this	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  subject	  observing	  the	  final	  state	  of	  an	  object	  and	  attempting	  to	  re-­‐create	  that	  state	  in	  the	  object.	   Thus,	   although	   a	   number	   of	   different	  mechanisms	   have	   been	   clustered	  together	   as	   emulative,	   the	   general	   mechanism	   may	   be	   defined	   as	   occurring	  “when	   after	   observing	   a	   demonstrator	   interacting	   with	   objects	   in	   its	  environment,	  an	  observer	  becomes	  more	  likely	  to	  perform	  any	  actions	  that	  bring	  about	  a	  similar	  effect	  on	  those	  objects”	  (Hoppitt	  &	  Laland,	  2008,	  pg	  110).	  	  
Imitation	   is	  stated	  as	   instrumental	   to	  culture,	  or	  cumulative	  culture,	   in	  some	  of	  the	  definitions	  in	  table	  1.1	  (e.g.	  Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Galef,	  1992).	  A	  general	  definition	  of	   imitation	   is	   that	   a	   subject	   learns	   some	  part	  of	   the	  exact	   form	  of	   a	  behaviour	   from	   observation	   of	   a	   demonstrator	   (Whiten	   &	   Ham,	   1992).	   Some	  researchers	   have	   also	   included	   in	   their	   definition	   the	   restriction	   that	   the	  behaviour	  must	  be	  an	  action	  that	  is	  not	  ‘innate’	  (Galef,	  1988)	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  subject	   is	   to	   achieve	   the	   same	   outcome	   as	   the	   demonstrator	   (Zentall,	   1996;	  Tomasello,	   1999).	   However,	   others	   have	   argued	   that	   ‘blind’	   imitation,	   that	   is	  imitation	  without	   intentionality,	   is	  possible	   (Moore,	  1996;	  Byrne,	  1999).	  These	  debates	   have	   a	   long	   history,	   dating	   back	   at	   least	   as	   far	   as	   the	   work	   of	   Lloyd	  Morgan	  (1896).	  Byrne’s	  theory	  of	  string	  parsing	  separates	  copying	  the	  behaviour	  and	   understanding	   the	   behaviour,	   thus	   a	   subject	   detects	   statistical	   regularities	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within	  the	  demonstrator’s	  behaviour,	  but	  does	  not	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  cause	  and	   effect	   of	   those	   behaviour	   patterns	   when	   first	   performing	   the	   behaviour	  pattern	  (Byrne,	  1999).	  	  The	  need	  for	  novelty	  is	  problematic	  operationally,	  as	  it	  is	  rare	  that	  there	  will	  be	  circumstances	  in	  which	  an	  investigator	  is	  aware	  of	  all	  of	  the	  previous	  behaviour	  patterns	   of	   an	   individual	   (Hoppitt	   &	   Laland,	   2008).	   However	   it	   is	   recognised	  there	  are	  some	  situations	   in	  which	  the	   individual	  may	   learn,	   through	   imitation,	  to	  use	  a	  known	  action	  in	  a	  novel	  situation.	   In	  this	  case	  the	  animal	  must	   imitate	  the	  action	  directly	  and	  not,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  for	  stimulus	  or	  local	  enhancement,	  be	  made	   aware	   of	   a	   stimulus	   and	   learn	   indirectly	   about	   the	   behaviour	   pattern	  needed	  to	  solve	  the	  task.	  This	  form	  of	  imitation	  is	  known	  as	  contextual	  imitation	  (Byrne,	  2002).	  	  	  
Production	   imitation	   is	   a	   process	   in	   which	   a	   new	   behaviour	   pattern,	   or	  behavioural	   sequence,	   is	   learned	   from	  observing	   the	  actions	  of	  a	  demonstrator	  (Byrne,	   2002).	   In	   this	   case	   novelty	   of	   the	   acquired	   sequence	   is	   required	   to	  differentiate	   it	   from	   contextual	   imitation.	  Hoppitt	   and	  Laland	   (2008)	  point	   out	  that	   there	   is	  a	   further	  difficulty	  with	   identifying	   truly	  novel	  actions	  as	  many	  of	  the	  behavioural	  patterns	  displayed	  by	  individuals	  will	  be	  based	  partly	  on	  motor	  actions	   that	   they	   have	   used	   in	   the	   past.	   Indeed,	   they	   argue	   that	   some	   novel	  actions	   may	   indeed	   be	   the	   addition	   of	   known	   motor	   actions	   simultaneously	  rather	  than	  in	  sequence.	  However,	  if	  individual	  behaviour	  patterns	  may	  be	  made	  up	  of	  small	  action	  units,	  Hoppitt	  and	  Laland	  argue	  that	  production	  imitation	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  occurring	   ‘when,	  after	  observing	  a	  demonstrator	  perform	  a	  novel	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action,	   or	   novel	   sequence	   or	   combination	   of	   actions,	   that	   is	   not	   in	   its	   own	  repertoire,	  an	  observer	  then	  becomes	  more	  likely	  to	  perform	  that	  same	  action	  or	  sequence	  of	  actions’	  (Hoppitt	  &	  Laland,	  2008,	  pg	  118).	  	  	  The	   imitation	   of	   sequences	   has	   been	   differentiated	   from	   the	   imitation	   of	  individual	   actions	  by	  Byrne	   and	  Russon	   (1998).	  They	   argue	   that	  program-­level	  
imitation	   is	   the	   imitation	   of	   the	   organisation	   of	   a	   behaviour	   pattern.	   The	  consequences	  of	  sub-­‐routines	  within	  the	  behaviour	  pattern	  and	  the	  importance	  of	   each	   sub-­‐routine	   is	   learned,	   although	   the	   motor	   actions	   that	   make	   up	  component	   parts	   of	   the	   behaviour	   pattern	   are	   learned	   asocially.	   Therefore,	   it	  differs	   from	   action-­level	   imitation	   by	   which	   individual	   motor	   patterns	   are	  learned	  from	  observation.	  	  	  Imitation	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  be	  of	  more	  value	  to	  human	  children	  than	  simply	  offering	   the	   chance	   to	   learn	   new	  behavioural	   patterns.	   Some	   researchers	   have	  proposed	  that	  imitation	  also	  has	  an	  affiliative	  function	  in	  children	  (Uzgiris,	  1981;	  Tomasello,	   1999;	   Tomasello,	   2009).	   They	   argue	   that	   children	   imitate	   to	   signal	  friendship	  and	  affinity	  and	  to	  fit	  in	  with	  others	  in	  the	  group.	  This	  social	  function	  of	  imitation	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  allow	  individuals	  to	  signal	  shared	  motivations	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  collaborate	  with	  one	  another,	  both	  with	  the	  task	  at	  hand	  and	  also	  in	  a	  wider	  social	  context	  (Carpenter,	  2006).	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  children	  might	   ‘over-­‐imitate’-­‐	   that	   is	  continue	   to	  reproduce	  actions	   that	  are	   functionally	  irrelevant-­‐	  due	  to	  the	  social	  aspect	  of	  imitation	  in	  humans	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  However,	   as	   detailed	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   in	   a	   transmission	   chain	   experiment,	  the	  2-­‐	  to	  3-­‐year	  old	  children	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chain	  performed	  significantly	  fewer	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unnecessary	  actions	  (Flynn,	  2008).	  The	  result	  of	  Flynn	  (2008)	  is	  consistent	  with	  findings	  that	  children	  are	  rational	  imitators,	  that	  is,	  they	  will	  only	  imitate	  when	  they	   see	   that	   there	   is	   a	   rational	   reason	   to	   do	   so,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   findings	   of	  over-­‐imitation.	  Where	  the	  actions	  performed	  by	  a	  demonstrator	  are	  signalled	  by	  the	   demonstrator	   as	   accidental	   (Carpenter	   et	   al.,	   1998)	   or	   due	   to	   extenuating	  physical	   circumstances,	   such	   as	   the	   demonstrator	   having	   her	   hands	   full	   and	  being	  unable	  to	  use	  them	  (Gergely	  et	  al.,	  2002),	  children	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  imitate	  the	   actions	   demonstrated	   than	   when	   the	   demonstrator	   appears	   to	   be	  deliberately	   carrying	   out	   an	   action	   in	   a	   specific	   form.	   Therefore	   children	   are	  observing	   both	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   demonstrator	   and	   learning	   something	   about	  the	  motivations	  of	   the	  demonstrator.	  They	  then	  go	  on	  to	  act	  accordingly,	  based	  on	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  demonstrator’s	  motivation.	  This	  suggests	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases,	  children	  are	  not	  simply	  copying	  blindly.	  	  Although	   there	   have	   been	   several	   different	   schemas	   to	   try	   to	   define	   different	  social	   learning	  mechanisms,	   there	   is	   a	   general	   consensus	   on	   the	   definitions	   of	  many	   of	   the	   mechanisms.	   Although	   there	   are	   some	   disagreements	   about	   how	  exactly	   imitation	   should	   be	   defined,	   it	   remains	   in	   the	   definitions	   of	   culture	   for	  some	  investigators.	  	  
Traditions	  
	  In	  their	  definitions	  of	  culture,	  Galef	  (1992),	  Goodall	  (1986),	  Heyes	  1993	  (1993),	  McGrew	   and	   Tutin	   (1978)	   and	   Whiten	   and	   van	   Schaik	   (2007)	   all	   include	   the	  word	   tradition.	   In	   a	   recent	   volume	   focussing	   upon	   animal	   traditions,	   Fragazsy	  
	   18	  
and	   Perry	   (2003,	   pg.	   xiii),	   define	   a	   tradition	   as	   ‘a	   distinctive	   behavior	   pattern	  shared	  by	  two	  or	  more	  individuals	  in	  a	  social	  unit,	  which	  persists	  over	  time	  and	  that	   new	   practitioners	   acquire	   in	   part	   through	   socially	   aided	   learning.’	  Accordingly,	   the	  presence	  of	   traditions	   in	  animal	  species	  would	  be	  sufficient	   to	  make	  the	  species	  cultural	  under	  the	  definitions	  of	  culture	  proposed	  by	  Boyd	  and	  Richerson	   (1996),	   Goodall	   (1986),	   Laland	   and	   Hoppitt	   (2003),	   Lumsden	   and	  Wilson	  (1981),	  van	  Schaik	  et	  al	  (2003)	  and	  Whiten	  et	  al.	  (1999).	  	  	  Other	   definitions	   of	   culture	   use	   traditions	   as	   a	   necessary	   but	   not	   sufficient	  criterion	   for	   identifying	   culture,	   with	   traditional	   behaviour	   patterns	   being	   a	  prerequisite	   for	   culture	   (McGrew	   &	   Tutin,	   1978;	  Whiten	   &	   van	   Schaik,	   2007).	  McGrew	  and	  Tutin	  define	  tradition	  specifically	  as	  the	  persistence	  of	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  the	  next.	  Using	  this	  specific	  definition	  they	  make	  tradition	  part	  of	  their	  eight	  criteria	  (six	  of	  which	  are	  listed	  in	  table	  1.1)	  by	  which	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  must	  be	  assessed	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  cultural.	  In	  their	  analysis	  of	   the	   behaviour	   patterns	   present	   in	   the	   chimpanzee	   population	   at	   Gombe,	  Tanzania,	   the	   criterion	   that	   the	   behavioural	   patterns	   are	   traditional	   is	  universally	   met,	   yet	   the	   authors	   fall	   short	   of	   naming	   any	   behaviour	   pattern	  cultural	  because	  the	  behaviour	  patterns	  do	  not	  fulfil	  other	  criteria.	  McGrew	  and	  Tutin	  also	  find	  that	  the	  tradition	  criterion	  is	  also	  satisfied	  by	  Japanese	  macaques	  and	   their	  many	   reported	   traditions	   (Kawamura,	   1959;	   Kawai,	   1965),	   although	  these	  also	  do	  not	  satisfy	  their	  other	  cultural	  criteria.	  	  Using	   the	   definition	   of	   traditions	   proposed	   by	   Fragaszy	   and	   Perry	   (2003),	  Whiten	   and	   van	   Schaik	   (2007)	   classify	   species	   as	   cultural	   if	   they	   exhibit	   a	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repertoire	  of	  two	  or	  more	  traditions	  across	  different	  behavioural	  domains.	  They,	  thus,	  define	  chimpanzees,	  orangutans	  and	  capuchin	  monkeys	  as	  cultural	  as	  these	  species	  have	  been	   shown	   to	  have	   traditions	   in	  multiple	  domains.	  Chimpanzees	  are	  argued	  to	  have	  traditions	  in	  a	  range	  of	  functional	  domains	  including	  foraging	  (e.g.	   nut	   cracking,	   some	  populations	  do	  not	   crack	  nuts	  despite	   their	  presence),	  hygiene	   (e.g.	   handclasp	   grooming,	   used	   to	   initiate	   grooming	   in	   some	  populations)	   and	   display	   (e.g.	   branch	   dragging	   whilst	   aggressively	   displaying,	  seen	   to	  differing	  degrees	  between	  populations)	   (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	   2001).	   Van	   Schaik	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   identified	   24	   putative	   cultural	   traits	   in	  orangutans	   (Pongo	   ssp.)	   and	   a	   further	   12	   speculative	   cultural	   traits,	   including	  seed	  extraction	  and	  slow	  loris	  hunting	  (foraging),	  play	  nest	  building	  (social)	  and	  leaf	   wiping	   (hygiene).	   White	   faced	   capuchins	   (Cebus	   capucinus)	   have	   both	  foraging	  traditions	  (Panger	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  social	  traditions	  (Perry	  et	  al.,	  2003b;	  Perry	  &	  Manson,	  2003).	   	  Furthermore,	  Whiten	  and	  van	  Schaik	  argue	   that	  birds	  have	  been	  found	  to	  have	  strong	  traditions	  in	  the	  vocal	  (Catchpole	  &	  Slater,	  1995)	  and	   foraging	   (Lefebvre	   &	   Bouchard,	   2003)	   domains	   but	   that	   there	   are	   no	  examples	  of	  multiple	  behaviour	  patterns	  in	  these	  two	  domains	  being	  transmitted	  in	  one	  species.	  Thus	  Whiten	  and	  van	  Schaik	  (2007)	  argue	  birds,	  by	  this	  criterion,	  are	  said	  not	  to	  have	  culture.	  Although	  this	  assertion	  may	  be	  due	  to	  a	  difference	  in	  research	   focus	   between	   primates	   and	   birds	   as	   there	   is	   evidence	   for	   multiple	  traditions	   in	   closely	   related	   species	   (Catchpole	   &	   Slater,	   1995;	   Slagsvold	   &	  Wiebe,	  Submitted)	  	  Thus,	   for	   some	   investigators	   the	   words	   tradition	   and	   culture	   may	   be	   used	  interchangeably.	  For	  others,	  traditions	  go	  towards	  making	  a	  species	  cultural	  and	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no	   distinctions	   are	  made	   regarding	   the	   transmission	   process	   of	   the	   traditions.	  However,	   some	  authors	  (e.g.	  Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Galef,	  1992)	  specify	   that	  only	   a	   sub-­‐set	   of	   traditions	   may	   be	   considered	   cultural,	   based	   upon	   their	  underlying	  social	  learning	  process.	  
	  The	  final	  group	  of	  definitions	  in	  table	  1.1	  that	  include	  traditions	  specify	  a	  subset	  of	   traditions	   proposed	   to	   be	   cultural	   (Galef,	   1992;	   Heyes,	   1993).	   These	  definitions	   of	   cultural	   behavioural	   traits	   deploy	   a	   concept	   of	   tradition	   that	   is	  broadly	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   Fragaszy	   and	   Perry	   (2003).	   However,	   according	   to	  these	   definitions	   of	   culture,	   traditions	   are	   only	   said	   to	   be	   cultural	   if	   they	   are	  passed	  on	   through	   imitation	  or	   teaching.	   Imitation	  and	   teaching	  are	   thought	   to	  be	  important	  because	  they	  are	  assumed	  to	  produce	  higher	  fidelity	  transmission	  than	  other	   forms	  of	   social	   learning	   (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  The	  higher	   fidelity	  transmission	  that	  these	  authors	  attribute	  to	  imitation	  and	  teaching,	  it	  is	  argued,	  allows	  species	  with	  culture	  to	  modify	  their	  behaviour	  over	  time.	  This	   increases	  the	   complexity	   of	   the	   behaviour	   pattern	   through	   a	   ‘ratchet	   effect’	   (Tomasello,	  1994)	  which	  prevents	  the	  loss	  of	  behavioural	  traits	  until	  such	  a	  time	  as	  further	  beneficial	   modifications	   arise.	   However,	   the	   assumptions	   that	   teaching	   and	  imitation	   lead	   to	   higher	   fidelity	   transmission	   than	   other	   social	   learning	  mechanisms,	  and	  that	  high-­‐fidelity	  transmission	  is	  central	  to	  cumulative	  culture,	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  established,	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  return	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  Those	   who	   define	   culture	   as	   a	   subset	   of	   traditions	   dependant	   upon	   specific	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  often	  cite	  a	   lack	  of	  evidence	   for	   the	  mechanisms	   in	  non-­‐humans	  and,	  therefore,	  argue	  that	  humans	  are	  the	  only	  species	  that	  have	  culture	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(Galef,	   1992;	   Tomasello,	   1994;	   Boyd	   &	   Richerson,	   1996).	   Although	   they	  acknowledge	   that	   traditions	   in	   other	   species	   are	   wide-­‐ranging	   and	   often	  complex,	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  accumulate	  changes	  to	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  sets	  human	  culture	  apart	  from	  the	  traditions	  of	  other	  animals	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  	  In	   sum,	   although	   the	   term	   tradition	   is	   used	   within	   many	   of	   the	   definitions	   of	  culture,	  its	  meaning	  varies.	  For	  some	  it	  is	  sufficient,	  others	  merely	  necessary,	  and	  for	   yet	   others	   it	   denotes	   behaviour	   patterns	   that	   are	   transmitted	   using	   low	  fidelity	   social	   learning	   processes.	   Due	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   culture	   used	   in	   this	  thesis,	  traditions	  and	  cultural	  traits	  are	  synonymous.	  	  
	  
A	  brief	  history	  of	  culture	  in	  non-­human	  primates	  
	  For	   many	   years	   there	   has	   been	   debate	   over	   whether	   non-­‐humans	   have	  something	  like	  culture	  (Laland	  &	  Galef,	  2009a).	  For	  many	  researchers	  the	  logical	  place	  to	  start	  in	  the	  quest	  to	  look	  for	  cultural	  origins	  was	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  as	  they	  appeared	  to	  be	  most	  closely	  related	  to	  humans	  (Kohler,	  1925;	  Kroeber,	  1928).	   It	   is	   in	   Japan	   in	   the	  early	  1950’s	   that	   the	   field	  of	  cultural	  primatology	   is	  widely	  thought	  to	  have	  begun	  (Nishida,	  1987;	  Perry,	  2006).	  As	  many	  of	  the	  initial	  publications	  were	  in	  Japanese,	  researchers	  in	  the	  West	  only	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  findings	   about	   a	   decade	   later	   (Kawamura,	   1959;	   Kawai,	   1965).	   Behavioural	  traditions	   were	   observed	   within	   populations	   of	   Japanese	   macaques	   (Macaca	  
fuscata);	   the	   most	   famous	   remain	   those	   involving	   the	   innovations	   by	   Imo,	   a	  young	   female,	   who	   invented	   the	   novel	   foraging	   behaviour	   patterns	   of	   sweet	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potato	  washing	  and	  wheat	  sifting,	  which	  spread	  within	  the	  Koshima	  population.	  When	  reporting	   these	  behavioural	   traditions	   investigators	  used	  the	   terms	   ‘pre-­‐culture’	  (Kawai,	  1965)	  and	  ‘sub-­‐culture’	  (Kawamura,	  1959),	  although	  Kawamura	  reports	  that	  Imanishi	  used	  the	  term	  ‘culture’	   in	  reference	  to	  animals	   in	  a	  paper	  presented	  in	  Japanese	  in	  1952.	  	  	  Other	  early	  work	  on	  ‘culture’	  in	  primates	  includes	  a	  study	  by	  Menzel	  et	  al	  (1972)	  of	  the	  response	  to	  novel	  objects	  by	  laboratory	  chimpanzees	  using	  a	  transmission	  chain	   design	   to	   investigate	   traditions	   within	   and	   between	   overlapping	   ‘social	  generations’.	  Menzel	  et	  al.	  hypothesised	  that	  culture-­‐like	  phenomena	  were	  acting	  within	   the	  population	  after	   finding	  evidence	   that	   traditions	  emerged	   regarding	  the	   responses	   to	   toys	   chimpanzees	   were	   given,	   following	   innovation	   by	   an	  individual	   in	  each	  chain.	  The	  authors	  called	  this	  phenomena	   ‘protoculture’.	  The	  phenomenon	  was	  characterised	  as	  being	   influenced	  by	  social	  experience,	  being	  characteristic	  of	  groups	  rather	  than	  idiosyncratic,	  and	  being	  transmissible	  across	  several	  generations.	  	  In	   1971	   Hans	   Kummer	   used	   the	   word	   ‘culture’	   in	   his	   book	   Primate	   Societies,	  albeit	   surrounded	   by	   quotation	   marks	   to	   distinguish	   his	   biological	   definition	  from	  anthropological	  definitions.	  Kummer’s	  biological	  definition	  states:	  ‘Cultures	  are	  behavioral	  variants	  induced	  by	  social	  modification,	  creating	  individuals	  who	  will	   in	   turn	   modify	   the	   behavior	   of	   others	   in	   the	   same	   way.’	   In	   further	  explanation,	   Kummer	   states	   his	   definition	   specifies	   that	   those	   behaviour	  patterns	   that	   are	   expressed	   by	   two	   different	   populations	   with	   the	   same	   gene	  pool,	  living	  in	  the	  same	  type	  of	  environment	  will	  be	  cultural	  (Kummer,	  1971).	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  McGrew	  and	  Tutin	  (1978)	  present	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘culture’	  in	  biology.	  By	  assessing	  the	  anthropological	  and	  animal	  behaviour	  literatures	  they	  propose	  eight	  conditions	  -­‐	  innovation,	  dissemination,	  standardisation,	  durability,	  diffusion,	   tradition,	   non-­‐subsistence	   and	   natural	   adaptiveness	   -­‐	   which	   they	  propose	   would	   make	   up	   an	   operational	   definition	   of	   culture.	   A	   cultural	   trait	  would	  begin	  as	  an	   innovation	  by	  one	  or	  more	   individual,	   it	  would	   then	  need	  to	  
disseminate	  within	  a	  population	  after	  its	  first	  appearance,	  the	  behaviour	  pattern	  should	   be	   standardised	   such	   that	   it	   is	   performed	   in	   the	   same	   way	   by	   all	  individuals	  which	  carry	  it	  out.	  Such	  a	  trait	  should	  be	  durable	  in	  that	  it	  survives	  as	  a	   behaviour	  pattern,	  without	   the	  presence	   of	   a	   demonstrator,	   over	   a	   period	   of	  time	  -­‐	  typically	  months	  or	  years	  -­‐	  and	  that	  the	  trait	  becomes	  a	  tradition	  by	  being	  passed	   onto	   subsequent	   generations.	   The	   stipulation	   of	   non-­subsistence	   limits	  cultural	  traits	  to	  those	  behaviour	  patterns	  which	  are	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  an	  individual’s	   energy	   budgeting,	   e.g.	   foraging	   or	   hunting.	   The	   final	   criterion	   of	  
natural	   adaptiveness	   stipulates	   that	   the	   behaviour	   patterns	   must	   occur	   in	   a	  natural	  environment	  without	  human	  influence	  greater	  than	  that	  which	  is	  exerted	  by	  hunter-­‐gatherers.	  	  	  Using	  these	  criteria,	  McGrew	  and	  Tutin	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  no	  example	  of	  a	  chimpanzee	  or	  macaque	  behavioural	  pattern	  which	  could	  conclusively	  be	  called	  cultural.	   They	   concluded	   that	   some	   of	   the	   criteria	  may	   not	   be	  met	   due	   to	   the	  experimental	   situation	   as	   most	   field	   sites	   working	   with	   macaques	   and	  chimpanzees	   at	   that	   point	   provisioned	   the	   populations	   under	   investigation.	  Other	  criteria	  may	  not	  be	  met	  due	  to	  other	  species	  characteristics,	  they	  suggest	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that	   chimpanzee	   populations	   may	   be	   culturally	   conservative	   and,	   thus,	   in	   the	  time	  span	  of	  their	  study	  innovations	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  seen;	  without	  innovations,	  dissemination	   also	   cannot	   be	   seen.	   Therefore,	   although	   McGrew	   and	   Tutin	  sought	   to	   create	   an	   operational	   definition	   of	   culture,	   the	   criteria	   used	   did	   not	  allow	  an	  assessment	  of	  whether	  cultural	   traits	  exist	  within	  populations	  of	  non-­‐human	  animals	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  the	  article.	  	  	  Lumsden	  and	  Wilson	   (1981)	   sought	   to	  differentiate	  between	  differing	   levels	  of	  cultural	   behaviour.	   Culture	   they	   defined	   as	   ‘the	   sum	   of	   all	   of	   the	   artifacts,	  behavior,	   institutions,	   and	   mental	   concepts	   transmitted	   by	   learning	   among	  members	  of	  society,	  and	  the	  holistic	  patterns	  they	  form’.	  However,	  Lumsden	  and	  Wilson	  split	  the	  cultural	  phenomena	  into	  two	  forms	  of	  protoculture	  (I	  and	  II)	  and	  euculture.	   Under	   this	   classification,	   11800	   species	   are	   classified	   as	   falling	   into	  the	   protoculture	   I	   category,	   in	   which	   information	   is	   transmitted	   between	  individuals	   and	   generations,	   through	   social	   learning	   processes	   other	   than	  imitation	  and	  teaching;	  23	  species	  are	  classified	  as	  falling	  into	  the	  protoculture	  II	  category,	   in	   which	   information	   is	   socially	   transmitted	   by	   all	   forms	   of	   social	  learning,	   and	   must	   include	   either	   imitation	   or	   teaching.	   Only	   humans	   are	  classified	  as	  eucultural.	  Euculturality	   is	  classified	  as	  the	  most	  advanced	  form	  of	  culture	   in	  which	   individuals	   teach	   and	   learn	   but	   also	   convert	   information	   into	  entities	  such	  as	  symbols	  and	   language.	  Thus,	  whereas	  Menzel	  et	  al.	   (1972)	  had	  used	  the	  word	  protoculture	  to	  mean	  a	  culture-­‐like	  behaviour,	  with	  culture	  being	  reserved	  for	  human	  culture,	  Lumsden	  and	  Wilson	  (1981)	  used	  protoculture	  as	  a	  subset	   of	   a	   general	   term	   culture	   which	   they	   applied	   to	   over	   11800	   species.	  Similarly,	   John	   Bonner	   (1980)	   traces	   culture	   back	   through	   all	   communication	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between	   organisms	   and	   agglomerations	   of	   populations,	   proposing	   the	   roots	   of	  culture	  to	  be	  slime	  moulds.	  	  	  	  Towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   20th	   century	  many	   researchers,	   particularly	   biologists	  and	  psychologists,	  became	  more	  inclined	  to	  use	  the	  word	  ‘culture’	  with	  reference	  to	  animals,	  with	  no	  prefix	  (Nishida,	  1987;	  McGrew,	  1992;	  Wrangham	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1999;	   Laland	   &	   Hoppitt,	   2003).	   The	   debate	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	  whether	   great	   apes,	   specifically	   chimpanzees	   in	   most	   cases,	   had	   culture.	  However	   the	   debate	   has	   not	   ceased,	   and	   there	   is	   certainly	   no	   consensus	  regarding	  whether	  animals	  have	  culture	  (Galef,	  1992;	  Tomasello,	  1994;	  Laland	  &	  Janik,	  2007;	  Laland	  &	  Galef,	  2009b).	  	  
	  
The	  ethnographic/	  group	  contrasts	  method	  Whilst	   researchers	   working	   with	   wild	   populations	   of	   chimpanzees	   had	   been	  studying	   individual	   populations	   for	   several	   decades,	   involving	   a	   few	  collaborations,	  broad	  comparisons	  of	  different	  populations	  were	  not	  made	  until	  the	  1990’s.	  To	  do	  so,	  the	  anthropological	  method	  of	  ethnography	  was	  adopted,	  in	  which	  the	  presence	  of	  traits	  was	  catalogued	  across	  several	  study	  sites	  (McGrew,	  1998).	   The	   ‘ethnographic	   method’,	   ‘group-­‐contrasts	   method’	   or	   ‘method	   of	  exclusion’,	   as	   it	   is	   variously	   known,	   was	   utilised	   by	  Whiten	   et	   al.	   (1999)	   in	   a	  paper	  which	  drew	   together	   researchers	   from	  seven	   chimpanzee	   field	   sites	   and	  produced	  an	  ethogram	  of	  39	  behaviour	  patterns	  that	  were	  judged	  to	  be	  cultural.	  The	  method	   is	  often	  called	   the	  method	  of	  exclusion	  as	   it	  seeks	   to	  eliminate	   the	  behavioural	  variation	  which	  might	  be	  due	  to	  genetic	  or	  ecological	  variation.	  	  	  
	   26	  
The	  ethnographic	  method	  has	  since	  been	  extended,	  firstly	  in	  a	  follow	  up	  paper	  in	  chimpanzees	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  subsequently	   in	  orangutans	  (van	  Schaik	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  bonobos	  (Hohmann	  &	  Fruth,	  2003),	  capuchin	  monkeys	  (Panger	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Perry	  et	  al.,	  2003b),	   Japanese	  macaques	  (Leca	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  cetaceans	  (Rendell	   &	  Whitehead,	   2001)	   and	   New	   Caledonian	   crows	   (Hunt,	   2003).	   These	  endeavours	  have	  enabled	  the	  range	  of	  behaviour	  patterns	  that	  animals	  perform	  across	  the	  species	  to	  be	  documented.	  	  	  However,	  the	  method	  is	  not	  without	  its	  critics	  (Galef,	  2004;	  Laland	  &	  Janik,	  2006;	  2007).	  The	  main	  criticisms	  of	   this	  work	  are	  that	   insufficient	  attention	  has	  been	  given	   to	   the	   ecological	   and	   genetic	   sources	   of	   variation	   as	   explanations	   for	  behavioural	   variation;	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   this	   approach	   relies	   too	   heavily	   on	  ‘armchair	   analysis’	   (Galef,	   2004,	   p56)	   of	   these	   factors.	   Also	   that	   the	   method	  potentially	   underestimates	   cultural	   variation,	   which	   may	   often	   covary	   with	  genes	  and	  ecology.	  The	  best-­‐known	  example	  of	  an	  overlooked	  ecological	  driver	  for	   group	  differences	   is	   in	   the	  domain	  of	   ant	  dipping.	  Ant	  dipping	   is	   a	  probing	  behaviour	  pattern	  chimpanzees	  use	  to	  harvest	  driver	  ants	  when	  they	  are	  moving	  in	  a	  column	  across	  the	  ground	  or	  at	  the	  entrance	  to	  tunnel	  nests	  (McGrew,	  1992;	  Humle	  &	  Matsuzawa,	  2002).	  This	  had	  been	  proposed	  to	  be	  a	  cultural	  behaviour	  pattern	   as	   different	   techniques	   and	   stick	   sizes	   had	   been	   seen	   to	   be	   used	   at	  different	  sites	  (McGrew,	  1992;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  However,	  when	  subjected	  to	  further	   investigation	  it	  was	  found	  that	   longer	  sticks	  were	  used	  by	  chimpanzees	  when	   the	   more	   aggressive	   and	   gregarious	   black	   Dorylus	   ant	   species	   were	  predated	  upon	  rather	   than	  the	  red	  ants.	  Moreover,	  when	  predating	  at	   the	  nest,	  where	   both	   clades	   of	   ants	   are	   more	   aggressive,	   longer	   sticks	   were	   used	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compared	   to	  when	  predating	  upon	   the	  migration	   columns,	  where	  ants	  are	   less	  aggressive.	  The	  technique	  of	  ant	  dipping	  also	  corresponded	  to	  the	  aggression	  of	  the	  ants.	  When	  tackling	  the	  more	  aggressive	  ants	  chimpanzees	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  pull	   the	  ants	  off	   the	  stick	  with	   their	   fingers	  and	  place	   them	   in	   their	  mouths,	  rather	  eat	  them	  off	  the	  stick,	  thus	  preventing	  their	  more	  sensitive	  lips	  from	  being	  bitten	  (Humle	  &	  Matsuzawa,	  2002).	  	  The	  case	  of	  ant	  dipping	  has	  recently	  been	  reinvestigated	  with	  a	  micro-­‐ecological	  approach	  and	  a	  more	  complex	  picture	  has	  emerged	   in	  which	  both	  cultural	  and	  ecological	   elements	   may	   play	   some	   part	   (Mobius	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Schöning	   et	   al.,	  2008;	   Sanz	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   These	   studies	   have	   reported	   a	   positive	   correlation	  between	   the	   speed	   of	   locomotion	   of	   the	   ants	   (measured	   directly	   and	   by	   the	  length	  of	   the	   legs)	   and	   the	   length	  of	   the	   sticks	  used	   to	  dip	   for	   them.	  However,	  other	  factors	  of	  the	  dipping	  process	  are	  not	  correlated	  with	  the	  ecological	  factors	  examined.	  Chimpanzees	  at	  Bossou,	  but	  not	  Tai,	  dip	   for	  epigaeic	  ants,	  which	  are	  seen	  above	  the	   leaf	   litter,	  as	  well	  as	   for	   intermediate	  ants	  which	   live	  below	  the	  leaf	  litter.	  Mobiüs	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  rewards	  from	  epigaeic	  ant	   dipping	  were	   lower	   at	   Tai	   than	   at	   the	  Bossou	   site,	   to	   the	   contrary,	   finding	  that	  the	  yield	  of	  epigaeic	  ants	  at	  Tai	  was	  higher	  than	  at	  Bossou.	  Further	  evidence	  against	  a	  purely	  ecological	  explanation	  for	  the	  group	  differences	  was	  that	  	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  aggression	  of	  the	  ants	  or	  ease	  of	  access	  to	  nests,	  which	  are	  sometimes	  behind	  large	  tree	  roots,	  between	  the	  two	  sites.	  	  	  However,	  the	  premise	  that	  all	  cultural	  behaviour	  must	  be	  free	  from	  genetic	  and	  environmental	  influences	  has	  also	  been	  challenged	  (Laland	  &	  Janik,	  2006;	  Byrne,	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2007),	  with	   critics	  arguing	   that	  genetic	  and	  environmental	   factors	  are	   likely	   to	  influence	   most	   behaviour	   patterns	   shown	   in	   animals	   and	   to	   exclude	   these	   is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  false	  negatives.	  The	  proponents	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  are	  only	  seeking	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   there	   are	   some	   behavioural	   traits	   which	   may	   be	  defined	   as	   cultural,	   and	   that	   the	   absolute	   number	   is	   not	   as	   important	   as	   the	  presence	  of	  cultural	  traits	  in	  the	  species	  (Krützen	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  A	   lack	   of	   consideration	   of	   the	   possibility	   that	   genetic	   variation	  might	   underlie	  traditions	  has	  also	  been	  criticised	  by	  some	  commentators	  (Galef,	  2004;	  Laland	  &	  Janik,	   2006),	   particularly	   as	   some	   of	   the	   ethograms	   produced	   have	   spanned	  recognised	   sub-­‐species	   (chimpanzees	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   2001))	   or	   species	  (orangutans	   (van	   Schaik	   et	   al.,	   2003)).	   When	   the	   effect	   of	   genetic	   differences	  between	   populations	   has	   been	   examined	   there	   have	   been	   mixed	   results.	   In	  chimpanzees,	   in	   which	   there	   has	   been	   sampling	   across	   subspecies,	  approximately	  one	  third	  of	   the	  39	  cultural	   traits	  are	   found	  only	   in	  the	  Western	  subspecies	   (Pan	   troglodytes	   verus).	   Geographical	   isolation	   of	   the	  Western	   and	  Eastern	   subspecies	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   be	   1.58	   million	   years	   and	   some	  researchers	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  verus	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  separate	  species	  (Morin	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  	  	  Two	  recent	  cladistic	  analyses	  have	  given	  contradicting	  results.	  Using	  a	  cladistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  behavioural	  differences	  between	  chimpanzee	  populations,	  Lycett	  et	   al.	   (2007)	  used	  data	   from	  Whiten	  et	  al.	   (1999)	   in	  which	   the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  behavioural	   trait	  was	  marked	   as	   either	   absent,	   present,	   habitual	   or	   customary	  and	  used	  the	  bonobo	  data	  set	  of	  Hohmann	  and	  Fruth	  (2003)	  as	  an	  outgroup	  for	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the	  analysis.	  Maximum	  parsimony	  trees	  were	  constructed	  using	  this	  data	  on	  the	  occurrence	   of	   behavioural	   traits.	   The	   resulting	   trees	   were	   compared	   to	   the	  subspecies,	  verus	  and	  schweinfurthii.	  As	  one	  Eastern	  (schweinfurthii)	  population,	  Budongo,	  was	  found	  to	  sit	   in	  a	  clade	  with	  the	  two	  Western	  (verus)	  populations,	  Lycett	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  argued	  that	  a	  genetic	  difference	  across	  subspecies	  could	  not	  explain	   the	   variation	   and	   a	   cultural	   explanation	   was	   supported.	   However,	  Langergraber	  et	  al.	   (2010)	  recently	  carried	  out	  a	  genetic	  analysis	  using	  mtDNA	  gathered	   from	   chimpanzees	   at	   nine	   field	   sites.	   They	   then	   compared	   the	  variability	  reported	  in	  cultural	  traits	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  2001)	  with	  the	  genetic	  data	   that	   they	   had	   gathered	   for	   the	   populations,	   finding	   that	   for	   33	   putative	  cultural	   traits	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   genetic	   difference	   underlying	   the	   variation	  could	   not	   be	   ruled	   out.	   Langergraber	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   pointed	   out	   that	   their	  approach	  had	  greater	  resolution	  as	  it	  offers	  an	  analysis	  of	  individual	  behavioural	  traits,	   rather	   than	   looking	   at	   the	   overall	   behavioural	   similarity	   between	  populations.	   They	   also	   point	   out	   that	   there	   is	   no	   well-­‐accepted	   method	   for	  assessing	   whether	   phylogenetic	   trees	   are	   statistically	   significantly	   different	   to	  one	   another,	   therefore	   the	   small	   differences	   between	   trees	   in	   the	   Lycett	   et	   al.	  (2007)	   analysis	   may	   be	   statistically	   insignificant.	   A	   final	   advantage	   of	   the	  Langergraber	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  genetic	  evidence	  is	  direct,	  rather	  than	   inferred	   from	   the	   subspecies.	   Further	   analysis	   using	   nuclear	   DNA	   or	   Y	  chromosome	   analysis	   may	   prove	   an	   interesting	   comparison	   to	   the	   mtDNA	  analysis,	   as	   mtDNA	   is	   passed	   from	   mother	   to	   offspring	   and	   chimpanzees	   are	  matrilocal.	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Whilst	   few	  would	   any	   longer	   claim	   that	   there	   is	   a	   direct	   genetic	   reason	   for	   a	  specific	   behavioural	   pattern,	   it	   remains	   possible	   that	   a	   difference	   in	   genetic	  predisposition	  across	  populations	  may	  affect	  some	  cultural	  traits.	  Likewise,	  one	  cannot	  expect	  behaviour	  patterns	  to	  be	  entirely	  free	  of	  ecological	  influences.	  
	  
Longitudinal	  data	  
For	  white	   faced	   capuchins	   (Cebus	   capucinus)	   and	   Japanese	  macaques	   (Macaca	  
fuscata)	   longitudinal	   data	   on	   behavioural	   patterns	   and	   social	   interactions	   also	  supports	  a	  cultural	  hypothesis.	  Perry	  et	  al.	  (2003b)	  reported	  a	  number	  of	  social	  conventions	   that	   arose	   in	   a	   population	   of	   capuchin	   monkeys,	   in	   particular	   a	  series	   of	   games	   that	  were	   initiated	   by	   one	  male,	   Guapo.	   Although	  most	   of	   the	  dyads	   that	   carried	   out	   the	   games	   featured	   the	   original	   male,	   the	   games	   did	  spread	  to	  some	  degree	  within	  the	  group.	  Whilst	  this	  is	  an	  interesting	  case	  of	  the	  spread	   of	   a	   series	   of	   novel	   behaviour	   patterns,	   it	   does	   remain	   a	   fairly	   isolated	  case	   which	   is	   focussed	   around	   one	   individual	   and	   dies	   out	   well	   within	   one	  generation.	  
	  
Another	   case	   in	  which	   the	   spread	  of	   a	  particular	  behavioural	  pattern	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  primates	  is	  in	  the	  Koshima	  population	  of	  Japanese	  macaques	  (Kawai,	  1965;	   Nishida,	   1987).	   As	  mentioned	   above,	   in	   this	   population	   a	   young	   female,	  Imo,	   invented	   two	   novel	   feeding	   patterns.	   The	   first	   was	   the	  washing	   of	   sweet	  potatoes,	   taking	  provisioned	  potatoes	   to	   a	   river,	   and,	   later,	   the	   sea	   to	  wash	  off	  sand.	   The	   second	  was	  wheat	  washing,	   in	  which	  handfuls	   of	   provisioned	  wheat	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and	   sand	  were	  dropped	   into	  a	  water	   source;	   the	  grains	   floated	  and	   sand	  sunk,	  allowing	  easier	  separation.	  The	  propagation	  patterns	  through	  the	  group	  could	  be	  traced,	  with	  the	  traits	  spreading	  first	  to	  close	  kin	  and	  playmates	  with	  whom	  the	  innovator	   spent	   most	   time.	   Whilst	   the	   pattern	   of	   spread	   of	   the	   behaviour	  patterns	   makes	   it	   likely	   they	   were	   socially	   learned,	   the	   fact	   the	   food	   was	  provisioned	  has	   led	  some	   to	  question	  whether	   this	   can	   legitimately	  be	  called	  a	  cultural	  trait	  (Galef,	  1992;	  Laland	  &	  Hoppitt,	  2003).	  
	  
Culture	  in	  non-­primates	  
	  Whilst	   the	  experimental	  work	   in	   this	   thesis	  concentrates	  on	   the	  primate	  order,	  there	  are	  reports	  of	  traditions,	  and	  some	  would	  say	  of	  ‘culture’,	  across	  vertebrate	  species	  and	  also	  invertebrates.	  Lefebvre	  and	  Palameta	  (1988)	  found	  nearly	  100	  reports	   of	   traditional	   behavioural	   patterns	   in	   animal	   species,	   across	   taxa	  including	   mammals,	   birds	   and	   fish.	   Reviewing	   field	   experiments	   on	   social	  learning	  Reader	  and	  Biro	  (2010)	  find	  evidence	  from	  taxa	  including	  social	  insects,	  fish,	   birds	   and	   mammals.	   A	   few	   illustrative	   examples	   are	   discussed	   in	   this	  section,	   to	   outline	   the	  work	   that	   has	   been	   carried	   out.	   It	   is	   not	   designed	   to	   be	  exhaustive,	   rather	   representative	   of	   the	   breadth	   of	   taxa	   and	   blend	   of	   field	  observations	  and	  experimental	  work	  in	  the	  discipline.	  	  	  Terkel	   (1996)	   has	   found	   that	   black	   rats	   (Rattus	   rattus)	   in	   Israeli	   pine	   forests	  have	  developed	  a	  method	   for	  striping	  pine	  cones	  of	   seeds,	   starting	  at	   the	  base.	  These	  seeds	  are	  very	  low	  in	  energy	  and	  require	  careful	  processing	  to	  ensure	  that	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any	   calorific	   advantage	   can	   be	   gained	   from	   eating	   them	   and	   offset	   the	   energy	  required	   to	   extract	   them.	   Testing	   this	   tradition	   in	   the	   laboratory,	   it	  was	   found	  that	   those	   young	   rats	   born	   to	   skilled	   pine	   stripping	   mothers	   but	   who	   were	  fostered	   onto	   and	   reared	   by	   unskilled	   mothers	   did	   not	   learn	   to	   strip	   cones.	  Conversely,	   when	   offspring	   of	   unskilled	   mothers	   were	   cross-­‐fostered	   to	   be	  reared	  by	  skilled	  mothers,	  90%	  of	  them	  learned	  to	  strip	  cones.	  This	  would	  seem	  to	   be	   a	   tradition	   that	   is	   passed	   on	   from	   mother	   to	   offspring	   through	   social	  learning.	   It	   remains	   an	   elegant	   example	   of	   a	   combination	   of	   wild	   and	   captive	  research	   (McGrew,	   1998;	   Galef,	   2009a)	   and	   highlights	   the	   power	   of	  traditions/culture	   in	   enabling	   a	   species	   to	   invade	   new	   habitats	   through	  relocational	  niche	  construction	  (Laland	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  There	   have	   also	   been	   claims	   of	   cultural	   transmission	   in	   birds.	  Madden	   (2007)	  investigated	  male	  bowerbird	  display	  behaviour,	  including	  vocalisations,	  caching	  of	   bower	   components,	   building	   techniques	   and	  male	  displays	   at	   the	  bower.	  He	  tested	   the	   published	   work	   to	   examine	   whether	   these	   behaviour	   patterns	   fell	  under	  four	  criteria:	  Is	  the	  behaviour	  pattern	  learned?	  Is	  it	  learned	  socially?	  Is	  it	  normative?	   And	   is	   it	   collective,	   that	   is	   do	   different	   populations	   have	   different	  behavioural	   patterns?	   He	   was	   unable	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   any	   one	   behaviour	  pattern	  met	   all	   of	   the	   four	   criteria,	   but	   suggested	   that	   there	   are	   variations	   in	  behaviour	   that	   are	   good	   candidates	   for	   traditional	   behaviour	   and	   warrant	  further	  investigation.	  	  	  Cowbird	  courtship,	  specifically	  song	  type,	  has	  also	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  traditional	  behaviour	  pattern,	  with	  males	  at	  different	  sites	  performing	  a	  different	  courtship	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behaviour	  pattern	  (Freeberg,	  1998;	  Freeberg	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Freeberg,	  2004).	  When	  tested	  in	  captivity	  the	  females	  of	  one	  culture	  would	  prefer	  to	  pair	  and	  copulate	  with	   the	   males	   of	   her	   own	   culture.	  When	   genetically	   similar	   juvenile	   birds	   of	  each	   population	   were	   housed	   with	   adults	   of	   the	   alternative	   population,	   they	  adopted	   the	   courtship	   customs	   of	   the	   population	  with	  which	   they	  were	   being	  housed.	   These	   studies	   suggest	   that	   social	   learning	   is	   playing	   a	   part	   in	   the	  traditions	   of	   courtship	   found	   at	   different	   sites.	   Moreover,	   in	   a	   review	   of	   the	  literature	  on	  courtship	   traditions,	  Freeberg	  (2000)	  discusses	  11	  bird	  species	   in	  which	   research	   has	   suggested	   that	   vocal	   traditions	   exist	   in	   the	   same	   species,	  suggesting	   that	   cowbirds	  might	   not	   be	   an	   isolated	   case	   and	   other	   bird	   species	  may	   display	   vocal	   traditions.	   However,	  most	   of	   these	   reports	   are	   field	   reports	  which	   show	   patterns,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   empirical	   evidence	   to	   substantiate	   the	  claims	  that	  the	  song	  types	  are	  passed	  on	  by	  social	  learning.	  	  	  Amongst	   bird	   species,	   the	   tool-­‐making	   abilities	   of	  New	  Caledonian	   crows	  have	  been	   famously	  subject	   to	   investigation	   in	   the	   laboratory	  and	   in	   the	  wild	   (Hunt,	  2000;	  2003;	  Hunt	  &	  Gray,	  2004;	  Weir	  &	  Kacelnik,	  2006;	  Bluff	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  species	   uses	   several	   tools,	   but	   the	   most	   studied	   are	   those	   constructed	   from	  
Pandanus	   leaves,	  which	  are	  used	   for	   foraging.	  Hunt	  and	  Gray	  (2003)	  document	  three	   different	   designs	   of	   these	   tools,	   narrow,	  wide	   and	   stepped.	   Amongst	   the	  stepped	   designs,	   between	   one	   and	   four	   steps	   are	   used.	   These	   patterns	   vary	  geographically	  across	  New	  Caledonia.	  In	  the	  laboratory	  the	  tool-­‐making	  abilities,	  including	  meta	   tool	   use,	   have	   been	   impressive,	   with	   a	   range	   of	   tasks	   and	   tool	  types	  observed	  (Taylor	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  A	  recent	  field	  study	  found	  some	  evidence	  for	  social	   learning	   in	   Pandanus	   tool	   production,	   however	   the	   evidence	   for	   social	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learning	   in	   the	   wild	   remains	   equivocal	   (Holzhaider	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   	   The	   case	   of	  culture	  in	  New	  Caledonian	  crows	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  Laland	   and	  Hoppitt	   (2003)	  make	   the	   claim	   that	   there	   is	   stronger	   evidence	   for	  culture	   in	   fish	   than	   there	   is	   in	   primates.	   Their	   claim	   is	   based	   on	   translocation	  experiments	   that	   have	   been	   carried	   out	   with	   some	   fish	   species,	   but	   not	  nonhuman	   primates,	   which	   provide	   strong	   experimental	   evidence	   for	   cultural	  transmission.	   Warner	   (1988)	   transferred	   bluehead	   wrasse	   (Thalassoma	  
bifasciatum)	  populations	  between	  spawning	  sites	  in	  small	  patch	  reefs.	  He	  found	  that	   the	   fish	   did	   not	   adopt	   the	   mating	   sites	   that	   the	   previous	   population	   had	  adopted,	   rather	   they	   adopted	  new	   sites	   and	  maintained	   them	  up	   to	   four	   years	  later,	  a	  time	  period	  longer	  than	  the	  three	  year	  lifespan	  of	  the	  fish.	  This	  indicates	  that	  there	  was	  not	  a	  solely	  ecological	  reason	  for	  adopting	  these	  sites,	  but	  rather	  a	  cultural	  explanation	  is	  supported.	  	  	  An	   experiment	   carried	   out	   with	   French	   grunts	   (Haemulon	   flavolineatum)	  transferred	   individuals	   to	   a	   new	   site,	   either	   into	   the	   population	   already	   living	  there	   or	   after	   removal	   of	   the	   resident	   shoal	   (Helfman	   &	   Schultz,	   1984).	   The	  experiment	   found	   that	   whilst	   those	   individuals	   who	   were	   introduced	   into	   an	  established	   population	   followed	   the	   shoaling	   sites	   and	  migration	   routes	   of	   the	  population,	  those	  introduced	  to	  a	  depopulated	  site	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  patterns	  of	  the	  former	  residents.	  The	  fact	  the	  control	  fish,	  introduced	  without	  the	  population	  present,	   established	   other	   routes	   suggests	   that	   the	   experimental	   fish	   did	   not	  adopt	   the	   established	   culture	   purely	   due	   to	   	   simple	   ecological	   reasons,	   but	  rather,	  due	  to	  social	  learning.	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  As	  the	  class	  contains	  some	  of	  the	  most	  social	  species	  it	  is	  little	  surprise	  that	  there	  are	  also	   reports	  of	   social	   learning	   in	   insects	   (Leadbeater	  &	  Chittka,	  2007).	  The	  best	  known	  example	  is	  the	  waggle	  dance,	  performed	  by	  honeybees	  (Apis	  spp),	  by	  which	  information	  is	  given	  to	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  colony	  about	  the	  location,	  distance	   and	   quality	   of	   food	   resources	   (von	   Frisch,	   1967).	   Recent	  work,	   using	  radar	   tracking	  of	  bees,	  has	  confirmed	   that	   the	   information	  given	  by	  bees	  when	  waggle	   dancing	   is	   followed	   by	   others	   in	   the	   colony	   (Riley	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   The	  experiment	  included	  a	  condition	  in	  which	  the	  hive	  was	  moved	  and	  therefore	  the	  information	  individuals	  had	  received	  was	  incorrect.	   In	  this	  case	  bees	  continued	  to	  fly	  in	  the	  direction	  and	  to	  a	  distance	  indicated	  by	  the	  waggle	  dance	  and	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  reward.	  Although	  there	  are	  few	  researchers	  who	  would	  claim	  that	  there	  is	   culture	   in	   insects	   there	   is	   some	   evidence	   that	   traditions	   could	   exist.	   By	  performing	  bioassays	  with	  a	  parasitoid	  wasp	  (Hyssopus	  pallidus),	  Gandolfi	  et	  al.	  (2003)	   found	   that	   individuals	   preferred	   chemical	   fruit	   cues	   they	   had	   learned	  from	  exposure	  as	  larvae,	  despite	  going	  through	  metamorphosis.	  As	  adults	  search	  for	  the	  caterpillars	  they	  parasitise	  by	  attending	  to	  cues	  from	  frass	  the	  caterpillars	  excrete,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   caterpillars	   feeding	   on	   the	   same	   foods	   could	   act	   as	  hosts	   for	   generations	   of	   the	   same	   family,	   although	   this	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   tested.	  Although	  this	  behaviour	  pattern	  may	  persist	  over	  generations	  the	  cues	  that	  are	  used	  are	   individually	  discovered,	   albeit	   influenced	  by	   the	  parent’s	  preferences,	  therefore	  although	  this	  behaviour	  pattern	  may	  be	  persistent	  it	  is	  not	  traditional	  using	  the	  definition	  of	  Fragazsy	  and	  Perry	  (2003).	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As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  possession	  of	  social	  traditions	  is	  widespread	  throughout	  the	  animal	  kingdom.	  Whilst	  some,	  such	  as	  Bonner	  (1980)	  and	  Lumsden	  and	  Wilson	  (1981)	  argue	  that,	  if	  species	  have	  traditions,	  they	  should	  be	  considered	  cultural	  others	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  more	  specific	  in	  our	  definition	  of	  culture	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  accurately	  define	  the	  differences	  between	  humans	  and	  other	  species	  (Galef,	  1992;	   Tomasello,	   1994).	   Social	   learning	   has	   been	   found	   in	   a	   range	   of	   species,	  both	   vertebrates	   and	   invertebrates.	   Based	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   Laland	   and	  Hoppitt	   (2003)	   that	   cultural	   behaviours	   are	   ‘group	   typical	   behaviour	   patterns	  shared	  by	  members	  of	  a	  community	  that	  rely	  on	  socially	  learned	  and	  transmitted	  information’,	   there	   is	   evidence	   for	   culture	   in	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   vertebrates.	   The	  exact	   number	   of	   species	   exhibiting	   cultural	   behavioural	   traits	   is	   difficult	   to	  assess	  due	  to	  the	  difference	  in	  research	  effort	  between	  species,	  but	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  widespread	  in	  the	  animal	  kingdom	  in	  a	  similar	  distribution	  to	  social	  learning.	  Accordingly,	   we	   now	   turn	   to	   that	   ability	   widely	   held	   to	   differentiate	   humans	  from	  other	  species.	  	  	  
Cumulative	  culture	  
	  The	  metaphor	  that	  is	  most	  commonly	  used	  to	  illustrate	  cumulative	  culture	  is	  the	  ratchet	   (Tomasello,	   1994).	   The	   theory	   is	   that	   loss	   of	   a	   cultural	   trait	   across	  generations	  is	  prevented	  by	  high-­‐fidelity	  information	  transmission	  conferred	  by	  accurate	   social	   learning	   processes	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   1993;	   Tomasello,	   1994;	  Tomasello,	  1999).	  As	  individuals	  learn	  behavioural	  traits	  with	  high	  fidelity	  from	  other	   individuals	   they	   are	   able,	   in	   turn,	   to	   add	   beneficial	   modifications	   to	   the	  cultural	   trait,	   ratcheting	   up	   its	   complexity	   or	   efficiency.	   These	   cumulative	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modifications	  result,	  over	  generations,	   in	  cultural	  traits	  that	  are	  too	  complex	  to	  have	   been	   invented	   by	   a	   single	   individual.	   It	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   this	  cumulative	  aspect	  or	  ‘ratcheting	  up	  the	  ratchet’	  (Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  is	  unique	  to	  human	   culture	   (Heyes,	   1993;	   Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   1993;	   Tomasello,	   1994;	   Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1996).	  	  	  Some	   researchers	   have	   classified	   the	   accumulation	   of	   behavioural	   traits	   (e.g.	  knowledge	   of	   different	   foods	   and	   how	   to	   process	   them)	   as	   cumulative	   culture	  (van	   der	   Post	  &	  Hogeweg,	   2008).	   However	   these	   do	   not	   involve	  modifications	  over	   generations	   and	   the	   ratcheting	   up	   of	   complexity	   of	   traits.	   In	   this	   thesis	  cumulative	   culture	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   process	   by	   which	   cultural	   traits	   are	  transmitted	   over	   generations	   with	   high-­‐fidelity	   and	   are	   modified,	   resulting	   in	  traits	  more	  complex	  than	  one	  individual	  could	  have	  invented	  alone.	  Cumulative	  culture	   may	   occur	   alongside	   the	   accumulation	   of	   knowledge	   or	   behaviour	  patterns,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  two.	  Accumulation	  is	  simply	  the	  addition	  of	  knowledge	  or	  behaviour	  patterns	  to	  the	  behavioural	  repertoire	  of	  an	   individual	   or	   populations,	   whereas	   cumulative	   culture	   requires	   the	  modification,	   over	   generations,	   of	   cultural	   traits	   increasing	   the	   complexity	   of	  these	  traits.	  	  
Human	  cumulative	  culture	  
	  Human	   culture	   is	   clearly	   cumulative,	   with	   innovations	   being	   built	   upon	   the	  knowledge	   of	   previous	   generations	   and	   ideas	   from	   different	   disciplines	   and	  populations	   combined	   to	   formulate	   new	   cultural	   traits.	   Basalla	   (1988)	   and	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Lehman	  (1947)	  have	  both	  documented	   the	   invention	  and	  propagation	  of	  novel	  innovations	   across	   various	   technological	   and	   academic	   disciplines.	   Lehman	  (1947)	   found	   that	   there	  had	  been	  rapid	  advancement	   in	   the	  academic	   fields	  of	  chemistry,	   genetics,	   geology,	   mathematics,	   medicine	   and	   public	   hygiene,	  education,	  entomology,	  botany,	  philosophy,	  operatic	  and	  symphonic	  music.	  Using	  historical	  sources	  of	  these	  fields	  documenting	  the	  number	  of	  books	  published	  or	  the	   number	   of	   outstanding	   contributions	   in	   the	   field	   as	   judged	   by	   several	  recognised	  historians	  of	   the	   individual	   fields,	  Lehman	  plots	  exponential	  growth	  in	   these	   fields	   on	   an	   historical	   timescale	   (starting	   between	   1000−1600	   AD	  through	   to	   the	   20th	   century).	   Lehman’s	   data	   may	   be	   somewhat	   subjective,	  although	   he	   makes	   efforts	   to	   gain	   data	   from	   multiple	   sources	   on	   what	   is	   an	  ‘outstanding	   contribution’	   in	   a	   particular	   field,	   but	   he	   illustrates	   that	   building	  upon	   previous	   knowledge	   humans	   have	   accelerated	   their	   discovery	   of	  knowledge.	   Indeed	  he	  predicts	  that	   in	  the	  future	  this	  acceleration	  will	  continue	  and	  mechanisation	  will	   become	  more	   important	   and	  widespread,	   a	   prediction	  that	   superficially	   seems	   to	  be	   true.	  Lehman	  (1947)	  does	  not	  explicitly	  examine	  whether	   cumulative	   culture	   is	   occurring,	   but	   details	   the	   accumulation	   of	  outstanding	  contributions,	  although	   it	  might	  be	  assumed	  that	   the	  contributions	  are	  built	  on	  previous	  contributions	  (Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  	  Basalla	  (1988)	  documents	  how	  many	   innovations	  characterised	  as	  having	  been	  invented	   by	   ‘geniuses’	   are	   in	   fact	   part	   of	   a	   continuum	   of	   technological	  development	   and	   application	   of	   old	   technology	   to	   new	   areas.	   For	   example	  Whitney’s	   cotton	   gin,	   which	   was	   patented	   in	   1794	   and	   was	   used	   to	   separate	  short	  staple	  cotton	  from	  pods,	  built	  upon	  a	  long	  line	  of	  Indian	  charkhi	  machines	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that	  had	  separated	   long	  staple	  cotton	  from	  the	  pods	  and	  other	  agricultural	  and	  milling	   machinery	   that	   was	   available	   at	   the	   time.	   Similarly	   when	   Guglielmo	  Marconi	  received	  a	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  1909	  for	  transmitting	  radio	  signals	  across	  the	  English	   Channel	   and	   the	   Atlantic	   Ocean	   he	   had	   built	   upon,	   and	   applied,	   the	  academic	  work	  pioneered	  by	  physicists	  such	  as	  Hertz	  and	  Righi	  (Basalla,	  1988).	  	  	  	  
Insights	  from	  theoretical	  research	  Humans,	   therefore,	   inherit	   both	   cultural	   knowledge,	   artefacts	   and	   other	  resources	   from	   previous	   generations	   and	   can	   use	   them	   to	   create	   new	  technologies	  and	  behaviour	  patterns	  (Byrne	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  It	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	   cultural	   knowledge	   may	   be	   gained	   through	   multiple	   alternative	  transmission	  routes	   (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2005).	  These	  include	   vertical	   transmission	   which	   is	   that	   from	   parents	   to	   their	   offspring;	  oblique	  transmission	  between	  individuals	  in	  successive	  generations	  who	  are	  not	  related	   and	   horizontal	   transmission	   which	   occurs	   within	   the	   generation,	  between	   individuals	   of	   the	   same	   age	   cohort	   whether	   related	   or	   not.	   Humans,	  clearly,	  receive	  information	  from	  all	  of	  these	  sources	  and	  others.	  	  Several	  key	  requirements	  have	  been	  proposed	  for	  a	  species	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  for	   cumulative	   culture,	   these	   are	   discussed	   in	   detail	   in	   chapter	   2.	   An	   obvious	  prerequisite	   is	   an	   ability	   to	   transmit	   information	   between	   individuals.	   Some	  researchers	   have	   proposed	   that	   complex	   social	   learning	   mechanisms,	   such	   as	  imitation,	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  teach	  are	  necessary	  to	  allow	  accurate	  enough	  copying	  of	  behaviour	  patterns	  between	  individuals	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Tomasello,	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1994;	   Boyd	   &	   Richerson,	   1996).	   Others	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   criterion	   of	   a	  complex	   social	   learning	  mechanism	   is	   not	   necessary	   as	   traditions	  may	   emerge	  from	   asocial	   learning	   of	   individuals	   in	   a	   population	   exposed	   to	   the	   same	  environment,	  although	  this	  refers	  to	  an	  accumulation	  of	  behavioural	  traits	  rather	  than	  an	  accumulation	  of	  modifications	   to	  an	  existing	  behavioural	   trait	   (van	  der	  Post	   &	   Hogeweg,	   2008).	   Similarly,	   others	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   evolution	   of	  adaptive	  filtering,	  that	  is	  the	  filtering	  out	  of	  maladaptive	  cultural	  traits,	  such	  that	  more	  adaptive	  cultural	  traits	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  survive,	  is	  more	  important	  than	  complex	   social	   learning	   mechanisms	   for	   culture	   to	   be	   cumulative	   (Enquist	   &	  Ghirlanda,	  2007).	  It	  is	  also	  necessary	  that	  a	  behavioural	  trait	  is	  persistent	  in	  the	  population;	  individuals	  need	  to	  have	  a	  sufficient	  memory	  of	  a	  cultural	  trait	  to	  be	  able	   to	   perform	   the	   trait	   and	   act	   as	   a	   model	   for	   other	   individuals	   in	   the	  population,	  including	  the	  next	  generation	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  1996).	  Using	  mathematical	  models,	  Enquist	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  investigated	  under	  what	  conditions	  a	  single	  cultural	  parent	  could	  provide	  stable	  cultural	  transmission.	  They	  found	  that	  multiple	   cultural	   parents	   were	   typically	   necessary	   for	   stable	   cultural	  transmission.	  Enquist	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  also	  found	  that	  as	  fidelity	  of	  transmission	  was	  increased	   the	   persistence	   of	   cultural	   traits	   increased,	   this	   held	   true	   even	   for	  small	  increases	  in	  fidelity.	  This	  increase	  in	  persistence,	  they	  argue,	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  another	  individual	  will	  learn	  the	  behaviour	  pattern	  and	  modify	  it,	  resulting	  in	  a	  cumulative	  cultural	  trait.	  	  For	  cumulative	  culture	  to	  evolve	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  a	  mixture	  of	  both	  social	  learning	  and	  individual	   learning	  is	  necessary	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1996;	  Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Social	  learning	  is	  required	  to	  allow	  the	  accurate	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and	   low	   cost	   transmission	   of	   cultural	   traits,	   whilst	   individual	   learning	   allows	  modifications	   to	   be	   added	   to	   the	   cultural	   traits.	   	   Thus	   a	   balance	   of	   social	   and	  individual	   learning	   is	   required	   for	   culture	   to	   ratchet	   up	   modifications	   and	   be	  classified	  as	  cumulative.	  However,	  there	  exists	  a	  disagreement	  about	  the	  relative	  importance	   of	   the	   two	   processes;	   Boyd	   and	   Richerson	   (1996)	   argue	   that	   it	   is	  important	   to	   first	   have	   complex	   and	   accurate	   social	   learning	  mechanisms	   that	  allow	   the	   individual	   to	   learn	   a	   behaviour	   pattern	   accurately,	   before	   asocial	  learning	  allows	  modifications	  to	  be	  added	  by	  individuals.	  However,	  Enquist	  et	  al.	  (2007)	   find	   that	   it	   is	   the	   rate	   of	   modification,	   or	   creativity,	   that	   allows	   a	  cumulative	  culture	  to	  develop,	  after	  which	  complex	  social	   learning	  mechanisms	  may	   develop.	   Whichever	   may	   have	   come	   first,	   both	   would	   appear	   to	   be	  important	   for	  cumulative	  culture.	  When	  mathematically	  modelling	   the	   increase	  in	  human	  culture,	  Enquist	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  find	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  both	  the	  fidelity	  of	  social	   learning	  and	  an	   increase	   in	   the	   rate	  of	   innovation	  were	   required	   for	   the	  exponential	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   significant	   contributions	   observed	   in	  historical	  time	  (Lehman,	  1947).	  	  	  Some	  researchers	  have	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  conformity	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  cumulative	  culture;	   conformity	  being	   the	  propensity	   to	  copy	   the	  most	   frequent	  behavioural	  trait	  in	  the	  population	  over	  and	  above	  the	  chance	  expectation	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Henrich	  &	  Boyd,	  1998;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  This	  is	  a	  biased	  form	  of	  social	  learning	  in	  which	  individuals	  have	  a	  disproportionate	  tendency	  to	  copy	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   majority	   (Laland,	   2004).	   The	   argument	   is	   that	  conformity	  and	  social	   learning	  co-­‐evolve	  and	  maintain	  group	  differences	  which	  would	  not	  be	  maintained	  if	  there	  was	  simply	  unbiased	  learning	  (Henrich	  &	  Boyd,	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1998).	   According	   to	  Henrich	   and	  Boyd,	   the	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   social	   learning	   and	  conformity	  means	  that	  conformity	  is	  strong	  and	  there	  is	  no	  case	  in	  which	  social	  learning	  evolves	  but	  conformity	  does	  not.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  individual	  learning	  in	  Henrich	  and	  Boyd’s	  models	  ensures	  there	  is	  a	  phase	  in	  which	  modifications	  can	  be	  made	   to	   the	  behaviour	  pattern	  which	  would	  otherwise	  be	   copied	  with	  high	  fidelity	  from	  generation	  to	  generation	  due	  to	  conformist	  social	  learning.	  	  These	  results	  have	  been	  disputed	  (Eriksson	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Wakano	  &	  Aoki,	  2007).	  Wakano	   and	   Aoki	   question	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  model	   that	   Henrich	   and	   Boyd	  (1998)	  ran,	  stating	  that	  they	  find,	  with	  more	  iterations,	  that	  social	   learning	  and	  conformity	  are	  not	  convergent	  when	  the	  environment	  is	  stable	  or	  the	  quality	  of	  the	   information	   about	   the	   environment	   is	   highly	   accurate.	   Under	   these	  conditions,	   they	   argue,	   individuals	   can	   find	   an	   optimal	   solution	   for	   themselves	  without	   needing	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   conformity	   bias.	   Eriksson	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   go	   a	   step	  further,	  as	   in	  their	  model	  they	  find	  that	   individuals	  who	  adopt	  cultural	  traits	  at	  random	  are	  more	   successful	   than	   those	  who	   adopt	   a	   conformist	   strategy.	   This	  finding	   is,	   however,	   based	   upon	   the	   ability	   of	   individuals	   in	   the	   model	   to	  ‘adaptively	  filter’	  the	  information	  that	  they	  receive	  allowing	  them	  to	  select	  those	  cultural	   traits	   which	   give	   greater	   rewards	   and	   the	   model	   does	   not	   include	   a	  spacial	  component,	  thus	  preventing	  sub-­‐populations	  from	  forming.	  Kandler	  and	  Laland	  (2009)	  modelled	  the	  spread	  of	  cultural	  traits	  that	  were	  derived	  through	  independent	   innovation	   or	   cumulative	  modification,	   they	   then	   added	   different	  levels	  of	  conformity	  bias	  to	  the	  transmission	  of	  cultural	  traits	  within	  the	  models.	  They	   found	   that	   strong	   conformity	   tended	   to	   hinder	   the	   spread	   of	   novel	  innovations	  within	  the	  population,	  whether	  the	  innovation	  was	  beneficial	  or	  not	  
	   43	  
as	   individuals	   would	   not	   switch	   to	   a	   new	   variant.	   Under	   weak	   conformity	   a	  beneficial	   variant	   could	   spread	  within	   the	   population,	   some	   individuals	  would	  switch	  as	   they	  had	  assessed	   that	   the	  new	  variant	  was	  more	  beneficial,	  but	   this	  would	  be	  enhanced	  as	  the	  trait	  became	  more	  common	  by	  other	  individuals	  who	  would	   adopt	   the	   variant	   due	   to	   the	   conformist	   learning	  bias.	  Weak	   conformity	  was	  therefore	  suggested	  to	  be	  adaptive,	  since	  it	  resulted	  in	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  individuals	  adopting	  the	  beneficial	  variant.	  	  Again	  counter	  to	  the	  arguments	  of	  rigid	  or	  complete	  conformity,	  within	  historical	  and	   archaeological	   records	   there	   exist	   examples	   of	   major	   cultural	   loss,	   where	  populations	   lost	   cultural	   traits	   and	   relied	   upon	  much	   reduced	   technology	   and	  knowledge.	  The	  best	  known	  example	  of	  this	  is	  Tasmania	  (Henrich,	  2004).	  On	  this	  island,	   humans	   arrived	   about	   34	   kya	   and	   were	   isolated	   from	   the	   mainland	  between	  12	  kya	  and	  10	  kya.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  after	  this	  the	  Tasmanians	  lost	  all	  but	  24	   items	   in	   their	   toolkit,	   compared	   to	   a	   toolkit	   of	   hundreds	   on	   mainland	  Australia.	  Thus	  when	  Europeans	  arrived	   in	   the	  18th	  century	   there	  was	  no	  bone	  technology,	  none	  of	  the	  skills	  for	  making	  winter	  clothing	  and	  no	  ability	  to	  fish	  as	  seen	  in	  mainland	  Australian	  aborigine	  populations	  (Henrich,	  2004).	  In	  modelling	  the	  data	  Henrich	  found	  that	  as	  population	  size	  drops	  it	  becomes	  much	  easier	  for	  losses	  of	  behavioural	  traits	  to	  occur	  due	  to	  small	  copying	  errors.	  The	  isolation	  of	  Tasmania	  meant	  that	  the	  small	  population	  could	  rapidly	  lose	  technologies,	  with	  little	   chance	   of	   innovations	   being	   introduced	   from	   other	   populations	   by	  migration.	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This	  finding	  with	  the	  Tasmanian	  population	  is	  replicated	  with	  other	  populations,	  demonstrating	   the	   importance	   of	   demographic	   factors.	   Kline	   and	   Boyd	   (2010)	  found	   that	   in	  Pacific	   islands	   the	  population	   size	   and	   rate	  of	   contact	  with	  other	  populations	   correlated	  with	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  marine	   foraging	   technology.	  The	  authors	  speculate	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  this:	  it	  may	  be	  that	  more	  complex	  technologies	  increase	  the	  carrying	  capacity	  of	  the	  population,	  that	  a	  larger	  population	  allows	  more	  specialisation	  or	  that	  the	  larger	  population	  forces	  more	   technologies	   to	   be	  discovered.	  However,	   they	   favour	   the	   idea	   that	  the	   influx	   of	   migrant	   ideas	   and	   range	   of	   ideas	   from	   a	   larger	   population	   allow	  modifications	   to	   cultural	   traits	   to	   be	   made	   more	   rapidly,	   ratcheting	   up	  complexity.	  Similarly,	  using	  simulation	  models	  Powell	  et	  al.	  (2009;	  2010)	  found	  that	  high	  population	  densities	  and	  high	  migration	  rates	  between	  subpopulations	  resulted	   in	   accumulation	   of	   modifications	   and	   increased	   complexity	   in	  technologies.	   They	   hypothesise	   that	   population	   dynamics	  may	   have	   played	   an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  acceleration	  of	  cumulative	  cultural	  change	  around	  50	  kya.	  	  	  Therefore	   mathematical	   modelling	   has	   given	   insights	   into	   cumulative	   culture	  and	  cultural	  evolution	  which	  can	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  laboratory	  or	  the	  field.	  Indeed	  for	   many	   years	   the	   importance	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   was	   only	   recognised	   by	  theoreticians	   (Cavalli-­‐Sforza	   &	   Feldman,	   1981;	   Boyd	   &	   Richerson,	   1985)	   and	  empirical	  exploration	  is	  in	  its	  infancy.	  	  
Insights	  regarding	  human	  cumulative	  culture	  from	  the	  laboratory	  An	   aspect	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   that	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   discussed	   is	   an	  improvement	  in	  efficiency.	  Whilst	  the	  aforementioned	  studies	  have	  concentrated	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on	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   cultural	   traits	   or	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  technology,	   a	   study	   by	   linguists	   has	   concentrated	   on	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   an	  artificial	   ‘language’	   can	   become	   more	   efficient	   and	   structured.	   This	   may	   be	  referred	   to	   as	   ‘bounded	   cumulative	   culture’,	   as	   there	   is	   an	   upper	   limit	   to	   the	  modifications	   that	   can	   be	   added;	   there	   will	   be	   a	   point	   at	   which	   a	   behaviour	  pattern	  is	  as	  efficient	  as	  it	  can	  be.	  	  Kirby	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  set	  up	  a	  diffusion	  chain	  experiment,	  in	  which	  participants	  take	  part	  in	  a	  task	  in	  series;	  thus	  the	  first	  participant	  will	  act	  as	  demonstrator	  to	  the	  second	  participant,	  who	  will	  in	  turn	  act	  as	  demonstrator	  to	  the	  third	  participant	  and	  so	  forth.	   In	  this	  case	  there	  was	  a	  novel	  word	  that	  was	  paired	  with	  a	  string,	  that	  is	  a	  coloured	  shape	  and	  movement	  pattern,	  colours,	  shapes	  and	  movement	  patterns	  were	  varied.	   Individuals	  were	   trained	  with	  a	   set	  of	   ‘seen’	   string-­‐word	  pairs	   and	  were	   then	   tested	   by	   asking	   them	   to	   write	   down	   the	  word	   that	   was	  paired	   with	   both	   previously	   seen	   and,	   unknown	   to	   the	   participant,	   unseen	  strings.	   As	   mistakes	   in	   recall	   of	   strings	   were	   made	   across	   generations	   in	   the	  experiment,	   the	  artificial	   language	  became	   less	  diverse	  but	   transmission	  errors	  were	  also	  less	  common,	  indeed	  in	  some	  transmission	  chains	  transmission	  errors	  were	   reduced	   to	   zero	   as	   languages	   increased	   not	   in	   complexity	   but	   in	  ‘learnability’.	  In	  this	  and	  a	  second	  experiment,	  in	  which	  strings	  that	  had	  had	  the	  same	  meaning	  ascribed	  to	  them	  by	  participants	  were	  removed,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	   meanings	   increased,	   with	   meanings	   for	   each	   colour	   and	   movement	   type	  becoming	  more	   similar.	   This	   increase	   in	   structure,	   the	   authors	   argue,	  was	   the	  reason	  why	  the	  language	  was	  transmitted	  with	  fewer	  copying	  errors.	  They	  also	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argue	  that	  the	  increased	  structure	  within	  these	  artificial	  languages	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  represents	  cumulative	  improvement	  in	  the	  trait.	  	  In	   another	   experimental	   set-­‐up,	   Caldwell	   and	   colleagues	   (Caldwell	   &	   Millen,	  2008;	  Caldwell	  &	  Millen,	  2010b)	  have	  tested	  laboratory	  micro-­‐populations	  with	  making	   paper	   aeroplanes	   and	   constructing	   towers	   with	   a	   specified	   amount	   of	  spaghetti	  and	  plasticine.	  Participants	  were	  told	  the	  aim	  was	  to	  build	  a	  plane	  that	  flew	   as	   far	   as	   possible	   or	   a	   tower	   that	   was	   as	   tall	   as	   possible.	   By	   using	  overlapping	   laboratory	   generations	   in	   the	   population,	   of	   variously	   two	   to	   four	  individuals,	   they	   were	   able	   to	   expose	   naïve	   individuals	   to	   skilled	   individuals.	  Starting	   times	  of	   different	  participants	  were	   staggered	   so	   each	  new	   laboratory	  generation	  would	  enter	   the	  population	  as	  an	  older	  generation	  were	  part	  of	   the	  way	   through,	   enabling	   the	   transfer	   of	   information	   between	   generations.	   They	  found	   that	   over	   generations	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   technology,	   the	   distance	  flown	  by	  a	  plane	  or	  the	  height	  of	  a	  tower,	  increased.	  They	  also	  found	  that	  designs	  within	   chains	   were	   more	   similar	   than	   those	   between	   chains,	   suggesting	   that	  traditions	   were	   formed	   and	   individuals	   were	   learning	   socially	   about	   design	  aspects	  of	  the	  technology.	  A	  striking	  finding	  was	  that	  the	  level	  of	  conservatism	  of	  design	   was	   higher	   when	   pay-­‐offs	   were	   less	   predictable	   (Caldwell	   &	   Millen,	  2010a).	   In	   this	  experiment	   there	  were	   two	  measuring	  protocols;	  one	  condition	  involved	  spaghetti	  towers	  being	  measured	  immediately	  upon	  completion	  whilst	  the	   second	   condition	   involved	   towers	   being	   measured	   five	   minutes	   after	  completion	   following	   their	   transfer	   to	   a	   table	   upon	  which	  was	   a	   desk	   fan.	   The	  increase	   in	  uncertainty	  about	  whether	   the	   tower	  would	  remain	  standing	   in	   the	  breeze	   from	   the	   fan	  decreased	   the	  amount	  of	  modifications	   that	  were	  made	   to	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designs	  over	  the	  chain	  compared	  to	  the	  towers	  that	  were	  measured	  immediately,	  suggesting	  in	  more	  risky	  situations	  the	  ratcheting	  up	  of	  cumulative	  cultural	  traits	  may	  slow.	  	  	  In	  an	  experiment	  also	  using	  a	  transmission	  chain	  design,	  Flynn	  (2008)	  presented	  children	  with	   puzzleboxes	   that	   could	   be	   solved	   to	   remove	   a	   reward.	   The	   first	  child	   in	   the	   chain	  was	   taught	   to	   use	   the	   puzzlebox,	   but	   five	   irrelevant	   actions	  were	  also	  included	  in	  the	  procedure.	  Thus	  although	  the	  children	  only	  needed	  to	  push	  or	   lift	   a	  door,	   the	   first	   child	  was	  demonstrated	  a	  procedure	   that	   included	  removing	   bolts	   from	   another	   part	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   and	   tapping	   the	   puzzlebox	  with	   a	   tool.	   The	   children	   then	   acted	   as	   a	   demonstrator	   for	   another	   child,	  who	  was	   able	   to	   play	   with	   the	   puzzlebox	   before	   subsequently	   acting	   as	   the	  demonstrator	  for	  another	  child.	  There	  were	  a	  maximum	  of	  six	  children	  in	  a	  chain.	  Flynn	   found	   that	   the	   irrelevant	   actions	   tended	   to	   have	   dropped	   out	   of	   the	  procedure	  later	  in	  the	  chain	  and	  suggests	  that	  this	  modification	  of	  the	  procedure	  represents	  a	  cumulative	  improvement	  in	  efficiency	  and,	  therefore,	  a	  cumulative	  cultural	  process.	  	  Caldwell	   and	   Millen	   (2009)	   also	   used	   transmission	   chains	   to	   examine	   the	  processes	   necessary	   to	   stimulate	   cumulative	   modifications	   to	   the	   distance	  travelled	   by	   a	   paper	   plane.	   Participants	   were	   assigned	   to	   one	   of	   several	  conditions	   in	   which	   they	   could	   gain	   information	   by	   imitation	   (observing	   the	  actions	   others	   used	   to	  make	   the	   plane),	   teaching	   (in	   which	  more	   experienced	  participants	   were	   encouraged	   to	   tell	   naïve,	   new	   participants	   how	   to	   make	   a	  plane)	  and	  emulation	  (seeing	  the	  planes	  previous	  participants	  had	  constructed)	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or	  a	  combination	  of	  these	  processes.	  They	  found	  that	  any	  of	  these	  processes	  was	  sufficient	   to	   elicit	   a	   cumulative	   improvement	   over	   generations.	   One	  interpretation	  of	  these	  findings	  is	  that	  imitation	  and	  teaching,	  commonly	  thought	  to	   be	   key	   to	   human	   cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello,	   1994;	   Boyd	   &	   Richerson,	  1996	  1994),	  may	  not	  be	   critical	   in	  all	   situations	   for	  human	  cumulative	   change.	  However	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  this	  pattern	  is	  characteristic	  of	  multiple	  tasks,	   particularly	  more	   complex	   tasks.	   In	   addition,	   as	   chimpanzees	   and	   other	  animals	   are	   capable	   of	   emulation	   and	   imitation	   learning	   (Nagell	   et	   al.,	   1993;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Custance	  et	  al.,	  1999)	  the	  finding	  indicates	  that	  some	  other	  factor	  may	  account	  for	  humans’	  unique	  capacity	  for	  cumulative	  culture,	  although	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  imitation	  and	  emulation	  exceeds	  those	  of	  chimpanzees	  and	  other	  animals.	  	  
Cumulative	  culture	  in	  non-­human	  animals	  	  Due	   to	   the	   observed	   differences	   in	   cultural	   complexity,	   cumulative	   culture	   has	  been	  proposed	  to	  be	  a	  purely	  human	  trait	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Tomasello,	  1999).	   Current	   experimental	   work	   is	   sparse,	   but	   there	   have	   been	   some	   key	  studies.	  	  The	   first	   explicit	   test	   of	   the	   capacity	   for	   cumulative	   cultural	   learning	   in	   non-­‐human	   primates	   found	   little	   evidence	   that	   chimpanzees	   could	   accumulate	  modifications	   to	   their	   behaviour	   (Marshall-­‐Pescini	   &	   Whiten,	   2008).	   This	   test	  involved	  a	  puzzlebox	  that	  could	  be	  opened	   in	  two	  ways,	  with	  the	  second,	  more	  complicated,	  method	  opening	  a	  door	  allowing	  access	  to	  a	  greater	  volume	  of	  nuts	  
	   49	  
and	  honey	  than	  the	  first,	  simpler	  method,	  which	  just	  allowed	  animals	  to	  dip	  for	  honey.	  The	  chimpanzee	  subjects	  were	  allowed	  to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  in	  a	  baseline	   condition	  with	   no	   demonstration,	   resulting	   in	   two	   individuals	   finding	  the	   first,	   ‘dipping’	   method,	   and	   one	   also	   discovering	   the	   more	   complicated	  method.	   When	   the	   dipping	   method	   was	   demonstrated	   by	   a	   familiar	   human	  demonstrator	   three	  more	   individuals	  managed	   to	   learn	   it.	   These	   animals	   then	  received	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  more	  complicated	  method	  to	  open	  the	  door;	  of	  the	   five	   individuals	   tested	  only	  one	   learned	   the	  more	   complicated	  method	  and	  this	  was	  the	  individual	  who	  had	  discovered	  the	  method	  in	  the	  baseline	  trials.	  	  	  Researchers	   have	   also	   inferred	   conclusions	   about	   cumulative	   culture	   from	   the	  results	  of	  experiments	  investigating	  other	  cognitive	  factors.	  In	  an	  experiment	  in	  which	  chimpanzees	  were	  required	  to	  obtain	   food	  by	  pushing	   it	  around	  a	  maze,	  five	   individuals	   discovered	   that	   by	   rattling	   the	   board	   on	   which	   the	  maze	   was	  placed,	   food	   could	   be	   obtained	   more	   rapidly	   (Hrubesch	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   The	  researchers	  altered	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  animals	  could	  interact	  with	  the	  maze	  board,	  either	   taking	  away	  sticks	   to	  encourage	   the	  rattling	   technique,	  or	  bolting	  the	  maze	  down	  to	  prevent	  the	  rattling	  technique.	  They	  found	  individuals	  did	  not	  switch	   the	   technique	   they	   used	   and	   appeared	   to	   have	   become	   fixed	   upon	   the	  method	   they	   had	   already	   discovered.	   Although	   not	   cumulative,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  adding	  modifications,	  the	  authors	  argue	  the	  conservatism	  of	  method	  displayed	  in	  this	   experiment	  may	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   lack	   of	   cumulative	   cultural	   evolution	   in	  non-­‐humans.	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In	  the	  wild,	  observations	  have	  suggested	  to	  some	  researchers	  that	  other	  species	  may	   show	   cumulative	   aspects	   to	   some	   behavioural	   patterns.	   Boesch	   (2003)	  outlines	   three	   chimpanzee	   behavioural	   patterns	   that	   he	   believes	   show	   the	  hallmarks	   of	   cumulative	   modifications.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   is	   nut-­‐cracking	  behaviour	  displayed	  by	  different	  populations	  across	  Africa.	  Western	  populations	  use	  tools,	  such	  as	  hammer	  stones,	  to	  crack	  nuts.	  This,	  Boesch	  hypothesises,	  is	  an	  elaboration	  of	  an	  ancestral	  behaviour	  pattern	  of	  hitting	  nuts	  on	  the	  substrate	  to	  smash	   them.	   This	   behaviour	   pattern	   has,	   according	   to	   Boesch,	   been	   further	  modified	  with	  the	  use	  of	  anvil	  stones	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  second	  stone	  used	  to	  stabilise	   the	   anvil	   stone.	   Whilst	   some	   of	   the	   variation	   between	   the	   proposed	  ancestral	   condition	   and	   the	   more	   complicated	   stone	   use	   may	   be	   unlearned	  (Langergraber	  et	  al.,	  2010),	   the	  further	  Western	  modifications	  are	   less	   likely	  to	  be	  so,	  as	  animals	  are	  in	  the	  same	  subspecies,	  indeed	  in	  the	  same	  population.	  This	  suggests	   that	   some	   modifications	   may	   have	   been	   made	   to	   the	   nut-­‐cracking	  behaviour	  pattern,	  but	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  simple	  enough	  for	  a	  single	  individual	  to	   invent,	   in	   which	   case	   the	   modifications	   would	   not	   classify	   as	   cumulative	  culture.	  	  The	   second	   behaviour	   pattern	   outlined	   as	   cumulative	   by	   Boesch	   is	   parasite	  manipulation	  in	  the	  three	  Eastern	  communities	  of	  Budongo,	  Mahale	  and	  Gombe.	  Boesch	  details	   that	   there	  are	   three	  different	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	   the	  parasites	  which	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  cumulative	  modifications.	  At	  all	  three	  sites	  leaves	  are	  used	  to	  inspect	  the	  parasites	  that	  have	  been	  removed	  during	  grooming,	  with	  the	  parasite	  being	  placed	  on	  a	   leaf	  when	  removed.	  However,	   at	  Mahale	   individuals	  fold	  the	  leaf	  and	  then	  cut	  it	  with	  their	  nail.	  At	  Gombe	  there	  is	  a	  variant	  in	  which	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several	  leaves	  are	  piled	  on	  top	  of	  one	  another	  before	  the	  parasite	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  top	   and	   is	   inspected.	   These	   are	   small	   modifications	   and	   there	   is	   no	   direct	  evidence	   that	   the	   ‘modified’	   behaviour	   pattern	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   ‘ancestral’	  behaviour	   pattern.	   With	   such	   simple	   behavioural	   patterns	   it	   remains	   a	  possibility	  that	  each	  could	  have	  been	  invented	  independently.	  	  The	   third	  behaviour	  pattern	  highlighted	  by	  Boesch	   is	   a	  modification	  of	   context	  for	   an	   existing	   behaviour	   pattern	   and	   the	   possible	   addition	   of	   a	   separate	  technology	   to	   it.	   This	   is	   the	   digging	   of	   wells	   in	   dry	   environments,	   which,	   it	   is	  argued,	   has	   been	   translated	   to	   those	   situations	   in	   which	   water	   sources	   are	  contaminated	  and	  the	  additional	  use	  of	  leaf	  sponges	  at	  these	  contaminated	  wells.	  Whilst	   the	   addition	   of	   leaf	   sponging	   to	   well	   digging	   may	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	  increase	  of	  complexity	  of	  one	  behaviour	  pattern,	  the	  digging	  of	  wells	  in	  this	  new	  context	  may	  not	  be	  a	  cumulative	  addition	  to	  the	  repertoire.	  If	  one	  specifies	  that	  wells	   should	   only	   be	   dug	   in	   dry	   conditions	   then	   the	   digging	   in	  wet	   conditions	  might	   represent	   a	   cumulative	   addition.	   However	   if	   the	   digging	   of	   wells	   when	  there	  is	  no	  water	  available	  to	  drink,	  whether	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  water	  in	  dry	  conditions	  or	  contaminated	  water	  in	  wet	  conditions	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  trait,	  then	  digging	  wells	  when	  water	  is	  contaminated	  is	  not	  a	  modification.	  	  In	   chimpanzees	   another	   behavioural	   trait	   hypothesised	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	  modifications	  to	  an	  ancestral	  trait	  are	  the	  toolkits	  observed	  in	  some	  populations.	  The	  complex	  tool	  sets	  observed	  at	  some	  sites,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  central	  African	  communities	  appear	  to	  show	  a	  set	  of	  tools	  that	  are	  used	  for	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  same	  foraging	  behaviour	  pattern	  (Sanz	  &	  Morgan,	  2007;	  Boesch	  et	  al.,	  2009;	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Sanz	   &	   Morgan,	   2009;	   Sanz	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Here,	   one	   tool	   is	   normally	   used	   to	  puncture	  the	  outside	  of	  the	  nest	  of	  ants	  or	  bees.	  There	  are	  then	  other	  tools	  which	  are	   used	   to	   widen	   the	   access	   hole	   to	   allow	   greater	   access	   to	   the	   food	   within.	  Finally,	  a	  smaller	  stick	  is	  used	  to	  gather	  honey,	  ants	  or	  larvae.	  In	  one	  finding	  this	  ‘collector’	  stick	  was	  modified	  to	   increase	  the	  surface	  area	  (Boesch	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  the	  bark	  was	  removed	  and	  the	  wood	  below	  was	  chewed	  to	  make	  it	  more	  like	  a	  brush.	   These	   tool	   sets	   contrast	   with	   other	   populations	   in	   which	   similar	  behaviour	   is	   performed,	   but	   with	   a	   single	   tool	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1999;	   Humle	   &	  Matsuzawa,	  2002).	  	  	  However,	   the	   aforementioned	   examples	   do	   not	   constitute	   strong	   evidence	   for	  cumulative	   culture.	   There	   is	   no	   direct	   evidence	   that	   any	   of	   the	   single	   tool	   or	  proposed	  ‘simpler’	  behaviour	  patterns	  are	  ancestral	  to	  the	  multiple	  tool	  or	  more	  elaborate	   variants.	   Also,	   even	   if	   these	   more	   complex	   behaviour	   patterns	   are	  derived	  from	  the	  single	  tool	  variants,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  that	  one	  individual	  could	  have	  invented	  all	  variants	  simply	  with	  a	  knowledge	  of	  one	  wooden	  tool.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  tool	  kits	  are	  within	  the	   ‘zone	  of	   latent	  solutions’	  (Tennie	  et	  al.	  2009)	  for	  the	  chimpanzee.	  If	  only	  one	  individual	  is	  responsible	  for	  inventing	  all	  of	  the	  modifications,	  then	  cumulative	  culture	  has	  not	  occurred.	  	  The	   use	   of	   composite	   tools	   provides	   another	   interesting	   avenue	   of	   research	  regarding	  cumulative	  culture.	  Use	  of	  such	  tools	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  the	  wild	  in	  chimpanzees,	   but	   on	   only	   a	   handful	   of	   occasions	   or	   only	   in	   certain	   contexts	  (Sugiyama,	  1997;	  Boesch,	   2003).	  This	   ability	   to	   combine	  objects	   to	   construct	   a	  meta-­‐tool	   has	   been	   tested	   in	   captivity	   (Price	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   In	   this	   experiment	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participants	  were	   required	   to	  put	   together	   two	  pieces	  of	   a	   tool.	  The	   tool	   could	  then	  be	  used	  to	  retrieve	  a	  food	  reward	  that	  was	  out	  of	  reach.	  Chimpanzees	  were	  given	  demonstrations	   via	   video	  of	   various	   stages	  of	   the	  process,	   including	   tool	  manufacture	  and	  retrieval	  of	  the	  food,	  just	  food	  retrieval,	  an	  individual	  eating	  the	  food	   and	   an	   individual	   using	   an	   alternative	   method	   that	   did	   not	   require	   tool	  combination.	   It	   was	   found	   that	   participants	   were	   significantly	   more	   likely	   to	  learn	  to	  combine	  and	  use	  the	  tool	  when	  they	  had	  seen	  a	  complete	  demonstration	  than	  in	  other	  conditions.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  modify	  a	   tool	   which	   they	   then	   used	   to	   retrieve	   food,	   however,	   they	   had	   not	  manufactured	  the	  tool	  from	  scratch	  and	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  inflexibility	  to	  the	  tool	   use	   behaviour.	   Those	   individuals	   who	   had	   seen	   the	   demonstration	   of	  combining	   the	   tool	  were	  more	   likely	   to	   combine	   the	   tool	   to	   retrieve	   a	   reward,	  even	   if	   the	   food	   reward	   was	   within	   reach	   of	   one	   of	   the	   components,	   than	  individuals	  who	  had	  not	  seen	  a	  demonstration.	  	  	  Other	   observations	   from	   the	  wild	  which	   have	   been	   gathered	   during	   long-­‐term	  field	   studies	   suggest	   that	   behavioural	   patterns	   may	   be	   modifications	   of	   an	  existing	  pattern.	  The	  case	  of	  games	  seen	  in	  wild,	  white	  fronted	  capuchins	  seem	  to	  exhibit	   some	   degree	   of	   modification	   (Perry	   et	   al.,	   2003b;	   Perry	   et	   al.,	   2003a).	  Hand-­‐sniffing	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  some	  populations	  and	  the	  games	  ,	  described	  earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   would	   appear	   to	   derive	   from	   this.	   The	   hand-­‐in-­‐mouth,	  hair-­‐in-­‐mouth	  and	  toy-­‐in-­‐mouth	  games	  emerged	  in	  succession,	  within	  one	  group,	  with	  the	  latter	  two	  appearing	  to	  be	  modifications	  of	  the	  first	  (Perry	  et	  al.,	  2003b).	  However,	  whilst	   this	   represents	  an	   interesting	  case	  of	  modifications	   to	  a	   social	  behaviour	   pattern,	   all	   modifications	   would	   appear	   to	   have	   emerged	   from	   one	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individual,	   Guapo,	   a	   young	  male	   in	   the	   group.	   Although	   this	   demonstrates	   the	  ability	  of	   individuals	   in	   the	  species	   to	  make	  small	  modifications	   to	  a	  behaviour	  pattern,	   it	   does	   not	   represent	   a	   multi-­‐generational	   or	   multi-­‐individual	  behavioural	  modification	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  cumulative	  culture.	  	  	  Stone-­‐handling	  behaviour	  in	  Japanese	  macaques	  offers	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  a	   seemingly	   non-­‐adaptive	   behaviour	   that	   is	   present	   in	   different	   forms	   at	   sites	  throughout	  Japan	  (Leca	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Huffman	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Nahallage	  &	  Huffman,	  2008;	  Leca	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Although	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  variants	  to	  the	  behaviour,	   Leca	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   have	   grouped	   them	   into	   five	   categories	   within	  which	   the	   behaviour	   appears	   similar.	   Several	   of	   the	   behaviour	   patterns	   are	  almost	  ubiquitous,	  but	  some	  are	  rare	  across	  Japan	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  within	  certain	  populations,	   leading	   to	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  some	   individuals	  may	  be	  specialists	  (Leca	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  These	  individuals	  may	  have	  created	  new	  behavioural	  variants	  from	  existing	  ones,	  modifying	  the	  ancestral	  trait.	  However,	  once	  again,	  these	  are	  small	   modifications	   made	   without	   the	   addition	   of	   behavioural	   patterns	   from	  other	  domains	  and	  presumably	  within	  a	  single	  individual’s	  capacity	  to	  innovate.	  If	   these	   traits	   are	   non-­‐adaptive,	   as	   it	   is	   claimed	   (Leca	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   then	   there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  little	  reason	  for	  there	  to	  be	  conservatism	  in	  the	  behaviour	  and,	  therefore,	  we	  would	   expect	   to	   see	   great	   diversity	   in	  modifications	   in	   Japanese	  macaques	  in	  this	  drift-­‐like	  process	  (Caldwell	  &	  Millen,	  2010a).	  	  Some	   of	   the	   strongest	   evidence	   for	   cumulative	   modifications,	   albeit	   again	  somewhat	   circumstantial,	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   corvids,	   particularly	   New	  Caledonian	  crows	  (Hunt	  &	  Gray,	  2004;	  Seed	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  It	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	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the	   variation	   in	   Pandanus	   tool	   design	   across	   New	   Caledonia	   is	   most	  parsimoniously	   explained	   as	   cumulative	   variation	   (Hunt,	   2003).	   As	   discussed	  previously,	   there	  are	   three	  main	  designs,	  wide	   tools,	  narrow	  tools	  and	  stepped	  tools;	  Hunt	  proposes	   that	   the	  wide	   tools	   are	   the	  ancestral	   tools	  with	   the	  other	  two	  types	  derived	  from	  them.	  The	  stepped	  tools	  also	  vary,	  with	  between	  one	  and	  four	  steps	  being	  present	  on	  different	  tools.	  This	  has	  also	  been	  proposed	  to	  be	  a	  series	   of	  modifications	   to	   the	   original	   one	   step	   design	   (Hunt,	   2003).	   However,	  like	   the	   chimpanzee	   tools,	   there	   is	   no	   direct	   evidence	   that	   these	   lineages	   are	  correct	  and	  the	  different	  tool	  types	  are	  not	  individual	  innovations.	  	  	  However,	   there	   is	   evidence	   from	   captivity	   that	   New	   Caledonian	   Crows	   are	  capable	   of	   complex	   sequences	   of	   tool	   use	   (Weir	   &	   Kacelnik,	   2006;	   Bluff	   et	   al.,	  2007;	  Taylor	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Taylor	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  found	  that	  the	  species	  was	  able	  to	  use	  up	  to	  three	  tools	  in	  series	  to	  solve	  a	  task,	  to	  obtain	  a	  food	  reward.	  Tools	  were	  required	   to	  obtain	  other	   tools	  before	   the	   final	   tool	   could	  be	  used	   to	  obtain	   the	  food.	  Weir	  and	  colleagues	  (Weir	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Weir	  &	  Kacelnik,	  2006)	  found	  that	  one	  subject	  in	  captivity	  was	  able	  to	  redesign	  a	  series	  of	  tools,	  sometimes	  bending	  the	   tool	   to	  make	   it	  more	   appropriate	   to	   hook	   items,	   at	   other	   times	   unbending	  tools	   to	   make	   them	   long	   enough.	   The	   modifying	   of	   tools	   to	   make	   them	  more	  suitable	  for	  a	  task	  and	  the	  meta-­‐tool	  use	  observed	  in	  captivity	  in	  New	  Caledonian	  crows	   seems	   to	   be	  more	   flexible	   than	   that	   of	   chimpanzees.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	  chimpanzees	   (Price	   et	   al.	   2009),	   the	   crows’	   tools	   were	   produced	   flexibly	  depending	  upon	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  task	  and	  without	  demonstration	  of	  the	  technique.	   Thus	   arguable	   the	   best	   experimental	   evidence	   for	   cumulative	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modifications	   to	   a	   behaviour	   pattern	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   found	   not	   in	   the	  nonhuman	  apes,	  but	  in	  corvids.	  	  	  In	   summary,	   there	   remains	   heated	   debate	   over	  whether	   cumulative	   culture	   is	  seen	   in	  non-­‐humans	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Boesch,	  2003;	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2005;	  McGrew,	   2007).	   In	   several	   species	   circumstantial	   evidence	   consistent	   with	  cumulative	  culture	  has	  been	  observed.	  However	  in	  no	  non-­‐human	  animal	  species	  has	   it	   been	   unequivocally	   demonstrated	   that	   a	   more	   complex	   natural	  behavioural	  pattern	  has	  derived	  from	  a	  simpler	  one	  through	  an	  innovation	  and	  social	   learning	   process.	   The	   proposed	   cumulative	   traits	   could	   also	   conceivably	  have	   been	   invented	   by	   one	   individual,	   not	   across	   several	   generations,	   and	  therefore	   cannot	   be	   considered	   cumulative	   culture.	   Even	   if	   the	   non-­‐human	  examples	  are	  cumulative	  culture	  traits,	  the	  scope	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  is	  clearly	  very	  limited	  compared	  to	  humans.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  why	  this	  should	  be,	  accordingly,	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   shall	   explore	   further	   various	   hypotheses	  proposed	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  non-­‐humans.	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  
HYPOTHESES	  REGARDING	  THE	  LACK	  OF	  CUMULATIVE	  CULTURE	  	  
IN	  NON-­HUMAN	  ANIMALS	  
	  A	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  proposed	  for	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  non-­‐human	  animals.	  Some	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  nominate	  social	  reasons	  as	   to	   why	   social	   information	   might	   not	   spread	   in	   non-­‐human	   species,	   whilst	  others	  propose	  cognitive	  reasons	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture.	  This	  chapter	  will	  address	  the	  nine	  main	  hypotheses,	  collated	  from	  the	  literature,	  offering	  an	  in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  hypotheses,	  as	  well	  as	  further	  background	  not	  included	  in	  the	   previous	   chapter.	   Any	   empirical	   evidence	   relevant	   to	   the	   hypotheses	   will	  then	  be	  discussed	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  study	  species.	  	  
Hypothesis	  1	  	  
A	  lack	  of	  teaching	  in	  non-­human	  primates	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  	  
innovations	  throughout	  the	  population	  (Galef,	  1992;	  Tomasello,	  1994;	  1999).	  
	  There	  are	  some	  definitions	  in	  table	  1.1	  that	  use	  as	  one	  of	  the	  criteria	  for	  culture	  the	   fact	   that	   teaching	  occurs	   (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Galef,	   1992).	  There	   are	  other	  researchers	  who	  have	  also	  specified	  that	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  human	  culture	  is	  the	   ability	   of	   individuals	   to	   teach	   one	   another,	   and	   that	   human	   infants	   are	  predisposed	  to	  look	  for	  teaching	  from	  adults	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2005).	  These	  definitions	  argue	  that	  teaching	  is	  a	  uniquely	  human	  trait	  and	  other	  
	   58	  
species,	   particularly	   non-­‐human	   primates,	   have	   never	   been	   observed	   teaching.	  Teaching	   is	   often	   thought	   to	   be	   particularly	   important	   for	   the	   transfer	   of	  cumulative	   modifications,	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   it	   promotes	   the	   fidelity	   of	  knowledge	   transfer,	   allowing	   specific	   behavioural	   patterns	   to	   be	   transmitted	  between	  individuals	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Strimling	  et	  al.,	  In	  review).	  
	  Caro	  and	  Hauser	  (1992)	  proposed	  a	  functional	  definition	  of	  teaching,	  that	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  animals.	  Their	  definition	  reads:	  ‘An	  individual	  actor	  A	  [the	  “tutor”]	  can	  be	  said	   to	   teach	   if	   it	  modifies	   its	  behaviour	  only	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  naïve	  observer,	  B	  [the	  “pupil”],	  at	  some	  cost	  or	  at	  least	  without	  obtaining	  an	  immediate	  benefit	  for	  itself.	  A’s	  behaviour	  thereby	  encourages	  or	  punishes	  B’s	  behaviour,	  or	  provides	  B	   with	   experience,	   or	   sets	   an	   example	   for	  B.	   As	   a	   result,	  B	   acquires	  knowledge,	   or	   learns	   a	   skill	   earlier	   in	   life	  or	  more	   rapidly	  or	   efficiently	   than	   it	  might	  otherwise	  do	  so,	  or	  would	  not	  learn	  at	  all’	  (Caro	  &	  Hauser,	  1992,	  pg.	  153).	  The	   spirit	   of	   the	   definition	   is	   that	   it	   seeks	   to	   identify	   behaviour	   that	  unequivocally	   functions	   specifically	   to	   facilitate	   learning	   in	   others.	   One	   key	  aspect	  of	  this	  definition	  is	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  tutor	  must	  sustain	  a	  cost	  or	  delay	  to	  the	  usual	  benefit	  for	  itself	  by	  modifying	  its	  behaviour.	  This	  differentiates	  the	  process	   from	   inadvertent	   social	   learning	   in	  which	   the	  pupil	  may	   learn,	   but	  from	  observing	   the	   tutor	   carrying	   out	   a	   behaviour	   pattern	   for	  which	   the	   tutor	  incurs	  no	  greater	  cost	  than	  it	  usually	  would	  for	  its	  own	  benefit.	  	  	  Other	   authors	   have	   proposed	   additional	   criteria	   necessary	   for	   teaching,	  including	   that	   there	   be	   feedback	   from	   the	   pupil	   to	   the	   tutor,	   with	   the	   tutor	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responding	   appropriately,	   altering	   its	   behaviour	   depending	   upon	   on	   the	  feedback	   given	   by	   the	   pupil	   (Franks	   &	   Richardson,	   2006);	   or	   that	   teaching	   is	  restricted	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  skills	  or	  rules	  (Leadbeater	  &	  Chittka,	  2007).	  	  Deploying	   such	   functional	   definitions,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   some	   non-­‐human	  animal	   species	   from	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   different	   taxa	   are	   capable	   of	   teaching	  (Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Thornton	   &	   Raihani,	   2008)	   although	   this	   remains	  contentious	   (Premack,	   2007).	   Two	   commonly	   cited	   examples	   are	   tandem	  running	   in	   ants	   (Franks	   &	   Richardson,	   2006)	   and	   scorpion	   processing	   in	  meerkats	  (Thornton	  &	  McAuliffe,	  2006).	  Tandem	  running	  in	  ants	  is	  a	  behaviour	  in	  which	  an	  informed	  ant	  will	  lead	  a	  naïve	  individual	  to	  a	  new	  nest	  site	  or	  a	  food	  source.	   	   This	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   more	   than	   inadvertent	   social	   learning	   as	   the	  informed	  individual	  will	  wait	  for	  her	  legs	  or	  abdomen	  to	  be	  tapped	  by	  the	  naïve	  individual	   before	   continuing	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   pupil	   is	   still	   present;	   this	   was	  estimated	  to	  have	  delayed	  the	  demonstrator’s	  movement	  to	  food	  fourfold,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  a	  fitness	  cost	  (Franks	  &	  Richardson,	  2006).	  	  	  Thornton	   and	   McAuliffe	   (2006)	   reported	   teaching	   in	   meerkats.	   Adult	   helpers	  bring	   scorpions,	   who	   present	   a	   mortal	   danger	   due	   to	   their	   sting,	   to	   young	  individuals	   in	   the	   population	   rather	   than	   eating	   them	   themselves	   (which	  constitutes	  a	  cost).	  Moreover	  the	  state	  of	  the	  scorpion	  presented	  to	  the	  juvenile	  is	   sensitive	   to	   the	   age	   (a	   proxy	   for	   knowledge)	   of	   the	   juvenile.	   The	   youngest	  meerkats	   are	   presented	  with	   dead	   scorpions,	   older	   individuals	  with	   scorpions	  that	  have	  had	  the	  stings	  removed	  and	  finally	  the	  oldest	   juveniles	  are	  presented	  with	   fully	   fit	   scorpions,	  with	  adults	   recatching	   the	   scorpion	   if	   it	   escapes.	  When	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manipulated	  experimentally	  using	  playbacks,	  Thornton	  and	  McAuliffe	  found	  that	  the	   adult	   response	   was	   influenced	   by	   the	   calls	   of	   the	   juveniles,	   which	   change	  with	  the	  age	  of	  the	  juvenile.	  Thus	  here	  adults	  specifically	  tailor	  their	  behaviour	  to	  the	  pupils	  and	  experience	  a	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  lost	  scorpion	  foraging	  opportunities.	  	  	  Caro	  and	  Hauser	   (1992)	  distinguish	  between	   ‘opportunity	   teaching’	  and	   ‘active	  teaching’.	  Opportunity	  teaching	  may	  defined	  as	  when	  the	  tutor	  places	  the	  pupil	  in	  a	  situation	  that	  exposes	  the	  pupil	  to	  a	  new	  situation	  conducive	  to	  learning.	  In	  contrast,	   active	   teaching,	   involves	   the	  moulding	   of	   the	   pupil’s	   behaviour	   using	  encouragement	   and	   punishment.	   Hoppitt	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   classify	   teaching	  processes	   based	   upon	   the	   classification	   of	   social	   learning	   mechanisms,	   but	  involving	   active	   transmission	   by	   demonstrators.	   These	   teaching	   processes	  include	  a	  ‘local	  enhancement’	  mechanism	  in	  which	  the	  tutor	  deliberately	  attracts	  the	   pupil	   to	   a	   particular	   location,	   and	   an	   ‘imitation’	   mechanism	   by	   which	   a	  teacher	   deliberately	   demonstrates	   actions	   to	   a	   pupil.	   This	   classification	   also	  includes	  ‘coaching’,	  which	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  ‘active	  teaching’	  of	  the	  Caro	  and	  Hauser	  definition,	  with	  the	  tutor	  directly	  shaping	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  pupil.	  	  A	  recent	  theoretical	  analysis	  by	  Strimling	  et	  al.	  (In	  review)	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	  circumstances	   in	  which	   teaching	  may	  be	   likely	   to	  evolve.	  Factors	  affecting	   the	   probability	   of	   teaching	   include	   the	   degree	   of	   relatedness	   of	   pupil	  and	  tutor,	  the	  cost	  of	  teaching	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  task.	  Teaching	  is	  suggested	  not	   to	   occur	  when	   the	   task	   is	   easily	   learned	   as	   it	   could	   be	   picked	   up	   through	  asocial	  learning	  or	  inadvertent	  social	  learning.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  where	  the	  task	  is	  difficult	  to	  learn,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  pool	  of	  knowledgeable	  individuals	  able	  to	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act	   as	   teachers	  would	   be	   too	   small	   to	   sustain	   teaching.	   This	   creates	   a	   narrow	  window	  of	  circumstances	  under	  which	  teaching	  is	  favoured.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  There	   is	  no	   reported	  evidence	  of	   teaching	   in	  any	  capuchin	  species,	   either	   from	  the	  wild	  or	  captivity	  (Visalberghi	  &	  Limongelli,	  1996;	  Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b).	   It	  has	  been	  argued	  that,	  as	  monkeys,	  capuchins	  do	  not	  have	  the	  cognition	  required	  for	   teaching	   (Visalberghi	   &	   Limongelli,	   1996).	   However,	   recent	   reviews	   of	  teaching	   have	   shown	   there	   is	   a	   more	   complicated	   taxonomic	   distribution	   of	  teaching,	   with	   teaching	   reported	   in	   isolated	   species	   in	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   taxa	  (Thornton	  &	  Raihani,	  2008),	  including	  species,	  such	  as	  ants	  and	  bees,	  that	  are	  not	  regarded	   as	   any	  more	   cognitively	   sophisticated	   than	  monkeys.	   Capuchins	  may	  not	  engage	  in	  any	  behaviour	  that	  is	  both	  sufficiently	  difficult	  to	  preclude	  learning	  through	   inadvertent	   social	   or	   individual	   learning	   and	   which	   also	   has	   a	   high	  enough	  reward	  to	  justify	  the	  evolution	  of	  teaching.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  Some	  researchers	  who	  work	  with	  wild	  chimpanzees	  have	  claimed	  that	  teaching	  occurs	  in	  the	  populations,	  however,	  these	  reports	  have	  an	  anecdotal	  quality	  and	  have	   not	   been	   experimentally	   corroborated	   (Boesch,	   1991;	   McGrew,	   1998;	  Boesch,	   2003).	   These	   reports	   focus	   upon	   the	   learning	   of	   nut	   cracking	   by	  juveniles,	  which	  it	  is	  claimed	  is	  taught	  by	  the	  mother.	  Boesch	  (1991)	  details	  a	  few	  cases	   in	   which	   mothers	   appear	   to	   alter	   their	   behaviour	   whilst	   cracking	   nuts.	  These	   behavioural	   modifications	   allow	   the	   juveniles	   access	   to	   hammer	   stones	  and	   nuts,	   which	   the	  mother	   is	   using.	   The	   study	   also	   reports	   cases	   of	  mothers	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repositioning	  the	  nut	  the	  juvenile	  is	  attempting	  to	  crack,	  thus	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  juvenile	  to	  crack	  (Boesch,	  1991).	  The	  evidence	  for	  teaching	  in	  chimpanzees	  is	  purely	   observational,	   with	   no	   experimental	  manipulation.	  Most	   reviews	   of	   the	  teaching	  literature	  conclude	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  equivocal	  (Caro	  &	  Hauser,	  1992;	  Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Thornton	   &	   Raihani,	   2008).	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	   feedback	  to	  the	  tutor	  and	  there	  is	   little	  evidence	  that	  the	  adults	   incur	   any	   cost	  making	   inadvertent	   social	   learning	   a	  more	   parsimonious	  explanation	  (Hoppitt	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Thornton	  &	  Raihani,	  2008).	  	  	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  That	  particular	  cultural	  traits	  are	  taught	  to	  human	  children	  is	  often	  assumed,	  but	  surprisingly	  rarely	  tested	  explicitly	  (Hoppitt	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Tehrani	  &	  Riede,	  2008).	  Some	   researchers	   have	   claimed	   that	   even	   apparently	   complicated	   human	  behavioural	   patterns,	   such	   as	   learning	   to	  make	   sushi	   or	   constructing	   tools	   for	  hunting,	   are	   passed	   on	   through	   inadvertent	   social	   learning,	   with	   little	   active	  teaching	  in	  many	  societies	  (de	  Waal,	  2002;	  MacDonald,	  2007).	  Other	  researchers	  argue	  that	  opportunity	  teaching	  occurs	  in	  these	  situations,	  with	  tutors	  exposing	  the	   individuals	   to	   new	   circumstances	   (Tehrani	   &	   Riede,	   2008).	   Tehrani	   and	  Riede	  (2008)	  document	  the	  rug-­‐making	  apprenticeships	  that	  are	  undertaken	  by	  some	  Iranian	  children	  starting	  from	  the	  age	  of	  9	  and	  continuing	  for	  several	  years.	  The	   sessions	   are	   undertaken	   in	   near	   silence,	   with	   little	   active	   instruction.	  Apprentices	  do	   receive	   a	   teaching	  of	   the	   rug	  patterns,	  with	   tutors	  weaving	   the	  outline	  and	  leaving	  the	  apprentice	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  pattern,	  providing	  the	  apprentice	  with	  an	  opportunity	  they	  would	  not	  have	  otherwise	  had.	  Tutors	  will	  also	  monitor	  the	  weaving	  and	   intervene	   if	   an	  apprentice	   is	  getting	   the	   technique	  wrong	  and	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will	  demonstrate	  the	  correct	  technique,	  providing	  a	  plastic	  feedback	  pattern	  that	  depends	  upon	  the	  pupil’s	  performance	  (Tehrani	  &	  Riede,	  2008).	  	  Under	  experimental	  conditions	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  children	  look	  to	  be	  taught	  from	  adults	  and	  other	  children,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  capable	  of	  teaching	  themselves	  (Wood	  et	  al.,	  1976;	  Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2006;	  Liszkowski	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Liszkowski	  et	   al.	   (2006)	   found	   that	   12-­‐	   and	   18-­‐month-­‐old	   children	   would	   provide	  informative	  pointing	  to	  show	  an	  adult	  where	  an	  item	  that	  had	  been	  moved	  was	  now	   located.	  This	   ‘informative	  pointing’	   is	   used	   to	  deliberately	   inform	  another	  individual	  of	   the	   location	  of	  something	  and,	  Liszkowski	  et	  al.	  argue,	  not	   to	  gain	  something	   for	   themselves.	   The	   cost	   of	   the	   behaviour	   was	   not	   measured,	   but	  there	   is	   little	   evidence	   that	   there	  was	   any	  benefit	   to	   the	   child	   to	   point	   out	   the	  location	  of	  an	  object.	  Therefore	  this	  behaviour	  can	  be	  called	  teaching.	  	  	  Wood	   et	   al.	   (1976)	   examined	   how	  3-­‐,	   4-­‐	   and	   5-­‐year-­‐old	   children	   learned	   from	  adults.	  Using	  a	  task	  in	  which	  children	  could	  build	  a	  particular	  pattern	  of	  wooden	  blocks,	   the	   makeup	   of	   tutoring,	   or	   active	   teaching,	   was	   examined.	   Although	  tutoring	   allowed	   the	   children	   to	   complete	   the	   task,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   tutoring	  required	  by	  different	  ages	  of	  children	  varied.	  As	  children	  got	  older	  they	  required	  fewer	   active	   demonstrations	   and	   could	   be	   instructed	   more	   through	  verbalisations.	  Csibra	  and	  Gergely	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  children	  actively	  look	  to	  be	  taught	  from	  adults,	  focussing	  on	  pedagogical	  cues	  that	  allow	  the	  children	  to	  learn	  from	  adults.	  Adults	  experience	  a	  cost	  as	   they,	   in	   turn,	  will	  perform	  actions	   that	  are	  designed	  simply	  and	  specifically	   to	  demonstrate	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  to	   the	  child,	  rather	  than	  to	  gain	  a	  reward	  themselves.	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  There	   are	  many	   instances	   in	   which	   human	   teaching	   is	   simply	   implied	   and	   no	  definition	  is	  tested,	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  apprenticeships	  and	  schools	  being	  used	  as	  evidence,	  without	  an	  examination	  of	   learning	  mechanism	  (MacDonald,	  2007;	  Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Tehrani	   &	   Riede,	   2008).	   However	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	  humans	  teach	  and	  look	  to	  be	  taught	  (Wood	  et	  al.,	  1976;	  Liszkowski	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Tehrani	  &	  Riede,	  2008).	  This	  teaching	  can	  vary	  between	  opportunity	  learning,	  or	  scaffolding,	  and	  direct	  instruction,	  or	  active	  teaching;	  whilst	  there	  may	  be	  some	  situations	   in	  which	   active	   teaching	   is	   engaged	   in,	   reports	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	  much	   more	   subtle,	   scaffolded	   teaching	   in	   human	   populations.	   In	   a	   recent	  experiment	   with	   children,	   Whiten	   and	   Flynn	   (2010)	   trained	   children	   as	  demonstrators	  and	  put	  them	  back	  into	  a	  small	  laboratory	  population.	  Setting	  out	  to	   examine	   inadvertent	   social	   learning,	   they	   found	   instances	   of	   demonstrators	  instead	  standing	  back	  and	  instructing	  others	  how	  to	  use	  the	  puzzlebox	  (Whiten	  &	  Flynn,	  2010).	  Thus	  children	  will	  themselves	  teach,	  as	  well	  as	  be	  taught.	  	  
Hypothesis	  2	  	  
Lack	   of	   a	   complex	   communication	   system,	   facilitating	   pedagogy,	   in	   non-­humans	  
prevents	  cumulative	  innovations	  spreading	  throughout	  the	  population	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2005;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  The	  human	   language	   is	  a	  uniquely	  complex	  communication	  system	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Hauser	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Pinker	  &	  Jackendoff,	  2005;	  Cheney	  &	  Seyfarth,	  2010).	  This	  complex	  communication	  system	  allows	  humans	  to	  transmit	   intentions	  and	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complex	   behaviour	   patterns,	   sharing	   information	   between	   individuals	   and	  facilitating	   pedagogy	   easily	   and	   cheaply	   between	   individuals.	   Language,	  therefore,	   could	   enable	   high-­‐fidelity	   transmission	   of	   modifications	   to	   existing	  behavioural	   traits,	   facilitating	   cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello,	   1999;	   Csibra	   &	  Gergely,	  2005;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Carpenter,	  2006).	  	  	  There	   remains	   debate	   about	   exactly	   which	   aspects	   of	   language	   are	   uniquely	  human	   (Hauser	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Pinker	   &	   Jackendoff,	   2005;	   Cheney	   &	   Seyfarth,	  2010).	   However,	   there	   are	   key	   aspects	   of	   human	   language	   that	   are	   widely	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  unique.	  One	  of	  the	  highlighted	  aspects	  is	  syntax,	  the	  ability	  to	  structure	  sentences	  to	  give	  information	  on	  the	  order	  and	  causation	  of	  events.	  Language	  and	   syntax	   is	   so	   important	   to	  humans,	  Chomsky	   (1965)	   argued,	   that	  syntax	  is	  innate	  and	  universal	  in	  humans	  in	  all	  societies.	  Similarly	  Pinker	  (1994)	  argued	   that	   language	   is	   an	   ‘instinct’	   in	   humans.	   There	   have	   been	   criticisms	   of	  these	  viewpoints,	  arguing	  that	  it	  simplifies	  language	  evolution	  and	  that	  the	  roots	  of	  language	  pre-­‐date	  humans	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Cheney	  &	  Seyfarth,	  2010).	  	  	  Non-­‐human	  primates	  clearly	  do	  not	  have	  language,	  but	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  vocal	  communication.	  Observations	  of	  non-­‐human	  primates	  have	  shown	  that	  a	  range	  of	  calls	  are	  given	  focussed	  on	  food,	  affiliation,	  predators	  and	  aggression.	  Whilst	  the	   calls	   of	   non-­‐human	   primates	   tend	   to	   be	   fixed	   and	  without	  much	   variation	  (Cheney	   &	   Seyfarth,	   2010),	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   some	   non-­‐humans	   primates	  use	   referential	   signals	   with	   respect	   to	   predators	   (Seyfarth	   et	   al.,	   1980;	  Zuberbühler,	  2000b).	  Diana	  monkeys	  (Cercopithecus	  diana),	  Campbell’s	  monkeys	  (Cercopithecus	  campbelli)	  and	  vervet	  monkeys	  (Cercopithecus	  aethiop)	  have	  been	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found	  to	  give	  different	  alarm	  calls,	  depending	  upon	  whether	  the	  threat	  is	  coming	  from	  a	  leopard	  or	  an	  eagle.	  The	  response	  of	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  population	  depends	  upon	  the	  type	  of	  call	  given,	  moving	  up	  the	  canopy	  for	  leopard	  calls	  and	  down	  for	  eagles	  (Seyfarth	  et	  al.,	  1980;	  Zuberbühler,	  2000b;	  Zuberbühler,	  2001).	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  Diana	  monkeys	  are	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  specific	  alarm	  calls	  of	  Campbell’s	  monkeys,	  with	  whom	  they	  form	  interspecific	  groups,	  and	  act	  appropriately	   according	   to	   the	   predator	   (Zuberbühler,	   2000a).	   Indeed	   there	   is	  also	   evidence	   that	   yellow–casqued	   hornbills	   (Ceratogymna	   elata),	   which	   are	  vulnerable	  to	  eagle	  predation,	  but	  not	  leopard	  predation,	  are	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  alarm	  calls	  and	  will	  respond	  only	  when	  appropriate	  (Rainey	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  These	  calls,	  therefore,	  contain	  information	  which	  can	  be	  detected	  by	  other	  individuals	   in	   the	   population,	   eliciting	   a	   specific	   response	   in	   them	   depending	  upon	  the	  signal	  given.	  
	  Many	  animal	  species	  give	  food	  calls,	  that	  is,	  excitement	  calls	  on	  the	  discovery	  of	  food	  (Marler	  et	  al.,	  1992).	  It	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  these	  calls	  are	  referential	  in	  a	  range	  of	  species,	  including	  chimpanzees	  (Slocombe	  &	  Zuberbühler,	  2005;	  2006),	  tufted	   and	   white-­‐faced	   capuchin	  monkeys	   (Di	   Bitetti,	   2003;	   Gros-­‐Louis,	   2004)	  and	  domestic	  fowl	  (Marler	  et	  al.,	  1986).	  However,	  the	  calls	  that	  are	  produced	  in	  the	  presence	  of	   food	  are	  not	  necessarily	   specific	   to	   food,	   sometimes	  also	  being	  produced	   in	   a	   range	   of	   situations	   in	   which	   the	   animal	   is	   excited,	   including	  appeasement,	   attracting	   attention	   and	   the	   appearance	   of	   the	   sun	   after	   a	   rain	  shower	  (Marler	  et	  al.,	  1992;	  Gros-­‐Louis,	  2006;	  Hopkins	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Whilst	   the	  call	  may	  be	  produced	   in	  other	   situations,	   food	   calls	  have	  been	   found	   to	  attract	  the	  attention	  of	  other	  individuals	  to	  a	  food	  source	  (Marler	  et	  al.,	  1986;	  Di	  Bitetti,	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2003;	   Gros-­‐Louis,	   2004).	   Therefore	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   learning	   of	   other	  individuals	   may	   be	   enhanced	   by	   the	   food	   calls	   emitted	   by	   their	   fellow	   group	  members,	  through	  a	  local	  enhancement	  mechanism.	  	  	  
	  	  Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  Capuchins	   have	   been	   recorded	   giving	   a	   range	   of	   calls,	   amongst	   them	   is	   a	   food	  call,	  given	  when	  an	  individual	  encounters	  a	  food	  source	  (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b).	  Studies	   of	   food	   calls	   in	   the	   wild	   have	   found	   that	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   caller,	  audience	  effects	  and	  food	  quantity	  may	  all	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  individual	  to	  call	  on	  the	  discovery	  of	  food	  (Di	  Bitetti,	  2003;	  Gros-­‐Louis,	  2004;	  Di	  Bitetti,	   2005;	   Gros-­‐Louis,	   2006).	   Using	   playback	   experiments,	  Di	   Bitetti	   (2003)	  tested	  whether	   food	  calls	   elicited	  a	   response	   from	  groups	  of	  wild	   capuchins.	   It	  was	   found	   that,	   when	   playing	   food	   calls,	   focal	   individuals	  were	  more	   likely	   to	  look	  or	  move	  towards	  the	  speaker	  than	  when	  played	  contact	  calls	  or	  the	  food	  call	  backwards.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  food	  call	  elicits	  a	  response	  in	  other	  individuals.	  Further	  work	  by	  di	  Bitetti	  (2005)	  and	  Gros-­‐Louis	  (2004)	  tested	  when	  food	  calls	  are	  given	  by	  wild,	  provisioned	  capuchins.	  Di	  Bitetti	  (2005)	  found	  that	  capuchins	  gave	   food	   calls	   81%	   of	   the	   time	   when	   they	   discovered	   food	   on	   provisioned	  platforms,	   but	   the	   probability	   of	   giving	   a	   call	   was	   lower	   in	   periods	   of	   food	  scarcity	  than	  when	  food	  was	  abundant	  and	  when	  there	  was	  only	  a	  small	  amount	  of	   food	   on	   the	   platform	   compared	   to	  when	   a	   large	   amount	  was	   present.	   Gros-­‐Louis	  (2004)	  found	  that	  individuals	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  produce	  food	  calls	  when	  they	   were	   provisioned	   with	   a	   high-­‐value	   food	   reward,	   than	   when	   they	   were	  provisioned	  with	  mid-­‐value	  rewards.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  animals	  are	  able	  use	  the	  food	  calls	  selectively	  and	  they	  are	  not	  simply	  an	  excitement	  call.	  There	  is	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evidence	  that	  not	  giving	  a	  food	  call	  is	  a	  deceptive	  act	  as	  individuals	  are	  found	  to	  call	  more	  when	  other	  individuals	  are	  in	  the	  immediate	  vicinity	  (and	  therefore	  the	  individual	  may	  be	  discovered	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  food,	  not	  having	  given	  a	  call)	  (Di	  Bitetti,	  2005).	  An	  individual	  not	  giving	  a	  food	  call	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  victim	  of	   aggression	   from	   a	   dominant	   individual	   than	   if	   they	   have	   given	   a	   call	   (Gros-­‐Louis,	  2004).	  	  
	  Evidence	  suggests	   that	   food	  calls	  allow	   individuals	   to	  assess	  where	   food	   is	  and	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  location	  if	  a	  food	  call	  is	  given	  than	  if	  any	  other	  type	  of	  call	  is	  given	  (Di	  Bitetti,	  2003).	  Specific	  components	  of	  the	  food	  call	  also	  may	  signal	  something	  about	  the	  food	  available.	  Di	  Bitetti	  (2003)	  found	  that	  ‘grgr’	   call	   components	   were	   almost	   exclusively	   given	   when	   individuals	   were	  feeding	  on	  a	  clumped	  fruit	  source;	  in	  the	  playback	  components	  of	  the	  study	  the	  number	   of	   ‘grgr’	   calls	   in	   the	   playback	   call	   also	   predicted	   likelihood	   of	   focal	  individuals	  moving	  towards	  the	  food	  source	  (Di	  Bitetti,	  2003).	  This	  suggests	  that	  food	  calls	  may	  be	  used	   to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  desirability	  or	  abundance	  of	  food	  as	  well.	  
	  
Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  Slocombe	  and	  Zuberbühler	  (2005;	  2006)	  tested	  whether	  the	  food	  calls	  produced	  by	   chimpanzees	   differed	   depending	   upon	   the	   food	   presented	   and	   whether,	   in	  playback	  experiments,	   individuals	  responded	  differently	   to	   food	  calls	  produced	  to	   different	   foods.	   With	   both	   captive	   and	   wild	   chimpanzees,	   Slocombe	   and	  Zuberbühler	  (2006)	  presented	  populations	  with	  three	  high-­‐value,	  three	  medium-­‐value	   and	   three	   high-­‐value	   food	   rewards.	   They	   found	   food	   calls	   differed	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depending	   upon	   the	   desirability	   of	   the	   food	   to	   the	   caller.	   Less	   desirable	   food	  elicited	  a	  shorter	  call	  which	  with	  a	  low	  frequency,	  whereas	  calls	  produced	  in	  the	  presence	   of	   more	   desirable	   food	   were	   longer	   and	   had	   a	   high	   frequency.	   In	  captivity	   they	   also	   found	   that	   chimpanzees	   produced	   acoustically	   distinct	   calls	  for	   each	   of	   the	   three	   different	   high	   value	   food	   rewards,	   but	   calls	   for	   different	  medium	  and	   low	  value	   food	  rewards	  were	  not	  distinct.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   the	  wild	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  chimpanzees	  produced	  different	  calls	  depending	  on	  the	   specific	   food,	   calls	   differed	   only	   in	   regard	   to	   desirability.	   Captive	  chimpanzees	   were	   also	   tested	   with	   playbacks	   to	   assess	   whether	   they	   could	  distinguish	   between	   the	   types	   of	   food	   call	   (Slocombe	   &	   Zuberbühler,	   2005).	  Chimpanzees	  were	  taught	   to	   find	  a	  desirable	   food	  hidden	  at	  one	   location	  and	  a	  low	   value	   food	   reward	   hidden	   at	   a	   second	   location.	   A	   speaker	   was	   located	  equidistant	   between	   the	   two	   locations.	   Subjects	   were	   played	   recordings	   of	  chimpanzees	   that	   had	   previously	   found	   either	   the	   high	   value	   or	   low	   value	  reward	   upon	   which	   subjects	   were	   significantly	   more	   likely	   to	   approach	   the	  location	   of	   a	   hidden	   reward	   that,	   according	   to	   their	   training,	  matched	   the	   call	  heard	   (Slocombe	   &	   Zuberbühler,	   2005).	   These	   findings	   demonstrate	   that,	  although	  not	  as	  complex	  as	  human	  language,	  non-­‐human	  calls	  can	  be	  referential.	  
	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  To	  my	  knowledge	   there	   is	   no	  work	   in	  which	   the	   problem	   solving	   of	   groups	   of	  children	  in	  silence	  is	  compared	  to	  groups	  allowed	  to	  have	  problem	  solving	  with	  vocal	   communication.	   In	   social	   learning	   experiments	   there	   are	   often	   special	  considerations	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  children	  are	  not	  able	  to	  gain	  any	  information	  from	  vocal	  communication	  (e.g.	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Flynn,	  2008;	  Hopper	  et	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al.,	   2008).	   In	   these	   studies,	   vocal	   communication	   is	   limited	   to	   phrases	   such	   as	  “You	  can	  play	  as	  much	  as	  you	  like”,	  with	  no	  reference	  to	  the	  puzzlebox.	  Although	  not	   tested	  explicitly,	   the	  assumption	   is	   that	   children	  will	   learn	  effectively	   from	  these	  vocal	   cues.	   In	   a	   similar	  manner,	  when	  Carpenter	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   conducted	  experiments	   on	   rational	   imitation	   they	   uttered	   ‘There’	   and	   ‘Woops’	   when	   the	  outcome	   was	   intentional	   or	   accidental,	   respectively.	   Along	   with	   facial	   cues	   of	  surprise	   in	   the	   accidental	   condition,	   this	   was	   sufficient	   to	   enable	   children	   to	  interpret	  the	  outcome	  as	  intentional	  or	  accidental.	  	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  3	  
	  
Lack	  of	  imitation	  or	  other	  complex	  forms	  of	  social	  learning	  in	  non-­humans	  prevents	  
the	   spread	   of	   cumulative	   innovations	   throughout	   the	   population	   (Boyd	   &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Galef,	  1992;	  Tomasello,	  1994)	  
	  Imitation,	   learning	   the	   exact	   motor	   pattern	   of	   a	   behaviour	   from	   observing	  another	   individual,	   is	   argued	  by	   some	   researchers	   as	   central	   to	  human	   culture	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	   1985;	   Galef,	   1992)	   and	   in	   particular	   to	   cumulative	   culture	  (Tomasello,	   1994;	   Boyd	   &	   Richerson,	   1996;	   Tomasello,	   1999).	   Imitation	   is	  thought	   to	   be	   key,	   as	   the	   replication	   of	   a	   whole	   behaviour	   pattern	   from	   the	  observation	  of	  a	  demonstrator	  is	  possible.	  Thus	  individuals	  do	  not	  have	  to	  learn	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  behaviour	  based	  merely	  on	  cues	  they	  have	  gained	  from	  social	  learning:	   a	   subject	   does	  not	  need	   to	   ‘reinvent	   the	  wheel’	  when	   it	   learns	   a	  new	  behaviour	   (Tennie	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Imitation	   is	   thought	   to	   be	  more	   conducive	   to	  cumulative	  culture	  than	  alternative	  social	  learning	  processes,	  as	  an	  observer	  can	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learn	   the	  whole	  behaviour,	   including	  modifications,	  without	  having	   to	   reinvent	  them	  based	  upon	  cues	   learned	  from	  another	   individual	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Tennie	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Thus	   imitation,	   it	   is	   assumed,	   can	   support	   high-­‐fidelity	  information	   transmission,	   creating	   the	   opportunity	   for	   refinements	   and	  elaborations	  of	   the	  original	  knowledge.	  According	   to	   this	  argument	   if	   a	   species	  does	   not	   imitate,	   it	   is	  much	   less	   likely	   that	   the	   species	  will	   be	   able	   to	   develop	  cumulative	  culture.	  	  The	   most	   common	  manner	   in	   which	   imitation	   is	   examined	   is	   the	   ‘two-­‐action’	  method.	  Using	  this	  method,	  separate	  models	  are	  trained	  to	  perform	  one	  of	   two	  distinct	  behaviour	  patterns	  that	  are	  directed	  at	  the	  same	  locus.	  The	  two	  actions	  can	   be	   moving	   part	   of	   the	   apparatus	   in	   different	   directions	   or	   with	   different	  movements	  (Heyes	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Bugnyar	  &	  Huber,	  1997)	  or	  using	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   body	   to	   operate	   the	   same	   part	   of	   the	   apparatus	  (Dawson	  &	  Foss,	  1965;	  Zentall	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Range	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  researchers	  who	   have	   carried	   out	   these	   experiments	   argue	   that	   the	   subjects	   are	   learning	  about	  the	  exact	  form	  of	  the	  actions	  required	  to	  solve	  the	  task	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  imitating	  the	  demonstrator.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  there	  remains	  a	  debate	  about	  the	  definition	  of	  imitation,	  in	  particular	  whether	  it	  requires	  insight	  into	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  demonstrator	  (Galef,	  1988;	  Byrne,	  1999)	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  reliant	  on	  transformational	   or	   associative	   processes	   (Heyes,	   1993).	   There	   have	   been	  reports	  of	  imitation	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  non-­‐human	  animals,	  including	  rats	  (Heyes	  et	  al.,	   1994),	   Japanese	   quail	   (Akins	   &	   Zentall,	   1998),	   dogs	   (Range	   et	   al.,	   2007),	  pigeons	  (Zentall	  et	  al.,	  1996),	  marmosets	  (Bugnyar	  &	  Huber,	  1997),	  budgerigars	  (Dawson	   &	   Foss,	   1965)	   and	   chimpanzees	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1996).	   All	   of	   these	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claims	  of	  imitation	  have	  been	  questioned	  by	  others	  who	  argue	  that	  other	  social	  learning	  mechanisms	  could	  explain	  the	  results.	  	  	  Several	  authors	   (Byrne	  &	  Tomasello,	  1995;	  Tomasello,	  1996;	  Tomasello	  &	  Call,	  1997;	  Tennie	   et	   al.,	   2009)	   argue	   that	   the	  patterns	   reported	   above	   as	   imitation	  could	   be	   explained	   by	   emulation	   or	   response	   facilitation.	   The	   argument	   for	  response	   facilitation	   focuses	   upon	   the	   issue	   of	   novelty.	   If	   the	   actions	   are	   not	  novel,	  Byrne	  and	  Tomasello	  (1995)	  argue	  that	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  social	  learning	  would	  be	  observed	  if	  response	  facilitation	  was	  occurring,	  rather	  than	  imitation.	  However,	   in	   a	   later	   classification	   of	   social	   learning	   (Byrne,	   2002),	   contextual	  
imitation,	  in	  which	  through	  imitation	  an	  individual	  learns	  to	  use	  a	  known	  action	  in	  a	  novel	  situation,	  was	  also	  hypothesised	  to	  explain	  these	  results.	  This	  differs	  from	  production	  imitation,	  in	  which	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  is	  entirely	  novel	  (Byrne,	  2002).	   It	   has	   also	   been	   argued	   that	   two-­‐action	   tasks	   might	   be	   solved	   using	  affordance	  learning	  (a	  category	  of	  emulation),	  rather	  than	  imitation	  (Tomasello,	  1996;	  Tomasello	  &	  Call,	  1997;	  Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  These	  authors	  argue	  that	  an	  observer	   may	   learn	   the	   affordances	   of	   a	   task	   rather	   than	   copying	   the	   exact	  behaviour	   that	   the	   demonstrator	   is	   carrying	   out.	   The	   subject,	   they	   argue,	  may	  learn	   something	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   foot/hand	   and	   task	  manipulandii,	  but	   the	   exact	   behaviour	   and	  movement	   patterns	   are	   learned	   asocially	   through	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	   learning.	   Tennie	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   argue	   that	   the	   finding	   that	  chimpanzees	  tend	  not	  to	  replicate	  causally	  irrelevant	  actions	  (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005)	  implies	  that	  chimpanzees	  tend	  to	  focus	  foremost	  on	  the	  desired	  outcome	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  demonstrator.	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Ghost	  conditions	  have	  also	  been	  used	  to	  distinguish	  between	  imitation	  and	  other	  social	   learning	   mechanisms,	   in	   particular	   the	   different	   types	   of	   emulation	  (Fawcett	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Klein	  &	  Zentall,	  2003;	  Hopper	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  2008;	  Hopper,	  2010).	   In	   a	   ghost	   condition	   the	   mechanism	   of	   a	   task	   is	   demonstrated	   to	   the	  subject	  without	  a	  demonstrator	  being	  present	  (as	   if	   it	  was	  being	  operated	  by	  a	  ghost).	  Thus	  the	  subject	  is	  given	  information	  about	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  task,	  but	  no	   information	   about	   the	   actions	   of	   another	   individual,	   that	   would	   allow	   the	  subject	  to	  imitate.	  Using	  conditions	  in	  which	  food	  is	  either	  present	  or	  absent	  in	  the	  ghost	  demonstrations	  then	  different	  types	  of	  emulation	  mechanisms,	  object	  movement	   re-­‐enactment,	   affordance	   learning	   and	   goal	   emulation,	   can	   be	  distinguished	  between.	  In	  a	  review	  of	  the	  ghost	  condition	  experiments	  that	  have	  been	  carried	  out,	  Hopper	  (2010)	  details	  mixed	  evidence,	  much	  of	  which	  may	  be	  due	  to	  experimental	  design.	  In	  particular,	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  individuals	  may	  have	  a	  social	  facilitation	  effect	  on	  the	  subject,	  this	  is	  often	  not	  considered	  in	  ghost	  conditions	   (Tennie	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  Hopper,	   2010).	  Tennie	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   also	   argue	  that	   non-­‐humans,	   particularly	   chimpanzees,	   are	   reward	   focussed	   and	  may	   not	  pay	   the	   same	   level	   of	   attention	   when	   they	   do	   not	   see	   a	   demonstrator	   being	  rewarded.	   Therefore,	   if	   an	   individual	   learns	   when	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  demonstrator	  and	  does	  not	  in	  the	  ghost	  condition,	  Tennie	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  argue	  this	  should	   not	   be	   interpreted	   as	   evidence	   for	   imitation	   as	   other	   social	   learning	  mechanisms,	  particularly	  goal	  emulation,	  may	  be	  occurring	  when	  learning	  from	  a	  demonstrator.	  In	  a	  recent	  review,	  Hoppitt	  and	  Laland	  (2008)	  report	  that	  there	  is	  only	   clear-­‐cut	   evidence	   for	   production	   imitation	   in	   two	   studies,	   both	   using	  pigeons,	  with	   the	   results	  of	  other	  experiments	  not	   clearly	   ruling	  out	   the	  use	  of	  other	  social	  learning	  mechanisms.	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Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  A	  number	  of	  different	  studies	  have	  sought	  to	  examine	  whether	  capuchins	  imitate	  but	  none	  have	  generated	  clear	  evidence	  for	  imitation	  (Visalberghi	  &	  Limongelli,	  1996;	  Fragaszy	  &	  Visalberghi,	  2004).	  Visalberghi	  and	  Fragaszy	  (1989)	  used	  two	  separate	  tasks,	  a	  tube	  out	  of	  which	  they	  pushed	  sunflower	  seeds	  using	  a	  stick	  and	  a	   set	   of	   walnuts	   that	   could	   be	   broken	   with	   a	   steel	   nut	   to	   investigate	   how	  capuchins	   learned	   socially.	   They	   found	   that	   the	  monkeys	   that	   learned	   to	   solve	  the	   tasks	  did	   so	  by	   inspecting	   the	  products	   of	   other	   individuals	   and	   individual	  learning,	   with	   no	   evidence	   of	   the	   monkeys	   learning	   by	   imitation	   (Fragaszy	   &	  Visalberghi,	  1989).	  In	  further	  studies	  in	  which	  individuals	  were	  demonstrated	  a	  tube	   with	   a	   food	   item	   trapped	   inside	   it	   and	   had	   to	   push	   it	   out	   with	   a	   stick,	  capuchins	  still	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  conspecific	  (Fragaszy	   &	   Visalberghi,	   1996).	   Individuals	   who	   received	   demonstrations	  interacted	   with	   the	   tube	   and	   tool	   significantly	   more	   after	   the	   demonstrations	  than	  before,	  but	  did	  not	   significantly	   improve	   their	  performance	  at	   the	   task	  or	  alter	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  handled	  the	  tool	  (Fragaszy	  &	  Visalberghi,	  1996).	  	  Custance	   et	   al.	   (1999)	   presented	   groups	   of	   hand-­‐reared	   capuchins	   with	   a	  puzzlebox,	  which	  could	  be	  fitted	  with	  one	  of	  two	  different	  bolts,	  from	  which	  food	  could	   be	   gained.	   Each	   bolt	   could	   be	   solved	   using	   two	   different	   actions,	   one	   of	  which	  was	   demonstrated	   to	   them	   by	   an	   human	   demonstrator.	  When	   given	   an	  opportunity	  to	  use	  the	  puzzlebox,	  for	  one	  of	  the	  bolts	  capuchins	  were	  more	  likely	  to	   use	   an	   action	   similar	   to	   that	   they	   had	   been	   demonstrated,	   although	   not	   an	  accurate	   copy	  of	   the	  method	   (Custance	  et	   al.,	   1999).	  There	  were	  differences	   in	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the	  body	  parts	  that	  were	  used	  to	  complete	  the	  bolt	  removal	  and	  the	  handling	  of	  bolts	   during	   removal.	   Custance	   et	   al	   (1999)	   concluded	   that	   object-­‐movement	  reenactment	   (a	   form	  of	   emulation)	   could	   not	   be	   ruled	   out	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	  imitation	  as	  monkeys	  had	   learned	  something	  about	   the	  movement	  of	   the	  bolts,	  but	   not	   the	   exact	   movement	   pattern.	   This	   result	   is	   consistent	   with	   previous	  findings	   which	   have	   failed	   to	   show	   unequivocally	   that	   capuchins	   are	   able	   to	  imitate.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  Several	   of	   the	   examples	   of	   experiments	   describing	   two-­‐action	   tasks	   and	   ghost	  conditions,	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  section,	  were	  carried	  out	  with	  chimpanzees.	  Whiten	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  presented	  chimpanzees	  with	  a	  puzzlebox	  mounted	  with	  one	  of	   two	  bolts,	   each	  of	  which	   could	  be	  manipulated	   in	   two	  different	  ways.	  When	  demonstrated	  the	  opening	  technique,	  chimpanzees	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  copy	  the	  action	   demonstrated	   to	   them.	   The	   exact	   manipulations	   demonstrated,	   as	   with	  the	   capuchins,	   were	   not	   always	   followed,	   with	   variation	   in	   the	   actions	   the	  observer	   produced	   being	   observed	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1996).	   In	   further	   studies	   in	  captivity,	  a	  range	  of	  puzzleboxes	  have	  been	  presented	  to	  chimpanzees	  (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Hopper	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  One	  puzzlebox	   was	   made	   in	   both	   an	   opaque	   and	   transparent	   design,	   but	   for	   both	  puzzleboxes	  demonstrations	   included	  a	  series	  of	   functionally	   irrelevant	  actions	  alongside	   actions	   that	   released	   a	   food	   reward	   (Horner	   &	   Whiten,	   2005).	  Chimpanzees	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  copy	  the	  irrelevant	  actions	  when	  using	   the	  opaque	  puzzlebox	   than	   the	   transparent	  puzzlebox.	  This	  suggests	   that	  chimpanzees	  were	  copying	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  demonstrator	  when	  they	  were	  not	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able	   to	  see	  which	  actions	  were	   irrelevant	   (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005).	   It	  suggests	  that	  chimpanzees	  are	  able	  to	   imitate,	  however	  they	  tend	  to	  emulate	   in	   the	   first	  instance	  and	  will	  switch	  to	  imitation	  if	  unable	  to	  emulate.	  	  	  There	  is	  disagreement	  about	  whether	  some	  reports	  of	   imitation	  that	  have	  been	  examined	  are	  ecologically	  valid.	  “Do-­‐as-­‐I-­‐do”	  experiments,	  in	  which	  chimpanzees	  are	   trained	  to	  copy	  novel	  actions	  (Hayes	  &	  Hayes,	  1952;	  Custance	  et	  al.,	  1995),	  demonstrate	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   chimpanzees	   to	   learn	   novel	   gestures	   when	  trained	  to	  reproduce	  the	  action	  performed	  by	  a	  human	  demonstrator.	  However,	  whilst	   these	   chimpanzees	   are	   able	   to	   imitate	   the	   actions	   of	   a	   human	  demonstrator,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   these	   human	   reared,	   enculturated	  chimpanzees	  are	  not	  representative	  of	  the	  species	  (Tomasello,	  1996;	  Tomasello	  &	  Call,	  1997).	  Developmentally,	  it	  is	  argued,	  these	  chimpanzees	  have	  been	  reared	  to	  focus	  on	  behaviour	  and	  to	  learn	  as	  humans,	  rather	  than	  chimpanzees,	  do.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  other	  researchers	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  social	  development	  and	  ecology	  of	  captive	  animals	  is	  impoverished	  (McGrew,	  1992;	  Boesch,	  2007;	  Boesch,	  2008;	  Boesch,	  2010).	  These	   researchers	  argue	   that	   the	   study	  of	   captive	  animals	  does	  not	  reveal	   the	   full	   range	  of	  behaviour	  of	  which	   the	  species	  are	  capable.	  Boesch	  (2007;	  2008)	  argues	  that	  the	  social	  conditions	  in	  which	  captive	  animals	  develop	  inhibits	  development	  of	  normal	  social	  processes,	   including	  social	   learning.	  This	  would	  result	  in	  negative	  results	  when	  testing	  for	  imitation	  using	  captive	  animals	  and	   a	   much	   wider	   prevalence	   of	   imitation	   in	   wild	   animals.	   Whilst	   there	   is	  evidence	   of	   the	   spread	   of	   traditions	   in	   the	   wild,	   whether	   social	   learning	   is	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occurring	   is	   difficult	   to	   test	   from	   the	   observations	   (Kendal	   et	   al.,	   2009)	   and,	  therefore	  the	  occurrence	  of	  imitation	  in	  the	  wild	  has	  not	  been	  explicitly	  tested.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  As	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  there	  are	  reports	  of	  imitation	  in	  children	  performing	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  tasks	  (Uzgiris,	  1981;	  Nagell	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Carpenter	   et	   al.,	   1998;	  Gergely	   et	   al.,	   2002;	  Horner	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Nielsen,	   2006;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Several	  studies	  have	  compared	  the	  performance	  of	  children	  and	  chimpanzees	  and	  have	  found	  children	  reproduce	  the	  actions	  produced	  by	  a	  demonstrator	   with	   greater	   fidelity	   than	   do	   chimpanzees	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1996;	  Horner	  et	   al.,	   2006).	  The	   fact	   that	   children	  will	   produce	   functionally	   irrelevant	  actions	   that	   they	   have	   observed	   a	   demonstrator	   produce	   has	   led	   to	   the	  suggestion	  that	  imitation	  has	  a	  social	  role	  for	  children	  as	  well	  as	  being	  a	  learning	  mechanism	  (Uzgiris,	  1981;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Carpenter,	  2006;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009).	   Horner	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   found,	   in	   the	   experiment	   described	   in	   the	  chimpanzee	   section	   above,	   that	   children	   were	   as	   likely	   to	   reproduce	   the	  functionally	   irrelevant	   actions	   when	   using	   a	   transparent	   puzzlebox	   as	   when	  using	   an	   opaque	   one,	   suggesting	   that	   children	   were	   not	   simply	   imitating	   the	  demonstrator	   to	  gain	   the	   rewards.	  Nielsen	   (2006)	   found,	  when	  presenting	  12-­‐,	  18-­‐	   and	   24-­‐month-­‐old	   children	   with	   demonstrations	   of	   puzzleboxes,	   children	  became	   more	   likely	   to	   imitate	   as	   they	   got	   older.	   Twelve-­‐	   month-­‐old	   children	  were	   more	   focussed	   replicating	   the	   outcome,	   emulation,	   than	   copying	   the	  actions;	   18-­‐month-­‐old	   children	   copied	   the	   actions	  of	   demonstrators	  who	  acted	  socially,	   but	   not	   demonstrators	  who	  were	   aloof.	   Finally,	   24-­‐month-­‐olds	   copied	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the	  actions	  of	  the	  demonstrator,	  but	  did	  so	  less	  when	  the	  model	  did	  not	  engage	  socially	  (Nielsen,	  2006).	  	  Whilst	   children	   have	   been	   found	   to	   imitate	   seemingly	   for	   social	   reasons,	   they	  have	  also	  been	  found	  to	   imitate	  rationally.	  When	  models	  signify	  that	   the	  action	  they	   have	   performed	   is	   either	   an	   accident	   (Carpenter	   et	   al.,	   1998),	   or	   due	   to	  extenuating	  physical	  circumstances	  (Gergely	  et	  al.,	  2002),	  children	  are	  less	  likely	  to	   copy	   the	   action	   they	   have	   observed.	   Carpenter	   et	   al.	   (1998)	  manipulated	   a	  series	  of	  objects,	  using	  a	  sequence	  of	  two	  actions.	  In	  some	  action	  sequences	  the	  demonstrator	   would	   perform	   one	   of	   the	   actions	   but	   suggest	   that	   it	   was	  accidental	  by	  exclaiming	  ‘Woops’	  and	  looking	  shocked.	  Children	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  reproduce	  these	  actions	  than	  actions	  that	   they	  were	  shown	  were	   intentional	  (after	   intentional	   actions	   the	   demonstrator	   would	   say	   ‘There’).	   In	   a	   study	   by	  Gergely	  et	  al.	   (2002)	  children	  watched	  a	  demonstrator	   turn	  on	  a	   light	  with	  her	  head.	  For	  half	  of	  the	  children	  the	  demonstrator	  used	  her	  head	  whilst	  her	  hands	  were	   free,	   for	   the	   other	   half	   the	   demonstrator’s	   hands	  were	   holding	   a	   blanket	  around	  her.	  After	  a	  week	  children	  were	  tested	  and	  those	  who	  had	  witnessed	  the	  demonstrator	  with	  her	   hands	   free	  whilst	   operating	   the	   light	  were	   significantly	  more	   likely	   to	  use	   their	  head	   than	   those	  who	  had	  witnessed	   the	  demonstrator	  with	  her	  hands	  full.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  children	  are	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  intentions	   of	   another	   individual	   and	   something	   about	   the	   situation	   of	   that	  individual	  (Carpenter	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Gergely	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Carpenter,	  2006).	  Rational	  imitation	  illustrates	  that	  children	  are	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  individual	  they	  are	  imitating	  and	  drawing	  inferences	  about	  the	  reasons	  actors	  are	  performing	  in	  the	  manner	   that	   they	   are.	   This	   understanding	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   demonstrator,	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combined	  with	  the	  social	  function	  of	  imitation,	  potentially	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  humans	  are	  capable	  of	  high	  fidelity	  information	  transmission,	  and	  how	  imitation	  can	  support	  cumulative	  culture.	  	  
Hypothesis	  4	  
	  
Lack	  of	  prosociality	  in	  non-­humans	  hinders	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  cultural	  traits	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  The	   evolution	   of	   prosociality,	   enabling	   cooperation	   between	   individuals,	  increased	  tolerance	  and	  the	  shared	  motivations	  of	  individuals	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	   support	   the	   evolution	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello	   &	   Call,	   1997;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	  2010).	  The	  argument	  states	   that	   if	   individuals	   cooperate	   they	   will	   be	   able	   to	   work	   on	   one	   task	  together,	  allowing	  naïve	  individuals	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  a	  knowledgeable	  individual,	  and	   thus	   increasing	   the	   chance	   the	   naïve	   will	   learn	   from	   the	   informed	  (Tomasello	  &	  Call,	  1997).	  Working	  together	  also	  allows	  two	  or	  more	  individuals	  to	  discover	  solutions	  to	  a	  task	  and	  to	  pool	  their	  information,	  thus	  providing	  the	  opportunity	  for	  two	  separate	  solutions	  to	  be	  combined	  or	  modified	  (Tomasello,	  1999).	   If	   individuals	   share	  motivations	   they	   are	   able	   to	   recognise	   that	   another	  individual	  has	  a	  goal	  and	  intentions,	  and	  potentially	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  assist	  that	   individual	   to	   achieve	   that	   goal	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   Shared	  intentionality,	   in	  which	   individuals	   are	   able	   to	   recognise	   that	   others,	  who	  may	  not	   even	   be	   present	   at	   the	   time,	   share	   their	   goals	   and	   intentions,	   thereby	  potentially	   facilitates	   the	   modification	   of	   a	   behaviour	   pattern	   by	   many	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individuals,	   over	  many	   generations	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   evolution	   of	   cumulative	  culture	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	  2010).	  	  	  The	   ability	   to	   recognise	   others	   as	   intentional	   agents	   with	   thoughts	   is	   called	  ‘theory	   of	   mind’.	   The	   concept	   of	   theory	   of	   mind	   was	   introduced	   by	   David	  Premack	   and	   Guy	  Woodruff	   in	   1978	   and	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   ability	   to	   attribute	  mental	   states	   to	   others.	   The	   distribution	   of	   theory	   of	   mind	   in	   non-­‐humans	   is	  contested.	   Some	   researchers	   have	   claimed	   that	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   for	   any	  theory	  of	  mind	  in	  any	  species	  except	  humans	  (Povinelli	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  1991;	  Heyes,	  1998).	  Others	  have	   found	  evidence	   for	   some	  aspects	  of	   theory	  of	  mind	   in	  apes	  (Byrne	   &	   Whiten,	   1988;	   Tomasello	   &	   Call,	   1997;	   Hare	   et	   al.,	   2001;	   Call	   &	  Tomasello,	  2008).	  It	   is	  often	  stated	  that	  even	  if	  non-­‐human	  primates	  do	  display	  aspects	   of	   theory	   of	   mind,	   it	   is	   quantitatively	   (and	   possibly	   qualitatively)	  different	  to	  that	  of	  humans	  (Povinelli	  &	  Vonk,	  2003;	  Premack,	  2007;	  Kaminski	  et	  al.,	   2008).	   In	   recent	   work,	   Kaminski	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   experimentally	   examined	  whether	  chimpanzees	  knew	  what	  another,	  focal,	  individual	  knew	  both	  when	  the	  focal	   individual	   was	   correct	   and	   when	   the	   focal	   individual	   was	   mistaken:	   the	  false	   belief	   test.	   By	   pointing	   to	   an	   upturned	   container,	   chimpanzees	   could	  request	   food	   underneath	   it	   and	   were	   given	   the	   food.	   Focal	   individuals	   and	  subjects	   took	   turns	   to	   point	   to	   buckets	   from	  which	   they	  wanted	   to	   gain	   food.	  Using	  this	  paradigm,	  chimpanzees	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  account	  of	  what	  other	   individuals	   knew	   and	   choose	   a	   bucket	   accordingly.	   However,	   when	   the	  experimenter	   swapped	   the	   buckets	   around	   in	   view	   of	   the	   subject	   but	   not	   the	  focal	  individual,	  subjects	  did	  not	  take	  account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  focal	  individual	  now	  had	   false	  beliefs.	  One	  prediction	  of	   theory	  of	  mind	   is	   that	   individuals	  with	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this	  capacity	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  altruistic	  and	  help	  other	  individuals	  as	  they	  will	  be	  equipped	  to	  recognise	  when	  others	  require	  assistance.	  The	  prevalence	  of	  altruism	   and	   cooperation	   in	   non-­‐humans	   has	   been	   used	   as	   a	   clue	   that	   they	  possess	  theory	  of	  mind,	  however	  altruism	  and	  cooperation	  may	  also	  play	  a	  key	  part	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello,	   1999).	   The	   level	   of	  cooperation	   and	   altruism	   in	   humans	   societies	   is	   hypothesised	   to	   be	   unique,	  involving	   the	   division	   of	   labour	   across	   a	   wide	   number	   of	   jobs,	   including	  dangerous	   jobs	  such	  as	   firefighting,	   the	  coordinated	  activity	  of	  vast	  numbers	  of	  individuals	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   institutions	   (Tomasello,	   1999;	   Fehr	   &	  Fischbacher,	  2003;	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2005).	  	  	  
Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  Investigation	  of	  the	  cooperative	  abilities	  and	  altruistic	  tendencies	  of	  capuchins	  is	  a	  recent	  development	  in	  primatology,	  stimulated	  by	  related	  work	  in	  great	  apes.	  Altruistic	   giving	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   capuchins	   in	   certain	   circumstances	  (Brosnan	   et	   al.,	   2010a;	   Lakshminarayanan	   &	   Santos,	   2010;	   Takimoto	   et	   al.,	  2010).	  Lakshminarayan	  and	  Santos	   (2010)	  presented	  capuchins	  with	  a	  version	  of	  the	  dictator	  game,	  derived	  in	  economics,	   in	  which	  they	  could	  pull	  one	  of	  two	  trays	  towards	  them.	  The	  trays	  contained	  two	  rewards,	  one	  that	  the	  subject	  could	  gain	  and	  another	  that	  a	  receiver	  in	  a	  neighbouring	  cage	  could	  take.	  On	  one	  tray	  two	  value	  food	  rewards	  were	  placed,	  on	  the	  other	  the	  subject	  could	  gain	  a	  high-­‐value	   reward	   and	   the	   receiver	   gained	   a	   low-­‐value	   reward.	   The	  monkeys	  were	  found	   to	   pull	   the	   tray	   containing	   high-­‐value	   rewards	   for	   both	   individuals	  towards	   them	   significantly	  more	   than	   chance.	   In	   a	   control	   condition	   in	   which	  there	  was	  no	  neighbouring	   receiver	  monkey,	   individuals	  were	  not	   significantly	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more	   likely	   than	   chance	   to	   pull	   the	   tray	   with	   two	   high-­‐value	   rewards	   on	   it.	  However,	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   conditions.	  Takimoto	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   allowed	   a	   subject	   to	   choose	   between	   two	   boxes	   each	  containing	  two	  rewards,	  one	   for	   them	  and	  one	   for	  a	  partner	   that	  was	   in	  a	  cage	  facing	  them.	  Both	  boxes	  contained	  a	  high-­‐value	  food	  reward	  for	  the	  subject,	  but	  one	  box	  contained	  a	  low-­‐value	  reward	  for	  the	  recipient	  and	  the	  other	  box	  a	  high-­‐value	   reward.	   Subjects	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   act	   altruistically,	   choosing	   the	  mutually	   high-­‐rewarding	   box,	   when	   paired	   with	   an	   individual	   subordinate	   to	  themselves	  than	  when	  paired	  against	  an	  empty	  cage.	  However,	  when	  a	  dominant	  individual	  was	   their	   partner,	   they	  were	   no	  more	   likely	   to	   choose	   the	   altruistic	  reward	  than	  they	  did	  when	  operating	  alone	  (Takimoto	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  in	  particular	  situations	  capuchins	  may	  behave	  altruistically,	  but	  that	  altruism	  is	  not	  universal	   in	  capuchin	  populations	  and	  may	  be	  applied	  for	  social	  gain	  within	  a	  population.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  The	   performance	   of	   chimpanzees	   in	   cooperation	   and	   altruism	   tasks	   also	  indicates	   that	   there	   are	   only	   a	   subset	   of	   situations	   in	   which	   they	   will	   assist	  another	   unrelated	   individual	   (Silk	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Jensen	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   2007;	  Warneken	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Yamamoto	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Melis	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Some	  of	  these	  experiments	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   chimpanzees	   are	   capable	   of	   altruism,	  helping	   experimenters	   and	   conspecifics	   to	   obtain	   objects,	   including	   food	  (Warneken	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Yamamoto	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Melis	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Until	  recently	  it	  had	  been	  proposed	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  food	  inhibited	  altruism	  in	  chimpanzees	  (Silk	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Jensen	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   However	   a	   recent	   study	   by	   Melis	   et	   al.	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(2010)	  found	  that	  chimpanzees	  assisted	  a	  conspecific	  to	  gain	  a	  food	  reward,	  by	  releasing	  a	  peg	  that	  allowed	  their	  partner	  to	  pull	  a	  reward	  towards	  itself.	  There	  do	   seem	   to	   be	   particular	   conditions	   in	   which	   chimpanzees	   will	   be	   altruistic:	  Firstly,	  altruism	  has	  been	  found	  where	  individuals	  have	  been	  able	  to	  solicit	  help	  from	   the	   experimental	   subject,	   by	   shaking	   bars	   and	   by	   gestural	   and	   vocal	  communication	  (Yamamoto	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Melis	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  in	  the	  same	  way	  it	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  meat	  is	  shared	  in	  the	  wild	  to	  avoid	  harassment	  (Gilby,	  2006).	  Secondly,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  reward	  for	  the	  subject	  as	  well	  as	  the	  recipient	  seems	  to	   distract	   the	   subject,	   potentially	   distracting	   them	   from	   making	   altruistic	  decisions	  (Silk	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Jensen	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  	  A	  mixed	  and	  complicated	  picture	  of	  altruism	  in	  chimpanzees	  emerges	  from	  these	  studies,	  however	  it	  could	  be	  summarised	  that	  chimpanzees	  are	  able	  to	  cooperate	  and	  to	  recognise	  the	  goals	  of	  others	  and	  assist	  them,	  but	  only	  in	  certain	  contexts,	  such	   as	   when	   an	   individual	   is	   not	   distracted	   with	   food	   for	   itself	   or	   when	   an	  individual	   is	   begged	   from	   (Warneken	   &	   Tomasello,	   2009).	   Indeed,	   in	   most	  situations	   chimpanzees	   have	   been	   found	   to	   be	   competitive,	   rather	   than	  cooperative	  (Hare,	  2001;	  Hare	  &	  Tomasello,	  2004).	  	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  The	  altruism	  and	  cooperation	  shown	  by	  humans	   is	  regularly	  argued	  to	  be	  very	  much	   more	   prevalent	   than	   that	   in	   non-­‐human	   primates	   (Fehr	   &	   Fischbacher,	  2003;	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2005;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Warneken	  and	  Tomasello	  (2009),	   in	   a	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   altruism	   in	   children	   and	   chimpanzees,	  find	  that	   there	  are	  many	  more	  situations	   in	  which	  children	  have	  been	   found	  to	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behave	  altruistically	  than	  chimpanzees.	  Children	  will	  help	  another	  individual	  to	  achieve	   a	   task,	   such	   as	   cleaning	   up,	   which	   has	   no	   personal	   gain	   for	   them	  (Rheingold,	  1982).	  Children	  as	  young	  as	  12	  months	  will	  also	  help	  an	  adult	   find	  something	   that	   they	   are	   looking	   for	   by	   pointing	   out	   the	   correct	   location,	   even	  when	  there	  is	  no	  reward	  for	  the	  child	  (Liszkowski	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  When	  tested	  with	  a	  barrage	  of	   tasks,	   including	  assisting	  a	  naïve	  adult	  carry	  out	  a	  task,	  picking	  up	  objects	  that	  had	  been	  dropped,	  handing	  an	  experimenter	  an	  out	  of	  reach	  object	  and	  removing	  an	  obstacle	   (such	  as	  opening	  a	  door),	   children	  were	  observed	   to	  offer	  help	  over	  a	  range	  of	  the	  tasks	  (Warneken	  &	  Tomasello,	  2006).	  A	  control,	  in	  which	   the	   demonstrator	   signified	   that	   an	   action	   was	   deliberate	   (for	   example,	  throwing	   an	   object	   on	   the	   floor,	   rather	   than	   dropping	   it)	   allowed	   for	   an	  assessment	  of	  the	  subjects	  comprehension	  of	  the	  demonstrator’s	  need.	  Although	  not	   all	   children	   behaved	   altruistically	   in	   all	   situations,	   children	   behaved	  altruistically	  in	  60%	  of	  the	  trials	  across	  a	  range	  of	  situations.	  	  
	  Comparative	  and	  developmental	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  humans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  cooperative	  than	  non-­‐humans	  and	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  social	  difference	  in	   which	   humans	   are	   able	   to	   recognise	   that	   others	   have	   goals	   and	   intentions	  (Tomasello	  &	  Call,	  1997;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	  2010).	  The	  ability	  to	  view	  others	  as	  intentional	  agents	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  allow	  shared	  cooperative	  activities	  to	  be	  carried	  out,	  the	  evolution	  of	  imitation	  and,	   through	   these	   processes,	   the	   evolution	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	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Hypothesis	  5	  
	  
Scrounging,	  or	  being	  scrounged	  from,	  hinders	  the	  likelihood	  of	  learning	  (Giraldeau	  &	  Lefebvre,	  1987;	  Lefebvre	  &	  Helder,	  1997).	  
	  Scrounging,	   or	   kleptoparasitism,	  may	   be	   a	  way	   in	  which	   some	   individuals	   can	  exploit	  others	  to	  gain	  a	   food,	  or	  other	  type	  of,	  reward.	  Scrounging	   is	  defined	  as	  the	   parasitizing	   of	   the	   food	   discoveries	   of	   other	   individuals	   (Giraldeau	   &	  Lefebvre,	   1987).	   Some	   studies	   have	   found	   a	   correlation	   between	   the	   level	   of	  scounging	   that	   individuals	   perpetuate	   and	   the	   amount	   that	   they	   learn	   socially,	  however	   this	   relationship	   is	   not	   always	   positive	   (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	   1987;	  Beauchamp	   &	   Kacelnik,	   1991;	   Lefebvre	   &	   Helder,	   1997;	   Midford	   et	   al.,	   2000;	  Caldwell	  &	  Whiten,	  2003).	  	  	  There	   are	   conflicting	   findings	   regarding	   the	   effect	   of	   scrounging	   on	   social	  learning.	   Some	   investigators	   have	   found	   that	   when	   given	   the	   opportunity	   to	  scrounge,	   social	   learning	   was	   inhibited	   in	   observers	   (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	  1987;	   Lefebvre	   &	   Helder,	   1997).	   It	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   when	   able	   to	  scrounge,	   individuals	   do	  not	   learn	   cues	   about	   the	   task	   from	   the	   demonstrator,	  but	   rather	   learn	   that	   the	   demonstrator	   itself	   is	   a	   cue	   for	   scrounging	  opportunities	   (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	   1987;	   Beauchamp	   &	   Kacelnik,	   1991).	   If	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  scrounge	  and	  subsequently	  learn	  to	  associate	  a	  producer	  with	  the	  reward,	  rather	  than	   learning	  about	  the	  task,	   then	  the	  solution	  will	  not	  spread	   in	   the	   population.	   Scrounging	   thereby	   restricts	   the	   spread	   of	   social	  information,	  thus	  hindering	  cumulative	  culture.	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  In	   experiments	  with	   pigeons,	   both	   individually	   housed	   and	   flock-­‐housed	   birds	  have	   been	   tested	   to	   examine	   the	   effect	   of	   scrounging	   (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	  1987;	  Lefebvre	  &	  Helder,	  1997).	  When	  pigeons	   in	  a	   flock	  were	  able	   to	   remove	  stoppers	   from	   test	   tubes	   to	   obtain	   a	   food	   reward	   that	   consisted	   of	   some	   seed,	  scroungers	   were	   able	   to	   eat	   some	   of	   the	   food	   found	   (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	  1987).	  When	  in	  a	  flock,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  pigeons	  that	  scrounged	  more	  tended	  to	  associate	  more	  with	   the	   individuals	   that	  were	   skilled	  at	  opening	   the	   test	   tubes	  than	   with	   other	   scroungers.	   The	   level	   of	   association	   was	   correlated	   with	   the	  success	   rate	   of	   the	   skilled	   individuals.	   However,	   it	   was	   unclear	   whether	  scroungers	  were	  learning	  anything	  about	  the	  test	  tubes	  through	  this	  association	  with	   skilled	   individuals.	   In	   an	   experiment	   with	   caged	   pigeons,	   Giraldeau	   and	  Levebvre	   (1987)	   allowed	   trained	   demonstrators	   to	   open	   test	   tubes	   to	   reveal	  food,	   with	   an	   observer	   watching	   from	   a	   separate	   cage.	   In	   one	   condition	   the	  demonstrator	   was	   able	   to	   gain	   all	   of	   the	   food,	   In	   a	   second	   condition	   the	  demonstrator	   still	   removed	   the	   stopper	   from	   the	   test	   tube,	   but	   a	   tilted	   tray	  beneath	   meant	   that	   the	   seed	   rolled	   towards	   the	   observer.	   In	   the	   scrounging	  condition	  only	  two	  of	  the	  eight	  observers	  subsequently	  showed	  any	  tube	  opening	  behaviour,	  compared	  to	  eight	  of	  eight	  in	  the	  non-­‐scrounging	  condition	  (Giraldeau	  &	  Lefebvre,	  1987).	  	  	  In	  contrast	   to	   the	   findings	  above,	  other	  studies	  have	   indicated	  that	   	  scrounging	  can	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  individuals	  socially	  learning	  from	  a	  demonstrator	  (Midford	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Caldwell	   &	  Whiten,	   2003).	  Midford	   et	   al.	   (2000)	   trained	  florida	   scrub	   jays	   (Aphelocoma	   coerulescens)	   to	   forage	   in	   a	   novel	   location.	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Peanuts	   were	   buried	   in	   sand	   contained	   in	   a	   ring	   of	   plastic	   and	   in	   subsequent	  years	   the	  performance	  of	   juvenile	  birds	   in	   the	   families	  was	   tested.	  There	  were	  three	  conditions,	  one	   in	  which	   trained	  adult	  birds	  were	  able	   to	  gain	   four	   to	  six	  pieces	   of	   peanut	   and	   juveniles	   were	   able	   to	   scrounge	   from	   them.	   In	   a	   second	  condition,	   untrained	   adults	   were	   able	   to	   find	   four	   to	   six	   pieces	   of	   food	   with	  juveniles	  present.	  The	  final	  condition	  was	  a	  no-­‐scrounging	  condition	  in	  which	  the	  	  demonstrator	  who	  recovered	  the	  reward	  was	  able	  to	  monopolise	  it	  and	  eat	  it	  all.	  Of	  41	  scrub	  jays	  exposed	  to	  the	  scrounging	  condition,	  when	  subsequently	  tested	  seven	  learned	  to	  locate	  the	  reward,	  but	  over	  50%	  learned	  to	  enter	  the	  circle	  and	  dig,	   though	  not	   in	   the	  centre.	  None	  of	   the	   juveniles	   in	   the	  scrounging	  condition	  were	   able	   to	   learn	   to	   dig	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   circle,	   although	   they	  were	  more	  likely	   to	   enter	   the	   circle	   and	   dig	   than	   those	   individuals	   in	   the	   no-­‐scrounging	  condition.	  Therefore	  in	  this	  case,	  although	  the	  solving	  rate	  was	  low,	  scrounging	  provided	  an	  advantage	  to	  juveniles	  in	  learning	  the	  behaviour.	  	  Caldwell	   and	  Whiten	   (2003)	   also	   found	   that	   scrounging	   facilitated	   learning	   in	  common	   marmosets	   (Callitrhrix	   jaccus).	   In	   this	   experiment	   individuals	   could	  learn	   either	   from	   observing	   a	   demonstrator	   extracting	   a	   reward	   from	   a	  puzzlebox	  through	  a	  wire	  mesh,	  or	  from	  within	  the	  same	  cage,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  observer	  could	  scrounge	  from	  the	  demonstrator.	  There	  were	  control	  conditions	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  effect	  of	  social	  facilitation.	  Caldwell	  and	  Whiten	  found	  that	  in	  the	  scrounging	  condition	  marmosets	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  learn	  to	  open	  the	  puzzlebox	  than	  those	  in	  the	  purely	  observational	  condition.	  They	  suggest	  this	  may	   be	   due	   to	   the	   close	   attention	   paid	   by	   the	   observers	   in	   the	   scrounging	  condition	   to	   the	   demonstration.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   ability	   to	   scrounge	   allowed	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closer	  observation	  of	  the	  procedure	  and	  allowed	  the	  observer	  to	  attend	  to	  cues	  of	   the	   puzzlebox,	   rather	   than	   simply	   associating	   the	   demonstrator	   with	   food.	  This	   observation	   allows	   the	   scrounger	   to	   learn	   a	   behaviour	   pattern	   more	  efficiently.	  	  There	   has	   been	   little	   examination	   of	   the	   affect	   of	   scrounging	   on	   the	  demonstrator.	  However,	  a	  study	  by	  Drea	  and	  Wallen	  (1999)	  described	  in	  depth	  in	   hypothesis	   7,	   suggests	   that	   demonstrators	  who	   fall	   victim	   to	   a	   high	   level	   of	  scrounging	   may	   cease	   to	   perform	   the	   behaviour.	   This	   would	   hinder	   social	  learning	   as	   there	  would	  be	   fewer	  demonstrators	   from	  whom	  other	   individuals	  could	  socially	   learn.	  If	  a	  task	  has	  several	  different	  solutions,	  as	  may	  be	  the	  case	  for	  cumulative	  culture,	  ‘playing	  dumb’	  after	  being	  scrounged	  from	  would	  inhibit	  the	   ability	   of	   individuals	   to	   discover	   better	   and	  more	   complex	   solutions.	   This	  would	   mean	   that	   cumulative	   innovations	   would	   not	   be	   introduced	   into	   the	  population,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   it	   would	   mean	   cumulative	  modifications	  would	  not	  be	  added	  to	  a	  behaviour	  pattern.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  Capuchins	   have	   a	   linear	   dominance	   hierarchy	   and	   higher-­‐ranking	   individuals	  have	   been	   found	   to	   scrounge	   from	   lower-­‐ranking	   individuals	   in	   the	   wild	   (Di	  Bitetti	  &	  Janson,	  2001b).	  Some	  capuchin	  groups	  use	  stones	  to	  crack	  nuts	   in	  the	  wild	   (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004a).	  This	   tool-­‐using	  behaviour	  seems	   to	  be	  difficult	   to	  master,	  with	  individuals	  taking	  a	  number	  of	  years	  to	  learn	  and	  some	  individuals	  being	  more	  skilled	  nut	  crackers	  than	  others	  (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004a;	  Ottoni	  &	  Izar,	  2008).	  Examining	  whether	   individuals	  preferentially	  observed	  more	  skilled	  nut	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crackers,	  Ottoni	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  that	  observers	  scrounged	  nut	  meat	  in	  35%	  of	  the	   cases	   in	   which	   an	   observer	   was	   watching	   a	   skilled	   nut	   cracker.	   Although	  observers	   are	   significantly	   more	   likely	   to	   observe	   an	   individual	   that	   is	   more	  skilled	  than	  they	  are,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  observers	  or	  scroungers	  learn	  to	  nut	   crack	   quicker	   than	   non-­‐observers	   or	   non-­‐scroungers.	   Therefore,	   although	  scrounging	  is	  observed	  in	  capuchins,	  the	  effect	  on	  learning	  is	  unclear.	  	  
	  
Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  wild	  low-­‐ranking	  chimpanzees	  tend	  to	  change	  their	  feeding	  behaviour	  to	  avoid	  being	  scrounged	  from	  by	  higher-­‐ranking	  individuals	  (Goodall,	   1986;	   Carson	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Gilby,	   2006),	   although	   high-­‐ranking	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  displace	  low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  from	  a	  high-­‐value	  food	   resource	   and	   monopolise	   it,	   rather	   than	   just	   scrounge	   from	   low-­‐ranking	  individuals.	  In	  these	  situations	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  any	  behaviour	  is	  being	  learned.	  In	   a	   food-­‐sharing	   experiment	   in	   captivity,	   Ueno	   and	   Matsuzawa	   (2004)	   gave	  chimpanzee	   mothers	   food	   items	   whilst	   in	   proximity	   to	   their	   infants.	   Mother-­‐initiated	   and	   infant-­‐initiated	   food	   transfers	   differed,	   with	   infants	   being	   more	  likely	  to	  scrounge	  edible	  parts	  of	  the	  food	  than	  mothers	  were	  likely	  to	  donate.	  A	  mixture	   of	   novel	   and	   familiar	   food	   items	   were	   given	   to	   the	   mother,	   but	   no	  significant	  difference	  was	  found	  between	  the	  type	  of	  food	  taken	  by	  the	  infant	  and	  there	   was	   no	   subsequent	   food	   preference	   testing	   (Ueno	   &	   Matsusaka,	   2004).	  Therefore,	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	   that	   infants	   learned	  anything	  about	   the	   food	   in	  this	  experiment.	  Hopper	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  in	  the	  ghost	  condition	  of	  a	  social	  learning	  experiment,	  sought	  to	  replicate	  the	  opportunity	  of	  individuals	  for	  scrounging,	  by	  allowing	   them	   to	   take	   the	   reward	   in	   1	   out	   of	   every	   20	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	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demonstrations	   they	   observed.	  Whilst	   this	  may	  have	   had	  positive	   effects	   upon	  the	   learning,	   as	   Hopper	   et	   al.	   (2007)	  were	   not	   interested	   in	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	  learning	   regime,	   there	  was	   no	   no-­‐scrounging	   control.	  Whilst	   there	   is	   evidence	  that	  chimpanzees	  scrounge	  from	  other	  individuals,	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  on	  learning	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  examined	  experimentally.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  Most	  experimental	  studies	  of	  social	  learning	  with	  children	  rely	  on	  dyadic	  testing,	  in	  which	  one	  the	  observer	  is	  told	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  ‘It	  will	  be	  your	  turn	  in	  a	  minute’,	   therefore	  minimising	   the	  chance	   for	  scrounging	   to	   take	  place	  (e.g.	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005).	  Recently,	  open	  diffusion	  experiments	  have	  taken	  place	  in	   which	   skilled	   demonstrators	   are	   placed	   into	   a	   group	   of	   naïve	   children	   and	  there	  are	  no	  controls	  upon	  how	  the	  technique	  is	  demonstrated	  (Flynn	  &	  Whiten,	  2010;	   Whiten	   &	   Flynn,	   2010).	   Flynn	   and	   Whiten	   (2010)	   report	   that	   in	   one	  experiment	  14%	  of	  the	  rewards	  were	  scrounged,	  being	  stolen	  by	  individuals	  who	  had	   not	   manipulated	   the	   puzzlebox	   to	   open	   it.	   They	   do	   not	   examine	   whether	  these	   scrounging	   events	   have	   an	   impact	   upon	   the	   likelihood	   of	   learning	   the	  solution.	  Whilst	   the	   focus	   in	   human	   children	  has	   often	   been	  working	   together,	  sharing	   motivations	   and	   rewards	   (Tomasello,	   1999;	   Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005),	  there	   remains	   a	  possibility	   that	   stealing	   the	   rewards	  of	   another	   individual	  will	  also	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  learning.	  	  	  The	  effects	  of	  scrounging	  on	  demonstrators	  and	  observers	  reported	  in	  previous	  experiments	  does	  not	  give	  an	  unambiguous	  pattern	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  effect	  on	  social	   learning.	   This	   effect	   may	   differ	   between	   those	   species	   with	   linear	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hierarchies,	   such	   as	   capuchins	   and	   chimpanzees,	   and	   in	   more	   egalitarian	  societies,	  such	  as	  humans.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  in	  those	  learning	  studies	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  to	  scrounge,	  scrounging	  has	  occurred	  in	  human	  children.	  In	  the	  three	  species	  studied	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  effects	  of	  scrounging	  on	  learning	  have	  not	  been	  thoroughly	  examined.	  	  	  
Hypotheses	  6	  	  
Dominant	   individuals	  monopolise	   resources	  preventing	   lower	   ranking	   individuals	  
gaining	  access,	  thereby	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  with	  the	  chance	  to	  solve	  
the	  task	  (Coussi-­‐Korbel	  &	  Fragaszy,	  1995;	  Lavallee,	  1999).	  	  Tolerance	  and	   the	  ability	  of	   individuals	   to	  monopolise	   	   resources	  may	  have	  an	  impact	   on	   the	   likelihood	   of	   innovations	   occurring	   and	   spreading.	   If	   each	  individual	  has	  an	  equal	  chance	  of	  finding	  a	  solution,	  as	  population	  size	  increases	  there	   is	   a	   greater	   likelihood	   that	   the	   population	  will	   find	   a	   solution	   (Bertram,	  1978;	  Day	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  In	  a	  review	  of	  the	  primate	  literature,	  Reader	  and	  Laland	  (2001)	   found	   that	   there	   were	   more	   reports	   of	   innovations	   in	   low-­‐ranking	  individuals	   than	   high-­‐	   or	   mid-­‐ranking	   individuals.	   If	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	  have	  a	  greater	  propensity	  to	  innovate	  than	  high-­‐ranking	  individuals	  but	  are	  not	  able	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   a	   task,	   then	   the	   necessary	   innovation	   for	   dealing	  with	   a	  particular	   task	   may	   not	   be	   discovered	   and	   the	   population	   will	   not	   learn	   the	  solution	  to	  the	  task,	  nor	  be	  able	  to	  exhibit	  cumulative	  social	  learning.	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Most	   primate	   species	   live	   within	   complex	   social	   environments,	   including	  complex	   fission-­‐fusion	   societies,	   sometimes	   involving	   over	   100	   individuals	  which	   split	   into	   smaller	   bands,	   often	   of	   unrelated	   individuals	   (Dunbar,	   1988;	  Wrangham	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Cheney	  &	  Seyfarth,	  2007).	  It	  has	  been	  hypothesised	  that	  the	   social	   environment	   has	   had	   an	   important	   impact	   upon	   brain	   evolution,	  particularly	   of	   primates	   (Jolly,	   1966;	  Humphrey,	   1976;	   Byrne	  &	  Whiten,	   1988;	  Dunbar,	   1992;	   Dunbar,	   1998).	   The	   social,	   or	   Machiavellian,	   intelligence	  hypothesis	  argues	   that	   increased	  social	  complexity	  creates	  a	  selection	  pressure	  for	  higher	  intelligence.	  	  	  Primate	  social	  structure	  differs	  between	  species,	   in	  some	  cases	  between	  closely	  related	  species	  (Wrangham,	  1987;	  Coussi-­‐Korbel	  &	  Fragaszy,	  1995;	  Thierry	  et	  al.,	  2000;	   2008).	   Social	   structure	   is	   normally	   measured	   by	   factors	   such	   as	   the	  dominance	   gradient	   (the	   ability	   of	   low	   ranking	   individuals	   to	   win	   fights	   with	  higher	   ranking	   individuals),	   amount	   of	   social	   play,	   the	   intensity	   of	   aggression	  within	   populations	   and	   the	   frequency	   of	   conciliatory	   displays	   (Thierry	   et	   al.,	  2008).	  Accordingly,	  Coussi-­‐Korbel	  and	  Fragaszy	  (1995)	  proposed	  a	  relationship	  between	   the	   social	   system	   and	   the	   patterns	   of	   social	   learning	   observed	   in	   a	  species.	  They	  proposed	  that	  in	  those	  species	  with	  a	  highly	  despotic	  social	  system,	  characterised	  by	  a	  high	  dominance	  gradient,	   there	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  vertical	   social	  transmission	   and	   only	   limited	   horizontal	   transmission.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   highly	  egalitarian	  societies	  they	  expect	  social	  transmission	  to	  occur	  evenly	  throughout	  the	  population.	  This	   is	  due	   to	   the	   tolerance	  of	  other	   individuals,	  particularly	   in	  situations	  where	  resources-­‐	  either	  food	  or	  mating	  opportunities-­‐	  are	  available.	  If	  individuals	  in	  a	  population	  are	  tolerant	  of	  other	  individuals	  in	  proximity	  to	  them,	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then	   the	   chance	   of	   observing	   a	   behaviour	   pattern	   and	   socially	   learning	   that	  behavioural	  trait	  are	  increased.	  	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  examples	  in	  which	  access	  has	  been	  restricted	  to	  a	  task	  by	  a	   dominant	   individual.	   In	   a	   series	   of	   experiments	   that	   exposed	   three	   lemur	  species	   to	  a	  novel	   foraging	   task	   it	  was	   found	   that	   female	  dominance	  and	   inter-­‐male	  social	  dominance	  decreased	   the	  amount	  of	   time	  certain	   individuals	   in	   the	  population	  were	  able	   to	   spend	   in	  proximity	  of	   the	  puzzlebox	   (Fornasieri	   et	   al.,	  1990;	   Anderson	   et	   al.,	   1992).	   For	   example,	   in	   a	   study	   of	   ring-­‐tailed	   lemurs	  (Lemur	   catta)	   the	   dominant	   female	   prevented	   a	   young	   male,	   who	   was	   more	  efficient	   at	   opening	   the	   puzzlebox,	   from	   gaining	   access	   to	   it	   (Fornasieri	   et	   al.,	  1990).	  Similarly	   in	  a	  group	  of	  brown	  lemurs	  (Eulemur	   fulvus)	   it	  was	   found	  that	  whilst	  two	  males	  learned	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  gain	  a	  food	  reward	  from	  it,	  the	  more	  dominant	  male	  started	   to	  monopolise	   the	  puzzlebox	  (Anderson	  et	  al.,	  1992).	  	  	  	  
Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  In	  an	  experiment	  investigating	  tool	  use	  in	  free-­‐ranging	  captive	  brown	  capuchins	  (Cebus	   apella),	   Lavallee	   (1999)	   reported	   that	   the	   alpha	  male	  would	   frequently	  chase	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   away	   from	   the	   tree	   stump	   that	   contained	  resources	   of	   honey.	   Out	   of	   a	   group	   of	   11	   individuals,	   four	   never	   had	   the	  opportunity	   to	   interact	   with	   the	   task	   and	   others	  were	   also	   constrained	   in	   the	  amount	   of	   time	   they	   could	   spend	   at	   the	   resource.	   There	   are	   also	   examples	   of	  experiments	  in	  which	  care	  has	  been	  taken	  to	  avoid	  task	  monopolisation	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  maximal	  opportunities	   for	   social	   learning.	  The	  precautions	   required	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depend	   upon	   the	   experimental	   design	   of	   the	   study.	   In	   transmission	   chain	  designs,	   one	   individual	   is	   trained	   to	   perform	   a	   behaviour	   and	   acts	   as	  demonstrator	   to	  another	   individual,	  whereupon	   the	   first	   individual	   is	   removed	  and	  the	  second	  acts	  as	  a	  demonstrator	  for	  a	  third	  individual	  and	  so	  on	  (Mesoudi	  &	   Whiten,	   2008).	   In	   this	   protocol	   there	   is	   often	   careful	   choosing	   of	  demonstration	  partners	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  rank	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  demonstrator	  is	  displaced	  before	  being	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  technique	  to	  the	  observer,	  or	  the	  observer	  inhibited	  from	  interacting	  with	  the	  task,	  although	  this	   still	   occurs	   on	   occasions.	  A	   transmission-­‐chain	   experiment	  with	   capuchins	  by	   Dindo	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   involved	   careful	   selection	   of	   animals	   paired	   together	  during	   the	   trial	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   demonstrator	   was	   always	   slightly	   higher	  ranked	  than	  the	  observer.	  	  	  
Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  From	  the	  wild	  there	  are	  reports	  of	  individuals	  monopolising	  plant	  food	  resources	  (Goodall,	   1986)	   and	   attempting	   to	  monopolise	  meat,	   but	   being	   forced	   to	   share	  due	  to	  harassment	  (Mitani	  &	  Watts,	  2001).	  In	  captivity,	  dominant	  individuals	  can	  use	   aggression	   to	   displace	   lower-­‐ranking	   individuals	   during	   feeding	   times,	  necessitating	   training	   regimes	   to	  ensure	  all	   animals	   can	  be	   fed	   (Bloomsmith	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  	  When	   training	   experimental	   demonstrators	   in	   chimpanzee	   populations,	   there	  are	   also	   examples	   of	   experiments	   in	   which	   care	   has	   been	   taken	   to	   avoid	   task	  monopolisation	   in	   order	   to	   provide	  maximal	   opportunities	   for	   social	   learning.	  The	   precautions	   required	   depend	   upon	   the	   experimental	   design	   of	   the	   study.	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Some	   experimenters	   using	   a	   seeded	   open	   diffusion,	   a	   protocol	   in	   which	   the	  behaviour	  of	  interest	  is	  introduced	  into	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  with	  one	  (or	  more)	  individuals	  trained	  as	  demonstrators	  (Whiten	  &	  Mesoudi,	  2008),	  use	  a	  design	  in	  which	  only	  the	  demonstrator	  can	  interact	  with	  a	  puzzlebox	  when	  the	  puzzlebox	  is	   first	   introduced.	  By	  doing	  this	  and	  by	  choosing	  a	  high	  ranking	  demonstrator,	  experimentors	  avoid	   the	  puzzlebox	  being	  monopolised	  by	  unskilled	   individuals	  before	  the	  demonstrator	  has	  been	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  behaviour	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Hopper	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  Social	  ranks	  are	  observed	  in	  children,	  with	  social	  hierarchies	  emerging	  in	  newly	  formed	  groups	  of	  children	  (Coie	  &	  Kupersmidt,	  1983;	  Dodge,	  1983).	  Social	  rank	  is	   often	  measured	   as	   popularity	   in	   children,	   rather	   than	   the	   competitive	   rank	  measured	   in	  non-­‐human	  animals	   (Coie	   et	   al.,	   1982).	   Indeed	   in	  human	   children	  the	  highest-­‐ranking	  children	  are	  those	  that	  engage	  in	   less	  aggressive	  behaviour	  and	   bullying	   and	   engage	   in	  more	   prosocial	   behaviour.	   Children	  who	   regularly	  defect	   from	   these	   norms	   gained	   unpopularity	   (Coie	   &	   Kupersmidt,	   1983;	  Salmivalli	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  This	  research	  suggests	  that	  the	  highest-­‐status	  individuals	  in	  groups	  of	  human	  children	  are	  those	  most	   likely	   to	  be	  those	  that	  will	  share	  a	  resource	  with	  others.	  Low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  attempt	  to	  monopolise	  a	  resource,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  effective	  that	  monopolisation	  would	  be.	  	  	  Most	  diffusion	  experiments	  involving	  students	  involve	  adult	  demonstrators	  and	  simple	  dyadic	  experimental	  design	  (Whiten	  &	  Flynn,	  2010).	  In	  dyads	  of	  children	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one	   individual	   can	   be	   explicitly	   instructed	   to	   wait	   their	   turn	   whilst	   another	  individual	  performs	  a	  task	  (e.g.	  Horner	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  adult	  experimenter	  who	  gives	  explicit	  instructions,	  children	  will	  not	  displace	  others,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   typical	   of	   a	   group	   of	   children	   acting	   without	   adult	  instruction.	  	  In	   a	   seeded	   diffusion	   study,	   Whiten	   and	   Flynn	   (2010)	   trained	   demonstrators	  they	   had	   identified	   as	   high	   ranking	   based	   upon	   questioning	   the	   teachers.	   The	  ranks	   were	   assigned	   both	   by	   perceived	   popularity	   in	   the	   class	   and	   perceived	  likelihood	  at	  winning	  a	   toy	   in	  a	   confrontation.	  The	  demonstrators	  picked	  were	  ranked	  in	  the	  top	  two	  most	  popular	  children	  in	  their	  respective	  classes.	  Despite	  this,	  and	  the	  fact	  the	  demonstrators	  were	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  puzzlebox,	  in	  the	   experimental	   condition	   demonstrators	   were	   not	   the	   first	   individuals	   to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  monopolise	  it.	  Indeed,	  as	  discussed	  earlier,	  both	  children	  were	  observed	  to	  instruct	  others	  how	  to	  use	  the	  puzzlebox.	  Thus	   despite	   their	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   group,	   these	   children	   did	   not	  monopolise	  the	  resource	  and	  even	  encouraged	  others	  to	  use	  it	  using	  the	  correct	  method.	  	  As	   chimpanzees	   and	   capuchins	   have	   a	   similar	   social	   structure	   with	   a	   linear	  dominance	  hierarchy,	  it	  may	  be	  expected	  that	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  monopolise	  a	   task,	   whereas	   children,	   in	   a	   more	   egalitarian	   society,	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	  dominate	   a	   task.	   As	   more	   individuals	   are	   able	   to	   interact	   with	   a	   task	   the	  likelihood	  of	  innovation,	  including	  cumulative	  modifications,	  being	  discovered	  is	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increased	  (Bertram,	  1978),	  especially	  as	  it	   is	  often	  subordinate	  individuals	  who	  may	  innovate	  (Reader	  &	  Laland,	  2003).	  	  
Hypothesis	  7	  	  
Lack	  of	  attention	  to	  low-­ranking	  and/or	  juvenile	  individuals	  hinders	  learning	  from	  
potentially	   skilled	   sections	   of	   the	   population	   (Nicol	   &	   Pope,	   1999;	   Biro	   et	   al.,	  2003).	  
	  Social	   learning	   biases	   may	   offer	   individuals	   a	   useful	   learning	   strategy	   for	  deciding	   from	   which	   individual	   they	   should	   learn	   (Laland,	   2004).	   Whilst,	   on	  average,	  a	  simple	   to	  apply	  bias	  such	  as	   ‘copy	  high-­‐ranking	   individuals’	  or	   ‘copy	  adults’	   may	   be	   reliable	   at	   gaining	   information,	   it	   has	   the	   disadvantage	   that	  individuals	   may	   risk	   missing	   new	   innovations.	   If	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   are	  more	  likely	  to	  innovate	  than	  high	  ranking,	  ignoring	  them	  completely	  would	  mean	  an	   individual	   would	   not	   learn	   about	   new	   innovations,	   including	   cumulative	  modifications	  to	  existing	  behavioural	  patterns.	  	  
	  Social	   learning	   strategies,	   which	   specify	   when,	   and	   from	   whom,	   an	   individual	  should	   learn	   have	   become	   the	   focus	   of	   recent	   attention	   by	   social	   learning	  researchers	   (Laland,	   2004;	   Galef,	   2009b;	   Laland	   et	   al.,	   In	   press;	   Rendell	   et	   al.,	  Submitted).	   Social	   learning	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   both	   energetically	   cheaper	   and	  less	   risky	   than	   asocial	   learning	   	   (Boyd	   &	   Richerson,	   1985;	   Rogers,	   1988).	  However,	   if	   an	   individual	   simply	   copied	   from	   another	   at	   random	   there	   is	   a	  chance	   that	   they	   may	   gain	   outdated	   or	   incorrect	   information,	   therefore	   the	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choice	   of	   demonstrator	   is	   important.	   	   Boyd	   and	   Richerson	   (1985)	   proposed	   a	  number	   of	   transmission	   biases.	   Some	   of	   these	   are	   direct	   biases,	   based	   on	   an	  assessment	   directly	   related	   to	   the	   task	   (e.g.	   a	   bias	   towards	   copying	   successful	  individuals),	   whilst	   others	   are	   indirect	   biases	   (e.g.	   copying	   older	   individuals,	  because	   they	  may	   be	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   successful).	   Such	   strategies	   have	   been	  described	   as	   ‘directed	   social	   learning’	   in	   which	   animals	   direct	   their	   attention	  towards	  some	  individuals	  to	  learn	  from	  them,	  and	  ignoring	  or	  being	  unlikely	  to	  learn	   from	   others	   (Coussi-­‐Korbel	   &	   Fragaszy,	   1995).	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	  indirect	   biases	   may	   be	   cognitively	   less	   demanding	   than	   direct	   biases	   (Laland,	  2004).	   Using	   a	   general	   learning	   heuristic,	   such	   as	   copying	   the	   majority	   or	  copying	   dominant	   individuals,	  may	   be	   reliable	   enough	   and	   prove	   quicker	   than	  assessing	  which	  individuals	  are	  most	  successful	  at	  each	  task.	  	  Laland	  (2004)	  distinguished	  between	  ‘when’	  and	  ‘who’	  strategies:	  When	  to	  learn	  and	  from	  whom	  to	  learn.	  This	  hypothesis	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  non-­‐humans	  deals	  with	   a	  who	   strategy:	  whether	   individuals	   direct	   their	   social	  learning	   based	  upon	   the	   social	   rank	   of	   	   the	   demonstrator	   (Laland,	   2004).	   This	  ‘copy	   the	   dominant’	   is	   a	   type	   of	   indirect	   bias,	   as	   dominant	   individuals	   are	   not	  necessarily	  those	  that	  are	  knowledgeable	  about	  a	  particular	  task,	  but	  this	  bias	  is	  used	   as	   a	   proxy.	   Similarly,	   in	   humans	   a	   ‘prestige	   bias’	   (Henrich	   &	   Gil-­‐White,	  2001)	   may	   emerge	   if	   individuals	   have	   high	   status	   due	   to	   their	   exploits,	   but	  specifically	  excluding	  the	  use	  of	  agonistic	  encounters.	  	  There	  are	  examples	  of	  a	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  dominant	  individuals	  in	  social	  learning	  in	   different	   taxa.	   In	   a	   study	   on	   domestic	   hens	   (Gallus	   gallus	   domesticus),	   Nicol	  
	   99	  
and	  Pope	  (1999)	  trained	  one	  individual	  as	  a	  demonstrator	  in	  each	  of	  24	  different	  flocks.	  The	  demonstrator,	  either	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  cockerel,	  high-­‐ranking	  hen,	  mid-­‐ranking	  hen	  or	  low-­‐ranking	  hen,	  was	  trained	  to	  peck	  either	  a	  red	  or	  green	  key	  to	  obtain	   food.	   The	   flocks	   that	   had	   observed	   a	   dominant	   hen	   demonstrator	  performed	  more	  pecks	  of	  the	  correct	  key,	  both	  pecks	  that	  gained	  food	  and	  pecks	  that	  were	   not	   sufficiently	   hard	   enough	   to	   gain	   food,	   than	   flocks	   that	   had	   seen	  demonstrators	  of	  any	  other	  social	  class.	  	  	  Similarly,	  Van	  de	  Waal	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  presented	  puzzleboxes	  to	  a	  series	  of	  groups	  of	   wild	   vervet	   monkeys,	   having	   trained	   a	   dominant	   individual	   in	   each	   group.	  Individuals	   in	   groups	   with	   female	   demonstrators	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   learn	  information	  about	  the	  puzzlebox,	  than	  groups	  with	  male	  demonstrators	  (van	  de	  Waal	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   As	   tolerance	   was	   controlled	   for,	   the	   authors	   conclude	  individuals	   were	   directing	   their	   social	   learning	   towards	   the	   dominant	  individuals,	  but	  specifically	  dominant	  individuals	  of	  the	  philopatric	  sex.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  capuchins:	  Whilst	   there	   has	   been	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   social	   learning	   studies	   with	   capuchins,	  both	   in	   the	   wild	   and	   captivity,	   few	   have	   explicitly	   examined	   social	   learning	  strategies.	   Instead	   these	   studies	   have	   focussed	   on	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   social	  learning	   (Fragaszy	   &	   Visalberghi,	   1996;	   Perry	   et	   al.,	   2003a;	   Fragaszy	   &	  Visalberghi,	  2004;	  Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b).	  Fragaszy	  and	  colleagues	  (reported	  in	  Fragaszy	  &	  Visalberghi,	  2004)	  presented	  juvenile	  capuchins	  with	  apparatus	  from	  which	  they	  could	  extract	  juice	  through	  two	  different	  ways,	  by	  pushing	  a	  lever	  or	  turning	  a	  wheel.	  During	  ten	  hours	  of	  trials,	  none	  of	  the	  juveniles	  learned	  to	  gain	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juice	   from	   the	   apparatus.	   In	   a	   subsequent	   trial	   the	   juveniles	  were	   placed	   back	  into	  their	  two	  multi-­‐age	  groups;	  one	  apparatus	  was	  presented	  to	  each	  group	  with	  one	  of	  the	  solutions	  (the	  lever	  or	  wheel)	  enabled	  and	  another	  was	  presented	  in	  a	  ‘crèche’	   area	   that	   only	   the	   juveniles	   could	   access	  with	   both	   solutions	   enabled.	  Most	   adults	   in	   each	   group	   learned	   the	   appropriate	   solution	   to	   the	   apparatus.	  Juveniles	   also	   learned	   the	   appropriate	   solution,	  due	   to	   their	   close	  proximity	   to	  adults	  whilst	  they	  were	  solving	  and	  previous	  inability	  to	  solve	  the	  task,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	   they	   learned	   the	   solution	   socially	   from	   the	   adults.	   Two	   juveniles	   in	   each	  group	   discovered	   the	   alternative	   solution	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   their	   group	   when	  using	  the	  apparatus	  located	  in	  the	  crèche.	  This	  solution	  did	  not	  spread	  to	  other	  juveniles	  who	  continued	  to	  use	  the	  group	  solution.	  Despite	  this	  lack	  of	  spread	  of	  the	   alternative	   juvenile-­‐discovered	   solution,	   the	   experiment	   provides	   only	  tenuous	   evidence	   for	   an	   adult	   bias	   in	   learning.	  When	   juveniles	  were	  operating	  the	  apparatus	  alone,	  without	  adults,	  no	  solution	  was	  discovered	  so	  diffusion	  of	  the	  solution	  via	  social	  learning	  was	  impossible.	  The	  authors	  do	  not	  give	  the	  order	  of	  discovery	  of	  solutions	  to	  the	  apparatus	  in	  the	  mixed	  age	  groups,	  the	  majority	  of	   juveniles	  may	  have	  copied	  the	  adult	  solution	  because	   it	  was	  discovered	  first,	  therefore	   they	   were	   exposed	   to	   that	   behaviour	   more	   frequently	   and	   by	   more	  individuals.	  	  Whilst	   some	   social	   effects,	   such	   as	   dominant	   individuals	   monopolising	   food	  resources,	  have	  been	  recorded	  (Lavallee,	  1999),	  there	  have	  not	  been	  any	  studies	  addressing	  whether	  dominant	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  learned	  from	  in	  capuchins.	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Evidence	  in	  chimpanzees:	  	  Biro	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  conducted	  a	  field	  experiment	  with	  chimpanzees	  at	  the	  Bossou	  field	  site	  in	  Guinea.	  They	  provisioned	  a	  population	  that	  already	  had	  knowledge	  of	  processing	   and	   consuming	   palm-­‐oil	   nuts	   (Elaeis	   guineensis)	   with	   coula	   (Coula	  
edulis)	  and	  panda	  nuts	  (Panda	  oleosa)	  that	  are	  not	  found	  in	  the	  local	  area.	  They	  found	   that	  one	   low	  status	   female,	  who	  emigrated	   into	   the	  group	  over	  20	  years	  before,	  was	  able	  to	  recognise	  and	  immediately	  process	  coula	  nuts.	  Over	  time	  the	  use	   of	   the	   coula	   nuts	   increased	   within	   the	   adult	   population,	   although	   this	   is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   juveniles	  who	  had	  observed	  the	  skilled	  female	  grew	  up.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  contemporaries	  of	  the	  skilled	  female	  learned	  to	  process	  coula	  nuts	  from	  her.	  Indeed,	  the	  prolonged	  period	  of	  learning	  that	  each	  of	   the	   few	  adults	   that	  who	  became	   skilled	   at	  processing	   coula	  nuts	   engaged	   in	  suggested	   that	  asocial	   learning	  was	  occurring.	  Examining	   the	  observation	  rates	  of	   individuals	   who	   were	   cracking	   novel	   nuts	   by	   naïve	   individuals,	   Biro	   et	   al.	  found	  that	  adults	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  observed	  than	  juveniles	  and	  infants,	  and	  that	  individuals	  observed	  others	  of	  the	  same	  age	  or	  older,	  but	  not	  younger.	  	  	  A	   recent	   study	   claimed	   to	   examine	   a	   prestige	   bias	   in	   captive	   chimpanzees	  (Horner	   et	   al.,	   2010);	   although	   it	   is	   contentious	   whether	   this	   term	   is	  appropriately	   applied.	   Two	   chimpanzees,	   judged	   to	   have	   different	   levels	   of	  ‘prestige’,	   in	   each	   of	   two	   groups	   were	   trained	   to	   place	   tokens	   in	   a	   different	  receptacle	   in	  order	   to	  gain	  a	   food	   reward.	  The	   trained	   individuals	  were	  placed	  back	   into	   their	   groups;	   it	  was	   found	   the	  group	  was	   significantly	  more	   likely	   to	  learn	   the	   solution	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   more	   ‘prestigious’	   demonstrator.	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‘Prestige’	   was	   judged	   by	   the	   age,	   rank	   and	   previous	   experience	   as	   a	  demonstrator	  (Horner	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	   inclusion	  of	  rank,	  which	  may	  be	  partly	  achieved	  by	  agonistic	  encounters,	  contradicts	   the	  definition	  of	  Henrich	  and	  Gil-­‐White	   (2001).	   ‘Highly	   prestigious’	   demonstrators	   were	   also	   judged	   by	   their	  previous	  use	  as	  a	  demonstrator,	   including	  in	  a	  similar	  token	  task	  (Bonnie	  et	  al.,	  2007),	   thus	   the	   social	   learning	   strategy	   of	   other	   individuals	   in	   the	   population	  may	   have	   been	   a	   direct	   ‘copy-­‐the-­‐successful’	   bias,	   rather	   than	   an	   indirect	  ‘prestige	   bias’.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   study	   does	   provide	   further	   evidence	   that	  chimpanzees	  are	  biased	  as	  to	  the	  individual	  from	  whom	  they	  learn,	  and	  this	  may	  depend	  upon	  age	  and	  rank	  of	  the	  demonstrator.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  children:	  Henrich	   and	   Gil-­‐White	   (2001)	   report	   a	   number	   of	   different	   cases	   in	   which	  communities	   have	   been	   hypothesised	   to	   regard	   some	   individuals	   as	   more	  prestigious	   than	   others	   and	   to	   copy	   those	   individuals	   disproportionately.	   For	  example,	   Smith	   and	   Bliege	   Bird	   (2000)	   document	   that	   turtle	   hunters	   in	   the	  Meriam	   population	   of	   the	   Torres	   Strait	   gain	   prestige	   by	   the	   number	   of	   turtles	  that	  they	  kill.	  This	  prestige	  does	  not	  simply	  apply	  to	  hunting	  reputation:	  skilled	  hunters’	   reputations	   confer	   higher	   status	   politically	   and	   when	   searching	   for	   a	  wife.	  Thus,	  although	  being	  a	  skilled	  hunter	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  an	   individual	   is	  more	   informed	   in	  any	  other	  decision	  regarding	   the	  population,	   their	  opinion	   is	  regarded	  with	  more	  respect	  in	  a	  range	  of	  decisions	  (Smith	  &	  Bliege	  Bird,	  2000).	  	  	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  children	  may	  rely	  on	  direct	  learning	  biases	  when	  it	  is	  easy	  to	   assess	   which	   individual	   is	   more	   reliable,	   but	   adopt	   indirect	   biases,	   such	   as	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Hypothesis	  8	  	  
Non-­human	   animals	   are	   conservative	   and	   satisfice,	   such	   that	   once	   they	   have	   a	  
solution	   that	   rewards	   them	   they	   do	   not	   change	   it	   (Marshall-­‐Pescini	   &	   Whiten,	  2008;	  Hrubesch	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
	  Some	   experimental	   studies	   have	   reported	   that	   non-­‐humans,	   in	   particular,	  chimpanzees,	   continue	   to	   use	   the	   first	   solution	   they	   discover	   even	   when	   a	  potentially	  more	  rewarding	  alternative	   is	  available	  to	  them	  (Marshall-­‐Pescini	  &	  Whiten,	  2008;	  Hrubesch	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  These	  authors	  argue	  that	   the	   discovery	   of	   a	   more	   rewarding	   solution	   is	   suppressed	   by	   the	   initial	  discovery	  of	  one	  solution	   to	   the	   task.	  This	  argument	  supposes	   that	  animals	  are	  satisfied	   to	   find	   any	   reward,	   therefore	   if	   they	   use	   a	   ‘copy-­‐if-­‐dissatisfied’	   social	  learning	  strategy	  (Laland,	  2004)	  they	  would	  not	  seek	  another	  solution	  to	  a	  task.	  Under	  some	  circumstances	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  conservatism	  in	  non-­‐humans	  might	  be	   regarded	   as	   an	  optimal	   foraging	   approach;	   that	   having	   found	   a	   food	   source	  and	  a	  means	   to	  exploit	   it,	   an	   individual	   should	  not	  continue	   to	  spend	   time	  and	  energy	  examining	  whether	  there	  is	  another	  solution	  (Stephens	  &	  Krebs,	  1986).	  	  	  Higher	   levels	   of	   conservatism	   in	   non-­‐humans	  would	  make	   it	   less	   likely	   that	   a	  cumulative	  solution	  to	  a	  task	  will	  be	  discovered,	  as	  once	  an	  individual	  discovers	  one	   solution	   it	   is	   not	   likely	   to	   attempt	   to	   find	   another.	   However,	   cumulative	  additions	   to	   a	   solution	   would	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   occur	   in	   a	   less	   conservative	  species,	  therefore	  if	  humans	  are	  less	  conservative,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Whiten	  et	  al.	  (2009),	   the	   species	   would	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   have	   cumulative	   culture.	   It	   is	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important	  here	  to	  distinguish	  between	  conservatism	  as	  a	  mechanism	  and	  as	  an	  outcome.	   If	   any	   of	   the	   hypotheses	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter	   are	   correct,	   then	  animals	   would	   fail	   to	   elaborate	   on	   acquired	   behaviour	   and	   would	   appear	  conservative.	   For	   this	   hypothesis	   to	   be	   supported	   we	   require	   evidence	   for	   a	  conservative	  learning	  strategy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  animal.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  non-­human	  primates:	  The	  hypothesis	  that	  conservatism	  is	  high	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  has	  important	  implications	   for	   behavioural	   patterns	   observed	   in	   the	  wild.	   If	   non-­‐humans	   are	  completely	  conservative	  then	  complex	  innovations	  would	  have	  to	  be	  invented	  in	  one	  episode	  without	  repeated	  episodes	  of	  innovation.	  For	  example,	  the	  elaborate	  toolkits,	   with	   multiple	   tools	   for	   ant-­‐dipping	   and	   honey	   probing,	   used	   by	  chimpanzees	   in	   some	  Western	  and	  Central	  populations	   (Sanz	  &	  Morgan,	  2007;	  Boesch	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Sanz	  &	  Morgan,	  2009;	  Sanz	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  would	  have	  to	  have	  been	   invented	   by	   one	   individual	   in	   one	   episode.	   In	   order	   to	   have	   created	   this	  elaborate	  tool	  kit	  the	  innovative	  individual	  would	  not	  have	  learned	  from	  others	  in	  the	  population	  the	  simpler	  technique	  for	  using	  a	  single	  tool	  for	  ant-­‐dipping	  or	  honey	  extraction	  and	  built	  upon	  it	  cumulatively.	  Rather,	  the	  innovator’s	  learning	  would	   have	   been	   canalised	   into	   learning	   the	   simpler,	   single	   tool,	   technique	  therefore	  making	   it	  unlikely	   that	   they	  would	  experiment	  with	  a	  new	  technique	  for	  gaining	  a	  particular	  food	  source.	  	  
	  Conservatism	   and	   satisficing	   in	   non-­‐human	   primates	   has	   not	   been	   explicitly	  investigated.	   As	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   Hrubesch	   et	   al.	   (2009)	  observed	   chimpanzees	   inventing	   a	   new,	  more	   efficient	   technique	   of	   shaking	   a	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maze	   rather	   than	  using	   a	   tool.	  When	   this	   shaking	   technique	  was	  prevented	  by	  bolting	   down	   the	   maze,	   the	   chimpanzees	   failed	   to	   learn	   the	   alternative,	   tool	  using,	   method.	   Hrubesch	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   concluded	   this	   was	   an	   example	   of	  conservatism	   in	   chimpanzees,	   although	   there	   are	   multiple	   alternative	  explanations	  consistent	  with	  these	  data.	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	  and	  Whiten	  (2008)	  in	  a	  cumulative	   problem	   solving	   study	   with	   chimpanzees,	   found	   all	   but	   one	   of	   the	  juvenile	   chimpanzees	   tested	   failed	   to	   find	   the	   alternative,	   more	   rewarding,	  solution.	  In	  some	  of	  the	  above	  studies,	  the	  observed	  ‘conservatism’	  may	  be	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  different	  mechanism,	  rather	  than	  the	  cause	  of	  any	  failure	   to	   solve	   the	   task.	   There	   has	   been	   no	   relevant	   experimentation	   of	  conservatism	  and	  satisficing	  in	  capuchins.	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Hypothesis	  9	  	  
Lack	   of	   ability	   to	   assess	   if	   another’s	   solution	   is	   better	   than	   one’s	   own	   inhibits	  
adoption	  of	  improved	  modifications	  (Laland,	  2004).	  	  The	   final	   hypothesis	   tested	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   ability	   in	   non-­‐humans	   to	  assess	   if	  another	  solution	   is	  better	   than	   their	  current	  one.	   It	  corresponds	   to	  an	  inability	  to	  use	  the	  social	  learning	  strategy	  of	  ‘copy-­‐if-­‐better’	  (Laland,	  2004).	  If	  an	  individual	   is	   not	   able	   to	   assess	   that	   another	   solution	   gains	   them	   superior	  rewards,	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	   switch	   to	   an	   alternative	   behaviour	   pattern,	   thus	  hindering	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  more	  rewarding	  solution.	  If	  individuals	  are	  not	  able	  to	  assess	  if	  another	  solution	  is	  better	  than	  the	  one	  they	  already	  know,	  cumulative	  modifications	  that	  increase	  the	  reward	  of	  a	  cultural	  trait	  will	  not	  be	  recognised.	  If	  this	  occurs,	  cumulative	  cultural	  traits	  are	  unlikely	  to	  spread	  within	  a	  population.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  non-­human	  primates:	  There	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   non-­‐human	   primates	   do	   not	   regard	   all	   food	   as	  similarly	  desirable.	  In	  experiments	  examining	  an	  animal’s	  response	  to	  inequality	  in	  food	  reward	  between	  it	  and	  another	  animal,	  animals	  have	  been	  tested	  for	  food	  preferences	   and	   their	   response	   when	   other	   animals	   are	   given	   different	   value	  food	   rewards	   for	   the	   same	   behaviour	   pattern	   (Brosnan	   &	   de	   Waal,	   2003;	  Brosnan	  &	  de	  Waal,	  2004;	  Brosnan	  et	  al.,	  2010b).	  In	  these	  experiments	  capuchin	  monkeys	  and	  chimpanzees	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  rewards	  that	  others	   are	   getting	   and	   the	   difference	   in	   rewards	   between	   themselves	   and	   a	  partner.	   Similarly,	   field	   researchers	   have	   recorded	   that	   some	   foods	   are	   much	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more	  desirable	  than	  others	  (Mitani	  &	  Watts,	  2001;	  Hockings	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  These	  assessments	   are	   based	   upon	   the	   cost	   of	   obtaining	   the	   food	   and	   the	   begging	  response	   that	   the	   food	   reward	   incites	   from	   other	   individuals	   in	   the	   group.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  some	  non-­‐humans	  do	  have	  preferred	  foods	  and	  that	  some	  individuals	  can	  recognise	  when	  there	   is	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  their	  reward	  and	  another	  individual’s	  reward.	  However,	  the	  possibility	  remains	  that	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  a	   food	  might	  not	  be	  recognised,	  perhaps	  enhanced	  when	  there	   is	  a	   low	  gradient	  between	   the	  desirability	  of	   two	  rewards	  or	   in	  regularly	  provisioned	  captive	  animals	  or	  when	  the	  rewards	  are	  unfamiliar,	  or	  difficult	   to	  assess.	  	  
Evidence	  in	  humans:	  When	   discussing	   human	   cumulative	   culture	   many	   researchers	   assume	   that	  humans	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  whether	  a	  new	  behaviour	  pattern	  is	  more	  rewarding	  than	  an	  older	  one	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  1996;	  Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Enquist	  &	  Ghirlanda,	   2007).	   Enquist	   and	   Ghirlanda	   (2007)	   argue	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	  ‘adaptive	  filter’	  that	  allows	  maladaptive	  culture	  to	  be	  discarded	  may	  be	  critical	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  cumulative	  culture.	  	  	  This	   assumption	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   diffusion	   of	   innovations	   literature	  (Rogers,	   1995),	   which	   describe	   numerous	   examples	   of	   humans	   adopting	  superior	  variants.	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  instances	   in	  which	  humans	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  adopted	  an	  inferior	  technology.	  The	  most	  famous	  of	  these	  in	  recent	  years	   is	   the	   adoption	   of	  what	   is	   regarded	   as	   the	   inferior	   VHS	   format	   over	   the	  Betamax	  format	  for	  VCRs	  (Park,	  2004).	  The	  lower	  cost	  of	  VHS	  and	  the	  release	  of	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more	   films	  on	  VHS	  ensured	   that	   this	   format	  out	   sold	   its	   rival	  Betamax,	  despite	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  video	  recording	  being	  lower.	  This	  example,	  however,	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  exception.	  	  
Other	  hypotheses	  	  There	  are	  several	  alternative	  hypotheses	  that	  have	  been	  proposed	  to	  explain	  the	  apparent	   lack	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   in	   non-­‐human	   species	   that	   are	   not	  considered	   in	   this	   thesis,	   either	   because	   they	   are	   contradicted	   by	   available	  evidence	  or	  because	  they	  overlap	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  hypotheses.	  	  	  Powell	   et	   al.	   (2009;	   2010)	   have	   proposed	   that	   the	   changes	   in	   human	   culture	  during	   the	   late	   Pleistocene	   that	   have	   been	   observed	   in	   the	   archaeological	  evidence	  are	  explained	  by	  demographic	  factors	  (see	  also	  Henrich,	  2004;	  Kline	  &	  Boyd,	   2010).	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  mathematical	  model,	   Powell	   et	   al	   (2009;	   2010)	  conclude	  that	  large	  regional	  subpopulations	  with	  migration	  between	  them	  drove	  the	   emergence	   of	   modern	   human	   culture.	   However,	   a	   key	   assumption	   of	   the	  models	   is	   the	   pre-­‐existence	   of	   the	   cognitive	   capacities	   for	   social	   learning	   and	  cumulative	   culture	   in	  humans.	  Therefore	  a	   complex	  demography	  may	  promote	  cumulative	   culture	   in	  a	   species	   capable	  of	  high-­‐fidelity	   social	   learning,	  but	   it	   is	  not	   enough	   alone.	   Furthermore,	   this	   hypothesis	   does	   not	   easily	   lend	   itself	   to	  empirical	   examination,	   since	   it	   requires	   multiple	   large,	   interacting	   groups	   of	  animals.	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Enquist	  and	  Ghirlanda	  (2007)	  have	  proposed	  that	  ‘adaptive	  filtering’,	  that	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  discard	  maladaptive	  traits,	  is	  key	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  cumulative	  culture.	  They	  argue	  that	  for	  cumulative	  culture	  to	  be	  adaptive,	  high-­‐fidelity	  transmission	  of	   information	   must	   be	   combined	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   adopt	   adaptive	   cultural	  traits	  selectively,	  therefore	  discarding	  maladaptive	  traits.	  However,	  this	  adaptive	  filtering	   mechanism	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   variant	   of	   a	   class	   of	   copy-­‐if-­‐better	  strategies	   (Laland,	   2004),	   a	   hypothesis	   that	   is	   already	   examined	   in	   this	   thesis.	  Another	  social	  learning	  strategy	  that	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  operate	  in	  humans	  is	  an	  ability	  to	  copy-­‐the-­‐successful	  (Mesoudi,	  2008).	  In	  the	  experiment	  reported	  in	  this	  thesis,	  successful	  individuals	  are	  those	  that	  are	  receiving	  preferred	  rewards.	  Therefore,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  experiment	  the	  copy-­‐the-­‐successful	  strategy	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  copy-­‐if-­‐better	  strategy	  and	  therefore	  examined	  by	  hypothesis	  9.	  	  An	  increased	  creativity,	  that	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  innovate,	  has	  also	  been	  proposed	  to	  drive	  cumulative	  culture	  (Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Enquist	  et	  al.	   (2008)	  argue	   that	  cultural	  traits	  must	  be	  invented	  to	  spread	  within	  the	  population	  and	  be	  modified	  in	  a	  cumulative	  process.	  Whilst	  this	  argument	  is	  logical,	  there	  are	  extensive	  data	  documenting	   innovations	   in	   a	   range	   of	   species	   of	   primates	   (Reader	   &	   Laland,	  2002)	   and	   birds	   (Overington	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   yet	   little	   evidence	   for	   cumulative	  culture.	   This	   suggests	   that	   innovation	   alone	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   cumulative	  culture.	  	  Another	   hypothesis	   proposed	   to	   explain	   the	   evolution	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   is	  evolution	   of	   conformity	   in	   humans,	   as	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   one	   (Boyd	   &	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Richerson,	   1985;	  Henrich	  &	  Boyd,	   1998).	   Conformity,	   argue	  Henrich	   and	  Boyd	  (1998),	   maintains	   group	   differences	   and	   ensures	   the	   transmission	   of	   cultural	  traits	   between	   generations.	   As	   with	   the	   demographic	   factors,	   high-­‐fidelity	  transmission	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  conformity.	  In	  addition	  strong	  conformity	   would	   hinder	   the	   spread	   of	   innovations,	   including	   cumulative	  modifications	   (Eriksson	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Kandler	  &	  Laland,	  2009).	  Thus	  conformity	  relies	  upon	  underlying	  social	  learning	  capacities,	  that	  are	  being	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis	  (hypothesis	  5).	  	  
Conclusions	  	  These	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  proposed	  by	  various	   researchers	   and	  are	  derived	  from	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   different	   disciplines,	   including	   biology,	   anthropology,	  psychology	   and	   economics.	   There	   has,	   however,	   been	   no	   explicit	   test	   of	   these	  hypotheses	   using	   a	   cumulative	   task.	   The	  work	   in	   this	   thesis	   set	   out	   to	   do	   this,	  using	   a	   cumulative	   puzzlebox	   on	   captive	   populations	   of	   capuchins	   and	  chimpanzees	  and	  groups	  of	  nursery	  school	  children.	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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
	  GENERAL	  METHODS	  
	  Social	   groups	   of	   3	   to	   4	   year-­‐old	   children,	   adult	   and	   juvenile	   chimpanzees	   and	  capuchin	  monkeys	  were	   exposed	   to	   an	   experimental	   puzzle	   box	   that	   could	   be	  solved	   at	   three	   sequential	   levels	   to	   retrieve	   rewards	   of	   increasing	   desirability.	  Specific	  details	  pertaining	  to	  the	  methodology	  with	  each	  species	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  subsequent	  species-­‐specific	  data	  chapters.	  	  The	   study	  was	   designed	   to	   evaluate	   nine	   separate	   hypotheses,	   detailed	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   concerning	   the	   factors	   necessary	   for	   cumulative	   cultural	  learning.	  Two	  experiments	  were	  conducted.	  The	  first	  involved	  presenting	  groups	  of	  naïve	  subjects	  with	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  recording	  which	  individuals	  interacted	  with	   it,	   when	   and	   how	   they	   did	   so,	   as	   well	   as	   which	   additional	   individuals	  observed	   these	   interactions.	   This	   experiment	   was	   carried	   out	   with	   all	   three	  species.	   The	   second	   experiment	   was	   carried	   out	   with	   chimpanzees	   only,	   and	  involved	  training	  demonstrator	  animals	  of	  high	  and	  low	  status	  to	  solve	  the	  box	  and	  retrieve	   food	  effectively.	  These	   trained	   individuals	  were	   then	  reintroduced	  into	   their	   native	   groups	   with	   the	   puzzlebox	   and	   allowed	   to	   demonstrate	  successful	  solutions	  to	  naïve	  group	  members.	  Again,	  which	  individuals	  interacted	  with	  the	  puzzlebox,	  when	  and	  how	  they	  did	  so,	  and	  which	  additional	  individuals	  observed	  these	  interactions	  was	  recorded.	  This	  second	  experiment	  was	  designed	  to	   determine	   whether	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   chimpanzees	   to	   achieve	   high-­‐level	  solutions	   in	   the	   first	   experiment	   was	   attributable	   to	   an	   absence	   of	   quality	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demonstration,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   evaluate	   further	   hypotheses,	   specified	   in	   chapter	  two.	  	  
Subjects	  Details	   of	   the	   social	   groups	   used	   for	   each	   species	   are	   given	   in	   the	   relevant	  chapters.	  	  	  	  Apparatus	  The	  puzzleboxes	  used	  in	  this	  experiment	  could	  be	  solved	  cumulatively,	  at	  three	  separate	   levels,	   or	   ‘stages’.	   The	   three	   stages	   offer	   successively	  more	   desirable	  rewards,	   but	   require	   more	   complex	   manipulations	   to	   solve,	   with	   each	   stage	  building	   upon	   the	   previous	   one	   (figure	   3.1).	   The	   box	   was	   designed	  symmetrically,	  allowing	  two	  parallel	  options	  (alternative	  doors	  could	  be	  slid	  left	  or	  right	  at	  stage	  1,	  alternative	  buttons	  at	  the	  top	  or	  bottom	  could	  be	  depressed	  at	  stage	  2,	  and	  two	  alternative	  coloured	  finger-­‐holes	  enabled	  the	  dial	  to	  be	  rotated	  clockwise	  at	   stage	  3)	  with	  which	   to	  complete	  each	  stage.	  This	   two-­‐action,	   two-­‐option	   design	   allowed	   us	   to	   distinguish	   between	   alternative	   social	   learning	  mechanisms	   and	   enabled	   more	   than	   one	   individual	   to	   interact	   with	   the	  puzzlebox	  simultaneously.	  	  The	   first	   stage	   could	  be	  opened	  by	   sliding	  one	  of	   the	   two	  doors	  outwards	   in	   a	  horizontal	  plane,	  the	  left-­‐side	  door	  moving	  to	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right-­‐side	  door	  to	  the	  right.	  This	  action	  revealed	  a	  feeding	  tube	  through	  which	  a	  low-­‐level	  reward	  could	   be	   delivered,	   with	   each	   door	   revealing	   a	   separate	   symmetrically	   placed	  tube.	  The	   second	  stage	   could	  be	  opened	  by	  pushing	  one	  of	   two	  buttons;	   either	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the	   button	   in	   the	   top	   runner,	   upwards,	   or	   the	   button	   in	   the	   bottom	   runner,	  downwards.	  	  Depression	  of	  these	  buttons	  allowed	  the	  door	  to	  be	  slid	  open	  wider	  to	   reveal	   a	   second	   food	   tube	   on	   that	   side,	   from	  which	   a	  mid-­‐level	   reward	  was	  delivered.	  Once	  again,	  there	  were	  symmetrically	  placed	  upper	  and	  lower	  buttons	  on	   each	   side	   of	   the	   box,	   and	   symmetrically	   placed	  mid-­‐level	   feeding	   tubes	   on	  right	  and	  left	  side.	  	  
	  Figure	  3.1:	  The	  cumulative	  puzzlebox,	  showing	  the	  right	  door	  fully	  opened	  to	  show	  the	  rewards	  at	  all	  three	  stages.	  The	  left	  door	  is	  completely	  closed,	  hiding	  the	  rewards,	  as	  both	  doors	  would	  be	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  experimental	  trials.	  The	  actions	  required	  to	  open	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  each	  stage	  are	  included	  in	  the	  labels,	  see	  text	  for	  further	  information.	  	  The	  final	  stage	  was	  opened	  by	  turning	  a	  dial,	  using	  one	  of	  two	  finger-­‐holes,	  which	  allows	   the	  door	   to	  be	   slid	   open	   even	   further,	   to	   reveal	   a	   third	   feeding	   tube	  on	  that	  side	   from	  which	  a	  high-­‐level	   reward	  could	  be	  retrieved.	  Again,	   there	  were	  symmetrically	   placed	   dials	   on	   each	   side	   of	   the	   box,	   and	   symmetrically	   placed	  high-­‐level	   feeding	  tubes	  on	  the	  right	  and	   left	  side.	   	  Olfactory	  holes	  were	  drilled	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into	   each	   puzzlebox	   door,	   to	   help	   ensure	   that	   the	   subjects	   were	   aware	   of	   the	  presence	  of	  the	  rewards	  behind	  them.	  	  	  The	  puzzleboxes	  given	  to	  children,	  chimpanzees	  and	  capuchin	  monkeys	  differed	  only	  in	  size,	  being	  scaled	  appropriately	  to	  the	  mean	  size	  of	  subject	  of	  that	  species.	  Puzzlebox	   1,	   used	  with	   chimpanzees,	   was	   700(l)x300(h)x300(w)mm,	  with	   the	  main	   frame	   constructed	   of	   Perspex.	   The	   doors	   were	   220(h)x160(w)mm	   and	  were	  made	  of	  acrylic	  veneered	  with	  steel	  for	  added	  strength.	  The	  acrylic	  buttons	  at	   stage	   two	   were	   positioned	   130mm	   from	   each	   end	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   and	  measure	  40(l)x10(w)mm.	  The	  dials	   (diameter	  100mm)	  were	  positioned	  50mm	  from	   each	   end	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   and	   were	   also	   made	   from	   acrylic.	   The	   entire	  puzzlebox	  was	  bolted	  to	  a	  cart	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  animals	  and	  experimenters	  and	  to	  assist	  in	  transport.	  	  	  Puzzlebox	  2,	  used	  with	  capuchins	  and	  children,	  was	  constructed	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  chimpanzee	  puzzlebox,	  except	  that	  the	  doors	  did	  not	  require	  a	  veneer	  of	  steel.	  This	  puzzlebox	  measured	  540(l)x180(h)x190(w)mm.	  The	  doors	  measured	  120(w)x115(h)mm	   each	   and,	   when	   closed,	   were	   140mm	   from	   the	   end	   of	   the	  puzzlebox.	   The	   buttons	   measured	   30(l)x5(w)mm	   and	   were	   positioned	   75mm	  from	   each	   end	   of	   the	   puzzlebox.	   The	   dials	   were	   50mm	   in	   diameter	   and	   were	  positioned	  90mm	  from	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  45mm	  from	  each	  end.	  	  	  The	   puzzlebox	   could	   be	   set	   up	   in	   two	   ways	   to	   allow	   for	   two	   different	  experimental	  conditions.	  In	  the	  ‘open’	  condition,	  groups	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  puzzlebox	   and	   a	   reward	   was	   provided	   at	   all	   stages.	   Individuals	   were	   able	   to	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manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  any	  stage	  and	  receive	  the	  reward	  at	  that	  level.	  If	  an	  individual	  successfully	  opened	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  stage	  three	  then	  all	  manipulandii	  were	   immediately	   reset	   and	   the	   food	   tubes	   restocked.	   However,	   if	   subjects	  performed	  unsuccessful	  manipulations	  or	  successfully	  manipulated	  the	  box	  and	  opened	   stage	   one	   or	   two	   then	   two	   minutes	   after	   the	   initial	   manipulation	   all	  manipulandii	   were	   reset	   and	   the	   food	   tubes	   restocked.	   In	   the	   ‘scaffolded’	  condition,	   groups	   were	   presented	   with	   regulated	   access	   to	   parts	   of	   the	  puzzlebox.	   Here,	   the	   dial	   and	   buttons	   of	   the	   task	  were	   shielded,	   using	   guards,	  such	  that	  the	  subjects	  could	  only	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  stage	  one	  doors.	  When	  75%	  of	  the	  group	  had	  successfully	  manipulated	  the	  doors	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  at	  least	  five	  times	   in	   each	   of	   at	   least	   two	   separate	   trials	   (a	   criterion	   judged	   as	   indicating	  ‘learning’	   of	   the	   technique),	   the	   guards	   covering	   the	   button	   manipulandii	   for	  stage	  2	  were	  removed.	  	  At	  this	  point	  the	  reward	  was	  removed	  from	  stage	  1,	  thus	  animals	  were	   required	   to	   successfully	  manipulate	   stage	  2	   (having	  manipulated	  stage	   one	   with	   no	   reward)	   to	   receive	   a	   reward.	   This	   procedure	   was	   to	   be	  repeated	   in	   transition	   of	   individuals	   from	   stage	   two	   to	   stage	   three	   of	   the	  puzzlebox.	  As	  with	  the	  open	  condition,	  the	  manipulandii	  were	  returned	  to	  their	  original	   positions	   two	   minutes	   after	   they	   were	   first	   manipulated	   unless	  individuals	  solved	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  the	  maximum	  level	  possible	  at	  the	  time	  and	  had	  received	  a	  food	  reward,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  puzzlebox	  was	  immediately	  reset.	  	  When	  in	  use,	  the	  experimenter	  sat	  behind	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  reset	  and	  re-­‐bait	  the	  box	  with	  the	  rewards.	  The	  experiments	  were	  filmed	  with	  a	  Sony	  Handicam	  DCR-­‐HC27E,	  which	  was	  positioned	  behind	  the	  experimenter	  for	  the	  chimpanzee	  and	  capuchin	  trials	  and	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  box	  in	  the	  children	  trials.	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Procedure	  	  
Food	  preference	  testing	  Prior	   to	   the	   experiment,	   food	   preference	   testing	   was	   carried	   out	   with	   the	  chimpanzees	   and	   capuchins	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   suitable	   low-­‐,	  mid-­‐	   and	  high-­‐level	  rewards.	  Although	  the	  method	  of	  comparison	  differed	  between	  species,	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  food	  preference	  testing	  was	  to	  offer	  two	  or	  more	  of	  the	  foods	  and	  observe	   which	   the	   individual	   would	   choose	   first.	   A	   similar	   procedure	   was	  adopted	   to	   determine	   the	   relative	   desirability	   of	   alternative	   stickers,	   used	   as	  rewards	  for	  the	  children.	  	  
Experiment	  one	  Experiment	   one	   was	   conducted	   with	   all	   three	   species.	   Groups	   of	   naïve	  individuals	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  were	  able	  to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	   to	   gain	   rewards.	   This	   experiment	   used	   the	   ‘scaffolded’	   and	   ‘open’	  conditions	   for	   children	   and	   chimpanzees,	   as	   described	   above.	   There	  were	   four	  groups	  of	   chimpanzees,	   two	   in	   ‘scaffolded’	   and	   two	   in	   ‘open’	   conditions.	  There	  were	   eight	   groups	   of	   children,	   four	   of	  which	  were	   in	   the	   ‘scaffolded’	   condition	  and	  four	   in	  the	   ‘open’	  condition.	  There	  was	  one	  group	  of	  capuchins	  that	  was	   in	  the	   ‘scaffolded’	   condition.	  Details	  of	   group	  composition	   is	   contained	  within	   the	  relevant	  chapters.	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Experiment	  two	  Experiment	   two	   was	   conducted	   with	   chimpanzees.	   In	   each	   of	   four	   groups	   a	  female	  was	  isolated	  from	  her	  group	  and	  trained	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  access	  stage	  3	  reliably	  and	  consistently.	  She	  was	  then	  returned	  to	  her	  group	  to	  act	  as	  a	  demonstrator	   for	   the	   other,	   naïve,	   members	   of	   her	   group.	   Further	   details	   are	  given	  in	  chapter	  5.	  	  
Data	  Collection	  	  All	   data	   were	   coded	   from	   the	   video	   made	   of	   the	   experimental	   trials.	   Inter-­‐observer	  reliabilities	  were	  >94%	  (Cohen’s	  κ=0.82)	  for	  recorded	  behaviour	  based	  on	   a	   sample	   of	   2%	   of	   the	   data.	   All	   occurrences	   sampling	   (Martin	   &	   Bateson,	  1993)	  was	  used	  to	  record	  each	  time	  an	  individual	  contacted	  the	  puzzlebox,	  and	  each	  unsuccessful	  and	  successful	  manipulation	  of	  the	  functionally	  relevant	  parts	  (stage	   1-­‐3)	   of	   the	   puzzlebox.	   Unsuccessful	   and	   successful	   manipulations	   were	  defined	  as	  those	  in	  which	  an	  individual	  did	  not	  and	  did	  retrieve	  a	  food	  reward,	  respectively.	  In	  each	  case	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  individual	  interacting	  with	  the	  task	  was	  recorded	  as	  was	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  (defined	  as	  an	  area	  of	  1.5m	  around	  the	  puzzlebox)	  when	  the	  events	  occurred.	  In	  addition,	  the	  latency	  at	  which	  all	  individuals	  arrived	  and	  left	  the	  area	  defined	  as	  proximity	  was	  recorded.	  Any	  aggression	  (defined	  as	  any	  interaction	  in	  which	  one	  individual	   struck	   another,	   displayed	   or	   exhibited	   an	   aggression	   face)	   or	  scrounging	  (defined	  as	  one	   individual	   removing	   food	   from	  the	  hand	  of	  another	  individual	   or	   from	   the	   puzzlebox	   before	   the	   individual	   who	   opened	   the	   door	  retrieved	  it)	  that	  took	  place	  within	  the	  area	  in	  proximity	  was	  recorded.	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Table	  3.1:	  The	  definitions	  of	   code	  and	  additional	  clarifications	   that	  were	  coded	   from	  the	  video.	  Inter-­‐observer	  reliability	  was	  calculated	  from	  both	  the	  code	  and	  addition	  comments	  combined.	  
Code	   Additional	  comments	  	   Definition	  Contact	  	   The	  area	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  (e.g.	  ‘left	  door’	  or	  ‘top’).	   An	  individual	  touches	  the	  puzzlebox,	  but	  does	  not	  operate	  any	  of	  the	  moving	  parts	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  	  Right/	  left	  door	   An	  individual	  opens	  the	  right/left	  door	  in	  the	  two	  minutes	  before	  the	  food	  reward	  has	  been	  replaced	  and	  therefore	  receives	  no	  food	  reward.	  Down	  on	  right/left	  The	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button	  (i.e.	  pushing	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
An	  individual	  pushes	  on	  the	  down	  button	  on	  the	  right/left	  after	  another	  individual	  has	  pressed	  it,	  but	  before	  it	  has	  been	  reset.	  Up	  on	  right/left	  The	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button	  (i.e.	  pushing	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
An	  individual	  pushes	  on	  the	  up	  button	  on	  the	  right/left	  after	  another	  individual	  has	  pressed	  it,	  but	  before	  it	  has	  been	  reset.	  
Unsuccessful	  	  
Dial	  on	  right/left	  The	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial	  (i.e.	  red	  or	  blue	  hole)	   An	  individual	  turns	  the	  dial	  after	  another	  individual.	  	  Right/	  left	  door.	  	  Stage	  to	  which	  door	  is	  pushed.	  Note	  whether	  the	  individual	  takes	  the	  food	  or	  not	  
An	  individual	  pushes	  the	  door	  open	  to	  reveal	  a	  reward.	  
Up	  on	  right/left.	  	  The	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button	  (i.e.	  pushing	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
An	  individual	  either	  pushes	  the	  up	  button	  or	  bites	  the	  button,	  unlocking	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  Down	  on	  right/left.	  The	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button	  (i.e.	  pushing	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  	  
An	  individual	  either	  pushes	  the	  down	  button	  or	  bites	  the	  button,	  unlocking	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  
Successful	  
Dial	  on	  right/left.	  The	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial	  (i.e.	  red	  or	  blue	  hole)	  	   An	  individual	  turns	  the	  dial	  to	  unlock	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  Altruism	  	   Identity	  of	  individual	  that	  donates	  reward	  and	  individual	  that	  receives	  it.	   An	  individual	  gives	  a	  reward	  it	  has	  obtained	  from	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  another	  individual.	  Aggression	  	   Identity	  of	  individual	  perpetrating	  aggression	  and	  those	  being	  attacked.	   Any	  interaction	  in	  which	  one	  individual	  strikes	  another,	  displays	  or	  exhibits	  an	  aggression	  face.	  Scrounging	   Identity	  of	  the	  scrounger	  and	  the	  victim	   An	  individual	  removes	  food	  from	  the	  hand	  of	  another	  individual	  or	  from	  the	  puzzlebox	  before	  the	  individual	  who	  opened	  the	  door	  retrieves	  it.	  Teaching	  	  	   Method	  of	  teaching	  (i.e.	  verbal,	  gestural	  or	  a	  mixture)	   An	  individual	  produces	  a	  gesture	  or	  vocalisation	  (or	  both)	  that	  functions	  to	  facilitate	  learning	  in	  another	  individual	  by	  imparting	  knowledge	  about	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  puzzlebox.	  	   Non-­human	  primates:	  an	  individual	  produces	  a	  food	  call	  (as	  defined	  in	  the	  relevant	  chapters).	  Vocalisation	  
Children:	  The	  words	  spoken	  by	  the	  individual	  or	  a	  description	  of	  the	  vocalisation	  if	  non-­‐verbal.	  
Children:	  an	  individual	  produces	  a	  vocalisation,	  either	  a	  verbal	  or	  non-­‐verbal.	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Analysis	  	  All	   analyses	   were	   carried	   out	   using	   the	   R	   statistics	   package	   (R-­‐Development-­‐Core-­‐Team).	  The	  data	  were	  tested	  for	  normality	  using	  a	  Shapiro’s	  test	  and	  non-­‐parametric	   tests	   used	   only	   where	   the	   assumptions	   of	   parametric	   tests	   were	  violated.	  Below	  we	  specify	  how	  the	  nine	  hypotheses	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  2	  were	  evaluated.	   Where	   necessary	   post-­‐hoc	   power	   analyses	   were	   calculated	   using	  power	   tables	   contained	   within	   Cohen	   (1988).	   Following	   Levine	   and	   Ensom	  (2001)	   and	   Johnson	   (1999)	   the	   95%	   confidence	   intervals	   of	   the	   difference	  between	   the	   groups	   are	   reported	   in	  preference	   to	  post-­‐hoc	  power	   calculations	  when	  using	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  or	  Wilcoxon	  tests.	  	  To	  allow	  the	  performance	  of	   individuals	   to	  be	  assessed	  with	  greater	  resolution	  than	   simply	   ranking	   individuals	   on	   a	   0-­‐3	   scale	   based	   on	   the	   stage	   of	   the	  puzzlebox	   that	   they	   achieved,	   a	   species-­‐specific	   ‘achievement	   rank’	   was	  calculated.	   The	   ‘achievement	   rank’	   ranks	   individuals	   first	   upon	   the	   stage	   that	  they	   achieved	   and	   then	   differentiates	   between	   individuals	   further	   by	   ranking	  individuals	   that	   achieved	   the	   same	   stage	   by	   the	   number	   of	   times	   they	  successfully	  manipulated	   the	   puzzlebox	   at	   that	   stage.	   If	   individuals	   are	   tied	   at	  this	  point,	  the	  number	  of	  successful	  manipulations	  that	  an	  individual	  performed	  at	  the	  previous	  puzzlebox	  stages	  is	  used	  to	  differentiate	  between	  individuals.	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Hypothesis	   1:	  A	   lack	   of	   teaching	   in	   non-­human	   primates	   prevents	   the	   spread	   of	  
cumulative	  innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  The	   effect	   of	   teaching	   was	   assessed	   in	   three	   separate	   ways.	   First,	   any	   direct	  instruction	  teaching	  events	  were	  recorded.	  Here	  teaching	  by	  direct	  instruction	  is	  defined	   as	   any	   instance	   in	   which	   an	   individual	   engaged	   in	   an	   act	   that	   clearly	  functioned	   to	   facilitate	   learning	   in	   another	   individual	   by	   imparting	   knowledge	  about	   the	   solutions	   to	   the	   puzzlebox.	   Whether	   the	   number	   of	   active	   teaching	  events	  covaried	  with	  individuals’	  achievement	  rank	  was	  examined.	  	  Second,	   as	   no	   direct	   teaching	   events	   were	   observed	   in	   chimpanzees	   and	  capuchins,	  in	  those	  species	  more	  subtle	  forms	  of	  teaching	  were	  also	  considered,	  such	  as	  ‘scaffolding’.	  Scaffolding	  is	  defined	  here	  as	  facilitating	  learning	  in	  others	  through	   acting	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   functions	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   task	   or	  rewards,	   or	   create	   learning	   opportunities	   for	   others	   (Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2008).	  	  Following	  Lonsdorf	  et	  al	  (2004),	  it	  is	  anticipated	  that	  scaffolding	  events	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  place	  amongst	  mothers	  and	  juveniles.	  Within	  the	  chimpanzee	  and	   capuchin	   groups	   there	  were	  mother-­‐juvenile	   offspring	   dyads	   and	  mother-­‐adult	   offspring	   dyads,	   which	   afforded	   a	   suitable	   comparison.	   If	   scaffolded	  teaching	  was	  occurring,	  mother-­‐juvenile	  offspring	  dyads	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  match	   in	   achievement	   rank	   than	  mother-­‐adult	   offspring	  dyads,	   on	   the	  grounds	  that	  adult	  offspring	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  than	  juveniles	  to	   learn	  independently	  of	   their	   mother.	   Therefore	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   achievement	   rank	   of	  	  offspring	  in	  mother-­‐juvenile	  and	  mother-­‐adult	  dyads	  was	  compared.	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Also	  considered	  was	  scaffolding	  afforded	  by	  the	  tolerated	  theft	  or	  scrounging	  of	  food	   from	   mothers	   by	   juveniles	   or	   altruistic	   giving	   of	   food	   by	   mothers	   to	  juveniles.	   In	  principle,	   by	   allowing	   food	   that	   they	  had	   retrieved	   to	  be	   eaten	  by	  others,	   individuals	   could	   stimulate	   or	   facilitate	   learning	   in	   others.	   All	   food	  transfers	  -­‐	  scrounging,	  tolerated	  theft	  and	  altruistic	  giving	  -­‐	  were	  recorded	  from	  mothers	   to	   juveniles	   and	   from	   juveniles	   to	  mothers.	   The	   frequency	   of	   all	   food	  transfer	   from	   mothers	   to	   juveniles	   was	   compared	   to	   that	   from	   juveniles	   to	  mothers.	  	  	  	  Hypothesis	  2:	  Lack	  of	  a	  complex	  communication	  system,	  facilitating	  pedagogy,	   in	  
non-­humans	   prevents	   cumulative	   innovations	   spreading	   throughout	   the	  
population.	  	  To	  examine	  whether	  vocal	  communication	  facilitated	  the	  spread	  of	  solutions	  to	  the	   puzzlebox,	   the	   number	   of	   direct	   instruction	   teaching	   events	   that	   involved	  vocalisations	   were	   recorded	   for	   the	   children,	   these	   were	   defined	   as	   those	  vocalisations	   that	   referenced	   part	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   an	   action	   or	   movement.	  Whether	   the	   number	   of	   direct	   teaching	   events	   that	   included	   vocalisations	  	  covaried	  with	  an	  individuals’	  achievement	  rank	  was	  examined.	  	  Also	   recorded	   were	   food	   calls	   made	   by	   chimpanzees	   or	   capuchins,	   which,	   in	  principle,	   could	   facilitate	   learning	   by	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   puzzlebox.	   We	  computed	  the	  rate	  (arrivals/minute)	  of	  animals	  entering	  proximity	  to	  the	  task	  in	  the	  two	  minutes	   following	  an	   individual	   in	  proximity	  emitting	  a	  vocalisation	  or	  food	   call,	   and	   compared	   this	   to	   the	   baseline	   rate	   of	   individuals	   entering	  proximity	  throughout	  the	  trial.	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Hypothesis	  3:	  Lack	  of	  imitation	  in	  non-­humans	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  
innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  
	  To	  test	  if	  observational	  learning	  played	  any	  role	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  solutions	  to	  the	  puzzlebox,	  it	  was	  examined	  whether	  individuals	  copied	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  at	   the	   puzzlebox.	   As	   physical	   access	   to	   the	   puzzlebox	  was	   often	   blocked	  when	  other	   individuals	  were	   interacting	  with	   it,	   the	   analysis	  determined	  whether	   an	  individual	  copied	   the	  actions	  of	  another	   individual	  who	  had	  been	  manipulating	  the	   puzzlebox	   immediately	   prior	   to	   their	   own	   manipulation.	   The	   precise	  methodology	  of	  this	  analysis	  differed	  with	  each	  species	  (see	  chapters	  4-­‐6)	  but	  in	  all	  cases,	  all	  classes	  of	  manipulations	  by	  the	  ‘demonstrator’	  (e.g.	  slide	  left	  door	  to	  left,	  push	  left	  upper	  button,	  etc)	  were	  recorded	  in	  the	  minute	  preceding	  it	  leaving	  the	  puzzlebox,	  and	  all	  manipulations	  by	  the	  observer	   in	  the	  subsequent	  minute	  were	   recorded.	   Those	   manipulations	   that	   matched	   those	   performed	   by	   the	  demonstrator	   were	   classified	   as	   ‘matching’,	   while	   those	   that	   had	   not	   been	  performed	  by	  the	  demonstrator	  were	  classified	  as	  ‘non-­‐matching’.	  	  	  Table	  3.2:	  Actions	  performed	  by	  a	  demonstrator	  and	  the	  actions	  that	  were	  classed	  as	  matching	  if	  performed	   by	   an	   observer	   after	   observing	   that	   demonstrators	   action.	   All	   other	   actions	   were	  classified	  as	  non-­‐matching.	  
Demonstrator’s	  action	   Matching	  actions	  Contact	  puzzlebox	  (+	  location	  on	  box	  touched)	   Contact	  puzzlebox	  (+	  same	  location	  on	  puzzlebox)	  Contact	  right	  door:	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  
door	  Unsuccessful	  right	  door:	  opens	  right	  door	  
before	  it	  has	  been	  reset	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  right	  door	  
Successful	  right	  door:	  opens	  right	  door	  	  Contact	  left	  door:	  touches	  left	  door	  but	  does	  not	  
move	  door	  Unsuccessful	  left	  door:	  opens	  left	  door	  before	  it	  
has	  been	  reset	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  left	  door	  
Successful	  left	  door:	  opens	  left	  door	  
	   124	  
Contact	  down	  on	  right	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  
down	  button	  on	  right,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  Unsuccessful	  down	  on	  right	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  down	  on	  right,	  but	  
before	  it	  has	  been	  reset,	  using	  same	  method	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  down	  on	  right	  (+method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button-­‐	  i.e.	  pushing	  button	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
Successful	  down	  on	  right	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  down	  on	  right,	  
using	  the	  same	  method	  Contact	  down	  on	  left	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  
down	  button	  on	  left,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  Unsuccessful	  down	  on	  left	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  down	  on	  left,	  but	  
before	  it	  has	  been	  reset,	  using	  same	  method	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  down	  on	  left	  (+method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button-­‐	  i.e.	  pushing	  button	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
Successful	  down	  on	  left	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  down	  on	  left,	  using	  
the	  same	  method	  Contact	  up	  on	  right	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  up	  
button	  on	  right,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  Unsuccessful	  up	  on	  right	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  up	  on	  right,	  but	  
before	  it	  has	  been	  reset,	  using	  same	  method	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  up	  on	  right	  (+method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button-­‐	  i.e.	  pushing	  button	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
Successful	  up	  on	  right	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  up	  on	  right,	  using	  
the	  same	  method	  Contact	  up	  on	  left	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  up	  
button	  on	  left,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  Unsuccessful	  up	  on	  left	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  up	  on	  left,	  but	  
before	  it	  has	  been	  reset,	  using	  same	  method	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  up	  on	  left	  (+method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button-­‐	  i.e.	  pushing	  button	  with	  hands	  or	  biting)	  
Successful	  up	  on	  left	  (+	  same	  method	  of	  pushing	  the	  button):	  pushes	  up	  on	  left,	  using	  the	  
same	  method	  Contact	  dial	  on	  right	  (+same	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial):	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  the	  dial	  on	  
right	  Unsuccessful	  dial	  on	  right	  (+same	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial):	  turns	  dial	  on	  right	  after	  
another	  individual,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  dial	  on	  right	  (+method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial-­‐	  i.e.	  red	  or	  blue	  hole)	  
Successful	  dial	  on	  right	  (+same	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial):	  turns	  dial	  on	  right	  after	  
another	  individual,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  Contact	  dial	  on	  left	  (+same	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial):	  touches	  but	  does	  not	  move	  the	  dial	  on	  
left	  Unsuccessful	  dial	  on	  left	  (+same	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial):	  turns	  dial	  on	  left	  after	  another	  
individual,	  using	  the	  same	  method	  
Unsuccessful/Successful	  dial	  on	  left	  (+method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial-­‐	  i.e.	  red	  or	  blue	  hole)	  
Successful	  dial	  on	  left	  (+same	  method	  of	  turning	  the	  dial):	  turns	  dial	  on	  left	  after	  another	  
individual,	  using	  the	  same	  method	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Hypothesis	  4:	  Lack	  of	  prosociality	   in	  non-­human	  primates	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  
cumulative	  innovations.	  One	  prediction	   of	   prosociality	   is	   that	   individuals	  will	   be	  more	   likely	   to	   behave	  altruistically,	   donating	   rewards	   to	   other	   individuals.	   Therefore	   the	   number	   of	  altruistic	   donations	   performed	   by	   each	   individual	   was	   recorded.	   Whether	   the	  number	   of	   altruistic	   events	   received	   covaried	  with	   achievement	   rank	  was	   also	  examined.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	   reasoned	   that	   competitiveness	  and	  self-­‐directedness	  would	   lead	  individuals	  to	  manipulate	  the	  box	  alone,	  whilst	  cooperation,	  tolerance	  of	  others	  and	  shared	  motivation	  might	  lead	  individuals	  to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  others.	   	  Accordingly,	   the	  proportion	  of	  all	  manipulations	   that	  were	  performed	  in	  proximity	  to	  others	  was	  compared	  across	  species.	  	  Hypothesis	   5:	   Scrounging,	   or	   being	   scrounged	   from,	   hinders	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
learning.	  To	  assess	  whether	  scrounging	  from	  others	  affected	  either	  the	  scrounger’s	  or	  the	  victim’s	   learning,	   the	   frequency	   of	   scrounging	   events,	   both	   perpetrated	   and	  received,	  was	  recorded	   for	  each	   individual.	  Whether	   the	  number	  of	   scrounging	  events,	  either	  perpetrated	  or	  received,	  covaried	  with	  an	  individuals’	  achievement	  rank	  was	  also	  examined.	  	  	  Hypothesis	   6:	   Dominant	   individuals	   monopolise	   resources	   preventing	   lower	  
ranking	   individuals	   gaining	   access,	   limiting	   the	   number	   of	   individuals	   with	   the	  
chance	  to	  solve	  the	  task.	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To	   assess	   whether	   dominant	   individuals	   monopolised	   the	   puzzlebox,	   thereby	  preventing	   lower-­‐ranked	   individuals	   from	   manipulating	   the	   puzzlebox,	   data	  were	   collected	   on	   the	   number	   of	   manipulations	   of	   any	   type	   carried	   out	   by	  individuals	  of	  differing	  social	  rank.	  	  	  Individuals	   were	   divided	   into	   rank	   categories,	   high,	   medium	   and	   low	   for	  chimpanzees	   and	   capuchins	   and	   high	   and	   low	   for	   children.	   For	   chimpanzees	  ranks	  were	   based	   upon	   data	   that	   had	   been	   previously	   gathered	   on	   aggression	  during	  reintroductions	  and	  on	  feeding	  priority.	  Capuchin	  data	  were	  gathered	  on	  displacement	   rates	   at	   a	   single	   monopolisable	   food	   source.	   Child	   data	   were	  gathered	   by	   asking	   teachers	   to	   rank	   pupils	   on	   a	   scale	   of	   bold-­‐shy	   and	   most	  socially	  dominant-­‐least	  socially	  dominant.	  	  	  Hypothesis	   7:	   Lack	   of	   attention	   to	   low-­ranking	   and/or	   juvenile	   individuals	  
prevents	  learning	  from,	  potentially	  skilled,	  sections	  of	  the	  population.	  To	  assess	  whether	  there	  was	  less	  attention	  paid	  to	  low-­‐ranking	  (or	  juvenile)	  than	  high-­‐ranking	  individuals	  (or	  adults),	  the	  proportion	  of	  manipulations	  with	  other	  individuals	   in	  proximity	  was	  compared	   for	   individuals	  of	  differing	  rank	  (or	  age	  category).	  Non-­‐human	   individuals	  were	   attributed	   to	   age	   categories	   using	   	   the	  conventions	  specified	  in	  Rowe	  (1996).	  	  	  Hypothesis	  8:	  Non-­human	  animals	  are	  conservative	  and	  satisfice;	  that	  is,	  once	  they	  
have	  a	  solution	  that	  rewards	  them	  they	  do	  not	  change	  it.	  To	   determine	   whether	   satisficing	   was	   inhibiting	   cumulative	   cultural	  transmission,	   the	   performance	   of	   individuals	   in	   the	   open	   and	   scaffolded	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conditions	  in	  experiment	  1	  was	  compared	  in	  both	  the	  children	  and	  chimpanzees.	  As	  there	  was	  only	  access	  to	  one	  capuchin	  group,	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  make	  this	  comparison	   in	   the	   capuchins.	   Satisficing	   is	   here	   defined	   as	   instances	   where	  achieving	   a	   lower-­‐level	   reward	   inhibits	   individuals	   from	   attempting	   to	   obtain	  higher	  level	  rewards.	  If	  individuals	  do	  satisfice	  then	  it	  may	  be	  hypothesised	  that	  individuals	   in	   the	   scaffolded	   condition	   should	  manipulate	   the	   puzzlebox	  more	  immediately	   after	   the	   food	   reward	   has	   been	   withdrawn	   at	   a	   lower	   stage,	  meaning	   individuals	  must	   get	   to	   the	   next	   stage	   to	   gain	   any	   food	   reward,	   than	  those	  individuals	  in	  the	  open	  condition.	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  give	  details	  of	  the	  time	  period	  for	  which	  this	  was	  calculated	  in	  the	  relevant	  species.	  	  If	   individuals	  are	  conservative,	  here	  defined	  as	  continuing	  to	  perform	  the	  same	  action	  even	  when	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  providing	  a	  reward,	  then	  after	  an	  individual	  has	  learned	   the	   first	   stage	   it	   should	   no	   longer	   attempt	   to	   perform	   any	   other	  behaviour	  pattern	  except	  those	  that	  are	  applicable	  to	  solving	  the	  first	  stage.	  The	  number	   of	   ‘conservative	   manipulations’	   (pushing	   the	   left	   or	   right	   door	   open,	  which	   accessed	   stage	   one,	   whether	   this	   was	   a	   successful	   or	   unsuccessful	  manipulation-­‐	  see	  table	  3.1)	  and	  the	  number	  of	  ‘non-­‐conservative	  manipulations’	  (any	  other	  manipulation)	  was	  recorded	  after	  the	  individual	  had	  learned	  to	  access	  stage	   one	   and	   these	   compared	   to	   the	   expectation	   of	   zero	   non-­‐conservative	  manipulations.	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Hypothesis	  9:	  Lack	  of	  ability	  to	  assess	  if	  another’s	  reward	  is	  better	  than	  one’s	  own	  
inhibits	  adoption	  of	  improved	  modifications.	  To	   determine	   whether	   individuals	   could	   recognise	   the	   values	   of	   different	  rewards	   that	  were	  being	   gained	   from	   the	  puzzlebox,	   it	  was	   examined	  whether	  the	  stage	  of	  a	  reward	  affected	  the	  probability	  that	  scrounging	  was	  tolerated.	  The	  proportion	  of	  rewards	  gained	  at	  each	  stage	  that	  were	  subsequently	  scrounged	  by	  another	  individual	  were	  compared	  across	  species.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Plate	  1	  (overleaf):	  Capuchins	  manipulating	  the	  puzzlebox	  during	  an	  experimental	  session.	  
	   129	  
CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
AN	  EXPERIMENTAL	  INVESTIGATION	  OF	  
CUMULATIVE	  CULTURE	  IN	  CAPUCHIN	  MONKEYS	  
	  
Introduction	  	  Brown	  capuchin	  monkeys	  (Cebus	  apella	  ssp.)	  are	  a	  species	  of	  platyrrhine	  monkey	  found	  broadly	  across	  the	  Amazon	  basin	  (Robinson	  &	  Janson,	  1987;	  Rowe,	  1996;	  Rylands	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Fragaszy	   et	   al.,	   2004b).	   The	   exact	   range	   of	   the	   species	  remains	  unclear,	  due	  to	  taxonomic	  disagreements	  and	  incomplete	  data	  collection	  (Rylands	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Fragaszy	   et	   al.,	   2004b).	   It	   is	   estimated	   that	   the	   species	  distribution	  ranges	  from	  Venezuela	  and	  Guyana	  in	  the	  north	  to	  northern	  Bolivia	  in	  the	  south,	  and	  from	  the	  Maranhão	  province	  of	  Brazil	  in	  the	  east	  to	  Peru	  in	  the	  west.	  	  	  The	  species	  lives	  in	  a	  range	  of	  different	  forest	  habitats,	  from	  tropical	  rainforest	  to	  dry	   forest	   and	   seasonal	   deciduous	   forest	   (Terborgh,	   1983;	   Galetto	   &	   Pedroni,	  1994;	   Fragaszy	   et	   al.,	   2004b).	   The	   exact	   composition	   of	   the	   diet	   of	   brown	  capuchins	  varies	  across	  study	  sites,	  but	  typically	  includes	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  fruit	  pulp,	  seeds	  and	  leaves	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  plant	  species	  (Terborgh,	  1983;	  Galetto	  &	  Pedroni,	   1994).	   Brown	   capuchins	   also	   regularly	   eat	   a	   variety	   of	   invertebrate	  species	  (Terborgh,	  1983;	  Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b),	  crops	  raided	  from	  plantations	  (Galetto	   &	   Pedroni,	   1994)	   and	   occasionally	   have	   been	   observed	   to	   consume	  vertebrates,	  including	  other	  primate	  species	  (Sampaio	  &	  Ferrari,	  2005).	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Brown	  capuchins	   (Cebus	  apella)	  have	  been	  observed	  using	  stone	   tools	   to	  crack	  nuts	   (Ottoni	   et	   al.,	   2005)	   and	   a	   closely	   related	   species	   (Cebus	   libidinosus)	   has	  been	  observed	  using	  stone	  tools	  to	  crack	  nuts,	  open	  hollow	  branches	  to	  extract	  insects	   and	   to	  break	   tubers	   into	  manageable	  pieces	   (de	  A.	  Moura	  &	  Lee,	  2004;	  Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004a;	  Ottoni	  &	  Izar,	  2008).	  There	  has	  also	  been	  one	  observation	  of	   an	   adult	   male	   brown	   capuchin	   (Cebus	   apella	   apella)	   using	   a	   tool	   to	   open	  oysters	  (Fernandes,	  1991).	  As	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  there	  is	  evidence	  in	  white	  faced	  capuchins	  of	  behavioural	  traditions	  in	  both	  the	  foraging	  domain	  (Panger	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  social	  domain	  (Perry	  et	  al.,	  2003b;	  2003a).	  	  	  As	   detailed	   in	   chapter	   two,	   brown	   capuchins	   live	   in	   multi-­‐male,	   multi-­‐female	  groups,	   usually	   comprising	   more	   adult	   females	   than	   adult	   males	   (Terborgh,	  1983;	   Di	   Bitetti,	   2001;	   Fragaszy	   et	   al.,	   2004b).	   Groups	   are	   commonly	   female	  philopatric,	  with	  males	  dispersing	  to	  other	  groups	  (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b;	   Izar,	  2004;	  Izar	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Group	  members	  usually	  remain	  in	  close	  proximity	  for	  all	  activities,	   although	   when	   food	   resources	   are	   scarce	   a	   group	   may	   split	   into	  subgroups	  during	  foraging	  (Robinson	  &	  Janson,	  1987;	  Izar,	  2004).	  The	  hierarchy	  within	  groups	  is	  usually	  linear	  with	  an	  alpha	  male	  that	  has	  preferential	  access	  to	  food	  resources	  and	   to	  oestrous	   females,	   and	  who	  exhibits	  aggression	   to	   lower-­‐status	   individuals	   (Robinson	  &	   Janson,	   1987;	   Fragaszy	   et	   al.,	   2004b).	   An	   alpha	  female	   within	   the	   group	   is	   also	   able	   to	  monopolise	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   alpha	  male	  and	  obtains	  preferential	  access	  to	  food	  (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b;	  Izar,	  2004).	  	  	  	  Although	   the	   average	   lifespan	   of	   capuchins	   is	   often	   given	   as	   around	   40	   years	  (Rowe,	  1996),	  there	  is	  not	  an	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  longevity	  for	  individuals	  of	  all	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capuchin	  species	  in	  the	  wild	  (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b).	  In	  captivity	  the	  maximum	  recorded	  age	  for	  a	  brown	  capuchin	  is	  55	  years	  old	  (Fragaszy	  et	  al.,	  2004b).	  With	  first	  birth	  at	  about	  seven	  years	  (Di	  Bitetti	  &	  Janson,	  2001a),	  there	  may	  be	  several	  generations	  of	  females	  present	  in	  one	  group,	  potentially	  offering	  the	  chance	  for	  vertical	  transmission	  of	  social	  information	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  traditions.	  	  	  Due	   to	   the	   reports	   of	   traditions	   and	   tool	   use	   in	   the	  wild	   (Panger	   et	   al.,	   2002;	  Perry	   et	   al.,	   2003b;	   Fragaszy	   et	   al.,	   2004a)	   and	   their	   performance	   in	   captive	  social	   learning	   experiments	   (Fragaszy	   &	   Visalberghi,	   1996;	   2004;	   Dindo	   et	   al.,	  2008),	   capuchins	   are	   a	   species	   well	   suited	   to	   test	   hypotheses	   on	   the	   lack	   of	  cumulative	   culture	   in	   non-­‐humans.	  As	   these	   experiments	   utilise	   a	   comparative	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  behaviour,	  the	  capuchins	  act	  as	  an	  ‘outgroup’,	  allowing	  better	  judgement	  of	  whether	  any	  differences	  between	  children	  and	  chimpanzees	  represent	  derived	  capabilities	  in	  humans	  that	  arose	  specifically	  in	  the	  lineage	  to	  humans.	  	  	  
Specific	  Methods	  
	  
Subjects:	  The	   study	   group	   of	   capuchins	   was	   housed	   at	   the	   Centre	   de	   Primatologie,	  Strasbourg.	   A	   single	   population	   was	   tested	   in	   the	   outdoor	   portion	   of	   their	  enclosure,	   consisting	  of	   two	   interconnected	   runs	  measuring	  45m2	   in	   total.	   The	  puzzlebox	  was	  placed	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   larger	   run	  with	  access	  allowed	   to	  both	  outdoor	  runs	  during	  the	  experiment.	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The	   capuchin	   group	   was	   a	   multi-­‐male,	   multi-­‐female	   group	   with	   ages	   ranging	  from	   0.5	   years	   to	   over	   30	   years	   (Table	   4.1).	   Testing	   was	   carried	   out	   in	   two	  sessions,	  in	  November	  -­‐	  December	  2007	  and	  June	  2008.	  	  During	  the	  intervening	  six	  months	  five	  members	  of	  the	  group	  were	  removed	  to	  start	  a	  new	  colony	  at	  a	  separate	  facility.	  For	  the	  2007	  cohort	  N=	  22,	  and	  for	  the	  2008	  cohort	  N=17. 	  
Table 4.1. Capuchins participating in the experiment. *Individuals that were removed from the group in 
March 2008 






Accroc* (Ac) Male 08/1996 Adult High/NA 
Alila (Al) Female 08/1999 Adult Mid/High 
Arnaud (Ar) Male 07/1998 Adult High/High 
Asson* (As) Female 05/1989 Adult High/NA 
Boy (Bo) Female 01/1973 Adult Low/Mid 
Kinika (Ki) Female 06/1992 Adult High/Low 
Kiwi (Kw) Female ~1980 Adult High/Mid 
Kolette (Ko) Female 08/1999 Adult Mid/Mid 
Olive* (Ol) Female 09/2000 Adult Low/NA 
Paola (Pa) Female 06/2001 Adult Low/Mid 
Petula (Pe) Female 04/2001 Adult Mid/Low 
Pistou (Pi) Male 04/2001 Adult High/High 
Popeye (Po) Male 05/2001 Adult Mid/High 
Raven (Ra) Male 08/2002 Adult Mid/High 
Rosy (Ro) Female 05/2002 Adult High/Mid 
Samir (Sa) Male 05/2003 Adult Mid/Mid 
Shaka* (Sh) Female 07/2003 Adult Mid/NA 
Velvet (Ve) Male 10/2006 Juvenile/ Subadult Low/Low 
Vicky (Vi) Female 03/2006 Juvenile/ Subadult Low/Low 
Vlad* (Vl) Male 05/2006 Juvenile/ Subadult Mid/NA 
Wallis (Wa) Male 05/2007 Infant/ Juvenile Low/Low 
Willow (Wi) Female 08/2007 Infant/ Juvenile Low/Low 
	  	  
Apparatus:	  Puzzlebox	   two,	   the	   smaller	   puzzlebox,	   was	   used	   with	   the	   capuchins.	   The	  puzzlebox	  was	  placed	  outside	  of	  the	  outdoor	  enclosure	  at	  a	  height	  of	  30cm	  from	  the	  ground.	  All	   subjects	  were	  easily	   able	   to	   reach	   through	   the	  50mm2	  mesh	   to	  manipulate	  it.	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Procedure:	  Food	  preference	  testing:	  The	  capuchin	  food	  preference	  testing	  exploited	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  capuchins	  were	  trained	  to	  exchange	  items	  and	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  experiments	  in	  which	  they	  choose	  between	  two	  options	  offered	  to	   them	  by	  an	  experimenter	  (Ramseyer	  et	  al.,	   2006).	  Whilst	   the	   group	  were	   freely	   associating	   in	   their	   outdoor	   enclosure,	  individuals	  were	  presented	  with	   two	   foods	   (from	  carrot,	   apple	   and	  grape)	   and	  were	  allowed	  to	  choose	  one	  food	  which	  they	  were	  able	  to	  consume.	  The	  order	  of	  food	   presentation,	   and	   the	   hands	   in	   which	   foods	   were	   presented,	   was	  randomised	  over	  time.	  Due	  to	  dominance	  in	  the	  group,	  some	  individuals	  received	  more	  tests	  than	  others	  as	  they	  displaced	  the	  focal	  individual.	  However,	  eighteen	  of	  the	  population	  received	  at	  least	  five	  food	  preference	  tests.	  	  
	  Rank	  assessment:	  The	   capuchin	   group	   was	   given	   a	   single,	   monopolisable	   food	   source	   to	   assess	  competitive	  rank	   in	   the	  group.	  A	   tap	  was	  attached	   to	   the	  wire	  mesh	  of	   the	  run	  from	   which	   individuals	   could	   drink	   orange	   squash,	   a	   highly	   desirable	   food	  source.	  The	  frequency	  of	  displacements	  was	  recorded,	  along	  with	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  individuals	  that	  were	  displaced	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  individuals	  that	  displaced	  others.	   Using	   these	   displacement	   data,	   the	   dominance	   hierarchy	   of	   the	  population	   was	   assigned	   using	   a	   modified	   Landau’s	   linearity	   index,	   which	  calculates	  rank	  based	  on	  the	  proportion	  of	  antagonistic	  encounters	  won	  by	  each	  individual	  of	  each	  dyad,	  taking	  account	  of	  missing	  data	  between	  some	  dyads	  (De	  Vries,	   1995).	   This	   calculation	   produced	   a	   single,	   linear	   dominance	   hierarchy	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from	  which	  rank	  categories	  were	  assigned.	  The	  individuals	  in	  the	  top	  third	  of	  the	  hierarchy	   were	   classified	   as	   ‘high-­‐ranking’,	   those	   in	   the	   middle	   third	   as	   ‘mid-­‐ranking’	  and	  those	  in	  the	  lower	  third	  as	  ‘low-­‐ranking’.	  	  Experiment:	  The	  capuchin	  population	  was	  tested	  in	  the	  ‘scaffolded’	  condition,	  in	  which	  there	  was	  regulated	  access	  to	  one	  stage	  at	  a	  time	  (details	  in	  chapter	  3).	  Two,	  one	  hour,	  trials	   were	   conducted	   daily	   with	   a	   total	   of	   53	   trials	   over	   two	   time	   periods	  (November	  to	  December	  2007	  and	  June	  2008).	  The	  first	   trial	  was	  conducted	   in	  the	   late	   morning	   (starting	   10.30-­‐11am)	   and	   the	   second	   trial	   in	   the	   afternoon	  (starting	  1.30-­‐2.30pm)	  with	  no	  less	  than	  90	  minutes	  between	  trials.	  	  	  
Analysis:	  There	  were	  two	  periods	  of	  data	  collection,	  in	  November	  to	  December	  2007	  and	  in	   June	  2008,	  with	   the	   removal	  of	   five	   individuals	   in	  between	   the	   two	  periods.	  This	   resulted	   in	   a	   change	   in	   the	   social	   hierarchy	   of	   the	   group.	   Accordingly,	  analyses	  that	  were	  based	  upon	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  group	  were	  conducted	  separately	   for	   each	   time	   period.	   All	   other	   analyses	   were	   conducted	   using	   the	  data	  combined	  for	  both	  data	  collection	  periods.	  	  All	  analyses	  were	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  3	  except	  that	  for	  hypothesis	  3.	  	  	  Hypothesis	  2:	  	  Data	  on	  food	  calls	  were	  collected	  for	  the	  2008	  data	  collection	  period	  only.	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Food	  preference	  testing:	  Across	   107	   food	   presentations	   to	   nineteen	   individuals,	   there	   were	   26	  simultaneous	  presentations	  of	  carrot	  and	  grape,	  43	  simultaneous	  presentations	  of	  apple	  and	  carrot	  and	  38	  simultaneous	  presentations	  of	  apple	  and	  grape.	  There	  were	  no	  instances	  in	  which	  carrot	  was	  preferred	  to	  grape.	  Carrot	  was	  preferred	  to	   apple	   on	   five,	   out	   of	   38,	   occasions,	   once	   by	   five	   individuals	   (Binomial	   test:	  0.116,	  p=	  2.50	  x	  10-­‐7),	  who	  in	  other	  test	  sessions	  preferred	  apple	  to	  carrot.	  There	  were	  eight	   instances	   in	  which	  apple	  was	  preferred	  to	  grape	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  38	  presentations	   (Binomial	   test:	  0.24,	  p=	  0.002);	  on	  all	  other	  occasions	  grape	  was	  preferred.	  One	  individual,	  Petula,	  preferred	  apple	  on	  all	  three	  occasions	  she	  was	  presented	   grape	   and	   apple	   simultaneously,	   whilst	   other	   individuals	   did	   not	  consistently	   prefer	   apple	   to	   grape.	   Overall	   this	   gives	   a	   clear	   pattern	   of	   food	  preference	  of	  grape	  over	  apple	  over	  carrot.	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General	  results:	  	  All	   capuchins	  were	  able	   to	  manipulate	   the	  puzzlebox	   (mean	  manipulations	  per	  individual:	  925.73,	  standard	  error:	  274.86,	  range:	  3	  to	  4642;	  figure	  4.1),	  with	  all	  individuals	  being	  able	  to	  solve	  stage	  one.	  There	  were	  two	  individuals	  who	  got	  to	  stage	   two,	   one	   in	   the	   first	   data	   collection	   period	   and	   one	   in	   the	   second	   data	  collection	  period.	  	  
	  
	  Figure	   4.1:	   The	   number	   of	   manipulations	   performed	   by	   each	   individual	   across	   all	   trials.	   The	  identity	  of	  the	  individuals	  is	  stated	  across	  the	  x-­‐axis,	  using	  name	  codes	  from	  table	  4.1.	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significant	   difference	   between	   the	   achievement	   rank	   of	   individuals	   in	   different	  age	  categories	  (Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  test:	  χ2=4.89,	  df=2,	  p=0.087,	  power=9%).	  	  
Hypothesis	   1:	   A	   lack	   of	   teaching	   in	   non-­human	   primates	   prevents	   the	   spread	   of	  
cumulative	  innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  There	  were	  no	  direct	   teaching	   events,	   defined	   as	   an	   act	   by	  one	   individual	   that	  clearly	   functioned	   to	   facilitate	   learning	   in	   another	   individual	   by	   imparting	  knowledge	   about	   the	   solutions	   to	   the	   puzzlebox.	   As	   no	   direct	   teaching	   events	  were	   observed,	   the	   effects	   of	   more	   subtle	   forms	   of	   teaching	   or	   precursors	   of	  teaching	  (henceforth	  ‘scaffolding’)	  were	  investigated.	  Mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	  dyads	  were	  hypothesised	  to	  be	  the	  dyads	  in	  which	  scaffolding	  was	  most	  likely	  to	  occur	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  dyads	  in	  which	  the	  performance	  at	  the	  puzzlebox	  was	  most	   likely	   to	   match.	   The	   achievement	   level	   was	   compared	   between	  mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	   dyads	   and	   mother⎯adult-­‐offspring	   dyads.	   There	  was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   difference	   in	   achievement	   rank	   of	  mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	   dyads	   (mean	   difference	   in	   achievement	   rank	   of	  mother	  and	  offspring=	  8.8,	  standard	  error	  =	  ±	  4.89)	  and	  mother⎯adult-­‐offspring	  dyads	   (mean	   difference	   in	   achievement	   rank	   of	   mother	   and	   offspring=	   -­‐2.45,	  standard	  error	  =	  ±2.87)	   (Wilcoxon	   test:	  W=44,	  p=0.07,	  95%	  CI	   around	  median	  difference=[-­‐1.00,	   	   23.00]).	   However	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   confidence	   intervals	  suggests	  that	  power	  is	  low	  in	  this	  case.	  	  In	   theory,	   scaffolded	   teaching	   may	   also	   be	   carried	   out	   by	   a	   tutor	   through	  allowing	  tolerated	  theft	  of	  a	   food	  reward	  by	  the	  pupil.	  However,	   there	  were	  no	  instances	   of	   a	   juvenile	   taking	   a	   food	   reward,	   either	   through	   tolerated	   theft	   or	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scrounging,	   from	   its	   mother.	   Similarly,	   mothers	   did	   not	   scrounge	   from	   their	  juvenile-­‐offspring.	  	  
Hypothesis	  2:	  Lack	  of	  a	   complex	   communication	   system,	   facilitating	  pedagogy,	   in	  
non-­humans	   prevents	   cumulative	   innovations	   spreading	   throughout	   the	  
population.	  The	  frequency	  of	  calls	  in	  response	  to	  gaining	  or	  seeing	  food	  was	  extremely	  low	  in	  the	  	  capuchin	  population,	  with	  only	  6	  food	  calls	  being	  recorded	  in	  total	  across	  all	  trials	  in	  2008	  (mean=0.261	  calls	  per	  subject).	  In	  the	  two	  minutes	  following	  these	  food	   calls	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   individuals	  recruited	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  (mean	  =1	  per	  minute)	  compared	  to	  the	  baseline	  rate	  of	  arrivals	  across	  the	  trials	  as	  a	  whole	  (mean=1.17	  per	  minute)	  (Wilcoxon	  test:	  W=9,	  p=0.45;	  figure	  4.3).	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  Figure	  4.3:	  The	  median	  rate	  of	  recruitment	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  in	  the	  two	  minutes	  after	  a	  food	  call	  and	  the	  baseline	  recruitment	  rate	  across	  all	  trials.	  	  
	  	  Hypothesis	  3:	  Lack	  of	  imitation	  in	  non-­humans	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  
innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  	  The	   learning	   time	   of	   individuals	   for	   the	   first	   stage	   (time	   of	   1st	   successful	  manipulation-­‐	   1st	   contact	   time)	  was	   not	   correlated	  with	   the	   time	   at	  which	   the	  individual	   first	   contacted	   the	   puzzlebox	   (Spearman’s	   rho=	   0.0069,	   p=0.78).	   As	  only	  2	   individuals	   learned	   to	  open	  stage	  2,	   there	  was	   insufficient	  data	   to	   carry	  out	  an	  analysis	  at	  stage	  2.	  	  As	  the	  population	  was	   in	  the	  scaffolded	  condition,	   from	  the	  beginning	  of	  trial	  7	  onwards	  the	  guards	  hiding	  stage	  2	  were	  removed	  and	  food	  was	  provided	  only	  at	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stage	  2.	  Therefore,	   the	  population	  was	  exposed	   to	  stage	  2	   for	  47	  hours.	  Within	  that	   time	   the	   mean	   proportion	   of	   manipulations	   performed	   by	   all	   individuals	  with	  at	  least	  one	  other	  individual	  in	  proximity	  was	  0.60	  (standard	  error=	  ±0.06).	  There	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   proportion	   of	   manipulations	  performed	  with	   other	   individuals	   in	   proximity	   in	   the	   first	   6	   trials	   (when	   only	  stage	  1	  was	   accessible)	   and	   in	   the	   last	  47	   trials	   (when	   stage	  2	  was	   accessible)	  (Wilcoxon	  test:	  W=148,	  p=0.11,	  95%	  CI=[-­‐0.038,	  0.323]).	  	  In	  the	  minute	  following	  the	  observation	  of	  a	  more	  knowledgeable	  individual	  for	  a	  minute,	   after	   which	   that	   knowledgeable	   individual	   left,	   observing	   individuals	  were	   more	   likely	   to	   perform	   an	   action	   they	   had	   not	   seen	   the	   more	  knowledgeable	   individual	  perform	   than	  one	   they	  had	  seen	  performed	   (W=721,	  p=0.0027).	   When	   considering	   only	   the	   first	   action	   produced	   by	   an	   observer,	  following	   the	   demonstrator’s	   departure,	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	  between	   the	   performance	   of	   an	   unseen	   and	   seen	   action	   (Binomial	   test:	   0.41,	  p=0.302,	  95%	  C.I.=[0.27,	  0.58]).	  There	  was	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  matching	  manipulations	  performed	  by	  an	  individual	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank	  within	  the	  population	  (Spearmans’	  Rank	  Correlation:	  Rho=	  -­‐0.06,	  S	  =	  1879.1,	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.79;	  figure	  4.4).	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  Figure	   4.4:	   The	   relationship	   between	   achievement	   rank	   of	   individuals	   and	   matching-­‐nonmatching	  manipulations.	  	  	  Hypothesis	   4:	   Lack	   of	   prosociality	   in	   non-­human	   primate	   individuals	   in	   a	  
population	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations.	  Capuchins	  were	  never	  observed	  to	  give	  another	   individual	  a	   food	  reward	   in	  an	  altruistic	  manner.	  There	  was	  a	  mean	  proportion	  of	  0.70	  manipulations	  (standard	  error=	   ±0.047)	   performed	   by	   an	   individual	   with	   other	   individuals	   also	   in	  proximity	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  
	  
Hypothesis	   5:	   Scrounging,	   or	   being	   scrounged	   from,	   hinders	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
learning.	  Scrounging	   was	   observed	   in	   the	   population,	   with	   individuals	   removing	   food	  rewards	   accessed	   by	   others	   from	   stage	   one	   and	   stage	   two	   of	   the	   puzzlebox.	  There	   is	   no	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	   times	   an	   individual	   scrounged	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from	   another	   before	   they	   reached	   the	   final	   stage	   they	   achieved,	   and	   their	  achievement	  rank	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=0.01,	  S	  =	  1753.1,	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.96).	   There	   was	   also	   no	   correlation	   between	   the	   total	   number	   of	   times	   an	  individual	  scrounged	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=	  0.34,	  S	  =	  1170.5,	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.12;	  figure	  4.5).	  	  There	   were	   no	   individuals	   who	   were	   the	   victims	   of	   scrounging	   before	   they	  reached	   the	   final	   stage	   that	   they	   achieved.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   hypothesis,	   the	  number	  of	  scrounging	  events	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  falls	  victim	  over	  the	  whole	  experiment	   is	   significantly	   positively	   (rather	   than	   negatively)	   correlated	   with	  their	   achievement	   rank	   (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	   rho=	  0.71,	   S	  =	  511.6,	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.0002;	  figure	  4.6).	  	  
	  Figure	   4.5:	   The	   relationship	   between	   achievement	   rank	   and	   number	   of	   scrounging	   events	  perpetrated	  by	  an	  individual	  across	  all	  trials.	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  Figure	   4.6:	   The	   relationship	   between	   achievement	   rank	   and	   number	   of	   scrounging	   events	   an	  individual	  falls	  victim	  to	  across	  all	  trials.	  
	  
Hypothesis	   6:	   Dominant	   individuals	   monopolise	   resources	   preventing	   lower-­	  
ranking	  individuals	  gaining	  access,	  thereby	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  with	  
the	  chance	  to	  solve	  the	  task.	  In	  2007	  	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  number	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  by	  individuals	  of	  different	  social	  ranks	  (Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  test:	  χ2=	  8.23,	  df=	  2,	  p=0.016).	  Post-­‐hoc	  pairwise	  comparisons,	  with	  p-­‐value	  adjusted	  using	  the	  Bonferroni	   method	   indicated	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   (mean=	   65.6	  manipulations)	   performed	   significantly	   fewer	  manipulations	   than	   high-­‐ranking	  (mean=	   1152.8,	   p=	   0.0034)	   or	   mid-­‐ranking	   (mean=	   508.25,	   p=	   0.024)	  individuals.	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  Figure	   4.7:	   The	   mean	   (±	   standard	   error)	   manipulation	   rate	   of	   capuchins	   according	   to	   rank	  category	  and	  trial	  period	  (November	  to	  December	  2007-­‐	  light	  yellow,	  June	  2008-­‐	  dark	  yellow).	  
	  Whilst	   there	   is	   a	   similar	   trend	   in	   2008,	   there	   is	   not	   a	   significant	   difference	  between	   the	   number	   of	   manipulations	   performed	   by	   high-­‐ranking	   (mean=	  1152.8,	  standard	  error=±871.38),	  mid-­‐ranking	  (mean=	  453.17,	  standard	  error	  =	  ±	  346.94)	  and	  low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  (mean=	  101.67,	  standard	  error=	  ±	  43.91)	  (Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  test:	  χ2=	  0.13,	  df=2,	  p=0.93).	  	  
Hypothesis	  7:	  Lack	  of	  attention	  to	  low-­ranking	  and/or	  juvenile	  individuals	  prevents	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different	  between	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   (mean=	  0.47,	   standard	  error=	  0.17),	  mid-­‐ranking	   individuals	   (mean=	   0.76,	   standard	   error=0.05)	   and	   high-­‐ranking	  individuals	   (mean=0.78,	   standard	   error=0.09)	   (Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   test:	   χ2=	   2.49,	  df=2,	  p=0.29,	  power=42%;	  figure	  4.8).	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juveniles	   (mean=	  0.78,	   standard	  error=	  0.03)	  and	  adults	   (mean=0.73,	   standard	  error=	   0.06)	   (Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   test:	   χ2=	   4.74,	   df=2,	   p-­‐value=0.09,	   power=10%).
	  Figure	  4.9:	  The	  mean	  (±	  standard	  error)	  proportion	  of	  manipulations	  with	  other	   individuals	   in	  proximity	   across	   age	   categories	   and	   trial	   periods	   (November	   to	   December	   2007-­‐	   light	   yellow,	  June	  2008-­‐	  dark	  yellow).	  	  Note	  that	  there	  are	  no	  subadults	  present	  in	  2007	  and	  no	  infants	  present	  in	  2008.	  	  In	   2008,	   there	   was	   also	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   proportion	   of	  manipulations	   performed	   with	   another	   individual	   in	   proximity	   between	  juveniles	  (mean=	  0.57,	  standard	  error=	  0.005),	  subadults	  (mean=0.30,	  standard	  error=	  0.05)	  and	  adults	  (mean=	  0.55,	  standard	  error=	  0.10)	  (Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  test:	  
χ2=	  0.91,	  df=2,	  p-­‐value=0.63,	  power=77%;	  figure	  4.9).	  	  
	  
	  







































	   148	  
Hypothesis	   8:	   Non-­human	   animals	   are	   conservative	   and	   satisfice,	   such	   that	   once	  
they	  have	  a	  solution	  that	  rewards	  them	  they	  do	  not	  change	  it.	  There	   were	   two	   individuals	   that	   got	   to	   stage	   2,	   thus	   suggesting	   that	   not	   all	  individuals	  act	  conservatively.	  Across	  the	  entire	  populations	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐conservative	   manipulations	   performed	   by	   individuals	   (mean=	   39.94	   standard	  error=	   22.41)	   was	   significantly	   different	   to	   zero	   (Mann-­‐Whitney	   test:	   U=78,	  p=0.002;	  figure	  4.10).	  
	  Figure	   4.10:	   The	   number	   of	   non-­‐conservative	   events	   performed	   by	   individuals	   after	   learning	  stage	  one.	  	  
Hypothesis	  9:	  Lack	  of	  ability	  to	  assess	  if	  another’s	  solution	  is	  better	  than	  one’s	  own	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the	   trials	   a	   higher	   proportion	   of	   stage	   one	   rewards	   (carrot)	   were	   able	   to	   be	  scrounged	  than	  stage	  two	  (apple)	  rewards	  (Wilcoxon	  W=103,	  p=0.003).	  	  
Discussion:	  	  Only	   two	   capuchins	   out	   of	   22	   managed	   to	   learn	   to	   solve	   stage	   two	   of	   the	  puzzlebox,	  based	  on	   the	  criteria	  of	  solving	   the	  stage	  at	   least	   five	   times	   in	  more	  than	  one	   trial,	   despite	   the	  puzzlebox	  no	   longer	  provisioning	   food	   at	   stage	   one.	  The	   capuchin	   group	  was	   in	   a	   scaffolded	   condition	   and	   not	   enough	   individuals	  solved	  stage	  two	  to	  allow	  access	  to	  stage	  three.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  task	  was	  difficult,	  but	  not	  out	  of	  the	  cognitive	  grasp	  or	  zone	  of	  latent	  solutions	  (Tennie	  et	  al.,	   2009)	   of	   the	   species.	   There	  was	   no	   evidence	   that	   capuchins	   used	   teaching,	  complex	  communication,	  social	   learning	  or	  prosociality	  when	  manipulating	  this	  cumulative	  puzzlebox.	  There	  was	  also	  evidence	  that	  dominant	   individuals	  were	  able	   to	   use	   the	   puzzlebox	   more	   than	   lower	   ranking	   individuals.	   Thus	   five	  hypotheses	  were	  supported.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  evidence	  for	  teaching	  in	  this	  experiment	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  reported	  evidence	   from	  the	  wild	  and	  captivity	  (Visalberghi	  &	  Limongelli,	  1996;	  Fragaszy	   &	   Visalberghi,	   2004).	   Capuchins	  were	   not	   observed	   to	   carry	   out	   any	  explicit	  teaching	  and	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  mothers	  scaffolding	  the	  learning	  of	   their	   juvenile-­‐offspring,	   although	  power	  was	  poor	   for	   this	   analysis.	  As	   there	  were	  no	  active	  teaching	  events	  observed,	  the	  use	  of	  vocalisations	  during	  teaching	  could	   not	   be	   analysed.	   Therefore,	   the	   recruitment	   of	   other	   individuals	   due	   to	  food	   calls	   was	   examined,	   as	   these	   calls	   might	   attract	   other	   individuals	   to	   the	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puzzlebox	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  they	  would	  socially	  learn	  through	  a	  local	  enhancement	  mechanism.	  There	  was	  a	  low	  rate	  of	  food	  calling	  and	  calls	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  recruit	   individuals	   to	  the	  puzzlebox.	   	   It	   is	  possible,	  however,	   that	   the	  low	  rate	  of	   food	  calling	   	   is	  an	  artefact	  of	   captivity.	   	   In	   the	  captive	  environment	  there	   may	   be	   increased	   competition	   for	   resources	   and	   	   individuals	   may,	  therefore,	  suppress	  calls	  when	  they	  discover	  food	  to	  avoid	  the	  attention	  of	  other	  individuals	  who	  may	  displace	  them	  from	  the	  puzzlebox	  (Di	  Bitetti,	  2005).	  There	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  individuals	  did	  not	  call	  later	  in	  the	  experiment	  as	  the	  puzzlebox	  was,	  by	  then,	  not	  novel;	   the	  purpose	  of	   food	  calls	   in	  capuchins	  being	  thought	  to	  be	  to	  alert	  other	  individuals	  to	  new	  food	  sources	  (Di	  Bitetti	  &	  Janson,	  2001b;	   Gros-­‐Louis,	   2004).	   However,	   food	   calls	   occurred	   throughout	   the	   trials	  and	  were	  not	  all	  at	  the	  beginning.	  The	  low	  number	  of	  food	  calls	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  vocal	  recruitment	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  do,	  however,	  suggest	  that	  vocal	  cues	  did	  not	  a	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  learning	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  	  Examining	   what	   role	   social	   learning	   played	   in	   the	   learning	   of	   the	   puzzlebox,	  there	   were	   two	   analyses:	   learning	   time	   analysis	   and	   assessment	   of	   matching	  behaviour.	   There	   was	   no	   correlation	   between	   learning	   time	   and	   contact	   time	  (social	   learning	   being	   indicated	   by	   a	   negative	   correlation).	   The	   first	   stage	  may	  have	   proved	   to	   be	   sufficiently	   easy	   to	   solve	   individually	   without	   individuals	  needing	   to	   learn	   from	  others	   (Kendal	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  possibly	  due	   to	  exposure	   to	  previous	  social	  learning	  experiments	  that	  employed	  a	  sliding	  door	  (Dindo	  et	  al.,	  2008).	   Social	   learning	   theorists	   have	   posited	   that	   there	   should	   be	   a	   trade-­‐off	  between	   social	   and	   asocial	   learning,	   with	   social	   learning	   being	   used	   if	   asocial	  learning	   is	   too	   costly	   or	   has	   not	   provided	   individuals	  with	   a	   solution	   (Boyd	  &	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Richerson,	  1985;	  Kendal	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  	  but	  c.f.:	  Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Kendal	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  examined	  the	  occurrence	  of	  social	  learning	  in	  callitrichids	  with	  a	  series	  of	  puzzleboxes,	  they	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  evidence	  for	  social	  learning	  with	  those	  puzzleboxes	  that	  were	  more	  difficult	  to	  solve.	  	  	  In	   subsequent	   trials,	   when	   individuals	   had	   been	   able	   to	   observe	   an	   individual	  that	  was	  proficient	  at	  stage	  two,	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  an	  action	  that	  they	  had	  not	  seen	  performed	  in	  the	  last	  minute.	  These	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  previous	   results	   from	  observation	   learning	   experiments	  with	   capuchins,	  which	  have	  mostly	  failed	  to	  get	  positive	  findings	  (Fragaszy	  &	  Visalberghi,	  1996;	  2004).	  These	   researchers	   have	   concluded	   that	   capuchin	   social	   learning	   is	   based	   on	  mechanisms	   such	   as	   local	   and	   stimulus	   enhancement	   rather	   than	   imitation	   or	  object	  movement	  re-­‐enactment.	  Dindo	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  argued	  that	  capuchins	  were	  able	   to	   copy	   the	   action	   that	  was	   demonstrated	   to	   them	  on	   a	   puzzlebox,	   either	  lifting	  a	  door	  or	  sliding	  it.	  They	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  insufficient	  evidence	  for	  any	  particular	  social	  learning	  mechanism,	  but	  as	  the	  actions	  were	  focussed	  upon	  the	   same	   handle,	   stimulus	   or	   local	   enhancement	  would	   not	   produce	   the	   same	  results	  in	  which	  one	  chain	  learned	  to	  lift	  and	  the	  other	  slide.	  One	  consideration	  raised	   by	  Dindo	   et	   al	   (2008)	   is	   that	   transmission	   chain	   experiments,	   in	  which	  participants	   are	   paired	   carefully	   according	   to	   tolerance	   within	   the	   dyad,	   may	  artificially	  engineer	  social	  tolerance	  rates	  not	  seen	  in	  a	  group	  as	  a	  whole.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	   judge	  whether	  the	  solution	  for	  the	  second	  stage	  was	  transmitted	  by	  social	   learning	   or	   if	   there	   were	   independent	   inventions.	   It	   is,	   however,	  informative	  to	  note	  that	  both	  individuals	  who	  regularly	  solved	  the	  second	  stage	  usually	   bit	   the	   ‘up	   button’	   on	   the	   puzzlebox	   rather	   than	   pushing	   it	   with	   their	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hands,	  although	  they	  also	  used	  the	  latter	  manipulation	  as	  well.	  The	  fact	  that	  both	  stage	  2	  solvers	  used	  their	  mouths	  hints	  at	  social	   learning,	  as	  biting	  the	  buttons	  was	   not	   the	   only	   action	   available	   to	   them.	   Indeed,	   other	   individuals	   were	  observed	  to	  use	  their	  hands	  to	  push	  the	  buttons,	  with	  some	  of	  these	  individuals	  then	   opening	   the	   door	   and	   solving	   stage	   two	   but	   not	   sufficiently	   frequently	   to	  meet	   the	   learning	   criteria;	   whereas	   others	   pressed	   the	   button	   but	   did	   not	  subsequently	   open	   the	   door,	   thereby	   failing	   to	   successfully	   solve	   stage	   two.	  These	   observations	   confirm	   that	   capuchins	   were	   strong	   enough	   to	   push	   the	  button	  with	  their	  hands.	  	  The	   two-­‐door	   design	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   may	   also	   stimulate	   more	   individual	  exploration	   than	   a	   single	   door	   design.	   Dindo	   et	   al	   (2010)	   tested	   capuchins	   in	  dyads	   with	   a	   trained	   demonstrator.	   In	   Dindo	   et	   al’s	   task,	   the	   puzzlebox	   with	  which	   the	   subjects	   were	   presented	   could	   be	   opened	   by	   pushing	   a	   door	   open	  diagonally	  up	  and	  right,	  or	  diagonally	  up	  and	  left.	  Demonstrators	  were	  trained	  to	  push	   in	   one	   direction	   only.	   There	   were	   two	   places	   in	   which	   food	   could	   be	  provisioned,	   one	   was	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   and	   was	   revealed	  immediately	   the	   door	   was	   pushed.	   The	   other	   was	   behind	   a	   hatch	   which	   was	  opened	  by	  pushing	  the	  central	  door	  either	  fully	  up	  and	  right,	  or	  fully	  up	  and	  left.	  When	   food	  was	  provisioned	  behind	   the	  central	  door,	  observers	   tended	   to	  copy	  the	   direction	   the	   demonstrator	   pushed	   the	   door.	   However,	   when	   food	   was	  provisioned	   behind	   one	   of	   the	   hatches,	   at	   the	   extremities	   of	   the	   puzzlebox,	  copying	   fidelity	  was	   significantly	   lower	   than	   in	   the	   first	   condition.	  Dindo	   et	   al.	  (2010)	   propose	   that,	   in	   the	   second	   condition,	   capuchins	   may	   be	   checking	   the	  rewards	   that	   are	   available	   at	   both	   locations	   and	   rely	   more	   on	   individual	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exploration.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  first	  condition	  they	  may	  copy	  with	  greater	  fidelity	  as	  social	   learning	  has	   enabled	   them	   to	   find	   the	   solution	   to	   the	  puzzlebox	   and	   the	  alternative	  is	  no	  more	  rewarding.	  	  	  The	  puzzlebox	   in	   this	   experiment	  has	   two	  doors	   that	   each	  may	   conceal	   a	   food	  reward.	  The	  twin	  doors	  may	  mean	  that	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  explore	  the	  puzzlebox	   individually,	   rather	   than	   follow	   the	   solutions	   of	   others.	   Therefore,	  although	   the	   possibility	   that	   animals	   learned	   through	   local	   or	   stimulus	  enhancement	  that	  the	  puzzlebox	  provides	  a	  reward	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  social	  learning	  is	  occurring.	  The	  ability	  of	  animals	  to	  generalise	  between	   the	   stimuli	   on	   both	   sides	  may	   account	   for	   some	   of	   the	   non-­‐matching	  behaviour	   that	   is	   observed.	   For	   example,	   if	   animals	   observed	   a	   more	   skilled	  individual	  push	  the	  up	  button	  on	  the	  left	  and	  subsequently	  pushed	  the	  up	  button	  on	  the	  right,	  this	  would	  have	  counted	  as	  a	  non-­‐matching	  action.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  observer	  may	  have	  learned,	  via	  stimulus	  enhancement,	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  up	  buttons.	  However	  the	  lack	  of	  spread	  of	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  second	  stage,	  despite	  the	   demonstration	   by	   two	   skilled	   individuals,	   suggests	   that	   this	   measure	   of	  matching	  behaviour	  is	  not	  significantly	  underestimating	  the	  social	   learning	  that	  is	  occurring.	  	  There	   were	   also	   no	   instances	   of	   altruism	   in	   the	   study,	   with	   no	   individuals	  voluntarily	  giving	  acquired	  	  food	  rewards	  to	  another.	  The	  captive	  environment	  of	  this	  group	  and	  the	  experimental	  set-­‐up,	  in	  which	  individuals	  had	  visual	  access	  to	  the	   puzzlebox	   much	   of	   the	   time,	   albeit	   from	   a	   distance,	   may	   increase	   the	  likelihood,	   or	   perceived	   likelihood,	   of	   displacement	   or	   scrounging.	   Therefore	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individuals	  may	  have	  sought	  to	  maximise	  the	  number	  of	  food	  rewards	  that	  they	  could	  gain	  by	  not	  acting	  altruistically	  and	  instead	  consuming	  the	  food	  themselves	  (Di	   Bitetti	   &	   Janson,	   2001b).	   Experimental	  work	   on	   capuchins	   in	   captivity	   has	  suggested	  that	  capuchins	  will	  behave	  altruistically	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  such	  as	   when	   paired	   with	   a	   subordinate	   individual	   (Lakshminarayanan	   &	   Santos,	  2010;	   Takimoto	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   however,	   such	   experiments	   have	   not	   tested	  individuals	   in	   a	   competitive	   situation.	   In	   this	   experimental	   set-­‐up,	   individuals	  would	   be	   completely	   forfeiting	   their	   own	   reward	   to	   give	   a	   reward	   to	   another	  individual,	   rather	   than	   simply	   considering	   other	   individuals	   when	   making	   a	  choice	  that	  gave	  the	  subject	  the	  same	  reward.	  	  Capuchins	   have	   been	   proposed	   to	   be	   tolerant	   of	   some	   individuals	   in	   the	  population	  being	   in	  close	  proximity	   to	   them	  whilst	   they	  perform	  tasks,	   such	  as	  nut-­‐cracking	  (Ottoni	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  In	  this	  experiment	  70%	  of	  manipulations	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  were	  performed	  with	  another	   individual	   in	  proximity.	  Coussi-­‐Korbel	  and	  Fragaszy	   (1995)	   argue	   that	   capuchins	  have	   an	   intermediate	   style	   of	   social	  dynamics,	   neither	   highly	   despotic,	   not	   highly	   egalitarian.	   Therefore,	   some	  individuals	  in	  the	  population,	  such	  as	  family	  members	  or	  juveniles,	  would	  be	  able	  to	   gain	   close	   visual	   access	   to	   a	   subject	  when	   they	   are	   performing	   a	   behaviour	  pattern,	  with	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  population	  also	  gaining	  some	  visual	  access,	  but	  from	  a	  greater	  distance.	  Individuals	  in	  this	  experiment,	  were	  either	  classified	  as	  in	  proximity	  or	  out	  of	  proximity,	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  possible	  to	  judge	  whether	  the	  tolerance	  of	  individuals	  in	  proximity	  resulted	  in	  increased	  opportunities	  for	  learning.	  Indeed	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  for	  social	  learning	  in	  most	  individuals	  in	  the	  population,	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   altruistic	   giving,	   suggests	   that	   being	   in	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proximity	   to	   the	  puzzlebox	  did	  not	  afford	   individuals	  an	  advantage	   in	   terms	  of	  learning	  opportunities.	  	  	  Examining	  whether	  scrounging	  affected	  the	  learning	  of	  the	  cumulative	  puzzlebox	  it	  was	   found	  that	  whilst	  scrounging	  does	  occur	   in	   the	  population,	   there	  was	  no	  evidence	   that	   being	   scrounged	   from,	   or	   scrounging	   from	   others,	   affected	   the	  performance	  of	  individuals.	  Whilst	  scrounging	  has	  been	  found	  to	  occur	  in	  other	  capuchin	   populations,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   the	   scrounging	   facilitates	  learning	   (Di	  Bitetti	  &	   Janson,	  2001b;	  Ottoni	  et	   al.,	   2005)	  and	   indeed,	  may	  even	  impede	  learning	  (Fragaszy	  &	  Visalberghi,	  1989;	  	  but	  c.f.	  Caldwell	  &	  Whiten,	  2003	  with	  reference	  to	  callitrichids).	  The	  evidence	  from	  this	  experiment	  is	  consistent	  with	  these	  results.	  There	  is	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  times	  an	   individual	   is	   scrounged	   from	   over	   all	   trials	   and	   achievement	   rank,	   the	  achievement	  relative	  to	  others	  in	  the	  species,	  but	  no	  individuals	  were	  scrounged	  from	  before	  they	  reached	  the	  final	  stage	  achieved.	  This	  may	  suggest	  two	  things,	  either	   that	   individuals	  were	   spurred	   on	   to	   use	   the	   puzzlebox	  more,	   but	   not	   to	  achieve	   a	   higher	   stage,	   if	   they	   were	   the	   victims	   of	   scrounging.	   An	   alternative	  	  conclusion	  is	  that	  scroungers	  were	  able	  to	  judge	  the	  performance	  of	  others	  and	  scrounge	   disproportionately	   from	   more	   successful	   individuals.	   The	   most	  parsimonious	   interpretation	   is	   that	   the	   finding	   merely	   reflects	   the	   increased	  scrounging	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	   individuals	  who	   retrieved	  more	   rewards.	  Either	   interpretation	   is	   contrary	   to	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   scrounging	   inhibits	  performance	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  by	  producers.	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The	   role	   of	   dominance	   hierarchy	   on	   learning	   of	   the	   cumulative	   puzzlebox	  was	  examined,	   finding	   the	   number	   of	   task	  manipulations	   correlated	  with	   the	   rank-­‐class	   of	   the	   individual.	   Higher-­‐ranking	   individuals	   performed	   more	  manipulations	  in	  both	  data	  collection	  periods,	  although	  this	  was	  only	  significant	  in	   2007,	   the	   period	  prior	   to	   the	   removal	   of	   five	   group	  members,	   including	   the	  2007	   alpha	   male.	   Thus	   high-­‐	   and	   mid-­‐ranking	   individuals	   were	   able	   to	  monopolise	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  some	  degree,	  depriving	  low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  of	  the	   opportunity	   to	   manipulate	   the	   puzzlebox	   as	   frequently.	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Lavalle	  (1999)	  who	  tested	  capuchins	  with	  a	  tool-­‐use	  task	  and	  found	   that	   the	  alpha	  male	  was	  able	   to	  monopolise	   the	   tree	  stumps	   from	  which	  honey	  could	  be	  gained,	  thus	  stopping	  other	  individuals	  being	  able	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  gain	  food.	  Despite	  dominant	  individuals	  manipulating	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  subordinates,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  individuals	  pay	  preferential	  attention	   to	   manipulating	   individuals	   according	   to	   rank.	   The	   effect	   that	   any	  monopolisation	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  by	  dominants	  had	  on	  social	  learning	  is	  unclear	  as	   there	  was	  no	  evidence	   that	   the	   individuals	  used	   social	   learning	   to	   solve	   the	  puzzlebox,	  particularly	  at	  stage	  one.	  The	  effect	  of	  monopolisation	  by	  dominants,	  whilst	   not	   affecting	   social	   learning,	   may,	   however,	   reduce	   the	   amount	   of	  innovation	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  population.	  In	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  innovation	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates,	  Reader	  and	  Laland	  (2001)	   found	  that	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	  were	   more	   likely	   to	   innovate	   than	   high-­‐ranking	   ones.	   Thus	   if	   low-­‐ranking	  individuals	   are	   able	   to	   use	   the	   puzzlebox	   less	   frequently	   than	   high-­‐ranking	  individuals,	  and	  low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  innovate	  (i.e.	  reach	  a	  higher	   stage),	   then	   fewer	   innovations	   may	   be	   likely	   to	   enter	   the	   population.	  However,	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   have	   significantly	   lower	   achievement	   ranks	  
	   157	  
than	  mid-­‐	  and	  high-­‐ranking	  individuals,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  do	  not	  perform	  any	  better.	  Therefore,	  this	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  not	  supported.	  	  Conservatism	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  has	  also	  been	  proposed	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  lack	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   (Hrubesch	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Capuchins	   performed	   a	  significant	  number	  of	  non-­‐conservative	  actions	  after	  they	  had	  solved	  stage	  one.	  If	  they	  were	  intrinsically	  conservative,	  that	  is,	  once	  they	  had	  learned	  one	  method	  of	  solving	  a	  task	  they	  would	  stick	  to	  it	  even	  if	  that	  method	  was	  no	  longer	  rewarding,	  they	   should	   not	   perform	   any	   actions	   except	   pushing	   the	   doors.	   This	   finding	  contradicts	   those	  of	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	  and	  Whiten	  (2008)	  and	  Hrubesch	  (2009),	  who	  proposed	  that	  the	  results	  of	  their	  experiments	  in	  which	  chimpanzees	  failed	  to	  learn	  alternative	  solutions	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  conservatism	  and	  satisficing.	  Conservatism	  may	  take	  at	   least	  two	  forms,	  either	  a	  failure	  to	   innovate	  once	  the	  individual	  has	  found	  one	  solution	  to	  a	  task	  is	  found	  or	  a	  failure	  of	  individuals	  to	  engage	  in	  social	  learning	  once	  they	  have	  learned	  one	  solution	  to	  a	  task.	  However,	  this	   result	   suggests	   that	  within	  capuchins	   individuals	  do	  not	   fail	   to	  accumulate	  modifications	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   curiosity	   or	   because	   they	   can	   only	   ascribe	   one	  solution	  to	  a	  particular	  task.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  
	  Whilst	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  was	  not	  too	  difficult	  for	  individuals	  to	  solve,	   the	   lack	  of	   spread	  of	   the	   cumulative	   solution	   for	   stage	   two	  was	   striking.	  The	   most	   likely	   explanations	   are	   the	   lack	   of	   evidence	   for	   imitation,	   teaching,	  prosociality	  and	  complex	  communication	  are	  responsible	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  spread	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of	   the	   novel	   cumulative	   solutions	   when	   they	   arose	   in	   the	   population.	   Social	  factors	  may	  also	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  rare	  invention	  of,	  and	  lack	  of	  spread	  of,	  novel	  cumulative	   solutions.	   The	   ability	   of	   dominant	   individuals	   to	   monopolise	   the	  puzzlebox	   may	   have	   prevented	   lower-­‐ranking	   individuals	   from	   being	   able	   to	  manipulate	   the	   puzzlebox,	   thereby	   inventing	   new	   cumulative	   solutions	   which	  might	   subsequently	   spread	   through	   social	   learning	   to	   other	   individuals	   in	   the	  population.	   However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   these	   results	   are	   only	   from	   one	  group	   of	   capuchins.	   This	   results	   in	   several	   of	   the	   analyses	   having	   low	   power,	  	  further	  groups	  would	  enable	  a	  better	  judgement	  as	  to	  whether	  these	  findings	  are	  species	  typical.	   In	  particular	  it	  would	  be	  valuable	  to	  test	  capuchins	  in	  the	   ‘open	  condition’	  in	  which	  capuchins	  are	  able	  to	  access	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  puzzlebox;	  the	  capuchins	   in	   this	   experiment	   were	   in	   the	   ‘scaffolded	   condition’	   and	   could	  therefore	  only	  solve	  up	  to	  stage	  two.	  The	  aggression	  and	  gradient	  of	  dominance	  may	  differ	  between	  groups,	  dependent	  upon	  the	  dominance	  style	  of	   individuals	  in	   the	   group	   (Sapolsky	   &	   Share,	   2004).	   By	   assessing	   multiple	   groups,	   small	  differences	  in	  group	  specific	  dominance	  style	  would	  not	  be	  as	  influential	  on	  the	  results	  and	  a	  more	  species	  typical	  result	  would	  be	  achieved.	  	  An	   analysis	   of	   the	   level	   of	   attention	   that	   bystanders	   are	   paying	   to	   individuals	  manipulating	  the	  puzzlebox	  would	  be	  advantageous	  to	  assess	  whether	  there	  are	  real	   differences	   associated	   with	   rank.	   The	   use	   of	   head	   orientation	   or	   gaze	  direction	   may	   allow	   for	   a	   better	   assessment	   of	   attention	   than	   presence	   or	  absence	  from	  proximity.	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The	   lack	   of	   evidence	   for	   imitation,	   teaching,	   prosociality	   and	   complex	  communication,	   combined	  with	   some	  evidence	   that	  dominant	   individuals	  were	  able	  to	  monopolise	  the	  puzzlebox	  may	  explain	  the	   lack	  of	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  solutions	   to	   the	   puzzlebox.	   These	   factors	   are	   also	   investigated	   in	   the	  chimpanzees	  and	  children,	  thus	  allowing	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  species.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Plate	  2	  (overleaf):	  Chimpanzees	  manipulating	  the	  puzzlebox	  during	  an	  experimental	  session.
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CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
AN	  EXPERIMENTAL	  INVESTIGATION	  OF	  
CUMULATIVE	  CULTURE	  IN	  CHIMPANZEES	  
	  
Introduction	  
	  Chimpanzees	  (Pan	  troglodytes	  ssp)	  are	  a	  species	  of	  ape	  dispersed	  across	  Western	  and	  Central	  subtropical	  Africa,	  from	  Senegal	  in	  the	  west	  to	  Uganda	  and	  Tanzania	  in	   the	   east	   (Goodall,	   1986;	   Morin	   et	   al.,	   1994;	   Wrangham	   et	   al.,	   1994;	   Rowe,	  1996;	  Boesch	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  There	  are	  four	  chimpanzee	  subspecies	  spread	  across	  the	  continent,	  divided	  into	  a	  Western	  clade,	  comprising	  Pan	  troglodytes	  verus	  and	  
P.t.	   vellerosus	   and	   an	   Eastern	   clade	   comprising	   P.t.	   troglodytes	   and	   P.t.	  
schweinfurthii	  (Gonder	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  species	  live	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  wooded	  and	  semi-­‐wooded	   habitats,	   ranging	   from	   rainforest	   to	   dry	   semi-­‐wooded	   savannah	  (Boesch	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  	  Chimpanzees	   are	   omnivorous,	   with	   a	   diet	   consisting	   of	   mostly	   of	   fruit	   and	  vegetation,	   including	   nut	   meat	   at	   several	   sites	   (Goodall,	   1986;	   Rowe,	   1996).	  Populations	   also	   regularly	   consume	   invertebrates	   such	   as	   ants	   and	   termites	  (McGrew,	   1992;	   Humle	   &	  Matsuzawa,	   2002)	   and	   hunt	   a	   range	   of	   vertebrates,	  including	   other	   primates	   such	   as	   red	   colobus	   monkeys	   (Colobus	   badius)	   and	  bushbabies	   (Galago	   senegalensis)	   (Mitani	   &	   Watts,	   2001;	   Pruetz	   &	   Bertolani,	  2007).	  In	  groups	  that	  live	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  human	  populations,	  crop	  raiding	  has	  also	  been	  reported	  (Hockings	  et	  al.,	  2007).	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Chimpanzee	  populations	  have	  a	  fission-­‐fusion	  society	  of	  up	  to	  80	  individuals	   in	  which	   small	   sub-­‐groups	   will	   forage	   independently	   across	   the	   territory,	   with	  males	   coming	   together	   to	  hunt	   and	  patrol	   the	   territory	   and	   females	   joining	  up	  into	   larger	  social	  groups	  more	  rarely,	  usually	  when	   in	  oestrous	  (Goodall,	  1986;	  Anderson	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Mitani	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  Individuals	  spend	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  time	  in	  these	  small	  parties,	  which	  vary	  in	  size	  and	  composition	  from	  a	  female	  and	  her	  offspring	  to	  mixed	  groups	  of	  around	  25	  individuals	  (Rowe,	  1996;	  Anderson	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Mitani	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  Females	  disperse	  from	  their	  natal	  groups	  when	  adults,	   often	   females	  will	   remain	   on	   the	   periphery	   of	   the	   group	   to	  which	   they	  have	  migrated	   for	   a	   period	   of	   time,	   sometimes	   leaving	   after	   a	   short	   period	   of	  time	   and	   joining	   another	   group	   (Kummer	   &	   Goodall,	   1985).	   There	   is	   a	   linear	  hierarchy	  within	  chimpanzee	  populations,	  with	  males	  generally	  being	  dominant	  to	  females	  (Goodall,	  1986;	  Rowe,	  1996).	  Chimpanzee	  lifespan	  has	  been	  estimated	  to	  be	  around	  40	  to	  50	  years	  in	  the	  wild	  (Goodall,	  1986;	  Rowe,	  1996).	  	  As	   detailed	   in	   chapters	   1	   and	   2,	   there	   have	   been	   widespread	   research	   efforts	  documenting	   the	   behaviour,	   structure	   and	   ecology	   of	   chimpanzee	   populations,	  with	  some	  populations	  being	  studied	  for	  over	  40	  years	  (Boesch	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  The	  many	  reports	  of	  behavioural	  traditions	  in	  foraging	  and	  social	  domains	  (McGrew,	  1992;	   1998;	   Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1999;	   2001;	   Boesch,	   2003),	   but	   reported	   lack	   of	  cumulative	   ability	   (Tomasello,	   1994;	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	   &	  Whiten,	   2008)	   in	   this	  species	   make	   it	   a	   prime	   candidate	   for	   the	   study	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   underlie	  cumulative	  culture.	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Specific	  Methods	  
	  


























1 C1  Open 4 4 7 1 25 
(±2.60) 
1 C5  Open 4 6 8 2 19.3 
(±2.03) 
1 C6  Scaffolded 3 5 8 0 32.4 
(±3.59) 
1 C8  Scaffolded 2 5 6 1 31.6 
(±6.17) 
2 C2  High 7 6 12 1 26.5 
(±3.39) 
2 C3  Low 4 5 9 0 22.7 
(±1.87) 
2 C4  Low 2 9 10 1 23.5 
(±3.40) 
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Apparatus:	  Puzzlebox	  1	  was	  used	  for	  the	  chimpanzee	  populations.	  Chimpanzees	  were	  tested	  at	   an	   observation	   point	   in	   the	   outdoor	   corrals.	   This	   was	   1(h)x1.93(w)m	   	   and	  covered	  with	  bars	  51mm	  apart.	  All	  subjects	  were	  able	  to	  reach	  through	  the	  bars	  and	   operate	   the	   puzzlebox	   which	   was	   located	   outside	   the	   enclosure.	   At	   first	  presentation	   (whether	   experimental	   presentation	   in	   the	   case	   of	   subjects	   or	  demonstrator	  training	  for	  demonstrators)	  the	  puzzlebox	  was	  novel	  to	  all	  animals	  in	  the	  group	  although	  the	  required	  actions	  were	  similar	  to	  those	  displayed	  by	  the	  chimpanzees	  when	  presented	  with	  other	  puzzleboxes	  (e.g.	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  actions	  required	   to	  solve	   the	  puzzlebox	  were,	   therefore,	   likely	   to	  be	   in	   the	  repertoire,	  or	  similar	  to	  actions	  in	  the	  repertoire	  of	  the	  chimpanzees.	  	  	  
Procedure:	  Food	  preference	  testing:	  Each	  chimpanzee	  group	  was	  tested	  with	  a	  separate	  food	  preference	  test.	  Testing	  occurred	   when	   chimpanzee	   groups	   were	   allowed	   back	   into	   their	   indoor	  enclosures	   following	   husbandry	   procedures.	   Half	   a	   kilo	   of	   three	   foods	   –	   (i)	  grapes,	   and	   grape-­‐sized	   pieces	   of	   (ii)	   carrots,	   and	   (iii)	   apples	   -­‐	   were	   each	  separately	   placed	   in	   four	   piles,	   totalling	   12	   piles	   of	   food	   spaced	   evenly,	   in	   a	  randomised	  order,	  across	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  enclosure.	  The	  food	  first	  consumed	  by	  each	  subject	   in	   the	  group	  was	  recorded,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  order	   in	  which	   the	   four	  piles	   of	   food	   were	   completely	   consumed.	   This	   was	   repeated	   three	   times	   with	  every	  experimental	  group	  in	  experiment	  one	  prior	  to	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  experimental	   trials.	   Data	  were	   also	   taken	   from	  previous	   food	   preference	   trials	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that	   had	   been	   conducted	   for	   experimental	   work	   on	   inequality	   perception	  (Brosnan	  et	  al.,	  2010b;	  Brosnan,	  pers.	  comm.).	  
	  Rank	  assessment:	  At	   the	   Michale	   E.	   Keeling	   Center	   data	   are	   collected	   on	   aggression	   when	  individuals	   are	   reintroduced	   to	   their	   group.	   Data	   are	   also	   collected	   on	  displacement	  rates	  during	  feeding	  tasks	  and	  general	  medical	  procedures.	  These	  data	   are	   collated	   by	   staff	   at	   the	   centre	   to	   produce	   the	   competitive	   ranks	   of	  individuals	  within	  social	  groups.	  From	  this	  linear	  dominance	  hierarchy,	  for	  each	  group	   the	  highest	   ranking	   third	  of	   individuals	  were	  classified	  as	   ‘high-­‐ranking’,	  the	  middle	   ranking	   third	  were	   classified	  as	   ‘mid-­‐ranking’	   and	   the	  bottom	   third	  were	  classified	  as	  ‘low-­‐ranking’.	  
	  Experiment	  1:	  All	  trials	  were	  one	  hour	  in	  duration	  and	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  morning	  between	  9am	   and	   12pm.	   Trials	   were	   conducted	   at	   least	   thirty	   minutes	   after	   the	   usual	  morning	  feed	  of	  vegetables	  and	  fruit	  	  and	  before	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  chow	  feed.	  The	  exact	  timing	  of	  the	  trials	  was	  randomised	  to	  control	  for	  feeding	  motivation	  of	  animals	  throughout	  the	  morning.	  In	  four	  instances	  early	  termination	  of	  testing	  was	  required.	  All	  groups	  were	  exposed	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  for	  a	  total	  of	  30	  hours.	  The	  trials	  were	  conducted	  from	  August	  to	  October	  2007,	  and	  from	  August	  2008	  to	   January	   2009.	  One	   trial,	   per	   group,	  was	   conducted	  per	   day	   as	   frequently	   as	  practicable.	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There	   were	   two	   groups	   (N=8	   &	   N=10)	   in	   the	   ‘open’	   condition.	   As	   detailed	   in	  chapter	   3,	   they	   were	   presented	   with	   the	   puzzlebox	   with	   food	   provided	   at	   all	  stages	   and	   were	   able	   to	   manipulate	   the	   puzzlebox	   to	   get	   to	   any	   stage.	   Two	  further	   groups	   (N=8	  &	  N=7)	   in	   the	   ‘scaffolded’	   condition	  were	   presented	  with	  regulated	  access	  to	  parts	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  	  	  
	  Experiment	  2:	  Four	   groups	   of	   chimpanzees	   took	   part	   in	   the	   second	   experiment	   involving	   the	  introduction	  of	   trained	   individuals	  of	  differing	   rank	   to	  ascertain	  whether	   there	  was	   a	  difference	   in	   the	   spread	  of	   a	   cumulative	   innovation	  depending	  upon	   the	  rank	  of	  the	  ‘innovator’.	  	  Demonstrator	   training	   took	   place	   in	   the	   indoor	   enclosures	   of	   the	   chimpanzee	  facility.	  During	  demonstrator	  training,	  tutee	  demonstrators	  observed	  successful	  performance	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  by	  the	  experimenter	  and	  the	  trainer	  at	  the	  facility.	  Rewards	   were	   handed	   to	   the	   chimpanzee	   once	   the	   trainer	   had	   demonstrated	  how	  to	  get	  to	  the	  stage.	  In	  addition,	  rewards	  including	  fruit,	  yoghurt	  and	  peanut	  butter	  were,	  where	  necessary,	  	  placed	  on	  the	  button	  and	  dial	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  scaffold	   learning.	   Training	   sessions	   never	   took	  more	   than	   20	  minutes	   and	   the	  animals	   were	   then	   reintroduced	   carefully	   back	   into	   their	   groups	   to	   avoid	   any	  violence	   towards	   them.	   Subjects	   were	   judged	   to	   have	   learned	   to	   use	   the	  puzzlebox	  when	  they	  could	  reach	  stage	  three	  on	  six	  successive	  attempts,	  in	  each	  of	  three	  training	  trials	  all	  of	  which	  were	  conducted	  on	  different	  days.	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From	   each	   of	   the	   four	   groups	   a	   female	   was	   isolated	   and	   trained	   to	   use	   the	  puzzlebox	  to	  access	  stage	  three	  reliably,	  rapidly	  and	  consistently.	  In	  two	  groups	  (N=13	   and	   8)	   a	   high-­‐ranking	   female	   demonstrator	   was	   trained	   whilst	   in	   two	  groups	   (N=11	  and	  9)	  a	   low-­‐ranking	   female	  demonstrator	  was	   trained.	  Females	  were	   chosen	   as	   demonstrators	   because	   they	   can	   be	   isolated	   more	   easily	   and	  reintroduced	  to	  the	  group	  with	  less	  aggression,	  and	  they	  tend	  to	  concentrate	  for	  longer	  periods	  during	  training	  sessions	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Demonstrators	  of	  different	  rank	  were	  used	  to	  assess	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  spread	  of	  a	  cumulative	  innovation	  depending	  upon	  the	  rank	  of	  the	  ‘innovator’.	  	  The	   trials	   in	   the	   second	   experiment	  were	   three	   hours	   in	   duration,	   each	   group	  receiving	  eight	  trials	  which	  were	  randomised	  between	  morning	  (8.30-­‐11.30am)	  and	  afternoon	  (1-­‐4pm)	  sessions.	  One	  trial	  was	  conducted	  per	  day	  over	  a	  period	  of	  two	  weeks	  with	  one	  to	  three	  days	  between	  trials.	  During	  trials	  a	  maximum	  of	  one	   small	   feed	   of	   vegetables	   and	   fruit	  was	   given	   by	   the	   care	   staff.	   These	  were	  insufficient	  to	  satiate	  the	  subjects	  or	  distract	  them	  for	  more	  than	  five	  minutes.	  	  In	   two	   groups,	   one	   with	   a	   low-­‐ranking	   demonstrator	   and	   one	   with	   a	   high-­‐ranking	  demonstrator,	  rewards	  were	  available	  at	  all	  levels	  for	  the	  first	  four	  trials	  and	  in	  the	  subsequent	  four	  trials	  there	  was	  food	  only	  available	  at	  the	  final	  stage.	  In	   the	   other	   two	   groups	   rewards	  were	   only	   available	   at	   the	   final	   stage	   for	   the	  first	   four	   trials	   and	  were	   available	   at	   all	   stages	   for	   the	   next	   four.	   This	   reward	  regime	  was	   designed	   to	   test	  whether	   the	   subjects	  would	   satisfice,	   i.e.	  whether	  they	  would	  cumulatively	  problem	  solve	  if	  forced	  to,	  to	  receive	  any	  reward	  (at	  the	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final	  stage),	  versus	  whether	  they	  would	  cumulatively	  problem	  solve	  if	  they	  were	  rewarded	  at	  all	  stages.	  
	  
Analysis	  All	  analyses	  were	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  3	  except	  that	  for	  hypotheses	  2,	  3	  and	  8,	  which	  are	  detailed	  below.	  	  Hypothesis	  2:	  Data	  on	  food	  calls	  were	  collected	  for	  the	  second	  experiment	  only.	  	  Hypothesis	  3:	  As	   described	   in	   chapter	   3,	   to	   assess	   hypothesis	   3,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  observational	   learning	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   cumulative	   culture,	   whether	   individuals	  copied	   the	   actions	   of	   others	   at	   the	   puzzlebox	   was	   examined.	   The	   analysis	  focussed	   on	   the	   demonstrators	   in	   experiment	   two,	   individuals	   that	   had	   been	  trained	  to	  solve	  stage	  3,	  as	  these	  individuals	  were	  displaying	  a	  complex	  and	  more	  rewarding	  solution	  than	  other	  subjects.	  When	  the	  demonstrators	   left	  proximity	  after	   having	  been	  observed	  by	   another	   individual	   in	  proximity	   for	   at	   least	   one	  minute,	   and	   the	   observer	  went	   on	   to	   contact	   the	   puzzlebox	   in	   the	   subsequent	  minute,	   the	  number	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  by	   the	  observer	   that	  matched	  and	  did	  not	  match	  the	  demonstrator	  were	  recorded.	  
	  Hypothesis	  8:	  To	   assess	   hypothesis	   8,	   whether	   individuals	   satisfice,	   the	   number	   of	  manipulations	  between	   the	  open	  and	   scaffolded	   conditions	  was	  examined.	  The	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difference	   in	  number	  of	  manipulations	  between	   those	   groups	   in	   the	   scaffolded	  condition	  and	  the	  open	  condition	  were	  compared	  in	  the	  first,	  one	  hour,	  trial	  after	  the	  scaffolded	  group	  had	  stopped	  receiving	  a	   reward	  at	   stage	  one	  and	   the	   trial	  that	  corresponded	  in	  time	  in	  the	  open	  condition.	  
	  
Results	  
Food-­preference	  testing:	  Across	  the	  16	  food	  preference	  testing	  trials,	  grapes	  (mean=	  5.63	  trials,	  standard	  error	  =	  ±	  0.34)	  were	  consumed	  first	  significantly	  more	  often	  than	  apples	  (mean=	  1.06,	   standard	  error=	  ±	  0.23),	  which,	   in	   turn,	  were	  consumed	   first	   significantly	  more	   often	   than	   carrots	   (mean=0.375,	   	   standard	   error=	   ±	   0.15)	   (ANOVA:	   F2,	  
45=71.0,	  p=1.21x10-­‐14).	  	  	  
General	  results:	  	  All	  chimpanzees	  manipulated	  the	  puzzlebox	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  experiment	  (mean=421.83	   per	   individual,	   standard	   error=	   ±	   69.49,	   range=	   1	   to	   3428).	  During	   the	   first	  experiment,	  one	   individual	  got	   to	   stage	   three,	  with	   four	  others	  getting	   to	   stage	   two.	   Three	   of	   the	   individuals	   that	   got	   to	   stage	   two	   were	   in	  scaffolded	  conditions,	  two	  in	  one	  group	  and	  one	  in	  another,	  and	  one	  was	  in	  the	  open	  condition,	  in	  the	  same	  group	  as	  the	  individual	  that	  got	  to	  stage	  three.	  There	  was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   stage	   reached	   by	   individuals	   in	  different	  conditions	  (Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  test:	  U=141,	  p=0.97,	  95%	  CI=	  [-­‐15,	  18]).	  	  In	   the	   second	   experiment	   demonstrators	   of	   differing	   rank	   	   were	   trained	   and	  reintroduced	   to	   their	   group.	   There	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   in	   the	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performance	  of	  demonstrators	  of	  different	  rank,	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  number	  of	  successful	  performances	  of	  stage	  3	  (Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  test:	  U=2,	  p=1,	  95%	  CI=	  [-­‐862,	  736]).	  In	  all	  groups	  in	  this	  experiment	  there	  were	  no	  individuals,	  apart	  from	  the	  demonstrators,	  that	  managed	  to	  learn	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  stage	  two	  or	  three.	   There	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   achievement	   rank	   of	  individuals	   in	   groups	   with	   a	   low	   ranking	   demonstrator	   (mean	   achievement	  rank=	   34.94,	   standard	   error=	   ±	   5.20)	   and	   individuals	   in	   groups	   with	   a	   high	  ranking	  demonstrator	  (mean	  achievement	  rank=23.84,	  standard	  error	  =	  ±	  3.42)	  (Mann-­‐Whitney	  U	  test:	  U=120,	  p=0.12,	  95%	  CI=	  [-­‐25.0,	  3.0]).	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achievement	   rank	   (mean=25.08)	   than	   either	   mid-­‐ranking	   individuals	  (mean=40.5,	   p=0.012)	   or	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals(mean=45.12,	   p=0.004),	   with	  no	   significant	   difference	   between	   mid-­‐	   and	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   (p=0.71).	  There	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   achievement	   ranks	   of	  individuals	  in	  different	  age	  categories	  (ANOVA:	  F2,68=3.00,	  p=0.059,	  power=9%),	  although	   there	   is	   low	   power	   in	   the	   test.	   Females	   (mean	   achievement	   rank=	  40.95)	  had	  a	  significantly	  higher	  achievement	  rank	  than	  males	  (mean=28.29)	  (t	  test:	  t=	  2.58,	  df=54.69,	  p=0.013)	  	  
Hypothesis	   1:	   A	   lack	   of	   teaching	   in	   non-­human	   primates	   prevents	   the	   spread	   of	  
cumulative	  innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  There	  were	  no	   instances	  of	  active	   teaching	  observed	  during	   the	   trials	   in	  either	  experiment	  one	  or	   two.	  Therefore	   the	  effects	  of	  more	  subtle	   forms	  of	   teaching,	  such	  as	  scaffolding,	  were	  investigated.	  If	  subtle	  forms	  of	  teaching	  were	  occurring,	  the	  stage	  reached	  by	  both	  individuals	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  similar	  than	  individuals	  that	  are	  not	   involved	  in	  the	  teaching	  dyad.	  As	  those	  who	  report	  teaching	  in	  the	  wild	   report	   teaching	   from	  mothers	   to	   juvenile-­‐offspring	  we	   examined	  whether	  mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	  dyads	  were	  more	  similar	  in	  the	  achievement	  ranking	  than	  mother⎯adult-­‐offspring	  dyads.	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	   difference	   in	   achievement	   ranking	   of	   mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	   dyads	  (mean	   difference=	   -­‐21.17,	   standard	   error=	   4.63)	   and	   mother⎯adult-­‐offspring	  dyads	  (mean	  difference=	  2.5,	  standard	  error=	  5.93)	  (Wilcoxon	  test:	  W=	  72.5,	  p=	  0.013).	  Contrary	  to	  the	  hypothesis,	  mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	  dyads	  were	  more	  different	  than	  mother⎯adult-­‐offspring	  dyads,	  with	  juvenile	  offspring	  performing	  
	   171	  
to	  a	  higher	  achievement	  ranking	  than	  their	  mothers,	  whereas	  mothers	  tended	  to	  perform	  marginally	  better	  than	  their	  adult	  offspring.	  
	  Figure	  5.2:	  Mean	  number	  of	  scrounging	  events	  (±	  standard	  error)	  between	  mother	  and	  juvenile	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  events.	  	  In	  theory,	  mothers	  could	  also	  scaffold	  the	  learning	  of	  their	  juvenile-­‐offspring	  by	  allowing	  the	  offspring	  to	  take	  food	  from	  the	  puzzlebox	  after	  they	  have	  solved	  it,	  thus	  promoting	  learning	  of	  the	  affordances	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  (i.e.	  that	  it	  provides	  a	   food	   reward).	   	   It	  was	   found,	   however,	   that	   across	   all	   trials,	  mothers	   (mean=	  14.4	   scrounging	   events,	   standard	  error=	  11.37)	   are	   significantly	  more	   likely	   to	  scrounge	   from	   their	   juvenile	   offspring	   than	   juvenile	   offspring	   (mean=	   0.2	  scrounging	   events,	   standard	   error=	   0.2)	   are	   to	   scrounge	   from	   their	   mother	  (Wilcoxon:	  W=16,	  p=0.026;	  figure	  5.2).	  	  


















	   172	  
Hypothesis	  2:	  Lack	  of	  a	   complex	   communication	   system,	   facilitating	  pedagogy,	   in	  
non-­humans	   prevents	   cumulative	   innovations	   spreading	   throughout	   the	  
population.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  food	  calls	  on	  the	  recruitment	  of	  other	  individuals	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  was	  examined.	  There	  were	  144	  food	  calls	  given	  across	  all	  trials	  (mean=	  3.51	  per	  individual).	   In	   the	   two	  minutes	   following	   food	   calls	   individuals	   were	   no	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  recruited	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  (mean=0.42	  individuals	  arriving/minute)	  than	   the	   baseline	   rate	   of	   arrival	   at	   the	   puzzlebox	   throughout	   the	   trials	  (mean=0.39)	  (Wilcoxon:	  W=4444,	  p=0.20,	  95%	  CI=[-­‐0.001,	  0.001];	  figure	  5.3).	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Hypothesis	  3:	  Lack	  of	   imitation	   in	  non-­humans	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  
innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  	  There	   was	   no	   correlation	   between	   the	   learning	   time	   for	   stage	   one	   (the	   first	  successful	   manipulation	   latency	   -­‐	   the	   first	   contact	   latency)	   and	   the	   time	   an	  individual	  first	  contacted	  the	  puzzlebox	  (Spearman’s	  rho=	  -­‐0.048,	  p=0.83).	  Those	  groups	  in	  the	  scaffolded	  condition	  in	  experiment	  1	  had	  the	  guards	  removed	  from	  stage	  2	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  trial	  2,	  therefore	  these	  groups	  were	  exposed	  to	  stage	  2	  for	  29	  hours.	  Of	  the	  five	  individuals	  that	  learned	  to	  use	  stage	  2,	  the	  percentage	  of	  all	  door	  openings	  that	  were	  on	  the	  left	  side	  was	  54.3%,	  6.6%,	  45.9%,	  27.1%	  and	  41.5%.	  	  In	  experiment	  2,	  when	  given	  the	  chance	  to	  copy	  demonstrators	  who	  were	  skilled	  at	   getting	   to	   stage	   3,	   individuals	   were	   no	  more	   likely,	   in	   the	  minute	   after	   the	  demonstrator	  left,	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  they	  had	  seen	  the	  demonstrator	  perform	  in	  the	  previous	  minute,	   than	  they	  were	  to	  perform	  any	  other	  action	  (Wilcoxon:	  W=1330.5,	  p=0.25,	  95%CI=[-­‐0.99,	  4.06x10-­‐5]).	  	  They	  were	  also	  no	  more	  likely	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  they	  had	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  minute	  with	  the	  first	  action	  they	  performed	   following	   the	  departure	  of	   the	  demonstrator	   (Binomial	   test:	  W=0.6,	  p=0.18,	   95%CI=[0.46,0.73]).	   There	   was	   a	   significant,	   negative	   correlation	  between	  the	  proportion	  of	  matching	  manipulations	  that	  an	  individual	  performed	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank	  (Spearman’s	  Rank:	  rho=	  -­‐0.38,	  S=	  11626.5,	  p=0.021;	  figure	  5.4).	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  Figure	  5.4:	  The	  relationship	  between	  achievement	  rank	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  matching	  actions	  	  an	  individual	  performs	  in	  the	  minute	  after	  watching	  a	  knowledgeable	  demonstrator	  for	  a	  minute.	  
	  
Hypothesis	  4:	  Lack	  of	  pro-­sociality	  in	  non-­human	  primate	  individuals	  prevents	  the	  
spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations.	  There	  were	  no	  altruistic	  events	  observed	  in	  the	  chimpanzee	  populations.	   	  Of	  all	  manipulations	   there	  was	   a	  mean	   proportion	   of	   0.47	   (standard	   error=	   ±0.027)	  which	   were	   performed	   while	   other	   individuals	   were	   in	   proximity	   of	   the	  puzzlebox.	  	  
Hypothesis	   5:	   Scrounging,	   or	   being	   scrounged	   from,	   hinders	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
learning.	  There	   was	   a	   significant	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	   times	   an	  individual	   scrounged	   before	   the	   final	   stage	   that	   they	   achieved	   and	   their	  achievement	   rank	   (Spearman’s	   Rank:	   rho=0.415,	   S=34862.0,	   p=0.0003).	  Similarly	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	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times	   an	   individual	   scrounged	   across	   the	   whole	   experiment	   and	   their	  achievement	   rank	   (Spearman’s	   Rank:	   rho=0.430,	   S=	   34006.9,	   p=0.0001;	   figure	  5.5).	  	  There	   was	   a	   significant	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	  manipulations	   that	   an	   individual	   carried	   out	   and	   the	   number	   of	   scrounging	  events	   that	   they	  perpetrated	  both	  before	   the	   individual	   reached	   the	   final	   stage	  they	   achieved	   (Spearman’s	  Rank:	   rho=	  0.521,	   S=	  28542.5,	   p-­‐value=	  3.12x10-­‐06)	  and	   across	   all	   trials	   (Spearman’s	   Rank:	   rho=	   0.552,	   S=	   26691.4,	   p-­‐value=	  5.88x10-­‐07).	  	  
	  Figure	  5.5:	  The	  relationship	  between	  achievement	  rank	  and	  the	  number	  of	  scrounging	  events	  an	  individual	  perpetrates	  across	  all	  trials	  	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  times	  an	  individual	  was	  the	  victim	  of	  scrounging	  before	  the	  final	  stage	  they	  achieved	  and	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their	   achievement	   rank	   (Spearman’s	   Rank:	   rho=0.376,	   S=	   37204.0,	   p=0.0012).	  Similarly	   there	   was	   a	   significant	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	  times	   an	   individual	  was	   the	   victim	  of	   scrounging	   across	   the	  whole	   experiment	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank	  (Spearman’s	  Rank:	  rho=0.312,	  S=	  41052.3,	  p=0.008;	  figure	  5.6).	  	  There	   was	   also	   a	   significant	   positive	   relation	   between	   the	   number	   of	  manipulations	   that	   an	   individual	   performed	   and	   the	   number	   of	   times	   they	   fell	  victim	  to	  scrounging,	  both	  in	  those	  trials	  before	  the	  individual	  reached	  the	  final	  stage	  they	  achieved	  (Spearman’s	  Rank:	  rho=0.50,	  S=	  29836.6,	  p=	  9.13x10-­‐06)	  and	  across	  all	  trials	  (Spearman’s	  Rank:	  rho=	  0.41,	  S=	  35466.2,	  p	  =	  0.0005).	  	  
	  Figure	  5.6:	  The	  relationship	  between	  achievement	  rank	  and	  the	  number	  of	  scrounging	  events	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  falls	  victim.	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Hypothesis	   6:	   Dominant	   individuals	   monopolise	   resources	   preventing	   lower-­	  
ranking	  individuals	  gaining	  access,	  thereby	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  with	  
the	  chance	  to	  solve	  the	  task.	  Across	   all	   groups,	   low-­‐	   (mean=	   793.42	   manipulations/individual,	   standard	  error=	   ±	   221.07)	   and	   mid-­‐ranking	   (mean=	   416.33,	   standard	   error=	   ±	   74.07)	  individuals	   manipulated	   the	   puzzlebox	   significantly	   more	   than	   high-­‐ranking	  individuals	   (mean=	   156.62,	   standard	   error=	   ±	   36.36)	   (ANOVA:	   F2,72=3.49,	  	  p=0.036;	  figure	  5.7).	  	  
	  Figure	   5.7:	   The	  mean	   rate	   of	  manipulations	   (±	   standard	   error)	   across	   rank	   categories	   in	   both	  experiments	  1	  &	  2,	  excluding	  demonstrators.	  	  
Hypothesis	  7:	  Lack	  of	  attention	  to	  low-­ranking	  and/or	  juvenile	  individuals	  prevents	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Using	   presence	   in	   proximity	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   attention	   being	   paid	   to	   individuals	  interacting	  with	  the	  puzzlebox,	   there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	   of	   attention	   paid	   to	   individuals	   of	   different	   rank	   categories	   (ANOVA:	  F2,72=1.22,	   p=0.3,	   Power=19.7%).	   Likewise,	   there	  was	   no	   significant	   difference	  between	  the	  number	  of	   individuals	   in	  proximity	   for	   individuals	  of	  different	  age	  categories	  (ANOVA:	  F2,72=0.25,	  p=0.78,	  Power=12.6%).	  	  
	  Figure	  5.8:	  The	  mean	  proportion	  of	  manipulations	  (±	  standard	  error)	  with	  another	  individual	  in	  proximity	  across	  rank	  categories.	  	  
Hypothesis	   8:	   Non-­human	   animals	   are	   conservative	   and	   satisfice,	   such	   that	   once	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stage	   than	   groups	   in	   the	   open	   condition	   (mean=	   36.76	   manipulations/hour,	  standard	  error=	  ±	   7.75)	  did	   in	   the	   corresponding	  hour	   trial	   (Mann-­‐Whitney	  U:	  U=193,	  p=0.003;	  figure	  5.9).	  	  Analysing	  whether	   individuals	  act	  conservatively	  after	  they	  have	   learned	  to	  get	  to	  the	  first	  stage	  shows	  individuals	  do	  not	  always	  act	  conservatively,	  across	  the	  populations	   the	   number	   of	   non-­‐conservative	   manipulations	   performed	   by	  individuals	  (mean=	  76.71	  non-­‐conservative	  actions,	  standard	  error=	  42.37)	  was	  significantly	   different	   to	   zero	   (Mann-­‐Whitney	   test:	  U=253,	   p=4.11x10-­‐5).	   In	   the	  first	  hour	  after	  the	  groups	  in	  the	  scaffolded	  condition	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  second	  stage	   the	  number	  of	   non-­‐conservative	  manipulations	  performed	  by	   individuals	  (mean=	   0.64,	   standard	   error=	   0.30)	   was	   not	   significantly	   different	   to	   zero	  (Mann-­‐Whitney	  test:	  U=15,	  p=0.058,	  95%	  CI=[1.0,	  3.0]).	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  Figure	  5.9:	  The	  median	  number	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  in	  the	  trial	  after	   individuals	   in	   the	  scaffolded	  condition	  ceased	  receiving	  rewards	  at	  the	  first	  stage.	  	  
Hypothesis	  9:	  Lack	  of	  ability	  to	  assess	  if	  another’s	  solution	  is	  better	  than	  one’s	  own	  
inhibits	  adoption	  of	  improved	  modifications.	  Pre-­‐trial	  testing	  revealed	  that	  individuals	  preferred	  grapes	  to	  apples	  and	  apples	  to	  carrots.	  This	  supplemented	  other	  sources	  which	  also	  concluded	  this	  order	  of	  food	  preference	  (Brosnan	  et	  al.,	  2010b;	  Brosnan,	  pers.	  comm.).	  During	  the	  trials	  there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   proportion	   of	   food	   that	  individuals	  allowed	  to	  be	  scrounged	  at	  each	  stage	  (Kruskal	  Wallis:	  χ2=1.05,	  df=2,	  p=0.59).	  There	  were	  29	   instances	  of	   ‘termiting’	  behaviour	   in	  which	   individuals	  probed	   the	   olfactory	   holes	   in	   the	   puzzlebox	   doors	   with	   small	   sticks	   or	   grass.	  There	  was	   at	   least	   one	   instance	   of	   this	   behaviour	   in	   seven	  of	   the	   eight	   groups	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(mean=3.63	   instances	   per	   group,	   standard	   error=	   1.16),	   with	   all	   instances	  occurring	  at	  the	  highest	  stage	  that	  was	  stocked	  with	  food.	  	  	  	  	  
Discussion:	  
	  Only	   five	   chimpanzees,	   out	   of	   34	   in	   experiment	   one,	   spontaneously	   solved	   the	  puzzlebox	   to	   stage	   two,	   with	   just	   one	   spontaneously	   solving	   the	   puzzlebox	   to	  stage	   three.	   In	   experiment	   two,	   despite	   the	   stage	   three	   being	   learned	   and	  performed	  by	  the	  trained	  demonstrators,	  no	  other	  individuals	  were	  able	  to	  learn	  the	   solution	   for	   stage	   two	   or	   three.	   Thus,	   although	   the	   task	  was	   difficult,	   	   the	  solutions	  of	  the	  puzzlebox	  were	  within	  the	  cognitive	  grasp,	  or	  the	  ‘zone	  of	  latent	  solutions’	   (Tennie	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   of	   the	   chimpanzees.	   The	   first	   stage	   was	  sufficiently	  easy	  for	  the	  chimpanzees,	  with	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  subjects	  opening	  the	  doors	   at	   least	   once,	  with	   stages	   two	   and	   three	   being	  more	   difficult	   to	   achieve.	  This	  pattern	  is	  analogous	  to	  that	  proposed	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  culture,	  with	   many	   species	   having	   simple	   behavioural	   traditions	   or	   culture,	   but	  progressive	  modification	   	  being	  difficult	  and,	   therefore,	  cumulative	  culture	  rare	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1996).	  	  	  The	   reasons	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   spread	   of	   cumulative	   solutions	   for	   the	   puzzlebox	  appear	   to	   be	   a	   lack	   of	   teaching,	   complex	   communication,	   imitation	   and	  prosociality.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  higher	  social	  rank	  allowed	  individuals	  to	   monopolise	   the	   puzzlebox,	   and	   the	   chimpanzees	   were	   not	   inherently	  conservative,	  allowing	  the	  proposal	  that	  these	  factors	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  chimpanzees.	  The	  effect	  of	  scrounging	  upon	  cumulative	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problem	  solving	  was,	  however,	  complex,	  with	  both	  the	  frequency	  of	  scrounging	  events	  an	  individual	  perpetrated	  and	  fell	  victim	  to	  being	  significantly	  positively	  correlated	   with	   achievement	   rank.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	  scrounging	   hindered	   performance	   of	   the	   behaviour,	   nor	   acquistion	   of	   the	  puzzlebox	  solutions.	  	  Consistent	  with	  analyses	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐humans	  (Caro	  &	  Hauser,	   1992;	  Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2008),	   there	  were	  no	   instances	   of	   active	   teaching	  observed	   in	   the	   chimpanzees.	   Therefore,	   signs	   that	   more	   subtle	   forms	   of	  teaching	  had	  occurred	  were	  examined,	  these	  also	  indicating	  that	  teaching	  did	  not	  occur,	   specifically	   between	  mothers	   and	   juvenile	   offspring.	  Mothers	   scrounged	  from	   their	   juvenile	  offspring	  significantly	  more	   than	   the	  offspring	  were	  able	   to	  scrounge	   from	   their	   mothers.	   These	   results,	   along	   with	   those	   of	   Ueno	   and	  Matsuzawa	   (2004)	   who	   found	   that	   chimpanzee	   mothers	   tended	   to	   provision	  infants	  with	  indigestible,	  rather	  than	  the	  nutritious,	  parts	  of	  food	  when	  the	  infant	  begged,	   suggest	   that	   chimpanzee	   mothers	   are	   focused	   on	   acquiring	   food	   for	  themselves	   rather	   than	   teaching	   their	   offspring	   about	   food	   resources.	   Indeed,	  juvenile	   offspring	   on	   average	   also	   outperformed	   their	   mothers	   on	   the	   task,	  suggesting	  that	  infant	  learning	  was	  not	  dependent	  upon	  teaching	  from	  mothers,	  as	  has	  sometimes	  been	  suggested	  for	  nutcracking	  in	  the	  chimpanzee	  population	  of	  the	  Tai	  forest	  (Boesch,	  1991).	  	  	  Juvenile	   performance	   exceeding	   that	   of	   their	   mothers	   suggests	   that	   juveniles	  may	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   innovate,	   possibly	   due	   to	   having	   more	   ‘spare	   time’	   in	  which	   they	   are	   able	   to	   play,	   without	   being	   distracted	   by	   feeding	   and	   social	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pressures	  (Reader	  &	  Laland,	  2001).	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  juveniles	  are	  tolerated	  by	   adults	   and	   are	   able	   to	   get	   closer	   to	   the	   puzzlebox	   than	   adults,	   therefore	  observing	  behaviour	  patterns	  with	  greater	  fidelity	  (Ottoni	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  However,	  in	   this	  experiment	   individuals	  were	  classified	  as	  either	   ‘in	  proximity’	  or	   ‘out	  of	  proximity’	   without	   judgement	   of	   exactly	   how	   close	   the	   individual	   was	   to	   the	  puzzlebox	  and	  animal	  using	   it,	   therefore	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  estimate	  which	  of	  these	  possibilities	  is	  most	  likely.	  	  The	  use	  of	  food	  calls	  was	  examined,	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  potential	  use	  to	  attract	  others’	  attention	  to	  the	  puzzlebox.	  There	  was	  little	  difference	  in	  the	  recruitment	  rate	  after	  calls	  and	  the	  baseline	  rate	  of	  arrivals	   throughout	   trials	  and	  therefore	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  calls	  recruited	   individuals	  to	  the	  puzzlebox.	  Slocombe	  and	  Zuberbühler	  (2005;	  2006)	  found	  that	  the	  structure	  and	  frequency	  of	  food	  calls	  of	  chimpanzees	  changed	  depending	  upon	  the	  desirability	  of	   the	   food	  to	   the	  caller,	  with	   other	   individuals	   tested	   in	   captivity	   being	   able	   to	   recognise	   the	   different	  types	  of	  food	  call.	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  recording	  of	  the	  experiments,	  on	  video	  rather	   than	   audio	   recording,	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   analyse	   the	   structure	   and	  frequency	   of	   the	   food	   calls	   here.	   However,	   whilst	   Slocombe	   and	   Zuberbühler	  (2005)	   found	   that	   chimpanzees	   engaged	   in	   more	   searching	   behaviour	   when	  played	  food	  calls	  produced	  in	  response	  to	  highly	  desirable,	  versus	  less	  desirable,	  foods,	  chimpanzees	  still	  responded	  to	  food	  calls	  for	  a	  less	  desirable	  food	  source	  and	   searched	   in	   the	   appropriate	   area	   (Slocombe	   &	   Zuberbühler,	   2005).	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  chimpanzees	  would	  not	  respond	  to	  any	  food	  call	  that	  is	  produced	  by	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  population,	  particularly	  as	  the	  population	  did	  not	  have	  another	  food	  source	  during	  most	  of	  the	  duration	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of	   the	  experiments,	   except	  on	   those	  occasions	  when	  a	   small	   feed	  was	  given	  by	  carestaff.	  	  	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  for	  social	   learning	   in	  the	  experiment.	  The	   learning	  time	  (time	  of	  first	  successful	  manipulation-­‐	  time	  of	  first	  contact)	  of	  stage	  one,	  did	  not	  correlate	  with	  the	  time	  of	  first	  contact	  with	  the	  puzzlebox,	  a	  negative	  correlation	  would	  be	  expected	  if	  social	  learning	  was	  occurring.	  The	  puzzlebox	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  similar	  to	  puzzleboxes	  that	  the	  chimpanzees	  had	  used	  previously	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Hopper	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Therefore,	  as	  with	  the	  capuchins,	  the	  first	  stage	  may	  be	  easily	  learned	  individually	  from	  prior	  experience,	  without	  needing	  to	  use	  social	  information,	  as	  has	  been	  proposed	  in	  the	  social	  learning	  literature	  (Boyd	  &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Kendal	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  There	  was	  insufficient	  data	  to	  perform	  this	  analysis	   for	   higher	   stages.	  Despite	   the	   ease	   of	   the	   first	   stage,	   in	   comparison	   to	  other	   similar	   chimpanzee	  studies,	   it	  may	  appear	  surprising	   that	   social	   learning	  was	  not	  found.	  With	  a	  simple	  puzzlebox,	   from	  which	  food	  could	  be	  accessed	  by	  pushing	  a	  door	  either	  right	  or	  left,	  Hopper	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  found	  that	  chimpanzees	  matched,	   in	   the	   first	   test	   trial,	   the	   direction	   they	   observed	   the	   door	  moved	   in	  several	  conditions	  including	  a	  ghost	  condition	  (in	  which	  the	  door	  was	  moved	  by	  an	  ‘invisible’	  force	  rather	  than	  demonstrator).	  The	  puzzlebox	  in	  this	  experiment	  differs	   from	   that	   used	   by	   Hopper	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   as	   there	   are	   two	   doors	   in	   this	  experiment	  and	  an	  individual	  may	  gain	  two	  food	  rewards	  if	  they	  operated	  both	  doors.	   It	   may	   pay,	   therefore,	   for	   individuals	   to	   explore	   the	   puzzlebox	  individually,	  rather	  than	  matching	  the	  behaviour	  of	  a	  demonstrator.	  In	  contrast,	  the	   puzzlebox	   used	   in	   Hopper	   et	   al’s	   (2008)	   experiment	   had	   only	   one	   food	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reward,	   contained	   behind	   one	   door,	   perhaps	   prompting	   conditional	   social	  learning	  (Gergely	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  	  In	  an	  alternative	  assessment	  of	  evidence	  for	  social	  learning,	  chimpanzees	  in	  the	  second	   experiment	   that	   observed	   demonstrators	   trained	   to	   solve	   stage	   three	  were	  no	  more	   likely	   to	  match	  any	  of	   the	  actions	   that	   they	  had	  observed	   in	   the	  previous	   minute,	   than	   perform	   non-­‐matching	   actions.	   This	   contrasts	   with	  experimental	   data,	   using	   puzzleboxes,	   which	   have	   demonstrated	   that	  chimpanzees	   are	   capable	   of	   social	   learning,	   including	   emulation	   and	   imitation	  (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1996;	   Hopper	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Whiten	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Hopper	   et	   al.,	  2008).	   There	   was	   a	   significant	   negative	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	  matching	   events	   that	   an	   individual	   carried	   out	   and	   their	   achievement	   rank,	  although	   this	   relationship	   may	   be	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   one	   individual	   that	  performed	  many	  more	  non-­‐matching	  manipulations	  than	  matching	  ones.	  In	  this	  study,	   the	   cumulative	   aspect	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   may	   have	   hindered	   the	   use	   of	  social	   learning,	   although	   how	   remains	   unclear,	   as	   complex	   sequences	   of	  manipulations	   resulting	   in	   a	   single	   reward	   have	   been	   performed	   in	   other	  experiments	  using	  puzzleboxes	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  The	  ‘termiting’	  behaviour	  of	  the	  chimpanzees	  through	  the	  olfactory	  holes	  of	  the	  puzzlebox,	   indicates	   that	   individuals	   were	   able	   to	   assess	   that	   there	   were	  successively	   more	   desirable	   food	   rewards	   contained	   within	   the	   puzzlebox.	  Individuals	  continued	  to	  use	  non-­‐conservative	  actions	  (i.e.	  any	  manipulation	  that	  was	   not	   sliding	   the	   doors)	   after	   they	   had	   discovered	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   first	  stage.	   Therefore	   they	   further	   investigated	   the	   puzzlebox	   asocially,	   belying	   the	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hypothesis	   that	   behavioural	   conservativeness	   hampers	   cumulative	   problem	  solving	  in	  chimpanzees,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  they	  did	  this	  socially.	  In	  two	   groups	   there	   was	   more	   than	   one	   individual	   that	   learned	   to	   solve	   higher	  stages	   (two	   individuals	   to	   stage	   two	   in	  group	  C6	  and	  one	   individual	   to	   stage	  3	  and	  another	  to	  stage	  two	  in	  C5),	  based	  on	  the	  learning	  criteria	  of	  more	  than	  five	  successful	  manipulations	  in	  more	  than	  one	  trial.	  One	  of	  these	  individuals	  in	  each	  group	  may	  have	   learned	   socially	   from	   the	   stage	   two	   innovator,	   but	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  that	  they	  could	  not	  have	   learned	  the	  methods	  asocially,	  as	   individuals	  did	  not	  faithfully	  use	  one	  of	  the	  two	  actions	  (buttons	  for	  stage	  two	  or	  doors	  for	  stage	  one).	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  social	  learning	  would	  benefit	  from	  further	  investigation,	  perhaps	  with	  a	  different	  cumulative	  task,	  to	  assess	  whether	  it	  is	  an	  artifact	   of	   this	   experiment.	   The	   results	   of	   the	   only	   other	   reported	   cumulative	  problem-­‐solving	   experiment	   (Marshall-­‐Pescini	   &	   Whiten,	   2008)	   is	   however	  consistent	  with	   this	  study.	  Their	   findings	  also	  suggest	   that	  chimpanzees	  do	  not	  engage	   in	  social	   learning	  once	  one	  solution	   to	  a	   task	  has	  been	   found,	  although,	  unlike	  this	  experiment,	   their	   findings	  suggest	  that	   individuals	  engaged	  in	  social	  learning	  of	  the	  first	  stage.	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	  and	  Whiten	  did	  report	  one	  individual	  that	  was	  able	  to	  switch	  to	  the	  more	  complex,	  and	  rewarding,	  technique,	  however	  that	   subject	   had	   previously	   discovered	   the	   more	   complex	   technique	   during	  baseline	   testing	   with	   the	   puzzlebox.	   This	   individual	   discovered	   the	   more	  complex	  technique	  in	  the	  second	  baseline	  trial,	  after	   it	  had	  discovered	  the	  first,	  less	   complex	   technique,	   suggesting	   that	   chimpanzees	   are	   not	   completely	  conservative.	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As	  was	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  the	  discussion,	  some	  researchers	  have	  posited	  that	  conservatism	   or	   satisficing	   explains	   the	   reported	   lack	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  (Marshall-­‐Pescini	  &	  Whiten,	  2008;	  Hrubesch	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  In	   this	   experiment	   there	   was	   no	   evidence	   that	   satisficing	   with	   any	   reward	  prevents	   chimpanzees	   progressing	   through	   use	   of	   alternative	   behaviour	  patterns,	   in	   a	   cumulative	   problem	   solving	   task.	   Contrary	   to	   what	   would	   be	  expected	   if	   animals	  were	   satisficing,	   subjects	   in	   the	   open	   condition	   performed	  more	   manipulations	   than	   those	   in	   the	   scaffolded	   condition	   during	   the	   trial	  equivalent	   to	   that	   in	   which	   the	   scaffolded	   individuals	   were	   no	   longer	   being	  rewarded	  at	  the	  lower	  stage	  but	  required	  to	  manipulate	  both	  the	  first	  and	  second	  stage	   to	   achieve	   reward.	   If	   individuals	   satisficed,	   only	   the	   individuals	   in	   the	  scaffolded	  condition	  ought	  to	  be	  seeking	  a	  new	  solution,	  evidenced	  by	  increased	  manipulations	   compared	   to	   individuals	   in	   the	   open	   condition,	   as	   they	   are	   no	  longer	  receiving	  a	  reward.	  Individuals	  in	  both	  experiments	  also	  continued	  to	  use	  non-­‐conservative	  actions	  (that	   is	  any	  actions	  except	  those	  that	  solve	  stage	  one-­‐	  i.e.	   opening	   the	   doors)	   after	   they	   have	   solved	   and	   learned	   stage	   one.	   This	  suggests	  that	  individuals	  do	  not	  simply	  stick	  with	  the	  actions	  they	  have	  found	  to	  gain	   them	  a	  reward.	   In	  combination	  with	   the	   findings	   in	   this	  study	  regarding	  a	  lack	   of	   social	   learning,	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   chimpanzee	   individuals	   may	  continue	   to	   explore	   alternative	   solutions	   asocially,	   enabling	   cumulative	  innovation	  by	  one	  individual,	  but	  may	  be	  unlikely	  to	  learn	  cumulative	  solutions	  socially,	   therefore	   halting	   cumulative	   transmission	   (and	   cumulative	   culture).	   If	  the	  individuals	  continue	  to	  explore	  asocially,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  others	  (Marshall-­‐Pescini	  &	  Whiten	  2008;	  Hrubesch	  et	  al.	  2009),	  the	  cause	  of	  this	  lack	  of	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cumulative	   transmission	   would	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   conservatism.	   Here	  conservatism	  was	  an	  outcome,	  rather	  than	  a	  mechanism.	  	  Evidence	   from	   the	   wild	   also	   suggests	   that	   chimpanzees	   may	   be	   able	   to	   add	  modifications	   to	   existing	   cultural	   traits	   and	   are	   thus	   not	   entirely	   conservative.	  Chimpanzees	  in	  the	  Congo	  Basin	  use	  complex	  tool-­‐kits	  to	  prey	  on	  insects	  (Sanz	  &	  Morgan,	   2007)	   and	  whilst	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   the	  multiple	   tools	   derived	  directly	  from	  the	  single	  tools	  used	  by	  other	  chimpanzee	  populations,	  a	  single	  tool	  would	   suffice	   for	   these	   particular	   chimpanzees	   to	   gain	   their	   insect	   prey.	   The	  addition	  of	  a	  large	  tool,	  to	  the	  tool	  kit	  of	  these	  chimpanzees,	  used	  to	  break	  open	  nests	   of	   ants	   (Sanz	   &	  Morgan,	   2007)	   and	   bees	   (Sanz	   &	  Morgan,	   2009),	   is	   not	  evidence	   for	   cumulative	   culture	   (unless	   it	   spreads	   over	   generations	   and	   the	  behaviour	   pattern	   is	   further	   modified	   across	   those	   generations),	   but	   it	   does	  suggest	  that	  at	  least	  one	  individual	  in	  the	  population	  was	  able	  to	  modify	  its	  own	  behaviour	  pattern.	  That	   is,	   it	  did	  not	  act	  conservatively	  and	  simply	  continue	   to	  use	  the	  first,	  one	  tool,	  solution	  to	  the	  task,	  but	  invented	  another.	  	  There	   were	   no	   instances	   of	   altruism,	   that	   is,	   of	   one	   individual	   giving	   a	   food	  reward	   to	   another,	   in	   this	   experiment.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   literature	   on	  altruism	   in	   chimpanzees,	   which	   has	   concluded	   that	   whilst	   chimpanzees	   are	  capable	  of	  acting	  altruistically,	  they	  are	  more	  skilled	  in	  cognitive	  tasks	  when	  they	  are	   acting	   competitively	   (Hare,	   2001;	   Hare	   &	   Tomasello,	   2004).	   It	   has	   been	  suggested	   that	   the	  presence	  of	   food	  may	   inhibit	   altruism	   in	   chimpanzees,	  with	  chimpanzees	   becoming	   fixated	   on	   the	   food,	   competing	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   it	   and	  disregarding	   others	   (Silk	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Jensen	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   However,	   a	   recent	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study	  has	   found	   that	   chimpanzees	  can	  act	  altruistically	   in	   the	  presence	  of	   food	  (Melis	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   although	   the	   subjects	   did	  not	   receive	   food	   themselves	   and	  were	  assisting	  a	  focal	  individual	  with	  whom	  the	  subject	  could	  not	  compete.	  In	  the	  experiment	   detailed	   in	   this	   thesis,	   chimpanzees	  were	   in	   competition	  with	   one	  another	  for	  food	  and	  each	  subject	  could	  maximize	  their	  food	  intake	  by	  not	  giving	  away	  any	  of	  their	  food	  rewards.	  The	  results	  reported	  in	  this	  thesis	  are,	  therefore,	  consistent	  with	   those	   found	  by	   researchers	  of	   altruism	   in	   chimpanzees	   (Silk	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Jensen	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  Scrounging	  has	  been	  hypothesized	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  learning,	  but	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  not	  consistent.	  Some	  researchers	  have	  found	  scrounging	  inhibits	  learning	   (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	   1987),	   whilst	   others	   have	   found	   a	   positive	  relationship	  between	  scrounging	  and	  learning	  (Caldwell	  &	  Whiten,	  2003).	  In	  this	  experiment,	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  frequency	  of	  scrounging	  events	  an	  individual	  perpetrates	  and	  their	  achievement	  ranking,	  both	  in	  the	  time	  period	  before	  they	  reach	  the	  final	  stage	  that	  they	  achieve	  and	  in	  total	  across	  all	  trials.	   This	   result	   appears	   to	   be	   consistent	   with	   that	   of	   Caldwell	   and	   Whiten	  (2003),	  who	  found	  that	  scrounging	   facilitated	   learning	   in	  marmosets.	  However,	  there	   is	   also	   a	   positive	   correlation	  between	   the	  number	   of	   times	   an	   individual	  was	  the	  victim	  of	  scrounging	  and	  their	  achievement	  ranking,	  both	  in	  those	  trials	  before	   they	   reached	   the	   final	   stage	   that	   they	   achieved	   and	   across	   all	   trials.	  Therefore,	  neither	  being	  the	  victim	  nor	  the	  perpetrator	  of	  scrounging	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  disadvantage	  to	  an	  individual	   in	  solving	  the	  puzzlebox,	  clearly	  refuting	  the	  hypothesis.	  As	  both	  the	  number	  of	  times	  an	  individual	  falls	  victim	  to	  scrounging	  and	   scrounges	   from	   other	   individuals	   are	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   the	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number	  of	  manipulations	  the	  individual	  carries	  out,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  these	  effects	  are	   a	   by-­‐product	   of	   time	   spent	   at	   the	   puzzlebox.	   If	   an	   individual	   spends	  more	  time	   in	  proximity	   to	   the	  puzzlebox,	   for	  which	   the	  number	  of	  manipulations	   an	  individual	  performed	  is	  a	  proxy,	  they	  will	  have	  more	  opportunities	  to	  scrounge	  than	   individuals	   that	   are	  not	   in	  proximity.	   Similarly,	   if	   an	   individual	   solves	   the	  puzzlebox	  and	  acquires	  food	  more	  often,	   then	  there	  are	  more	  opportunities	   for	  other	   individuals	   to	   scrounge	   from	   them.	   Therefore	   the	   correlations	   between	  scrounging	  and	  achievement	  ranking	  may	  be	  artifacts	  of	  the	  increased	  time	  spent	  at	   the	  puzzlebox.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	   there	  has	  been	  no	  explicit	   test	  of	  whether,	  and	   how,	   scrounging	   affects	   learning	   in	   chimpanzees.	   Similar	   experiments	   to	  those	   carried	   out	   by	   Caldwell	   and	  Whiten	   (2003)	   and	   Giraldeau	   and	   Lefebvre	  (1987),	   could	   be	   used	   to	   assess	   the	   effect	   of	   scrounging	   on	   learning	   in	  chimpanzees	  which	  may	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  scrounging	  upon	  cumulative	  culture.	  	  	  Contrary	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  dominant	  individuals	  monopolise	  key	  resources,	  low-­‐ranking	  and	  mid-­‐ranking	  individuals	  were	  able	  to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  significantly	  more	  than	  high-­‐ranking	  individuals.	  Whilst	  high-­‐ranking	  individuals	  have	  been	  found	  to	  monopolise	   food	  resources	   in	  chimpanzees	  (Bloomsmith	  et	  al.,	   1994),	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   in	   this	   experiment.	   This	   pattern	   may	   be	   partly	  because	  only	  a	  low	  value	  food	  reward	  was	  available	  at	  stage	  one	  (where	  the	  vast	  majority	   of	   successful	   manipulations	   occurred),	   ensuring	   a	   low	   motivation	   of	  high	  ranking	  individuals	  to	  monopolise	  the	  puzzlebox.	  In	  experiments	  in	  which	  a	  foraging	  apparatus	  has	  been	  monopolised,	  the	  reward	  has	  been	  high-­‐value	  food,	  although	   these	   experiments	   were	   carried	   out	   with	   other	   species	   (lemurs-­‐	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Anderson	  et	  al.,	  1992;	  	  capuchins-­‐	  Lavallee,	  1999).	  In	  the	  experiment	  reported	  in	  this	   thesis,	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   may	   have	   been	  more	  motivated	   by	   a	   low-­‐value	  food	  reward	  than	  high-­‐ranking	  individuals,	  similar	  to	  reports	  from	  the	  wild	  in	  which	   low-­‐ranking	  chimpanzees	  are	  sometimes	  forced	  to	  use	   low-­‐value	  food	  resources	   as	   high-­‐value	   resources	   are	   being	   monopolised	   by	   high-­‐ranking	  individuals	   (Goodall,	   1986).	   Low-­‐	   and	  mid-­‐ranking	   individuals	   interacting	  with	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	   than	  high-­‐rankers	   is	  also	  consistent	  with	   the	  meta-­‐analyses	   of	   Reader	   and	   Laland	   (2001),	   in	   which	   it	   was	   found	   that	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   were	  more	   innovative	   than	   high-­‐ranking	   individuals.	   This,	  Reader	   and	   Laland	   argue,	   is	   due	   to	   the	   old	   adage	   ‘necessity	   is	   the	   mother	   of	  invention’,	  whereby	  low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  need	  to	  innovate	  to	  find	  a	  novel	  way	  of	  gaining	  food,	  as	  they	  have	  reduced	  access	  to	  regular	  food	  sources.	   In	   the	   experiment	   reported	   in	   this	   thesis,	   low-­‐	   and	   mid-­‐ranking	  individuals	  may	  have	  been	  more	  motivated	  to	  find	  food	  from	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  were	  not	   stopped	   in	   this	  by	  dominant	   individuals	  monopolizing	   the	  puzzlebox.	  The	   fact	   that	   of	   the	   five	   individuals	   that	   solved	   stages	  2	   and	  3,	   four	  were	   low-­‐ranking	  and	  one	  was	  mid-­‐ranking	  also	  supports	  this	  hypothesis.	  Thus	  there	  is	  no	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  only	  some	  individuals	  in	  a	  group	  would	  be	  able	  to	  use	   the	   puzzlebox,	   thus	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   innovations,	   including	  cumulative	  innovations,	  in	  groups	  of	  chimpanzees.	  	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   individuals	   preferentially	   observe	   high-­‐ranking	  individuals,	  there	  is,	  unfortunately,	  low	  power	  in	  the	  analyses	  assessing	  whether	  low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  and	  juveniles	  are	  ignored	  by	  their	  conspecifics	  when	   interacting	   with	   the	   task.	   However,	   the	   pattern	   of	   the	   results	   does	   not	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support	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  that	  were	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  task	  when	  it	  was	  being	  manipulated	  (a	  proxy	  of	  attentiveness)	  by	  individuals	  of	  different	  age	  and	  rank	  categories.	  It	  may,	  however,	  be	  the	  case	  that	   within	   the	   data	   some	   individuals	   are	   in	   proximity,	   but	   are	   not	   paying	  attention	   to	   the	   individual	  manipulating	   the	  puzzlebox.	  For	   instance,	  Biro	  et	  al.	  (2003)	   found	   that	  when	  a	   low-­‐ranking	   female	  cracked	  novel	  panda	  nuts	   in	   the	  same	   area	   as	   other	   individuals,	   there	   was	   no	   evidence	   that	   they	   paid	   any	  attention	  to	  her.	  The	  same	  may	  be	  occurring	  in	  the	  experiment	  reported	  in	  this	  thesis.	   As	   this	   experiment	   was	   conducted	   in	   large	   outdoor	   enclosures	   with	   a	  puzzlebox	   with	   many	   different	   manipulandi,	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   assess	   the	  gaze	   direction	   and	   focus	   of	   the	   gaze	   of	   the	   chimpanzees	   in	   proximity	   to	   the	  puzzlebox.	   Using	   a	   simpler	   puzzlebox,	   with	   fewer	   manipulandi,	   in	   a	   smaller	  setting,	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   gaze	   of	   observers	   could	   be	   assessed	   and	   a	   finer-­‐grained	   analysis	   conducted	   to	   examine	   whether	   observers	   watch	   the	   exact	  movements	  of	  demonstrators	  of	  different	  ranks	  to	  a	  differing	  degree.	  	  	  
Conclusions:	  The	  cumulative	  puzzlebox	  used	  in	  this	  experiment	  was	  within	  the	  zone	  of	  latent	  solutions	   of	   chimpanzees,	  with	   five	   individuals	   being	   able,	  without	   training,	   to	  solve	   stage	   two	   and	   one	   of	   those	   going	   on	   to	   solve	   stage	   three.	   Similarly,	   four	  demonstrators	   were	   able	   to	   be	   trained	   to	   solve	   stage	   three	   faithfully	   and	  consistently,	  suggesting	   the	  reason	   for	   the	   lack	  of	  spread	  of	  solutions	   to	  higher	  stages	  was	  not	  simply	  because	  the	  puzzlebox	  was	  too	  complicated	  for	  the	  species	  to	   learn.	   The	   cumulative	   solutions	   for	   the	   puzzlebox	   did	   not,	   however,	   spread	  widely	  within	   the	  groups.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	   that	  social	  hierarchy	  affected	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the	   ability	   of	   chimpanzees	   to	   use	   the	   puzzlebox	   or	   observe	   others,	   nor	   that	  satisficing	   or	   conservatism	   prevented	   cumulative	   problem	   solving.	   Four	   of	   the	  same	   hypotheses	   that	   received	   support	   from	   the	   capuchin	   study	   are	   also	  supported	  in	  the	  chimpanzees.	  As	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  chimpanzees	  used	  teaching,	   complex	   communication,	   imitation	   and	   prosocial	   behaviours	   when	  solving	   the	   puzzlebox	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   these	   factors	   are	   necessary	   for	  cumulative	  cultural	  transmission.	  These	  results,	  however,	  can	  only	  be	  accurately	  assessed	   in	   comparison	   with	   humans,	   a	   species	   known	   to	   have	   cumulative	  culture.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Plate	  3	  (Overleaf):	  Children	  manipulating	  the	  puzzlebox	  during	  an	  experimental	  session.	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CHAPTER	  SIX	  
AN	  EXPERIMENTAL	  INVESTIGATION	  OF	  




	  Children	  have	  been	  used	   in	  a	   range	  of	   comparative	   studies	  with	  other	  primate	  species	  focussing	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  cognitive	  questions	  (Nagell	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Herrmann	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	  &	  Whiten,	   2008).	   These	   studies	   have	   been	   based	   upon	   reported	   cognitive	  similarities	  between	  3	  year	  old	  children	  and	  chimpanzees	  (Premack,	  1988).	  The	  rationale	  for	  comparing	  chimpanzees	  to	  children	  rather	  than	  to	  adult	  humans	  is	  that	   the	   latter	   have	   been	   greatly	   enculturated	   by	   human	   society.	   The	   use	   of	  children	  thus	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  inherent	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  species	  prior	  to	  culture	  becoming	  too	  great	  a	  confounding	  factor.	  	  Humans	  are	  the	  most	  widespread	  primate	  species	  on	  Earth	  (Rowe,	  1996),	  with	  residents	   on	   all	   continents.	   The	   technological	   achievements,	   which	   have	   been	  described	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  are	  wide	  and	  various,	  with	  tools	  and	  technology	  being	  invented	  to	  aid	  foraging,	  transportation,	  communication,	  courting,	  shelter	  and	   in	   various	   other	   domains	   (Basalla,	   1988).	   Furthermore,	   humans	   have	  devised	  a	  range	  of	  aesthetic	  behaviour,	  for	  example	  art,	  music	  and	  literature,	  that	  are	   thought	   to	   be	   selectively	   neutral	   and	   for	   entertainment	   (Lehman,	   1947;	  Enquist	  et	  al.,	  2008).	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  For	  most	   studies	   in	   comparative	   and	  developmental	  psychology,	   children	   from	  Western	  countries	  are	  compared	  with	  captive	  non-­‐humans,	  usually	  chimpanzees.	  This	  approach	  has	  been	  criticised	  by	  fieldworkers,	  both	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  captive	  chimpanzees	  are	  not	  species	  typical,	  but	  also	  that	  these	  children	  are	  not	  representative	   of	   all	   human	   populations	   (Boesch,	   2007;	   2008;	   Henrich	   et	   al.,	  2010).	   These	   researchers	   argue	   that	   population	   differences	   in	   humans	   are	   not	  taken	   seriously	   enough	   and	   that	   striking	   differences,	   such	   as	   differences	   in	  spatial	   cognition	   (Haun	   et	   al.,	   2006),	   exist	   between	   populations.	   Whilst	  acknowledging	  that	   there	   is	   limited	  cross-­‐cultural	  evidence,	  Tomasello	  and	  Call	  (2008)	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  children,	  particularly	  pre-­‐school	  age	  children,	  differ	  in	  cognition	  across	  different	  populations.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  recent	  study	  Nielsen	  and	  Tomaselli	  (2010)	  found	  that	  Kalahari	  bushman	  children	  over-­‐imitated	   to	   the	   same	  extent	   as	   children	   in	   a	   ‘Western’	   community	   in	  Australia,	  implying	  that	  over-­‐imitation	  is	  not	  just	  a	  consequence	  of	  Western	  societies.	  Some	  researchers	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   experiments	   used	   to	   assess	   cognition	   in	  different	  populations	  may	  give	   false	  positive	  results	  of	  differences	   in	  cognition,	  whereas	   differences	   in	  motivation	   and	  understanding	   of	   tasks	  may	  be	   the	   real	  cause	  (Baumard	  &	  Sperber,	  2010).	  Thus,	  whilst	  we	  must	  remain	  mindful	  of	   the	  small	  number	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  studies,	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  premise	  that	  there	   is	   currently	  no	  evidence	   that	   children	   in	  Western	   societies	  differ	   in	   their	  social	  cognition	  from	  those	  in	  other	  societies.	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Specific	  Methods	  	  
Participants:	  The	  children	   that	   took	  part	   in	   this	  experiment	  were	  drawn	   from	  three	  nursery	  schools	   in	   east	   Fife,	   namely,	   St.	   Andrews	   Nursery	   School,	   Lawhead	   Primary	  School	  and	  Westfield	  Nursery	  School.	  They	  were	  tested	  in	  an	  area	  of	  their	  school	  that	  was	  separate	  from	  the	  main	  class,	  but	  was	  familiar	  to	  them.	  Where	  required	  by	  the	  school,	  a	  teacher	  was	  also	  present	  in	  the	  room,	  although	  the	  teacher	  was	  requested	  not	  to	  speak	  or	  interact	  with	  the	  children	  during	  the	  trial	  sessions.	  	  
	  Eight	  groups	  of	  children	  were	   tested	   in	  group	  sizes	  of	  4	  and	  5	   individuals.	  The	  age	  range	  of	  the	  groups	  was	  3	  to	  4	  years.	  There	  was	  always	  a	  mix	  of	  sexes	  within	  the	   groups,	   although	   exact	   sex	   ratios	   varied	   (Table	   6.1).	   	   	   The	   parents	   of	   all	  children	  involved	  in	  the	  study	  had	  signed	  consent	  forms	  agreeing	  that	  their	  child	  could	  participate.	  	  Table	  6.1:	  The	  composition	  of	  groups	  of	  children	  that	  participated	  in	  the	  experiment.	  
Group identity Condition Number of males Number of 
females 




WF4 Scaffolded 3 1 3.6 (± 0.15) 
StAA Scaffolded 3 1 4.1 (± 0.19) 
LAM2 Scaffolded 4 1 4.7 (± 0.13) 
LPM2 Scaffolded 2 2 3.9 (± 0.31) 
WF3 Open 4 1 3.9 (± 0.20) 
StAD Open 1 3 4.2 (± 0.20) 
LAM1 Open 3 2 4.3 (± 0.21) 
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Apparatus:	  Puzzlebox	  2,	   the	  smaller	  puzzlebox,	  was	  used	  with	   the	  children.	  The	  puzzlebox	  was	  positioned	  on	  a	  low	  table	  and	  children	  received	  instructions	  before	  the	  start	  of	   the	   first	   trial	  where	   in	   the	   room	   they	  were	   allowed	   to	  walk.	   If	   necessary,	   a	  barrier	  of	  chairs	  prevented	  the	  children	  walking	  directly	  behind	  the	  puzzlebox,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  they	  did	  not	  gain	  visual	  access	  to	  the	  mechanisms	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  experimenter.	  	  
	  
Procedure:	  Reward	  preference	  testing:	  In	  a	  pilot	  study,	   five	  children,	  none	  of	  whom	  took	  part	   in	   the	  experiment,	  aged	  between	  4	  and	  8	  years,	  took	  part	   in	  preference	  testing	  with	  a	  range	  of	  stickers,	  including	   stickers	   not	   used	   in	   the	   experiment.	   During	   the	   course	   of	   a	   game	  children	  were	  asked	  to	  stick	  a	  range	  stickers	  in	  order	  of	  preference	  on	  a	  piece	  of	  paper.	   Stickers	   were	   chosen	   for	   the	   main	   experiment	   that	   appeared	   in	  hierarchies	   in	  same	  order	  as	  observed	   in	  the	  pilot,	  regardless	  of	   the	  exact	  rank	  each	  child	  gave	  the	  sticker.	  	  In	   the	  main	   experiment,	   prior	   to	   the	   experimental	   sessions,	   the	   subjects	  were	  told	   that	  during	   the	  game	   they	  might	   get	   stickers,	   although	   they	  were	  not	   told	  that	   these	  rewards	  would	  come	   from	  the	  puzzlebox.	  Drawing	  on	   the	  data	   from	  the	  pilot,	  experimental	  participants	  were	  told	  the	  order	  of	  desirability	  of	  stickers,	  with	  small	  stars	  being	  bettered	  by	   large	  stars,	  which	  were,	   in	   turn,	  bettered	  by	  stickers	  displaying	  a	  smiling	  face	  and	  a	  glittery	  background.	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Assessment	  of	  the	  social	  rank	  of	  children:	  Teachers	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  children	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  participants	  in	  their	  group	   based	   on	   two	   criteria:	   (i)	   shy-­‐bold	   ranking	   and	   (ii)	   a	   competitive	   social	  rank.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  teachers	  were	  asked,	  by	  thinking	  of	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  children,	  which	  children	  were	  more	  bold	  and	  which	  were	  shyer	  and,	  secondly,	  to	  rank	  the	  children	  according	  to	  which	  child	  was	  likely	  to	  use	  the	  puzzlebox	  most.	  	  Experiment:	  	  Each	  group	  received	  five	  trials	  of	  30	  minutes	  each,	  with	  one	  trial	  per	  day,	  and	  a	  space	  of	  one	  to	  three	  days	  between	  trials.	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  testing	  context	  for	   the	  non-­‐human	  primates,	   the	   children	  were	  allowed	   to	   leave	   the	   room	  and	  return	   to	   their	   classroom	   at	   any	   time.	   The	   stickers	   that	   individuals	   collected	  were	  placed	  in	  an	  opaque	  cup	  that	  the	  children	  were	  allowed	  to	  carry	  with	  them.	  This	   allowed	   the	   stickers	   to	   be	   stored	   in	   one	   discrete	   place,	   but	   also	   allowed	  limited	  visual	  access	  by	  other	  members	  of	   the	  group,	  making	   it	   less	   likely	   they	  could	  assess	  the	  skill	  of	  another	  individual	  from	  results	  alone.	  Four	  groups	  were	  allocated	   to	   the	   open	   condition	   and	   four	   to	   the	   scaffolded	   condition,	   with	  conditions	  balanced	  across	  nurseries.	  
	  
Analysis:	  All	  analyses	  were	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  3	  except	  those	  for	  hypotheses	  3	  and	  8	  which	  are	  detailed	  below.	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Hypothesis	  5:	  As	  described	   in	  chapter	  3,	   to	  assess	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  observational	   learning	  plays	   a	   role	   in	   cumulative	   culture,	   whether	   individuals	   copied	   the	   actions	   of	  others	   at	   the	   puzzlebox	   was	   examined.	   As	   children	   left	   the	   puzzlebox	   less	  frequently	  than	  the	  other	  species	  tested,	  all	  instances	  of	  skilled	  children	  leaving	  the	  puzzlebox	  were	  considered	  until	  a	  time	  at	  which	  all	  individuals	  in	  the	  group	  had	   learned	   to	   open	   stage	   three.	   The	   focus	   was	   on	   occasions	   where	   a	  demonstrating	  child	  had	  been	  observed	  by	  another	  child	  in	  proximity	  for	  at	  least	  one	  minute,	   and	  where	   the	  observer	  child	  went	  on	   to	   contact	   the	  puzzlebox	   in	  the	  subsequent	  minute.	  	  Hypothesis	  8:	  To	   assess	   hypothesis	   8,	   whether	   individuals	   satisfice,	   the	   number	   of	  manipulations	   in	   the	   open	   and	   scaffolded	   conditions	   were	   compared.	   The	  difference	   in	  number	  of	  manipulations	  between	   those	   groups	   in	   the	   scaffolded	  condition	  and	  the	  open	  condition	  were	  compared	  in	  the	  first	  ten	  minutes	  of	  the	  trial	  after	  the	  scaffolded	  group	  had	  stopped	  receiving	  a	  reward	  at	  stage	  one	  and	  the	  trial	  at	  the	  corresponding	  time	  in	  the	  open	  condition.	  	  
Results	  
	  As	  with	  previous	  chapters,	  these	  results	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  the	  order	  in	  which	  they	  appear	  in	  chapter	  2.	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General	  results:	  All	  but	   four	  children	  manipulated	  the	  puzzlebox	  (mean=	  210.11	  manipulations,	  standard	   error=	   36.85,	   range=	   0,	   847).	   There	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	  between	   the	   mean	   achievement	   level	   of	   individuals	   in	   the	   open	   condition	  (mean=	   18.78,	   standard	   error=	   3.22)	   and	   those	   in	   the	   scaffolded	   condition	  (mean=15.53,	  standard	  error=	  2.01)	  (Mann	  Whitney	  U	  test:	  U=188,	  p=0.25,	  95%	  CI=	  [-­‐8.0,	  13.0]).	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difference	   between	   the	   achievement	   rank	   of	   males	   (mean	   achievement	   rank=	  18.35,	  standard	  error=	  2.31)	  and	  females	  (mean	  achievement	  rank=	  15,	  standard	  error=	   3.45)	   (Mann-­‐Whitney	   test:	   U=116,	   p=0.45,	   95%	   CI=[-­‐13.0,	   5.0]).	   There	  was	  no	  significant	  correlation	  between	  the	  age	  of	  children	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank	  (Spearman’s	  Rank:	  rho=0.30,	  S=	  5031.59,	  p=0.09).	  	  
Hypothesis	   1:	   A	   lack	   of	   teaching	   in	   non-­human	   primates	   prevents	   the	   spread	   of	  
cumulative	  innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  There	  were	   23	   instances	   of	   teaching,	   by	   six	  male	   children	   across	   four	   groups,	  observed	  in	  the	  populations	  of	  children	  (mean=	  0.69,	  standard	  error=	  0.32).	  Ten	  children	  received	  at	   least	  one	   teaching	  event.	  The	  number	  of	   teaching	  events	  a	  child	   received	   was	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   their	   achievement	   ranking	  (Spearman	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho	  =	  0.556,	  S=3167.13,	  p=0.0005;	  figure	  6.2).	  	  
	  Figure	  6.2:	  Relationship	  between	   the	  number	  of	   teaching	  events	   received	  and	   the	   achievement	  rank	  of	  individuals.	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Hypothesis	  2:	  Lack	  of	  a	   complex	   communication	   system,	   facilitating	  pedagogy,	   in	  
non-­humans	   prevents	   cumulative	   innovations	   spreading	   throughout	   the	  
population.	  Teaching	  was	  classified	   into	   those	  events	   that	   involved	  vocalisations	  and	   those	  that	  included	  non-­‐verbal	  gestures,	  such	  as	  pointing.	  It	  was	  found	  that	  all	  teaching	  events	   included	   vocalisations,	   for	   instance,	   instructions	   such	   as	   ‘Push	   that’	   or	  ‘Open	   that’.	   Both	   the	   number	   of	   teaching	   events	   that	   solely	   involved	   verbal	  instruction	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=	  0.50,	  S=	  3545.71,	  p=	  0.002)	  and	  those	   teaching	   events	   that	   involved	   both	   verbal	   and	   gestural	   instruction	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=	  0.44,	  S=	  3994.76,	  p=	  0.008)	  were	  positively	  correlated	   with	   the	   achievement	   rank	   of	   recipients.	   This	   suggests	   that	   verbal	  instruction	  may	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  teach	  other	  individuals.	  	  	  Hypothesis	  3:	  Lack	  of	  imitation	  in	  non-­humans	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  
innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  	  The	   learning	   time	   of	   individuals	   for	   the	   first	   stage	   (time	   of	   first	   successful	  manipulation-­‐	  first	  contact	  time)	  was	  not	  correlated	  with	  the	  time	  at	  which	  the	  individual	  first	  contact	  the	  puzzlebox	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=	  0.135,	  S=2833.9,	  p=0.50).	  There	  was	  no	  correlation	  between	  the	   learning	   time	   for	   the	  second	   stage	   and	   the	   time	   an	   individual	   first	   contacted	   the	   puzzlebox	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=	  0.111,	  S=	  1013.9,	  p=	  0.65).	  Similarly,	   there	  was	   no	   correlation	   between	   learning	   time	   for	   the	   third	   stage	   and	   the	   time	   an	  individual	   first	   contacted	   the	   puzzlebox	   (Spearman’s	   Rank	   Correlation:	   rho=	  0.053,	  S=644.0,	  p=0.85).	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In	  the	  minute	  following	  the	  observation	  of	  a	  more	  knowledgeable	  demonstrator	  for	   a	   minute,	   after	   which	   the	   demonstrator	   left,	   children	   were	   more	   likely	   to	  perform	  an	  action	  that	  they	  had	  seen	  the	  knowledgeable	  individual	  perform	  than	  one	  they	  had	  not	  seen	  performed	  (Wilcoxon	  test:	  W=	  163,	  p=	  0.003).	  There	  was	  a	  positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   proportion	   of	   matching	   actions	   a	   child	  performed	   and	   their	   achievement	   rank	   (Spearman’s	   Rank	   Correlation:	   rho=	  0.456,	  S=	  3882.6,	  p=0.00591;	  figure	  6.3).	  
	  Figure	   6.3:	   Relationship	   between	   the	   number	   of	   matching	   –	   nonmatching	   manipulations	   and	  achievement	  rank.	  
	  
Hypothesis	  4:	  Hypothesis	  4:	  Lack	  of	  pro-­sociality	  in	  non-­human	  primate	  individuals	  
prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations.	  Children	  were	  observed	  to	  perform	  a	  total	  of	  215	  altruistic	  acts,	  that	  is,	  donating	  a	   reward	   to	   another	   individual	   (mean=	   6.14	   acts/child,	   standard	   error=	   2.32).	  Across	  six	  of	  the	  eight	  groups,	  16	  children	  were	  altruistic	  at	  least	  once,	  with	  17	  children	  receiving	  at	  least	  one	  altruistic	  act.	  The	  number	  of	  times	  a	  child	  received	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an	   act	   of	   altruism	   was	   positively	   correlated	   with	   their	   achievement	   rank	  (Spearman’s	   Rank	   Correlation:	   rho=	   0.66,	   S=2228.4,	   p=	   2.21x10-­‐5;	   figure	   6.4).	  Individuals	   conducted	   a	  mean	   proportion	   of	   0.939	   (standard	   error=	   0.019)	   of	  manipulations	  in	  proximity	  with	  other	  individuals.	  
	  Figure	  6.4:	  Relationship	  between	  the	  number	  of	  altruistic	  events	  an	  individual	  receives	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank.	  	  
Hypothesis	   5:	   Scrounging,	   or	   being	   scrounged	   from,	   hinders	   the	   likelihood	   of	  
learning.	  Scrounging	  was	   observed	  with	   children	   removing	   stickers	   from	   the	   puzzlebox	  before	  the	  individual	  that	  opened	  the	  stage	  and	  also	  from	  the	  cups	  that	  children	  had	  been	  given	  in	  which	  they	  could	  store	  their	  stickers.	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	   the	  number	  of	   times	  an	   individual	   scrounged	   (before	   they	  reached	   the	   final	   stage	   they	   achieved)	   and	   their	   achievement	   ranking	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	  rho=	  0.40,	  S=	  	  4248.68,	  p=	  0.016).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  times	  an	  individual	  scrounged	  in	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total,	   even	   after	   they	   had	   achieved	   the	   final	   stage	   they	   reached,	   and	   their	  achievement	   ranking	   (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	   rho=	  0.84,	   S=	  1165.90,	   p=	  3.82x10-­‐10;	   figure	   6.5).	   The	   number	   of	   scrounging	   events	   that	   an	   individual	  perpetrated	  was	  also	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  the	  number	  of	  manipulations	  that	   an	   individual	   carries	   out	   (Spearman’s	   Rank:	   rho=0.802,	   S=1412.2,	  p=6.87x10-­‐9).	  	  
	  Figure	  6.5:	  Relationship	  between	  the	  number	  of	  scrounging	  events	  perpetrated	  by	  an	  individual	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank.	  	  The	  number	  of	  times	  an	  individual	  was	  scrounged	  from	  before	  they	  reached	  the	  final	   stage	   that	   they	   achieved	   was	   also	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   their	  achievement	   rank	   (Spearman’s	   Rank	   Correlation:	   rho=	   0.37,	   S=	   4479.9,	   p=	  0.028).	  The	  number	  of	  times	  an	  individual	  was	  the	  victim	  of	  scrounging	  in	  total,	  across	   all	   trials,	   was	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   their	   achievement	   rank	  (Spearman’s	  Rank	  Correlation:	   rho=	  0.80,	   S=	  1412.24,	   p=6.87x10-­‐9;	   figure	  6.6).	  The	   number	   of	   scrounging	   events	   to	   which	   an	   individual	   falls	   victim	   is	   also	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significantly	   correlated	   with	   the	   number	   of	   manipulations	   that	   an	   individual	  carries	  out	  (Spearman’s	  Rank:	  rho=0.739,	  S=1860.9,	  p=3.91x10-­‐7).	  
	  Figure	  6.6:	  Relationship	  between	   the	  number	  of	   scrounging	  events	   to	  which	  an	   individual	   falls	  victim	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank.	  	  	  
Hypothesis	   6:	   Dominant	   individuals	   monopolise	   resources	   preventing	   lower-­
ranking	  individuals	  gaining	  access,	  thereby	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  individuals	  with	  
the	  chance	  to	  solve	  the	  task.	  Across	   all	   groups,	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   number	   of	  manipulations	   performed	   by	   high-­‐ranking	   (mean	   manipulations=	   228.06,	  standard	   error=	   ±	   51.49)	   and	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   (mean	   manipulations=	  183.61,	   standard	   error=	  ±	   53.61)	   (Wilcoxon	   test:	  W=	  186,	   p=	  0.15,	   95%	  CI=	   [-­‐72.9,	  184.9];	  figure	  6.7).	  	  
	  





























	   207	  
	  Figure	  6.7:	  Mean	  rate	  of	  manipulations	  of	  individuals	  according	  to	  rank	  (±	  standard	  error)	  	  
Hypothesis	  7:	  Lack	  of	  attention	  to	  low	  ranking	  and/or	  juvenile	  individuals	  prevents	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  Figure	  6.8:	  Mean	  proportion	  of	  manipulations	  with	  another	  in	  proximity	  (±	  standard	  error)	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  8:	  Non-­human	  animals	  are	  conservative	  and	  satisfice,	  that	  is	  once	  they	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  Figure	  6.9:	  Median	  manipulations	  in	  first	  five	  minutes	  after	  rewards	  are	  removed	  at	  stage	  one	  in	  scaffolded	  condition.	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  9:	  Lack	  of	  ability	  to	  assess	  if	  another’s	  solution	  is	  better	  than	  one’s	  own	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Discussion:	  
	  Twenty	   seven	   of	   thirty	   five	   children	   learned	   to	   solve	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	  cumulative	   puzzlebox,	   based	   on	   the	   criterion	   of	   solving	   the	   stage	   at	   least	   five	  times	  in	  at	  least	  two	  separate	  trials.	  Fourteen	  of	  these	  children	  learned	  to	  solve	  stage	  two,	  with	  twelve	  going	  on	  to	  learn	  to	  use	  stage	  three.	  Of	  those	  that	  did	  not	  meet	   the	   learning	   criterion,	   a	   further	   seven	   solved	   the	  puzzlebox	   to	   stage	   two,	  fewer	   than	   five	   times	   in	   two	   trials.	   	   Although	   this	   represents	   a	   considerable	  degree	   of	   success,	   the	   performance	   of	   children	   with	   the	   puzzlebox	   was	   also	  notable	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   learning	   of	   stage	   one	   by	   eight	   children,	   this	   will	   be	  discussed	   at	   greater	   length	   below.	   Evidence	  was	   found	   for	   teaching,	   imitation,	  complex	  communication	  and	  prosociality	  in	  the	  childrens’	  behaviour,	  all	  of	  which	  covaried	  with	  performance.	  This	   implies	   these	  capabilities	  may	  be	  required	   for	  cumulative	  culture.	  The	  data	  were	  not	  consistent	  with	  social	  rank,	  satisficing	  or	  other	  social	  hypotheses.	  	  	  There	   were	   23	   instances	   of	   teaching,	   through	   direct	   instruction,	   across	   the	  populations.	   This	   result	   is	   consistent	   with	   reports	   of	   teaching	   in	   human	  populations	  (Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2006;	  Leadbeater	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  and	  in	  experiments	  with	  human	  children	  (Whiten	  &	  Flynn,	  2010).	  In	  a	  seeded	  diffusion	  experiment,	  Whiten	   and	   Flynn	   (2010)	   trained	   demonstrators	   to	   manipulate	   a	   puzzlebox	  before	   introducing	   them	   and	   the	   puzzlebox	   to	   a	   group	   of	   naïve	   individuals.	  Without	  instructing	  the	  knowledgeable	  demonstrators	  as	  to	  how	  they	  should	  act	  during	   the	   group	   sessions,	   they	   found	   that	   the	   demonstrators	   actively	   taught	  naïve	   individuals.	   A	   recent	   model	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   teaching	   is	   enlightening	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when	   considering	   the	   teaching	   behaviour	   of	   the	   children.	   In	   modelling	   the	  occurrence	  of	  teaching,	  Strimling	  et	  al.	   (In	  review)	  found	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  was	  a	  significant	   factor	   in	  whether	   it	  would	  be	   taught.	   In	  an	  argument	  akin	   to	   the	   ‘costly	   information	  hypothesis’	   (Boyd	  &	  Richerson	  1985),	  easy	  behaviour	  patterns	  can	  be	  learned	  without	  teaching	  and	  therefore	  teaching	  does	  not	  evolve.	  Behaviour	  patterns	  that	  are	  very	  difficult	  to	  learn	  are	  not	  likely	  to	   spread	   via	   teaching	   as	   the	   likelihood	   of	   individuals	   in	   the	   population	   being	  knowledgeable	  enough	  to	  act	  as	  teachers	  is	  low	  (Strimling	  et	  al.,	  In	  review).	  The	  low	   number	   of	   teaching	   events	   per	   individual	   in	   this	   experiment,	   therefore,	  reflects	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  were	   few	   individuals	  who	  were	   knowledgeable	   and	  able	  to	  act	  as	  teachers.	  However,	  six	  children	  in	  this	  experiment	  used	  their	  ability	  to	  teach	  a	  total	  of	  ten	  other	  participants.	  	  There	   was	   a	   significant	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   number	   of	   teaching	  events	  that	  an	  individual	  received	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank.	  Tomasello	  (1999)	  states	   that	   teaching	   is	   one	   way	   in	   which	   cultural	   traits	   can	   be	   transmitted	  faithfully	  between	  individuals,	  allowing	  modifications	  to	  be	  made	  and,	  therefore,	  facilitating	   cumulative	   culture.	   Six	   children	   in	   this	   experiment	   taught	   others	   to	  add	  modifications	  to	  their	  behaviour	  and,	  therefore,	  to	  get	  to	  a	  higher	  stage	  than	  they	  were	  previously	  achieving.	  While,	  in	  principle,	  in	  this	  type	  of	  open	  diffusion	  study	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   judge	   relatively	   how	   important	   teaching	   is	   compared	   to	  other	  learning	  processes,	  such	  as	  inadvertent	  social	  learning,	  in	  practice,	  the	  data	  were	   not	   appropriate	   for	   such	   an	   analysis.	   The	   relatively	   low	   number	   of	  instances	  of	  teaching	  and	  positive	  correlations	  of	  other	  learning	  processes	  with	  achievement	   rank,	   suggests	   that	   teaching	   acted	   alongside	   other	   learning	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processes.	   Further	   investigation	   is	   required	   to	   examine	   under	   what	  circumstances	   children	   teach,	   and	   whether	   they	   use	   teaching	   to	   remedy	   an	  inaccuracy	   in	   the	   performance	   of	   another	   individual	   (Wood	   et	   al.,	   1976)	   or	   to	  enforce	  norms	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  If	  teaching	  occurs	  only	  to	  enforce	  norms	  resulting	  in	  complete	  conformity,	  cumulative	  culture	  may	  be	  hindered,	  as	  no	  new	  cumulative	  modifications	  enter	   the	  population	   (Eriksson	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  although	  in	   this	   experiment	   the	   positive	   correlation	   between	   teaching	   received	   and	  performance	  contradicts	  any	  such	  argument.	  	  All	   teaching	   events	   identified	   in	   this	   experiment	   used	   vocalisations,	   in	   some	  cases	   paired	   with	   a	   gesture.	   Whilst	   other	   species	   may	   have	   some	   referential	  vocal	   signals,	   human	   language	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   represent	   a	   uniquely	  complex	  communication	  system	  (Hauser	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Pinker	  &	  Jackendoff,	  2005;	  Cheney	  &	  Seyfarth,	  2010).	  This	  complex	  system	  of	   communication	  can	  be	  used	  for	  pedagogy,	  allowing	  the	  spread	  of	  cultural	  traits	  (Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2006)	  and	  seemingly	   supporting	   cumulative	   culture.	   The	   use	   of	   referential	   vocalisations,	  such	  as	  ‘push	  that’	  or	  ‘turn	  the	  dial’,	  by	  children	  in	  this	  experiment,	  demonstrates	  that	   these	   complex	   vocalisations	   are	   used	   by	   children	   to	   communicate	   about	  learning	   opportunities	   and	   for	   pedagogy.	   Further	   analysis	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  vocalisations,	   separating	   their	   effect	   from	   that	   of	   teaching	  would	   prove	   useful.	  The	   effect	   of	   vocalisations	   on	   inadvertent	   social	   learning,	   for	   example	   one	  individual	  declaring	  that	  they	  had	  just	  gained	  a	  reward	  and	  thus	  advertising	  their	  worth	  as	  a	  learning	  model,	  would	  allow	  a	  more	  general	  assessment	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  complex	  vocalisations,	  not	  just	  in	  reference	  to	  pedagogy.	  	  
	   213	  
The	   finding	   that	   children	   were	   significantly	   more	   likely	   to	   match,	   than	   to	   not	  match,	  actions	  that	  they	  had	  observed	  an	  individual	  perform	  demonstrates	  that	  children	  were	  learning	  socially	  from	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  group.	  The	  number	  of	  matching	  manipulations	  that	  an	  individual	  performed	  in	  the	  minute	  following	  departure	   of	   a	   demonstrator	  was	   positively	   correlated	  with	   their	   achievement	  rank,	  thus	  suggesting	  that	  this	  social	  learning	  enabled	  individuals	  to	  modify	  their	  behaviour,	  by	  adding	  cumulative	  modifications,	  resulting	   in	  cumulative	  cultural	  culture.	  Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  imitation	  is	  integral	  to	  cumulative	  culture	  as	  it	  allows	  high	  fidelity	  transmission	  of	  the	  exact	  actions	  of	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  between	   individuals,	   without	   individuals	   having	   to	   work	   out	   the	   actions	   for	  themselves	  (Tomasello,	  1994;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  finding	  from	   this	   experiment	   suggests	   that	   imitation	   did,	   indeed,	   assist	   individuals	   to	  cumulatively	  modify	   their	   behaviour.	   These	   results	   are	   consistent	  with	   a	  wide	  range	  of	  experimental	  evidence	  of	  imitation	  in	  children	  (Uzgiris,	  1981;	  Carpenter	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Gergely	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Nielsen,	  2006;	  Flynn	  &	  Whiten,	  2010)	  but	  are	  the	  first	  to	  show	  evidence	  of	  its	  role	  in	  cumulative	  culture	  in	   a	   group	   setting	   (but	   see:	   Whiten	   et	   al.,	   2009	   for	   imitation	   of	   cumulative	  modifications	  in	  a	  dyadic	  setting).	  	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  learning	  time	  data	  did	  not	  support	  the	  social	  learning	  at	  any	  stage.	  As	   in	  previous	  chapters,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   the	   first	  stage	  could	  be	  solved	  asocially,	  not	  relying	  upon	  social	  learning.	  Therefore	  an	  effect	  on	  learning	  time	  would	  not	  be	  found.	  The	  relatively	  low	  sample	  size	  at	  stages	  two	  (n=14)	  and	  three	  (n=12),	  with	  small	  group	  sizes,	  therefore	  meaning	  that	  a	  maximum	  of	  only	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three	   individuals	   subsequently	   learn	   the	   stage	   following	   the	   initial	   innovation,	  may	  be	  reducing	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  test.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  fairly	  low	  levels	  of	  teaching	  across	  all	  groups,	  there	  were	  215	  altruistic	   events,	   with	   16	   individuals	   donating	   a	   reward	   they	   had	   retrieved	   to	  another	  17	   individuals.	  The	   scope	  of	   human	  altruism	  has	  been	  proposed	   to	  be	  wider	  and	  more	  prevalent	  than	  in	  any	  other	  species	  (Fehr	  &	  Fischbacher,	  2003;	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	   2005;	  Warneken	  &	  Tomasello,	   2006).	   The	   results	   from	   this	  experiment	  are	  consistent	  with	  that	  argument.	  The	  utility	  of	  altruism	  for	  learning	  in	  this	  study	  is	  also	  emphasised	  by	  the	  significant	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  number	  of	  altruistic	  events	  that	  an	  individual	  received	  and	  their	  achievement	  rank.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   this	   altruistic	   giving	   enhances	   learning	   in	   a	   number	   of	  ways.	   It	   may	  make	   individuals	   aware	   of	   the	   rewards	   that	   are	   available	   in	   the	  puzzlebox,	   scaffolding	   the	   learning	   of	   the	   individual	   (Hoppitt	   et	   al.,	   2008).	  Altruistic	  giving	  may	  also	  be	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  prosocial	  behaviours	  in	  which	  individuals	   are	   cooperating	   with	   one	   another,	   in	   which	   both	   are	   sharing	  motivations	  and	  goals	  and	  assisting	  one	  another	  to	  solve	  a	  task	  (Carpenter,	  2006;	  Tomasello	   &	   Moll,	   2010).	   The	   high	   level	   of	   manipulations	   conducted	   with	  another	   individual	   in	   proximity	   (92%)	   suggests	   that	   children	   are	   able	   to	  cooperate	  at	  the	  puzzlebox,	  without	  monopolising	  it.	  There	  were	  rare	  examples	  of	  children	  stating	  phrases	  such	  as	  ‘It	  is	  your	  turn	  now’	  to	  another	  individual	  and	  moving	  to	  allow	  another	  child	  access	  to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox.	  The	  evolution	  of	  increased	  levels	  of	  cooperation	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  have	  allowed	  humans	  to	  solve	   more	   complex	   tasks,	   to	   extend	   their	   zone	   of	   latent	   solutions,	   and	   the	  evolution	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  (Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	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  It	  would	  be	  particularly	  enlightening	  to	  investigate	  the	  level	  of	  altruism	  observed	  in	  children	  when	  tested	  with	  food	  rewards	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  stickers.	  The	   use	   of	   stickers	   with	   children,	   rather	   than	   food	   rewards	   as	   with	   the	   non-­‐human	  primates,	  was	  a	  stipulation	  of	  the	  nursery	  schools	  and	  ethics	  committee.	  Stickers	   are	   regularly	   used	   as	   rewards	   for	   children	   in	   psychology	   experiments	  and	   have	   proved	   desirable	   enough	   to	   motivate	   children	   to	   attempt	   to	   solve	  similar	  puzzleboxes	  (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Hopper	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Whiten	  &	  Flynn,	  2010).	  The	  widespread	  occurrence	  of	  scrounging	  children	  suggests	  that	  the	  stickers	  were	  regarded	  as	  a	  high-­‐value	  reward	  by	  the	  children.	  However,	   ideally	   children	  would	   be	   tested	   using	   high-­‐value	   food	   rewards	   that	  they	   could	   consume	   immediately	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   more	   direct	   comparison	   with	  other	  species.	  	  	  The	   number	   of	   scrounging	   events	   an	   individual	   perpetrated	   was	   significantly	  correlated	   with	   their	   achievement	   rank.	   Also	   positively	   correlated	   was	   the	  number	   of	   scrounging	   events	   to	   which	   an	   individual	   fell	   victim	   and	   their	  achievement	  rank.	  Neither	  of	  these	  positive	  correlations	  supports	  hypothesis	  5,	  that	   scrounging	   inhibits	   learning.	   Scrounging	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   affect	  learning,	   although	   not	   necessarily	   in	   a	   positive	   direction.	   Some	   studies	   have	  reported	  that	  those	   individuals	  that	  were	  able	  to	  scrounge	  from	  demonstrators	  performed	  better	  in	  subsequent	  testing	  of	  a	  novel	  foraging	  task	  than	  individuals	  that	   had	   not	   been	   able	   to	   scrounge	   (Midford	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Caldwell	   &	  Whiten,	  2003).	   However,	   other	   researchers	   have	   found	   that	   scrounging	   hindered	   the	  learning	  of	  observers	  and	  those	  that	  were	  not	  able	  to	  scrounge	  performed	  better	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at	   tasks	   than	   scroungers	   (Giraldeau	  &	   Lefebvre,	   1987;	   Beauchamp	  &	  Kacelnik,	  1991).	  The	  evidence	  from	  the	  experiment	  reported	  in	  this	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  both	   scrounging	   and	   being	   scrounged	   from	   affect	   the	   performance	   of	   an	  individual.	  As	  both	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  number	  of	  manipulations	  of	  the	   puzzlebox	   that	   an	   individual	   performed,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   number	   of	  scrounging	   events	  perpetrated	  and	   received	  are	   a	   function	  of	   each	   individuals’	  interaction	   with	   the	   puzzlebox.	   Nevertheless,	   we	   may	   consider	   what	   these	  findings	  may	  mean;	  scrounging	  may	  have	  provided	  some	  scaffolded	  learning	  for	  individuals,	  allowing	  them	  to	  see	  the	  rewards	  that	  are	  available	  and	  maintaining	  their	   interest	   in	   the	   puzzlebox,	   thus	   facilitating	   social	   learning	   (Beauchamp	   &	  Kacelnik,	  1991;	  Caldwell	  &	  Whiten,	  2003).	  The	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	   scrounging	   events	   to	   which	   an	   individual	   fell	   victim	   and	   their	   achievement	  rank,	  suggests	  that	  individuals	  did	  not	  ‘play	  dumb’	  (Drea	  &	  Wallen,	  1999)	  when	  scrounged	   from,	   but	   continued	   to	   manipulate	   the	   puzzlebox	   and	   find	   more	  stickers.	   Indeed,	   the	   result	   suggests	   that	   individuals	   were	   spurred	   on	   to	   gain	  more	  stickers	  when	  they	  were	  scrounged	  from.	  	  	  We	  now	  move	  on	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  social	  rank	  plays	  a	  role	   in	  the	  capacity	   of	   cumulative	   culture.	   There	   was	   no	   effect	   of	   rank	   on	   the	   number	   of	  	  puzzlebox	   manipulations	   individuals	   performed.	   However,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	  that	  the	  power	  of	  this	  analysis	  was	  low	  and	  the	  assignment	  of	  rank	  to	  children	  is	  different	  to	  that	  used	  with	  the	  capuchins	  or	  chimpanzees.	  The	  measure	  of	  rank	  in	  children	  has	  frequently	  been	  different	  to	  that	  measured	  in	  other	  animal	  species,	  usually	   based	   upon	   popularity	   rather	   than	   competitive	   ability	   (Coie	   &	  Kupersmidt,	  1983;	  Dodge,	  1983).	  The	  social	  rank	  of	  children	  in	  this	  experiment	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was	   based	  mostly	   on	   personality	   traits	   as	   judged	   by	   teachers,	   rather	   than	   the	  competitive	  rank.	  The	  use	  of	  teachers	  to	  assign	  rank	  to	  children	  has	  been	  used	  by	  other	   researchers	   (Flynn	   &	   Whiten,	   2010;	   Whiten	   &	   Flynn,	   2010).	   However,	  these	  researchers	  used	  an	  explicit	  competitive	  question	  ‘Which	  child	  would	  win	  in	   a	   confrontation	   over	   a	   toy?’,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   question	   used	   in	   this	  experiment	  ‘which	  child	  will	  use	  the	  puzzlebox	  most?’.	  The	  choosing	  of	  questions	  when	  measuring	   rank	   indirectly	  must	   be	   carefully	   considered,	   with	   the	   direct	  measurement	  of	  rank	  being	  preferable.	  The	  use	  of	  a	  purely	  competitive	  ranking	  in	  children,	  however,	  may	  not	  be	  the	  most	  accurate	  measure	  of	  rank.	  Studies	  on	  roles	  in	  bullying	  have	  shown	  that	  children	  that	  defect	  from	  social	  norms,	  such	  as	  stealing	   from	   other	   individuals,	   are	   unpopular	   within	   the	   group	   and	  consequently	  have	  a	  low	  status	  within	  those	  groups	  (Salmivalli	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  The	  effect	   of	   rank	   in	   children	   in	   the	   learning	   tasks	   is	   not	  well	   explored	   due	   to	   the	  small	  number	  of	  experiments	  that	  have	  been	  carried	  out.	  Although	  rank	  has	  been	  found	   to	   be	   positively	   correlated	   with	   number	   of	   task	   manipulations	   in	   some	  experiments	  (Flynn,	  pers.	  comm.),	  this	  is	  not	  consistently	  true.	  Whiten	  and	  Flynn	  (2010)	   trained	  high-­‐ranking	   children	   as	   demonstrators,	   but	   found	   that	   despite	  their	   rank	   and	   experience	   with	   the	   puzzlebox,	   they	   did	   not	   manipulate	   the	  puzzlebox	   first,	   rather	   several	   other	   children	   were	   able	   to	   use	   the	   puzzlebox	  before	   them.	  Whilst	   there	  was	   no	   effect	   of	   rank	   in	   the	   experiment	   reported	   in	  this	   thesis,	   this	   may	   reflect	   the	   system	   chosen	   to	   measure	   rank.	   There	   is	   no	  consensus	   on	   how	   to	   best	   define	   rank	   for	   child	   learning	   experiments,	   with	  indirect	   measures	   being	   favoured,	   and	   an	   emphasis	   on	   popularity	   as	   well	   as	  competitive	   rank	   (Whiten	   &	   Flynn,	   2010).	   Whilst	   the	   results	   reported	   here	  attempted	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  rank	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  children	  to	  monopolise	  a	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resource,	  the	  question	  asked	  to	  teachers	  in	  assessing	  rank	  may	  not	  have	  probed	  the	   competitive	   ability	   of	   the	   child	   explicitly	   enough.	   There	   also	   exists	   the	  possibility	   that	   small	   groups	   did	   not	   allow	   for	   much	   variation	   in	   rank	   within	  them,	  groups	  may	  have	  consisted	  of	  children	  of	  not	  substantially	  different	  ranks.	  	  	  	  No	   effect	   was	   found	   regarding	   the	   amount	   of	   attention	   paid	   to	   individuals	   of	  different	  ranks	  when	  interacting	  with	  the	  puzzlebox.	  As	  in	  other	  chapters,	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  should	  be	  voiced	  here,	  as	  the	  presence	  in	  proximity	  of	  individuals	  was	  used	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  their	  attention.	  Thus	  the	  level	  of	  attention	  individuals	  paid	  to	  one	   another	   may	   not	   be	   perfectly	   correlated	   with	   their	   proximity	   to	   the	  puzzlebox.	   A	   large	   percentage,	   92%,	   of	   manipulations	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   were	  carried	  out	  with	  another	   individual	   in	  proximity.	  This	  suggests	   that	   individuals	  were	  highly	   tolerant	  of	  others	   in	  proximity	   to	   them,	  allowing	  observers	   to	  gain	  visual	   access	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   individuals	   manipulating	   the	   puzzlebox,	   thus	  increasing	   the	   chance	   for	   social	   learning	   (Coussi-­‐Korbel	   &	   Fragaszy,	   1995).	  Whilst	  the	  same	  reservations	  over	  the	  rank	  of	  children	  should	  be	  noted	  here,	  the	  very	  high	   level	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  with	  another	   in	  proximity	  suggests	  that	  most	  of	  the	  manipulations	  performed	  by	  most	   individuals	  were	  performed	  with	   others	   in	   proximity,	  which	  would	   imply	   that	   even	   if	   the	   rank	   assessment	  were	  more	  	  accurate	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  that	  a	  relationship	  of	  attention	  to	  individuals	  according	  to	  rank	  would	  be	  found.	  A	  useful	  follow-­‐up	  to	  this	  investigation	  would	  be	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  gaze	  of	  children	  to	  assess	  what	  they	  are	  looking	  at	  and	  whether	   they	   are	   following	   the	   exact	   actions	   of	   the	   individual	   performing	   the	  task.	  Any	  differences	  between	   the	  attention	  paid	   to	  different	   individuals	   in	   the	  population	  could	  then	  be	  investigated	  using	  this	  data.	  
	   219	  
	  The	   fact	   that	  14	  children	  were	  able	   to	  solve	  stage	   two	  and	   twelve	  solved	  stage	  three	  of	   the	  puzzlebox	  provides	  evidence	   that	  children	  are	  not	  conservative,	   in	  that	  they	  do	  not	  simply	  stick	  to	  the	  first	  solution	  that	  they	  find,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  continues	  to	  offer	  a	  reward	  to	  them,	  and	  do	  not	  satisfice	  once	  they	  have	  attained	  a	  reward	  of	  any	  type.	  The	  number	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  by	  children	  in	  the	  scaffolded	  condition	  after	  the	  group	  could	  no	  longer	  gain	  a	  reward	  at	  stage	  one,	  and	   at	   the	   corresponding	   time	   for	   groups	   in	   the	   open	   condition,	   were	   not	  significantly	   different.	   This	   suggests	   that	   children	   were	   not	   satisficing	   and	  settling	  for	  the	  first	  reward	  that	  they	  found,	  but	  were	  instead	  continuing	  to	  seek	  higher	   rewards.	   The	   ability	   of	   individuals	   to	   modify	   behaviour	   patterns,	   thus	  creating	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  over	  generations	  that	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  any	  one	  individual	   can	   create,	   is	   regarded	   as	   a	   hallmark	   of	   human	   culture	   (Boyd	   &	  Richerson,	  1985;	  Basalla,	  1988;	  Tomasello,	  1994).	  This	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  if	  humans	  were	   conservative	   in	   the	  actions	   they	  used	  or	   satisficed,	   accepting	   the	  first	   reward	   they	   gained.	   The	   results	   from	   this	   experiment	   are	   consistent	  with	  those	   from	   Whiten	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   who	   also	   found	   that	   children	   were	   able	   to	  modify	  their	  behaviour	  in	  an	  experimental	  setting	  to	  gain	  a	  greater	  reward	  from	  a	  puzzlebox	  and	  did	  not	  simply	  stick	  to	  the	  first	  solution	  that	  they	  discovered.	  	  Finally,	   it	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   in	  one	  group	  of	   children	  no	  participants	   solved	  the	  puzzlebox	  and	  another	  group,	  in	  the	  scaffolded	  condition,	  did	  not	  qualify	  as	  having	   solved	   the	   first	   stage	   to	   progress	   to	   the	   second	   stage.	   These	   results	  contrast	  markedly	  with	   other	   species	   in	  which	   all	   but	   one	   of	   the	   chimpanzees	  and	  15	  out	  of	  22	  capuchins	  learned	  to	  solve	  stage	  one.	  	  Shyness	  in	  children	  of	  an	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unfamiliar	  experimenter	  and	  neophobia	  of	   the	  puzzlebox	  may	  partially	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  manipulations	  in	  some	  groups.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  chimpanzees	  and	  capuchins	   studied,	   who	   live	   in	   colonies	   that	   regularly	   take	   part	   in	   a	   range	   of	  extractive	  foraging	  experiments	  (capuchins-­‐	  e.g.	  Ramseyer	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Dindo	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  	  chimpanzees-­‐	  e.g.	  Hopper	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Price	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Brosnan	  et	  al.,	  2010b),	  the	  children	  had	  not	  taken	  part	   in	  similar	  experiments.	  Whilst	  being	  in	  proximity	   to	   the	   puzzlebox,	   shyness	   or	   neophobia	   may	   have	   inhibited	   the	  children	   from	   closely	   approaching	   or	   manipulating	   the	   puzzlebox.	   Whilst	  shyness	   or	   neophobia	   are	   individual	   traits	   (Kagan	   et	   al.,	   1988),	   a	   group	  conformity	  effect	  may	  operate	  (Asch,	  1955),	  whereby	  if	  one	  child	  does	  not	  step	  forward	  and	  operate	  the	  puzzlebox,	  others	  will	  also	  refrain	  from	  doing	  so.	  In	  the	  group	   that	   did	   not	   solve	   the	   puzzlebox	   at	   any	   stage,	   all	   of	   the	   children	  participated	  in	  a	  spontaneous	  game	  involving	  the	  cups	  that	  they	  had	  been	  given	  to	   store	   any	   stickers	   that	   they	   found.	   This	   game,	  which	   involved	   throwing	   the	  cup	   and	   chasing	   it,	   was	   started	   when	   one	   child	   dropped	   their	   cup	   and	   soon	  spread	  throughout	  the	  entire	  group.	  The	  rapid	  spread	  of	  the	  game	  suggests	  that	  the	   other	   children	   learned	   this	   behaviour	   through	   social	   learning	   (Boyd	   &	  Richerson,	   1985).	   As	   there	   was	   no	   explicit	   reward	   for	   this	   behaviour	   it	   was	  probably	   copied	   for	   social	   reasons	   (Uzgiris,	   1981;	   Nielsen,	   2006).	   The	   game	  provided	   an	   alternative,	   possibly	   socially	   learned,	   function	   of	   the	   trials	   for	  children	  which	   distracted	   them	   from	   use	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	  with	   another	   social	  activity.	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Conclusions:	  
	  Children	  in	  this	  experiment	  were	  able	  to	  solve	  the	  higher	  stages	  of	  the	  puzzlebox.	  This	  performance	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  several	  different	  factors,	  including	  teaching,	  complex	  communication,	  altruistic	  giving	  and	  imitation,	  resulting	  in	  the	  same	   four	   hypotheses	   being	   supported	   here	   as	   with	   the	   capuchins	   and	  chimpanzees.	   These	   processes	   have	   been	   hypothesised	   to	   indicate	   an	   ‘other-­‐regarding’	   tendency	   in	   individuals	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   individuals	   to	   share	  motivations	  and	  goals.	  The	  resulting	   	   increased	  cooperation	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	   be	   the	   key	   driver	   of	   cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello,	   1999;	   Tomasello	   et	   al.,	  2005;	   Carpenter,	   2006).	   The	   evidence	   from	   the	   experiment	   reported	   in	   this	  chapter	   is	   consistent	   with	   that	   theory.	   Although	   the	   methods	   used	   to	   rank	  children	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  results	  for	  social	  effects	  on	  performance,	  taken	  as	   a	   whole,	   the	   results	   do	   not	   indicate	   a	   strong	   role	   for	   social	   rank	   effects	   in	  cumulative	   culture	   in	   children.	   It	   should	   be	  noted	  here	   that	   these	   children	   are	  Western	   children	   in	   a	   learning	   environment,	   that	   is,	   a	   nursery.	   The	   use	   of	  Western	   children	   in	   learning	   experiments	   has	   been	   questioned	   by	   some	  researchers	  (Boesch,	  2007;	  Boesch,	  2008).	  Whilst	  there	  have	  been	  relatively	  few	  cross-­‐cultural	   experiments,	   those	   that	   have	   taken	   place	   have	   found	   little	  difference	  between	   the	  cognitive	  capacities	  of	  different	  populations	  (Tomasello	  &	   Call,	   2008;	   Nielsen	   &	   Tomaselli,	   2010).	   Whilst	   certain	   processes	   are	  significantly	   correlated	  with	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   children,	   a	   comparison	   of	  their	   importance	   across	   the	   different	   species	   is	   required	   to	   allow	   analysis	   of	  which	  may	  be	  implicated	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  cumulative	  culture.	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CHAPTER	  SEVEN	  
COMPARATIVE	  ANALYSES	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  
	  Each	   species	   has	   been	   examined	   separately.	   In	   this	   final	   chapter	   comparative	  analyses	  will	  be	  performed	  on	   those	  hypotheses	   for	  which	   there	   is	  evidence	  of	  differences	   between	   species.	   The	   chapter	   will	   then	   conclude	   with	   a	   general	  discussion	  of	   the	   results	   in	   light	  of	   the	  hypotheses	   that	  have	  been	  proposed	   to	  explain	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  non-­‐human	  animals.	  	  	  
Methods:	  
	  
Achievement	  rank:	  Achievement	   rank	   has,	   thus	   far,	   been	  measured	   on	   a	   species-­‐by-­‐species	   basis,	  with	   the	   rank	   depending	   upon	   the	   stage	   reached	   and	   the	   successful	  manipulations	   at	   that	   stage.	   For	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   individuals	  across	  all	  species,	  this	  process	  was	  repeated,	  but	  ranking	  individuals	  against	  all	  other	  individuals,	  irrespective	  of	  species.	  	  
Hypothesis	  1:	  The	  occurrence	  of	  active	  teaching	  was	  compared	  across	  species.	  The	  number	  of	  active	   teaching	   events,	   as	   detailed	   in	   chapters	   4-­‐6,	   were	   compared	   across	   the	  three	  species	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis.	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Hypothesis	  3:	  The	   difference	   between	   the	   rate	   of	  matching	   and	   non-­‐matching	  manipulations	  performed	   by	   individuals	   of	   the	   three	   different	   species,	   in	   the	   minute	   after	   a	  more	  informed	  individual	  left	  proximity,	  was	  compared	  across	  the	  species.	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  4:	  The	  number	  of	  altruistic	  acts	  performed	  by	   individuals	  of	  different	  species	  was	  compared	  across	  species.	  The	  proportion	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  with	  other	  individuals	  in	  proximity	  was	  also	  compared	  between	  species.	  	  
Results:	  	  
General	  results:	  There	  were	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  mean	  achievement	  rank	  of	  each	  species	   (ANOVA:	  F2,125=	  9.81,	  p=0.0001,	   figure	  7.1).	  A	  post-­‐hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	   test	  indicated	   that	   the	   mean	   achievement	   rank	   of	   children	   (mean=	   83.54)	   was	  significantly	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   chimpanzees	   (mean=	   59.86,	   p=0.005)	   and	  capuchins	   (mean=	   42.09,	   p=0.0001),	   but	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	  between	  chimpanzees	  and	  capuchins	  (p=0.11).	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  Figure	  7.1:	  The	  mean	  achievement	  rank	  (±	  standard	  error)	  of	  individuals	  across	  species.	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  Figure	  7.2:	  The	  mean	  number	  of	   instances	  of	   active	   teaching	   (±	   standard	  error)	   carried	  out	  by	  each	  individual,	  according	  to	  species.	  	  	  
































	   226	  
	  Figure	   7.3:	   Mean	   difference	   (±	   standard	   error)	   of	   matching	   and	   non-­‐matching	   manipulations	  performed	  by	  individuals	  in	  the	  minute	  following	  the	  departure	  of	  another	  individual.	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Table	  7.1:	  Summary	  of	  findings	  across	  species	  for	  all	  hypotheses.	  
Hypotheses	   Capuchins	   Chimpanzees	   Children	   Hypothesis	  
supported?	  
1.	  A	  lack	  of	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  hinders	  ratcheting.	  	   No	  direct	  teaching	  events.	  Mother⎯juvenile-­‐	  offspring	  	  dyads	  	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  reached	  a	  different	  achievement	  rank	  than	  mother	  
⎯adult-­‐offspring	  dyads.	  	  
No	  direct	  teaching	  events.	  Individuals	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  scrounge	  from	  their	  juvenile	  offspring	  than	  from	  their	  mother.	  	  No	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  achievement	  rank	  by	  mother⎯juvenile-­‐offspring	  dyads	  and	  mother⎯adult-­‐offspring	  dyads	  
Active	  teaching,	  with	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  teaching	  events	  received	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  	  	  
Supported	  
2.	  Lack	  of	  complex	  communication	  system	  facilitating	  pedagogy	  in	  non-­‐humans	  hinders	  ratcheting.	  	  
Few	  food	  calls	  emitted.	  No	  increase	  in	  recruitment	  following	  calls.	  
Few	  food	  calls	  emitted.	  No	  increase	  in	  recruitment	  following	  calls.	   All	  instances	  of	  teaching	  involved	  vocalization	  and	  significant	  correlation	  between	  the	  number	  of	  teaching	  events	  received	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  	  
Supported	  
3.	  Lack	  of	  imitation	  in	  non-­‐humans	  hinders	  ratcheting.	  	   Did	  not	  match	  recently	  observed	  actions.	  	   Did	  not	  match	  recently	  observed	  actions	   Matched	  recently	  observed	  actions	  and	  significant	  correlation	  between	  proportion	  of	  matching	  manipulations	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  
Supported	  
4.	  Lack	  of	  pro-­‐sociality	  in	  non-­‐human	  primate	  individuals	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations.	  	  
No	  voluntary	  donation	  of	  rewards.	  	   No	  voluntary	  donation	  of	  rewards.	  	  	  
Frequent	  voluntary	  donation	  of	  rewards	  and	  significant	  relationship	  between	  gifts	  received	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  
Supported	  
5.	  Scrounging	  or	  being	  scrounged	  from,	  hinders	  learning.	  	   No	  correlation	  between	  scrounging	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  Positive	  correlation	  between	  number	  of	  times	  scrounged	  from	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  	  	  
Positive	  correlation	  between	  scrounging,	  and	  number	  of	  times	  scrounged	  from,	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  	  	  
Positive	  correlation	  between	  scrounging,	  and	  number	  of	  times	  scrounged	  from,	  and	  achievement	  rank.	  	  	  
Not	  supported	  
6.	  Dominants	  monopolise	  resources	  preventing	  low	  rankers	  from	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  task.	  	  
High-­‐	  &	  mid-­‐rankers	  used	  the	  puzzlebox	  significantly	  more	  than	  low-­‐rankers	  in	  2007,	  but	  not	  in	  2008.	  
Low-­‐	  and	  mid-­‐rankers	  used	  the	  puzzlebox	  significantly	  more	  than	  high-­‐rankers.	   No	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  number	  of	  manipulations	  performed	  by	  low-­‐	  and	  high-­‐rankers	  
Not	  supported	  
7.	  Lack	  of	  attention	  to	  low	  rankers	  and/or	  juveniles	  hinders	  diffusion.	  	  
No	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  attention	  paid	  to	  	  individuals	  of	  different	  ranks	  or	  age.	  
No	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  attention	  paid	  to	  individuals	  of	  different	  ranks	  or	  age.	  
No	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  attention	  paid	  to	  individuals	  of	  different	  ranks.	  	  
Not	  supported	  
8.	  Non-­‐human	  animals	  are	  conservative	  and	  satisfice.	  	   Individuals	  performed	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  non-­‐conservative	  manipulations.	  
Receiving	  rewards	  at	  all	  stages	  did	  not	  hinder	  performance	  relative	  to	  scaffolded	  condition.	  Individuals	  performed	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  non-­‐conservative	  manipulations.	  
Receiving	  rewards	  at	  all	  stages	  did	  not	  hinder	  performance	  relative	  to	  scaffolded	  condition.	  Individuals	  performed	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  non-­‐conservative	  manipulations.	  
Not	  supported	  
9.	  Lack	  of	  ability	  to	  assess	  if	  another’s	  solution	  is	  better	  than	  one’s	  own	  hinders	  ratcheting.	  
Proportion	  of	  stage	  1	  rewards	  for	  which	  scrounging	  was	  tolerated	  is	  significantly	  higher	  than	  for	  stage	  2	  rewards.	  
No	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  proportion	  of	  rewards	  for	  which	  scrounging	  was	  tolerated	  at	  each	  stage.	  	  All	  instances	  of	  ‘termiting’	  behaviour	  occurred	  at	  the	  highest	  stage.	  
Proportion	  of	  stage	  1	  and	  stage	  2	  rewards	  for	  which	  scrounging	  was	  tolerated	  significantly	  higher	  than	  stage	  3	  rewards.	  	  
Not	  supported	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Discussion:	  
	  Whether	  we	  consider	  each	  species	  in	  isolation,	  as	  in	  chapters	  4-­‐6,	  or	  make	  direct	  comparisons	   between	   species,	   the	   same	   four	   explanations	   for	   the	   lack	   of	  cumulative	   culture	   in	   non-­‐human	   animals	   are	   supported,	   with	   non-­‐human	  primates	   showing	   a	   lack	   of	   teaching,	   complex	   communication,	   imitation	   and	  prosociality.	   These	   abilities	   have	   been	   proposed	   to	   operate	   as	   a	   ‘package’	   of	  processes	   that	   can	   all	   be	   classified	   as	   other-­‐regarding,	   that	   is,	   they	   function	   to	  affect	   other	   individuals,	   usually	   positively	   (Tomasello,	   1999;	   Tomasello	   et	   al.,	  2005;	   Tomasello	   &	   Moll,	   2010).	   These	   abilities	   help	   to	   transmit	   information	  between	  individuals	  with	  high	  fidelity,	  including	  modifications	  to	  cultural	  traits.	  The	  argument	  that	  they	  underpin	  cumulative	  culture	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  strong	  positive	  relationship	  between	  each	  of	   these	  and	  achievement	  rank.	   Individuals’	  level	   of	   performance	   in	   this	   cumulative	   learning	   task	  was	   positively	   related	   to	  the	  amount	  of	  teaching,	  verbal	  instruction	  and	  altruistic	  acts	  they	  received,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  imitation	  they	  performed.	  	  	  Children	  actively	  taught	  other	  individuals	  how	  to	  operate	  the	  puzzlebox,	  giving	  verbal	   instructions	   and	   pointing	   to	   manipulandi,	   whereas	   chimpanzees	   and	  capuchins	  did	  not.	  There	  was	  also	  no	  evidence	  for	  other	  forms	  of	  teaching,	  such	  as	  scaffolding,	  in	  either	  the	  chimpanzees	  or	  the	  capuchins.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  reported	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  callitrichid	  monkeys	  for	  which	  there	  is	  some	  suggestive	  evidence	  (Hoppitt	  et	  al.,	   2008;	   Thornton	   &	   Raihani,	   2008).	   Boesch	   (1991)	   reported	   findings	   of	  mothers	   scaffolding	   the	   learning	   of	   their	   juvenile	   offspring	  when	   nut-­‐cracking.	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However	   Boesch’s	   study	   was	   entirely	   observational,	   with	   no	   experimental	  manipulation;	   most	   reviews	   of	   the	   literature	   have	   therefore	   regarded	   the	  evidence	   as	   equivocal,	   with	   inadvertent	   social	   learning	   remaining	   a	   more	  parsimonious	  explanation	  (Caro	  &	  Hauser,	  1992;	  Hoppitt	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Thornton	  &	  Raihani,	  2008).	  There	  are	  however,	  reports	  of	  teaching	  in	  a	  few,	  taxonomically	  diverse,	  non-­‐human	   species,	   including	  meerkats	   (Thornton	  &	  McAuliffe,	   2006),	  pied	  babblers	   (Raihani	  &	  Ridley,	   2008)	   and	   ants	   (Franks	  &	  Richardson,	   2006).	  Some	  researchers	  argue	  that	  whilst	  these	  reports	  of	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐humans	  are	  compelling,	  there	  are	  keys	  differences	  between	  the	  type	  of	  teaching	  reported	  in	  humans	   and	   non-­‐humans	   (Csibra,	   2007;	   Premack,	   2007).	   These	   researchers	  argue	  that	  the	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐human	  species	  is	  limited	  to	  individual	  behavioural	  traits	  in	  each	  species,	  rather	  than	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  traits	  as	  in	  humans,	  and	  is	   qualitatively	   different	   in	   structure	   to	   teaching	   in	   humans.	   The	   teaching	   of	  skills,	  rather	  than	  declarative	  information	  such	  as	  the	  location	  of	  a	  food	  resource	  or	   nest,	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   be	   key	   to	   human	   teaching	   (Csibra,	   2007;	  Leadbeater	   &	   Chittka,	   2007),	   although	   evidence	   from	   meerkats	   arguably	  suggests	   that	   other	   species	   are	   also	   capable	   of	   teaching	   skills	   (Thornton	   &	  McAuliffe,	  2006).	  Human	  teaching	  is	  often	  also	  regarded	  as	  being	  uniquely	  active,	  that	   is,	   a	   teacher	   actively	   instructs	   the	   pupil,	   rather	   scaffolding	   the	   learning	  opportunities	  of	  that	  individual	  (Premack,	  2007).	  Reports	  of	  teaching	  in	  humans	  sometimes	   stress	   the	   low	   level	   of	   active	   teaching	   that	   occurs	   in	   non-­‐Western	  communities	   (de	   Waal,	   2002;	   MacDonald,	   2007;	   Tehrani	   &	   Riede,	   2008).	  However,	  Tehrani	   and	  Riede	   (2008)	   found	   that	   Iranian	   children	   in	   rug-­‐making	  apprenticeships	  were	  usually	  taught	  by	  scaffolding,	  but	  active	  teaching	  did	  occur	  when	   the	   apprentice	   needed	   correcting.	   Thus,	   it	   appears	   that	   although	   human	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cultures	   differ	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   actively	   teach,	   it	   is	   not	   a	   uniquely	  Western	  practice.	  	  	  The	  active	  teaching	  performed	  by	  children	  in	  this	  experiment	  demonstrates	  the	  flexibility	  of	   teaching	   in	  humans.	  Children	  had	   interacted	  with	   the	   task	   for	   less	  than	  two	  and	  a	  half	  hours,	  few	  were	  related	  to	  one	  another	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  there	  were	  fitness	  costs	  for	  not	  learning	  to	  use	  the	  puzzlebox.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	   children	   were	   reliant	   upon	   a	   general	   teaching	   competence,	   rather	   than	   a	  specific	  adaptation	  for	  a	  single	  situation,	  as	  may	  be	  the	  case	  in	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐human	   species	   (Premack,	   2007).	   The	   teaching	   in	   this	   experiment	   is	   also	  consistent	   with	   teaching	   having	   a	   social	   function	   in	   children,	   whereby	   they	  recognise	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  method	  of	  others	  and	  attempt	  to	  rectify	  the	  method	  (Tomasello,	   1999).	   Although	   teaching	   may	   appear	   altruistic,	   children	   that	  regularly	  share	  information	  and	  resources	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  more	  popular	  than	   those	   that	   do	   not	   or	   do	   so	   inconsistently	   (Coie	   et	   al.,	   1982;	   Coie	   &	  Kupersmidt,	  1983;	  Dodge,	  1983).	  Therefore	  those	  children	  that	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	   teach	   others	   may	   gain	   social	   status	   from	   passing	   on	   the	   information,	   or,	  alternatively,	  lose	  status	  by	  refusing	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  The	  apparent	  lack	  of	  teaching	  in	  most	  non-­‐human	  primates	  may	  be	  due	  to	  their	  competitive	  nature	  in	  learning	  tasks	  (Hare,	  2001;	  Hare	  &	  Tomasello,	  2004).	  This	  competitiveness	  has	  been	  proposed	   to	  be	   the	  reason	   that	  non-­‐human	  primates	  are	  not	  known	  to,	  for	  example,	  perform	  actions	  to	  alert	  others	  to	  the	  location	  of	  food	   using	   gestures,	   a	   mechanism	   by	   which	   one	   individual	   can	   teach	   another	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  food	  (Coussi-­‐Korbel,	  1994;	  Hirata	  &	  Matsuzawa,	  2001;	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Hare	  &	  Tomasello,	  2004).	  Many	  non-­‐humans	  have	  also	  not	  been	  found	  to	  learn	  to	  use	   human	   cues	   in	   an	   object-­‐choice	   paradigm	   easily,	   therefore	   failing	   to	  recognise	   when	   they	   have	   been	   taught	   (Anderson	   et	   al.,	   1995;	   Itakura	   et	   al.,	  1999).	   Competition	   between	   individuals	   may	   preclude	   most	   non-­‐human	  primates	   from	   the	   sharing	   of	  motivation	   and	   goals	   (Hare,	   2001).	  Without	   this	  shared	   intentionality,	   individuals	   will	   not	   be	   motivated	   to	   teach	   others	   in	   the	  wide	  range	  of	  circumstances	  that	  is	  observed	  in	  human	  populations	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	   2010).	   It	   is	   interesting,	   in	   this	  respect,	  that	  the	  best	  evidence	  for	  teaching	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  comes	  from	  callitrichid	  monkeys,	  which	  are	  cooperative	  breeders	  (Rapaport	  &	  Ruiz-­‐Miranda,	  2002;	  Rapaport,	  2006).	  	  The	  use	  of	  language	  to	  teach	  other	  individuals	  in	  the	  groups	  of	  children,	  coupled	  with	   a	   large	   number	   of	   vocal	   utterances	   throughout	   the	   experiment	   about	   a	  range	  of	  topics	  including	  the	  referencing	  of	  past	  and	  future	  events,	  illustrates	  the	  significance	   of	   vocalisations	   in	   human	   learning.	   Although	   a	   uniquely	   complex	  system	   of	   communication,	   the	   roots	   of	   human	   language	   are	   shared	  with	   other	  species	   and	   there	   are	   multiple	   reports	   of	   referential	   communication	   in	   non-­‐human	   primates	   (Seyfarth	   et	   al.,	   1980;	   Zuberbühler,	   2000b;	   Di	   Bitetti,	   2003;	  Slocombe	  &	  Zuberbühler,	  2005).	  	  	  Whilst	   food	   calls	   have	   been	   suggested	   to	   be	   referential	   in	   both	   chimpanzees	  (Slocombe	  &	  Zuberbühler,	  2005)	  and	  capuchins	  (Di	  Bitetti,	  2003),	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  individuals	  responded	  to	  the	  food	  calls	  of	  others	  in	  the	  experiment	  reported	   in	   this	   thesis.	   The	   rate	   at	   which	   individuals	   were	   recruited	   to	   the	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puzzlebox	  was	  not	  significantly	  higher	  following	  a	  food	  call	  from	  an	  individual	  at	  the	   puzzlebox	   than	   the	   baseline	   rate	   of	   arrivals	   during	   the	   trials.	   Therefore,	  although	  individuals	  may	  be	  able	  to	  recognise	  food	  calls,	  they	  are	  not	  using	  them	  as	  a	  signal	  about	  the	  availability	  of	  food	  and	  coming	  to	  the	  location	  of	  the	  call	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  obtain	  food.	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  analysis	  of	  the	  calls	  might	  reveal	  evidence	  for	  referential	  communications	  in	  these	  species,	  the	   low	   level	  of	   calling	  observed,	  and	   the	   lack	  of	   recruitment,	   renders	   it	  highly	  unlikely	   that	  extensive	   referential	   communication	  was	  utilised	  by	  capuchins	  or	  chimpanzees.	  	  Human	  vocal	  communication	  is	  structured	  with	  syntax	  that	  allows	  individuals	  to	  communicate	  to	  others	  specific	   intentions	  and	  complex	  behaviour	  patterns	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   less	   complex	   communication	   systems	   do	   not	   (Chomsky,	   1965;	  Tomasello,	  1999).	  Whilst	  some	  researchers	  argue	  that	  language	  is	  an	  ‘instinct’	  in	  humans	   (Pinker,	   1994),	   due	   to	   the	   complex	   social	   communication	   of	   humans,	  Tomasello	   (1999)	   argues	   that	   language	   evolved	   from	   other	   communicative	  abilities,	  such	  as	  gestures	  and	  simple	  vocalisations.	  In	  the	  experiment	  reported	  in	  this	   thesis,	   vocalisations	   were	   used	   in	   all	   instances	   of	   teaching,	   sometimes	  accompanied	  by	  a	  gesture.	  This	  supports	  the	  argument	  that	  language	  is	  a	  major	  factor	   allowing	   the	   instruction	   of	   exact	  methods	   and	   the	   spread	   of	   cumulative	  modifications	  between	  individuals	  in	  our	  species.	  	  	  A	   lack	   of	   imitation	   and	   observational	   learning	   mechanisms	   in	   non-­‐human	  primates	  has	  also	  been	  proposed	  to	  hinder	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations	  throughout	  the	  population.	  It	  is	  possible	  social	  learning	  may	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	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two	  capuchins	   that	  achieved	  stage	   two,	  as	  both	  adopted	  a	   ‘biting-­‐up’	   technique	  for	  the	  buttons,	  even	  though	  other	  individuals	  had	  been	  able	  to	  push	  the	  buttons,	  albeit	  not	   learning	   the	   full	   sequence	  of	  manipulations	   in	   the	  process.	  Likewise,	  social	  learning	  may	  have	  occurred	  in	  two	  groups	  of	  chimpanzees	  in	  which	  more	  than	  one	   individual	   learned	  to	  access	  stage	   two.	  However,	   this	   is	  hardly	  strong	  evidence	   and	   contrary	   to	   evidence	   for	   social	   learning	   in	   non-­‐cumulative	  puzzleboxes	   in	   chimpanzees	   (Whiten	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Whiten	   et	   al.,	   2007)	   and	  capuchins	   (Dindo	  et	  al.,	  2009),	   the	   technique	   for	  opening	  higher	  stages	  did	  not	  spread	   throughout	   the	   population.	   In	   contrast	   multiple	   children	   in	   five	   of	   the	  eight	   groups	   learned	   to	   solve	  higher	   stages.	   Children	  were	   found	   to	  match	   the	  actions	   of	   a	   knowledgeable	   demonstrator	   significantly	  more	   than	   chimpanzees	  and	   capuchins.	   Both	   non-­‐human	   species	   produced,	   on	   average,	   more	   non-­‐matching	  actions	  than	  matching	  actions	  and	  there	  was	  only	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	   the	   number	   of	   matching	   actions	   an	   individual	   performed	   and	   their	  achievement	  ranking	  in	  children.	  	  	  Galef	   (1992)	   and	   Tomasello	   (1994)	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   high	   fidelity	  transmission	  of	  actions	   is	   integral	   to	  cumulative	  culture,	  with	   individuals	  being	  able	  to	  copy	  the	  exact	  actions	  of	  others	  and	  not	  having	  to	  work	  out	  the	  actions	  for	   themselves	   based	   on	   cues	   learned	   from	   another	   individual.	   Therefore,	  pertinent	  information	  is	  far	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  lost	  allowing	  subsequent	  generations	  to	  continuously	  build	  upon	  the	  discoveries	  of	  others	   (Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Both	  the	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   proportion	   of	   matching	   actions	   and	  achievement	   rank	   and	   the	   observation	   that	   children	   performed	   significantly	  more	   matching	   actions	   than	   either	   chimpanzees	   or	   capuchins,	   supports	   the	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hypothesis	   that	   complex	   social	   learning	   is	   necessary	   for	   cumulative	   culture.	   If	  individuals	   are	   able	   to	   copy	   the	   exact	   actions	   of	   others,	   they	   do	   not	   have	   to	  ‘reinvent	   the	  wheel’	   at	   all	   stages,	   thus	   allowing	   higher	   fidelity	   of	   transmission	  including	  transmission	  of	  cumulative	  modifications	  (Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Whilst	  there	   is	   evidence	   for	   imitation	   in	   various	   non-­‐human	   animals	   (Hopper	   et	   al.,	  2007;	  Hoppitt	  &	  Laland,	  2008;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  the	  prevalence	  of	  imitation	  in	  humans	   is	   reported	   to	   be	  wider	   and	  more	   rapid,	   with	  more	   focus	   on	   copying	  actions	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  functional	  (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Herrmann	  et	  al.,	   2007;	   Nielsen	   &	   Tomaselli,	   2010).	   Moreover,	   imitation	   appears	   to	   have	   a	  social	  function,	  namely	  to	  be	  like	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  learning	  function	  in	  humans,	  increasing	   its	   potency	   (Uzgiris,	   1981;	   Horner	   &	   Whiten,	   2005;	   Nielsen,	   2006;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Therefore,	   the	  groups	  of	  children	  have	  two	  motivations	  to	  imitate	  one	  another	  in	  the	  experiment	  reported	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  gain	  rewards	   from	  the	  puzzlebox,	  whereas	   the	  second	   is	   to	  share	  goals	  and	  be	  like	  the	  others	  in	  the	  group.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  in	  the	  non-­‐human	  species	  there	   is	   only	   one	  motivation,	  which	   is	   to	   gain	   the	   reward	   by	  whatever	  means.	  Social	  learning	  mechanisms	  other	  than	  imitation	  allow	  the	  copying	  of	  results,	  or	  other	  features,	  but	  do	  not	  entail	  a	  replication	  of	  the	  means;	  therefore	  for	  children	  imitation	  must	  be	  used	  to	  gain	  social	  benefits,	  whereas	  in	  other	  species	  that	  are	  seeking	  only	  a	  reward,	  the	  use	  of	  other	  social	   learning	  mechanisms	  may	  suffice	  for	  that	  purpose.	  	  	  Prosociality	  has	  also	  been	  proposed	  to	  enable	  cooperation	  between	   individuals	  and,	   therefore,	   the	   sharing	   of	   motivations,	   supporting	   the	   evolution	   of	  cumulative	   culture	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	   2010).	   Prosocial	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tendencies	  were	   assessed	   in	   this	   thesis	   by	  measuring	   the	   number	   of	   altruistic	  acts	   that	   individuals	   performed	   and	   also	   the	   proportion	   of	  manipulations	   that	  were	  performed	  with	  other	  individuals	  in	  proximity.	  	  	  In	   total,	   children	   performed	   215	   altruistic	   acts,	   with	   47%	   of	   children	   giving	  another	  individual	  a	  reward	  that	  they	  had	  found	  and	  53%	  of	  children	  receiving	  at	  least	  one	  sticker	  from	  another	  individual.	  Chimpanzees	  and	  capuchins	  did	  not	  perform	  any	  altruistic	  acts.	  Altruism	  has	  been	  argued	  to	  be	  much	  more	  prevalent	  and	   occur	   in	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   circumstances	   in	   humans	   than	   in	   non-­‐human	  primates	   (Fehr	   &	   Fischbacher,	   2003;	  Warneken	  &	   Tomasello,	   2009).	   Although	  both	   chimpanzees	   and	   capuchins	   have	   been	   found	   to	   act	   altruistically	  (Yamamoto	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Brosnan	   et	   al.,	   2010a;	   Lakshminarayanan	   &	   Santos,	  2010;	  Melis	  et	  al.,	  2010),	   the	  range	  of	   situations	   in	  which	  non-­‐human	  primates	  perform	   altruistic	   acts	   is	   narrower	   than	   in	   humans	   (Warneken	   &	   Tomasello,	  2009).	   Chimpanzees	   have	   been	   found	   to	   assist	   others	   only	  when	   their	   help	   is	  solicited,	  with	  the	  recipient	  harassing	  the	  subject	  (Yamamoto	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Melis	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  when	   the	  subject	   is	  not	  distracted	  by	  receiving	  a	   food	  reward	  itself	   (Silk	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Jensen	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   The	   results	   of	   the	   experiment	  reported	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  humans	  tend	  to	  be	  more	   altruistic	   than	   non-­‐human	   primates.	   Similarly	   children	   performed	   a	  significantly	  higher	  proportion	  of	  their	  manipulations	  with	  another	  individual	  in	  proximity	   to	   them	   than	   either	   chimpanzees	   or	   capuchins.	   This	   suggests	   that	  children	  are	  more	  tolerant	  of	  one	  another	  in	  proximity	  to	  the	  puzzlebox	  than	  are	  capuchins	   or	   chimpanzees,	   and	   provides	   the	   opportunity	   for	   them	   to	   behave	  cooperatively	   (here	   seen	   in	   altruistic	   donation	   of	   rewards	   and	   also	   teaching)	  
	   238	  
rather	   than	  competitively	   (Hare,	  2001).	  Altruism	  and	  cooperation	   indicate	   that	  individuals	  are	  able	   to	   recognise	   the	   intentions,	  motivations	  and	  goals	  of	  other	  individuals,	  recognising	  that	  they	  wish	  to	  gain	  a	  reward	  and	  assisting	  them	  with	  achieving	  that	  goal	  (Fehr	  &	  Fischbacher,	  2003;	  Warneken	  &	  Tomasello,	  2009).	  	  	  The	   results	   regarding	   prosociality	   also	   fit	   into	   the	   broader	   frame	   of	   other-­‐regarding	  tendencies	  in	  humans,	  that	  have	  already	  been	  discussed	  with	  respect	  to	   teaching,	   vocalisations	   and	   imitation.	   The	   evidence	   from	   capuchins,	  chimpanzees	  and	  children	  in	  this	  thesis	  consistently	  supports	  a	  lack	  of	  teaching,	  imitation,	  complex	  communication	  and	  prosociality	  in	  non-­‐humans	  as	  hindering	  cumulative	   culture.	   Therefore	   the	   results	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   arguments	  made	   by	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   (Tomasello,	   1999;	   Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  Herrmann	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Tomasello	  &	  Carpenter,	  2007;	  Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	  2010).	  These	  researchers	  argue	  that	  cumulative	  culture	  has	  evolved	  in	  humans	  because	  humans	   are	   able	   to	   regard	   others	   not	   just	   as	   intentional	   agents,	   but	   as	  cooperative	  agents	  with	  whom	  they	  share	  motivations	  and	  intentions	  (Tomasello	  &	  Moll,	   2010).	  Whilst	   chimpanzees	   and	   other	   non-­‐human	  primates	   can	   regard	  others	   as	   goal-­‐directed	   intentional	   agents,	   Tomasello	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   argue	   that	  humans	  are	  unique	  in	  understanding	  that	  others	  have	  emotions	  and	  motivations	  and	  in	  seeking	  to	  share	  them.	  This	  difference	   is	  supported	  by	  several	  empirical	  studies.	  For	  example,	  the	  failure	  of	  chimpanzees	  in	  higher-­‐order	  theory	  of	  mind	  tasks,	  such	  as	  the	  false	  belief	  test	  (Kaminski	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Herrmann	  et	  al.	  (2007;	  2010)	   presented	   a	   barrage	   of	   tests	   to	   children,	   chimpanzees	   and	   orangutans,	  testing	   physical	   and	   social	   aspects	   of	   cognition.	   They	   found	   that,	   whilst	  chimpanzees	   and	   orangutans	   performed	   as	   well	   as	   children	   in	   physical	   tasks,	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such	   as	   using	   a	   tool	   to	   retrieve	   an	   out-­‐of-­‐reach	   reward,	   children	   significantly	  outperformed	   chimpanzees	   and	   orangutans	   in	   social	   tasks,	   such	   as	   gaze	  following.	  Whilst	  the	  results	  from	  Herrmann	  et	  al’s	  experiments	  have	  suggested	  that	   the	  difference	   in	  cognition	  between	  humans	  and	  non-­‐human	  primates	   is	  a	  difference	   in	   social	   cognition,	   rather	   than	   physical	   cognition,	   the	   experiment	  presented	   in	   this	   thesis	   explicitly	   tests	   this	   hypothesis	   in	   a	   cumulative	   setting.	  The	   results	   suggest	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   other-­‐regarding	   behaviour	   (teaching,	  complex	  communication,	  imitation	  as	  a	  social	  function	  and	  prosociality)	  in	  non-­‐human	   primates	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   reported	   cumulative	   culture.	  Therefore,	   a	   gap	   in	   social	   cognition	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   lack	   of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  non-­‐humans.	  	  There	   were	   five	   hypotheses	   that	   were	   not	   supported	   by	   the	   data	   from	   the	  experiment	   presented	   in	   this	   thesis.	   There	   were	   three	   social	   hypotheses:	   that	  scrounging	   would	   hinder	   learning	   and	   therefore	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   cumulative	  modifications;	   that	   dominant	   individuals	   would	   monopolise	   the	   puzzlebox	  inhibiting	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations;	  and	  the	  there	  would	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  attention	  paid	  to	  low	  ranking	  individuals	  also	  inhibiting	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  innovations.	   In	   chimpanzees	   and	   children,	   the	   number	   of	   times	   an	   individual	  scrounged	  from	  another	  was	  found	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated	  with	  achievement	  rank,	  running	  contrary	  to	  the	  prediction	  that	  scrounging	  would	  hinder	  learning;	  in	   capuchins	   there	   was	   no	   correlation.	   In	   all	   species,	   the	   number	   of	   times	   an	  individual	  was	   the	  victim	  of	   scrounging	  was	  also	  positively	  correlated	  with	   the	  individual’s	  achievement	  rank,	  suggesting	  that	  being	  the	  victim	  of	  scrounging	  did	  not	  hinder	  learning.	  In	  previous	  studies	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  scrounging	  on	  individuals’	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learning,	   there	   have	   been	   mixed	   results	   with	   some	   experiments	   reporting	   a	  positive	   effect	   of	   scrounging	   on	   learning	   (Midford	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Caldwell	   &	  Whiten,	   2003),	   but	   others	   reporting	   that	   scrounging	   hindered	   learning	  (Giraldeau	   &	   Lefebvre,	   1987;	   Beauchamp	  &	   Kacelnik,	   1991).	   However,	   for	   the	  hypothesis	   to	   be	   supported	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   occurrence	   of	   scrounging	   in	  different	  species	  would	  need	  to	  have	  been	  found,	  with	  scrounging	  from	  others,	  or	  being	   the	   victim	   of	   scrounging,	   being	   found	   to	   hinder	   learning	   in	   non-­‐human	  primates,	   but	   not	   in	   children.	   As	   both	   the	   number	   of	   scrounging	   events	   an	  individual	   perpetrated	   and	   fell	   victim	   to	   were	   positively	   correlated	   with	   the	  achievement	   rank	   of	   individuals	   in	   all	   species,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   predicted	  negative	  correlation,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  from	  this	  experiment	  that	  scrounging	  hinders	  the	  spread	  of	  cumulative	  cultural	  traits.	  	  	  Dominant	   individuals	  have	  been	  proposed	   to	  monopolise	   resources,	   restricting	  the	   number	   of	   individuals	   with	   the	   chance	   to	   solve	   a	   task	   and,	   therefore,	   the	  chance	  of	   innovations	  (Coussi-­‐Korbel	  &	  Fragaszy,	  1995;	  Lavallee,	  1999).	  Whilst	  high-­‐	   and	   mid-­‐ranking	   capuchins	   performed	   significantly	   more	   manipulations	  than	   low-­‐ranking	   capuchins	   in	   2007	   only,	   in	   the	   chimpanzee	   groups,	   low-­‐	   and	  mid-­‐ranking	  individuals	  performed	  significantly	  more	  manipulations	  than	  high-­‐rankers.	   In	  children	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  number	  of	  manipulations	   performed	   by	   low-­‐	   and	   high-­‐ranking	   individuals.	   For	   the	  hypothesis	   to	   be	   supported	   there	   would	   have	   to	   be	   a	   consistent	   pattern	   of	  monopolisation	  by	  dominants	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  and	  no	  monopolisation	  by	  high-­‐ranking	  children.	  Although	  high-­‐ranking	  capuchins	  were	  able	  to	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  significantly	  more	  in	  2007,	  as	  low-­‐	  and	  mid-­‐ranking	  chimpanzees	  
	   241	  
perform	  significantly	  more	  manipulations	  than	  high-­‐ranking	  chimpanzees	  there	  is	   no	   consistent	   pattern	   in	   the	   non-­‐human	   primate	   species.	   Low-­‐ranking	  capuchins	  also	  had	  significantly	   lower	  achievement	   ranks	   than	   	  mid-­‐	  and	  high-­‐ranking	   capuchins,	   running	   contrary	   to	   the	   prediction	   that	   low-­‐ranking	  individuals	  are	  more	  innovative.	  Therefore	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  not	  supported.	  	  	  A	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	   low-­‐ranking	   individuals	   has	   been	   proposed	   to	   hinder	  learning	   from	   sections	   of	   the	   population,	   thus	   inhibiting	   the	   spread	   of	   any	  cumulative	   innovations	   (Nicol	   &	   Pope,	   1999;	   Biro	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   In	   none	   of	   the	  species	   was	   there	   a	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   attention	   paid	   to	  individuals	   of	   different	   rank	   categories,	   as	   measured	   by	   the	   number	   of	  manipulations	   performed	   with	   another	   in	   proximity.	   As	   there	   is	   a	   consistent	  pattern	   across	   all	   three	   species	   in	   the	   experiment,	   the	   hypothesis	   is	   not	  supported.	  	  Some	   researchers	   have	   proposed	   that	   non-­‐human	   animals	   might	   satisfice,	  sticking	   to	   the	   first	   solution	   that	   they	   discover,	   even	  when	   a	   potentially	  more	  rewarding	   solution	   might	   be	   available	   to	   them	   (Marshall-­‐Pescini	   &	   Whiten,	  2008).	  Similarly,	  some	  researchers	  have	  claimed	  that	  other	  apes	  are	  conservative	  and	   stick	   to	   the	   first	   solution	   that	   they	   find,	   even	   if	   it	   no	   longer	   rewards	   them	  (Hrubesch	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   If	   individuals	   are	   conservative	   or	   satisfice,	   cumulative	  modifications	   will	   not	   enter	   the	   population,	   preventing	   cumulative	   culture	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009).	   In	  the	  experiment	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis,	  capuchins	  and	  chimpanzees,	   in	   addition	   to	   children,	   continued	   to	   perform	   non-­‐conservative	  manipulations	   (that	   is,	   any	   manipulation	   that	   is	   not	   directed	   towards	   the	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puzzlebox	  doors)	  at	  a	  rate	  significantly	  more	  than	  zero	  after	  they	  had	  learned	  the	  solution	   for	   the	   first	  stage.	  Therefore,	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  non-­‐human	  primates	  are	   conservative	   is	  not	   supported.	  This	   suggests	   that	  animals	   in	  all	   species	  are	  continuing	  to	  explore	  the	  puzzlebox	  and,	  contrary	  to	  the	  prediction,	  non-­‐human	  primates	  are	  not	  acting	  conservatively.	  While	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  slight	  reduction	  in	   non-­‐conservative	   actions	   following	   learning	   cannot	   be	   ruled	   out,	   clearly	  significant	   numbers	   of	   non-­‐conservative	   actions	   continue	   to	   be	   performed.	  Therefore,	  even	   if	  chimpanzees	  or	  capuchins	  possess	  a	  weak	  tendency	  towards	  satisficing,	  this	  could	  not	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  these	  species.	  As	  there	  was	  only	  one	  group	  of	  capuchins	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	   species	   satisficed	   in	   the	   experiment	   presented	   in	   this	   thesis.	   However,	  comparing	   the	   manipulations	   of	   chimpanzees	   and	   children	   in	   open	   and	  scaffolded	   conditions,	   there	   was	   no	   evidence	   of	   satisficing.	   Individuals	   in	  scaffolded	  conditions	  did	  not	  manipulate	  the	  puzzlebox	  significantly	  more	  when	  they	  no	  longer	  received	  a	  food	  reward	  at	  the	  lowest	  stage,	  than	  did	  individuals	  in	  the	   open	   condition	   at	   the	   equivalent	   time	   as	  would	   be	   predicted	   if	   individuals	  satisficed.	  Therefore,	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  not	  supported.	  	  The	   hypothesis	   that	   non-­‐humans	   are	   unable	   to	   assess	   if	   another’s	   reward	   is	  better	   than	   one’s	   own	   can	   only	   be	   partly	   addressed	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Pre-­‐trial	  reward	  preference	  testing	  demonstrates	  that	  individuals	  have	  clear	  preferences	  for	   some	   rewards	   over	   others.	   Similarly,	   the	   ‘termiting’	   behaviour	   observed	   in	  chimpanzees,	   in	   which	   a	   twig	   was	   inserted	   into	   olfactory	   holes	   of	   the	   highest	  stage	  food	  reward,	  but	  not	  into	  the	  olfactory	  holes	  at	  lower	  stages,	  suggests	  that	  chimpanzees	   were	   able	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   food	   rewards	   that	   were	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available	   in	   the	  puzzlebox	  at	  each	  stage.	   It	  may	  be	  predicted	   that	   if	   individuals	  are	   able	   to	   assess	   higher-­‐level	   rewards	   as	   more	   desirable,	   they	   will	   scrounge	  them	   more	   often.	   The	   pattern	   of	   scrounging	   observed	   did	   not	   follow	   this	  prediction.	   In	   capuchins	   and	   children	   a	   significantly	   greater	   proportion	   of	  rewards	   were	   scrounged	   from	   lower	   stages	   than	   from	   the	   highest	   stage,	   in	  chimpanzees	   there	   was	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   proportion	   of	  rewards	   that	   were	   scrounged	   at	   each	   stage.	   This	   result	   runs	   contrary	   to	   the	  prediction	  across	  all	   species.	  There	   is	  no	  evidence	   that	   children	  were	  better	  at	  identifying	   the	   rewards	  extracted	  by	  others	  more	  effectively	   than	  chimpanzees	  or	   capuchins.	   However,	   another	   possibility	   is	   that	   the	   children	   and	   capuchins	  recognised	  the	  value	  of	  the	  higher-­‐level	  rewards	  they	  obtained	  immediately,	  and	  were	  more	  protective	  of	  them,	  reducing	  scrounging	  opportunities	  for	  others,	  as	  a	  consequence.	   The	   evidence	   from	   the	   ‘termiting’	   behaviour	   of	   chimpanzees,	  suggests	   that	   they	  are	  able	   to	  distinguish	  between	  rewards	  when	   they	  were	   in	  the	   puzzlebox.	   There	   is,	   therefore,	   no	   evidence	   of	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   ability	   of	  children	   and	   the	   non-­‐human	   species	   to	   distinguish	   between	   rewards	   during	  experimental	  trials.	  	  
Future	  research	  directions	  
	  In	  the	  discussions	  of	  chapters	  4,	  5	  and	  6,	  I	  have	  detailed	  some	  future	  directions	  that	   would	   improve	   the	   evidence	   presented	   in	   this	   thesis.	   However,	   in	   this	  section	   I	   will	   outline	   some	   further	   investigations	   that	   stem	   from	   ideas	   in	   this	  thesis.	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  The	  dissection	  of	  cumulative	  learning	  in	  children	  Achievement	   rank	   in	   children	   in	   the	   experiment	   presented	   in	   this	   thesis	   was	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  number	  of	  teaching	  events	  an	  individual	  received,	  vocal	   teaching	   events	   individuals	   received,	   the	   number	   of	   altruistic	   acts	  individuals	   received	   and	   the	   proportion	   of	   matching	   actions	   an	   individual	  performed.	  Whilst	   these	  may	   represent	   a	   suite	   of	   other-­‐regarding	   behavioural	  processes	   that	   act	   together	   to	   enable	   individuals	   to	   share	   motivations	   and	  intentions	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   some	   researchers	   have	   proposed	   that	   one	  process	  may	   be	  more	   important	   than	   others,	   for	   example	   pedagogy	   (Csibra	   &	  Gergely,	   2006).	   In	   a	   similar	   manner	   to	   that	   with	   which	   Caldwell	   and	   Millen	  (2009)	   have	   dissected	   which	   social	   learning	  mechanisms	   are	   required	   for	   the	  cumulative	  learning	  of	  their	  paper	  airplane	  task,	  controlling	  the	  information	  that	  children	   receive	   would	   allow	   an	   assessment	   of	   which	   of	   the	   four	   positively	  correlated	  processes	  was	  required	  for	  cumulative	  learning	  in	  children	  and	  which	  has	  the	  largest	  effect	  on	  the	  cumulative	  learning	  of	  children.	  Alternatively,	  more	  data	  collection	  with	  the	  same	  task	  design	  would	  allow	  generalised	  linear	  mixed	  models	   (GLMM’s)	   to	   be	   performed,	   allowing	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   these	  factors	  to	  be	  teased	  out	  statistically.	  	  A	   dyadic	   design,	   in	  which	   the	   experimenter	   demonstrates	   a	   task	   solution	   to	   a	  child,	  has	  been	  used	  in	  a	  range	  of	  social	   learning	  experiments	  (e.g.	  Nagell	  et	  al.,	  1993;	   Whiten	   et	   al.,	   1996;	   Horner	   &	   Whiten,	   2005).	   With	   this	   design	   the	  experimenter	  can	  control	  the	  information	  that	  the	  subject	  receives.	  After	  having	  been	   told	   that	   they	  were	   going	   to	  be	   able	   to	  play	  with	   the	  puzzlebox,	   children	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would	   receive	   one	   of	   four	   experimental	   demonstrations,	   plus	   a	   no-­‐demonstration	  control:	  (i) Verbal	   	   and	   gestural	   teaching	   condition:	   The	   demonstrator	   would	  instruct	   children	   how	   to	   open	   the	   puzzlebox	   verbally,	   using	   phrases	  such	   as	   “to	   get	   the	   sticker,	   push	   this	   button”	   whilst	   simultaneously	  performing	  the	  actions.	  	  (ii) Verbal	  teaching	  condition:	  The	  demonstrator	  would	  instruct	  children	  how	   to	   open	   the	   puzzlebox	   using	   verbal	   instructions,	   but	   no	   actions	  would	  be	  performed.	  (iii) Inadvertent	   social	   learning	   condition:	   The	   demonstrator	   would	  perform	  the	  actions	  required	  to	  open	  the	  puzzlebox	  to	  the	  final	  stage,	  but	  give	  no	  verbal	  instructions	  to	  the	  subject.	  (iv) Altruistic	   condition:	   The	   demonstrator	   would	   obscure	   the	   subject’s	  vision	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   by	   standing	   between	   the	   subject	   and	   the	  puzzlebox	   facing	   the	   puzzlebox,	  without	  manipulating	   the	   puzzlebox	  (so	  as	  not	  to	  give	  any	  oral	  cues)	  the	  demonstrator	  would	  then	  turn	  and	  present	  the	  subject	  with	  the	  sticker	  rewards.	  	  These	   conditions	   would	   be	   compared	   to	   one	   another	   and	   to	   the	   no-­‐demonstration	  control	   to	  examine	   the	  stage	   reached	  and	  achievement	   ranks	  of	  the	   children	   in	   the	   condition.	   Obviously,	   such	   a	   procedure	   would	   not	   be	  appropriate	  for	  capuchins	  and	  chimpanzees.	  	  
A	  developmental	  approach	  to	  childrens’	  cumulative	  learning	  This	  thesis	  employs	  a	  comparative	  approach	  to	  investigate	  the	  factors	  underlying	  a	  capacity	  for	  cumulative	  culture,	  however,	  developmental	  approaches	  have	  also	  
	   246	  
been	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  cognition	  as	  children	  age	  to	  assess	  the	   effect	   that	   culture	   has	   on	   their	   cognitive	   skills	   (Carpenter	   et	   al.,	   1998;	  Nielsen,	  2006;	  McGuigan	  et	   al.,	   2007;	  Moll	  &	  Tomasello,	  2007).	   It	   is	  during	   the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  life	  that	  Tomasello	  (1999)	  has	  proposed	  the	  social	  cognition	  of	  children	  develops,	  due	  to	  the	  human-­‐specific	  cultural	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  are	  raised.	  Supporting	  this	  hypothesis,	  Nielsen	  (2006)	  found	  that	  children	  tended	  to	  increase	  in	  copying	  actions,	  rather	  than	  outcomes,	  through	  their	  second	  year;	  12-­‐month-­‐olds	  tending	  to	  focus	  upon	  outcomes	  and	  24-­‐month-­‐olds	  focussing	  on	  actions,	  with	  18-­‐month-­‐olds	  performing	  at	  an	  intermediate	  level.	  	  Taking	  a	  developmental	  approach,	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  simple	  cumulative	  task	  to	   12-­‐,	   18-­‐	   and	   24-­‐month-­‐olds	   would	   allow	   an	   assessment	   of	   how	   the	  development	  of	  social	  cognition,	  as	  proposed	  throughout	  the	  second	  year,	  alters	  children’s	   cumulative	   learning	   ability.	   To	   ensure	   that	   the	   solution	   was	  introduced	  to	  all	  of	  the	  groups,	  it	  would	  be	  pertinent	  to	  train	  a	  demonstrator	  to	  the	  highest	  stage	  and	  then	  reintroduce	  them	  to	  a	  group	  of	  their	  contemporaries.	  The	   spread	   of	   the	   cumulative	   solutions	   of	   the	   puzzlebox	   would	   be	   recorded,	  along	  with	  any	  instances	  of	  teaching,	  altruism	  and	  verbal	  instructions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   occurrence	   of	   imitation.	   As	   children	   move	   through	   their	   second	   year,	   the	  effects	   of	   social-­‐cognitive	   changes	  would	   be	   predicted	   to	   cause	  more	   teaching,	  altruism,	  complex	  communication	  and	  an	  increased	  reliance	  on	  imitation,	  rather	  than	   other	   forms	   of	   social	   learning.	   By	   presenting	   the	   puzzlebox	   to	   control	  children	  with	  no	  training	  and	  assessing	  their	  performance,	  the	  effect	  of	  changes	  in	  physical	  cognition	  with	  age	  could	  be	  partialled	  out	  in	  the	  analysis.	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Investigation	   of	   cumulative	   learning	   with	   alternative	   puzzleboxes	   or	   reward	  
structures	  Social	   learning	   in	   captive	   non-­‐human	   primates	   has	   been	   investigated	   using	   a	  variety	  of	  puzzleboxes	  (Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Whiten	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  however	  there	  are	   few	  experiments	  using	  cumulative	  puzzleboxes.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  only	  the	  experiment	  detailed	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  that	  of	  Marshall-­‐Pescini	  and	  Whiten	  (2008;	  Whiten	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   have	   used	   cumulative	   puzzleboxes.	   Both	   of	   these	  experiments	   have	   found	   the	   same	   results	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   spread	   of	  cumulative	  solutions	  in	  chimpanzees	  and	  children.	  However,	  it	  remains	  possible	  that	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  these	  puzzleboxes	  prevents	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  cumulative	   solutions.	   Therefore,	   repeating	   the	   experiment	  with	  puzzleboxes	   of	  other	  designs	  would	  help	  to	  validate	  the	  results	  from	  these	  two	  studies.	  	  	  Increasing	  the	  parity	  of	  rewards	  between	  the	  species	  would	  also	  aid	  analysis	  of	  results.	  The	  use	  of	  desirable	   food	  rewards	   in	  experiments	  with	  children,	  rather	  than	   stickers,	   may	   provide	   different	   results	   with	   respect	   to	   cooperation	   and	  competitiveness.	  Due	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  parents,	  schools	  and	  ethics	  committees,	  it	  may,	  however,	  prove	  difficult	  to	  run	  experiments	  with	  children	  that	  use	  food	  as	  immediate	  reward.	  A	  possible	  solution	  to	  this	  would	  be	  to	  give	  children	  cups,	  as	  with	  the	  experiment	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Children	  could	  then	  collect	  the	  food	  for	  eating	  later,	  under	  supervision	  of	  teachers	  or	  parents.	  Although	  this	  would	  not	  give	  the	  immediate	   food	   reward	   used	   in	   the	   nonhuman	   primate	   experiments,	   it	   would	  allow	   an	   assessment	   of	  whether	   food	   elicits	   a	   different	   response	   to	   stickers	   in	  children.	   Giving	   healthy,	   but	   desirable	   foods,	   such	   as	   grapes,	  may	   also	   help	   to	  alleviate	  the	  concerns	  of	  parents	  and	  teachers.	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  Social	  learning	  experiments	  with	  non-­‐human	  primates	  have	  generally	  used	  food	  as	   a	   reward	   (Watson	   &	   Caldwell,	   2009).	   However,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that,	   in	  altruism	   experiments,	   if	   a	   chimpanzee	   can	   receive	   food	   itself	   it	   is	   likely	   to	  disregard	   any	   consequences	   for	   a	   potential	   recipient	   (Jensen	   et	   al.,	   2006).	  Therefore,	   an	   alternative	   reward	   structure	   in	   non-­‐humans	   would	   also	   be	  valuable	  to	  investigate.	  It	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  motivate	  animals	  in	  an	  experiment	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  food	  at	  all.	  However,	  using	  a	  token	  that	  could	  be	  exchanged	  for	   food	   rewards,	   as	   in	   the	   recent	   experiments	   by	   Horner	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   and	  Bonnie	  (2007),	  may	  elicit	  different	  responses	  in	  non-­‐humans,	  as	  any	  food	  reward	  is	   delayed	   and	   indirect.	   A	   token	   reward	   would	   allow	   some	   assessment	   of	  whether	   direct	   food	   rewards	   inhibit	   cooperation,	   and	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  cooperation	  is	  required	  also	  inhibit	  	  cumulative	  culture,	  in	  non-­‐humans.	  	  
Different	  types	  of	  cumulative	  culture	  In	  some	  research	  conducted	  on	  humans,	   improvements	   in	  efficiency	  have	  been	  investigated	   as	   cumulative	   culture.	   Kirby	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   found	   an	   increase	   in	  structure	   and,	   therefore,	   increase	   in	   efficiency	   of	   transmission	   of	   an	   artificial	  language	  across	  experimental	  generations.	  Flynn	  (2008)	  found	  imitation	  of	  non-­‐functional/irrelevant	   actions	   decreased	   along	   transmission	   chains	   of	   children,	  potentially	  increasing	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  children	  at	  gaining	  rewards	  from	  the	  puzzlebox.	   However,	   in	   non-­‐human	   species	   cumulative	   culture	   has	   generally	  been	  regarded	  as	  the	  addition	  of	  beneficial	  modifications	  to	  a	  behaviour	  pattern	  (Boesch,	   2003;	   Hunt,	   2003;	   Marshall-­‐Pescini	   &	   Whiten,	   2008)	   rather	   than	   an	  increase	  in	  efficiency	  through	  the	  stream-­‐lining	  of	  behaviour.	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  It	   is	  not	  clear	   that	   the	  addition	  of	  modifications	  to	   increase	  the	  complexity	  of	  a	  behavioural	   trait	   and	   cumulative	   increases	   in	   efficiency	   should	   necessarily	  covary.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   there	   are	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   species	   that	   are	   able	   to	  increase	   the	   efficiency	  of	   a	   behavioural	   trait,	   there	   could	  be	   substantial	   fitness	  costs	   to	   making	   behavioural	   traits	   such	   as	   food	   processing	   more	   efficient.	  Therefore	   it	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   investigate	   the	   occurrence	   of	   cumulative	  improvements	  in	  efficiency	  or	  structure,	  across	  experimental	  generations	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates,	  using	  a	  transmission	  chain	  design.	  However	  care	  would	  need	  to	  be	   taken	   in	   experimental	   design	   to	   ensure	   efficiencies	   can	   be	   made	   over	  generations,	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  first	  animal	  in	  the	  chain.	  The	  relative	  reliance	  of	  non-­‐human	   primates	   on	   social	   learning	  mechanisms	   that	   focus	   on	   results	   and	  object	  affordance	  learning,	  rather	  than	  imitation	  of	  exact	  motor	  actions	  (Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005),	  might	  mean	  that	   the	   first	   individual	   in	  the	  chain	  may	  remove	  any	  unnecessary	  actions	  and,	  therefore,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  scope	  for	  cumulative	  improvement	  along	  the	  chain.	  However,	  robust	  training	  of	  the	  founder	  individual	  could	  circumvent	  this	  problem.	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Concluding	  remarks	  
	  The	  results	  of	  the	  experiment	  described	  in	  this	  thesis	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  it	   is	   a	   uniquely	   advanced	   social	   cognition	   that	   explains	   the	   occurrence	   of	  cumulative	  culture	  in	  humans	  (Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Whilst	  other	  species	  have	  been	  observed	  to	  have	  behavioural	  traditions,	  the	  complexity	  of	   human	   culture	   far	   exceeds	   that	   of	   other	   species,	   with	   complex	   technology,	  social	  institutions,	  and	  values	  and	  knowledge	  handed	  down	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  the	  next	  (Feldman	  &	  Laland,	  1996;	  Richerson	  &	  Boyd,	  2005).	  	  	  Using	   a	   cumulative	   puzzlebox,	   evidence	   was	   found	   for	   the	   occurrence	   of	  teaching,	   imitation,	   complex	   communication	   and	   prosociality	   in	   groups	   of	  children,	   but	   not	   in	   groups	   of	   capuchins	   and	   chimpanzees.	   Furthermore,	   these	  processes	  were	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  performance	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  groups	  of	  children.	  Five	  further	  hypotheses	  were	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  data	  from	   the	   experiment.	   These	   include	   the	   ‘social’	   hypotheses	   that	   scrounging	  would	   hinder	   the	   spread	   of	   cumulative	   traits	   in	   non-­‐human	   primates,	   that	  dominant	   individuals	   would	   monopolise	   the	   puzzlebox	   hindering	   cumulative	  innovations	   in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  and	   that	   low-­‐ranking	  non-­‐human	  primates	  would	   receive	   no	   attention	   hindering	   the	   spread	   of	   cumulative	   modifications.	  The	   two	   remaining	   unsupported	   hypotheses	   were	   more	   cognitive:	   that	   non-­‐human	   primates	   satisfice	   or	   behave	   conservatively	   and	   that	   non-­‐human	  primates	  are	  unable	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  reward	  of	  another	  individual	  is	  better	  than	  the	  reward	  they	  are	  receiving.	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This	   is	  one	  of	   the	   first	  comparative	  studies	   to	  examine	   the	  social	  and	  cognitive	  factors	  hypothesised	  to	  the	  underlie	  the	  capacity	  for	  cumulative	  culture	  using	  a	  cumulative	  experimental	  paradigm.	  Human	  cumulative	  culture	  has	  ratcheted	  up	  over	   many	   generations	   and,	   in	   most	   cases,	   is	   not	   bound	   by	   an	   upper	   limit	   of	  achievement	   as	   it	   is	   in	   this	   experiment.	   By	   comparing	   species	   using	   a	   much	  simpler	  cumulative	  paradigm	  than	  is	  observed	  in	  most	  human	  cultural	  traits,	  an	  assessment	   of	   the	   factors	   underlying	   cumulative	   culture	   is	   possible.	   This	  experiment	   found	   that	   the	   difference	   was	   in	   social	   cognition,	   supporting	   the	  position	   advanced	   by	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   1993;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005)	   that	   ‘human	  social	   learners	   focus	   to	  a	  much	   greater	   degree	   than	   other	   non-­‐human	   primates	   on	   the	   actual	   actions	  performed	   by	   others…[and]…	   that	   uniquely	   human	   forms	   of	   cooperation…	  teaching	  and	  norms	  of	  conformity	  contribute	   to	   the	  cultural	  ratchet’	   (Tennie	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  pg.	  2413).	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